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Montezuma Edition

HISTORY OF THE REIGN

OF

Ferdinand and Isabella

THE CATHOLIC

of W. H. Prescott

BY

WILLIAM H. PRESCOTT

EDITED BY

WILFRED HAROLD MUNRO

PROFESSOR OF EUROPEAN HISTORY IN BROWN UNIVERSITY

WITH COMPLETE THE NOTES OF THE EDITION BY
JOHN FOSTER KIRK

Quæ surgere regna
Conspicio tali!
Virgil, Æneid, iv. 47

Nomen, fama, famaque et imperi
Nomen, majestas ab Euro
usque ad Occiduum cubile
Idem, Georg. iv. 15

VOL. III

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1826 314

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Page 314

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Horat. Carm. iv. 15

VOL. III

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CONTENTS OF VOL. III

PART II

THE PERIOD WHEN, THE INTERIOR ORGANIZATION OF THE MONARCHY HAVING BEEN COMPLETED, THE SPANISH NATION ENTERED ON ITS SCHEMES OF DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST; OR THE PERIOD ILLUSTRATING MORE PARTICULARLY THE FOREIGN POLICY OF FERDINAND AND ISABELLA

CHAPTER I

ITALIAN WARS—GENERAL VIEW OF EUROPE—INVASION OF ITALY BY CHARLES VIII. OF FRANCE

	PAGE
Foreign Politics directed by Ferdinand	3
Europe at the Close of the Fifteenth Century	4
Character of the reigning Sovereigns	5
Improved Political and Moral Condition	6
More intimate Relations between States	7
Foreign Relations conducted by the Sovereign	8
Italy the School of Politics	9
Her most powerful States	10
Character of Italian Politics	11
Internal Prosperity	13
Intrigues of Sforza	15
Charles VIII. of France	15
His Pretensions to Naples	16
Negotiations respecting Roussillon	18
Charles's Counsellors in the Pay of Ferdinand	20
Treaty of Barcelona	20
Its Importance to Spain	21
Alarm at the French Invasion, in Italy	22
In Europe, especially in Spain	23
Preparations of Charles	24
An Envoy sent to the French Court	25
Announces Ferdinand's Views	25
Charles's Dissatisfaction	27
The French cross the Alps	27
Italian Tactics	29
The Swiss Infantry	30

PAGE
French Artillery 32
Sforza jealous of the French 33
The Pope confers the Title of Catholic 34
Naval Preparations in Spain 35
Second Mission to Charles VIII. 35
Bold Conduct of the Envoys 36
The King of Naples flies to Sicily 38
The French enter Naples 39
General Hostility to them 40
League of Venice 41
Zurita's Life and Writings 44

CHAPTER II

Italian Wars—Retreat of Charles VIII.—Campaigns of Gonsalvo de Cordova—Final Expulsion of the French

Conduct of Charles 47
Plunders the Works of Art 48
Retreat of the French 49
Gonsalvo de Cordova 52
His Early Life 52
His brilliant Qualities 53
Raised to the Italian Command 56
Arrives in Italy 56
Lands in Calabria 57
Marches on Seminara 58
Gonsalvo's Prudence 59
Battle of Seminara 61
Defeat of the Neapolitans 61
Gonsalvo retreats to Reggio 62
Ferdinand recovers his Capital 64
Gonsalvo in Calabria 66
His Successes 67
Decline of the French 67
Besieged in Atella 70
Gonsalvo surprises Laino 71
Arrives before Atella 72
Receives the Title of Great Captain 73
Beats a Detachment of Swiss 74
Capitulation of Montpensier 76
Miserable State of the French 77
Death of Ferdinand of Naples 78
Accession of Frederick II. 78
Total Expulsion of the French 79
Remarks on Guicciardini and Giovio 79
Sismondi 80

CHAPTER III

Italian Wars—Gonsalvo succors the Pope—Treaty with France—Organization of the Spanish Militia

PAGE
War on the Side of Roussillon 82
The Pope asks the Aid of Gonsalvo 84
Storming and Capture of Ostia 84
Gonsalvo enters Rome 85
His Reception by the Pope 85
Returns to Spain 86
Peace with France 87
Ferdinand's Views respecting Naples 88
His Fame acquired by the War 90
Influence of the War on Spain 92
Organization of the Militia 93

CHAPTER IV

Alliances of the Royal Family—Death of Prince John and Princess Isabella

Royal Family of Castile 96
Joanna Beltraneja 97
Marriage of the Princess Isabella 98
Death of her Husband 99
Alliances with the House of Austria 101
And that of England 101
Joanna embarks 105
The Queen's Anxiety 105
Margaret of Austria 106
Returns in the Fleet 107
Marriage of John and Margaret 108
Second Marriage of Princess Isabella 110
Sudden Illness of Prince John 110
His Death 111
His amiable Character 113
The King and Queen of Portugal visit Spain 114
Objections to their Recognition 115
Isabella displeased 117
Her Daughter's Death 118
Its Effects on Isabella 118
Prince Miguel's Recognition 121

CHAPTER V

Death of Cardinal Mendoza—Rise of Ximenes—Ecclesiastical Reform

PAGE
Death of Mendoza 122
His Early Life 123
And Character 124
His Amours 124
The Queen his Executor 126
Birth of Ximenes 127
He visits Rome 128
His Return and Imprisonment 129
Established at Siguenza 130
Enters the Franciscan Order 131
His severe Penance 131
His ascetic Life 132
He is made Guardian of Salzeda 133
Introduced to the Queen 134
Made her Confessor 134
Elected Provincial 135
Corruption of the Monasteries 136
Attempts at Reform 137
See of Toledo vacant 138
Offered to Ximenes 140
He reluctantly accepts 141
Characteristic Anecdotes of Ximenes 142
His austere Life 143
Reform in his Diocese 145
Example of his Severity 146
Reform of the Monastic Orders 146
Great Excitement caused by it 147
Visit of the Franciscan General 147
Insults the Queen 148
The Pope's Interference 149
Consents to the Reform 150
Its Operation and Effects 150
Alvaro Gomez, and Biographers of Ximenes 152

CHAPTER VI

Ximenes in Granada—Persecution, Insurrection, and Conversion of the Moors

Introductory Remarks 155
Ximenes, his Constancy of Purpose 157
Tranquil State of Granada 158

PAGE
Tendilla 158
Talavera 159
Archbishop of Granada 160
His mild Policy 160
The Clergy dissatisfied with it 162
Temperate Sway of the Sovereigns 162
Ximenes in Granada 164
His violent Measures 166
Destroys Arabic Books 167
Mischievous Effects 169
Revolt of the Albaycin 171
Ximenes besieged in his Palace 171
The Insurgents appeased by Talavera 173
Displeasure of the Sovereigns 175
Ximenes hastens to Court 175
Conversion of Granada 176
Applauded by the Spaniards 178

CHAPTER VII

Rising in the Alpujarras—Death of Alonso de Aguilar—Edict against the Moors

The Alpujarras 180
Rising of the Moors 181
Huejar sacked 182
Ferdinand marches into the Mountains 183
Carries Lanjaron 184
Punishment of the Rebels 184
Revolt of the Sierra Vermeja 186
Rendezvous at Ronda 188
Expedition into the Sierra 188
The Moors retreat up the Mountains 189
Return on the Spaniards 190
Alonzo de Aguilar 191
His Gallantry and Death 193
His noble Character 194
Bloody Rout of the Spaniards 194
Dismay of the Nation 196
The Rebels submit to Ferdinand 196
Banishment or Conversion 197
Commemorative Ballads 198
Melancholy Reminiscences 198
Edict against the Moors of Castile 202
Christianity and Mahometanism 204
Causes of Intolerance 205

PAGE
Aggravated in the Fifteenth Century 206
Effects of the Inquisition 206
Defects of the Treaty of Granada 208
Evasion of it by the Christians 209
Priestly Casuistry 210
Last Notice of the Moors in the Present Reign 211

CHAPTER VIII

Columbus—Prosecution of Discovery—His Treatment by the Court

Progress of Discovery 213
Misconduct of the Colonists 214
Complaints against Columbus 216
His Second Return 217
The Queen's Confidence in him unshaken 218
Honors conferred on him 220
His Third Voyage 222
Discovers *Terra Firma* 222
Mutiny in the Colony 222
Loud Complaints against Columbus 223
Bigoted Views in regard to the Heathen 225
More liberal Sentiments of Isabella 226
She sends back the Indian Slaves 228
Authority to Bobadilla 228
Outrage on Columbus 229
Deep Regret of the Sovereigns 230
Reception of Columbus 231
Vindication of the Sovereigns 232
Commission to Ovando 234
Groundless Imputations on the Government 235
The Admiral's Despondency 238
His Fourth and Last Voyage 240
Remarkable Fate of his Enemies 240

CHAPTER IX

Spanish Colonial Policy

Careful Provision for the Colonies 242
Liberal Grants 243
License for Private Voyages 244
Their Success 245
Indian Department 247

PAGE
Casa de Contratacion 248
Important Papal Concessions 248
Spirit of the Colonial Legislation 251
The Queen's Zeal for converting the Natives 252
Unhappily defeated 253
Immediate Profits from the Discoveries 255
Origin of the Venereal Disease 258
Moral Consequences of the Discoveries 261
Their Geographical Extent 262
Historians of the New World 264
Peter Martyr 264
Herrera 265
Muñoz 265

CHAPTER X

Italian Wars — Partition of Naples — Gonsalvo overruns Calabria

Louis XII.'s Designs on Italy 268
Politics of that Country 268
The French conquer Milan 269
Alarm of the Spanish Court 270
Remonstrance to the Pope 271
Boldness of Garcilasso de la Vega 271
Negotiations with Venice and the Emperor 272
Louis openly menaces Naples 273
Views of Ferdinand 275
Fleet fitted out under Gonsalvo de Cordova 277
Partition of Naples 277
Ground of Ferdinand's Claim 278
Gonsalvo sails against the Turks 281
Storming of St. George 281
Honors paid to Gonsalvo 284
The Pope confirms the Partition 285
Astonishment of Italy 285
Success and Cruelties of the French 287
Fate of Frederick 288
Gonsalvo invades Calabria 290
Invests Tarento 291
Discontents in the Army 291
Munificence of Gonsalvo 293
He punishes a Mutiny 294
Bolder Plan of Attack 295
Tarento surrenders 296
Perjury of Gonsalvo 297

CHAPTER XI

Italian Wars—Rupture with France—Gonsalvo besieged in Barleta

PAGE
Mutual Distrust of the French and Spaniards 300
Cause of Rupture 300
The French begin Hostilities 303
The Italians favor them 304
The French Army 306
Inferiority of the Spaniards 307
Gonsalvo retires to Barleta 309
Siege of Canosa 310
Chivalrous Character of the War 312
Tournament near Trani 312
Duel between Bayard and Sotomayor 314
Distress of the Spaniards 316
Spirit of Gonsalvo 317
The French reduce Calabria 317
Constancy of the Spaniards 318
Nemours defies the Spaniards 319
Rout of the French Rear-guard 320
Arrival of Supplies 321
Design on Ruvo 322
Gonsalvo storms and takes it 322
His Treatment of the Prisoners 324
Prepares to leave Barleta 324

CHAPTER XII

Italian Wars—Negotiations with France—Victory of Cerignola—Surrender of Naples

Birth of Charles V. 327
Philip and Joanna visit Spain 328
Recognized by Cortes 331
Philip's Discontent 332
Leaves Spain for France 333
Negotiates a Treaty with Louis XII. 334
Treaty of Lyons 335
The Great Captain refuses to comply with it 337
Marches out of Barleta 338
Distress of the Troops 339
Encamps before Cerignola 339
Nemours pursues 340

PAGE
The Spanish Forces 341
The French Forces 342
Battle of Cerignola 342
Death of Nemours 343
Rout of the French 344
Their Loss 345
Pursuit of the Enemy 346
D'Aubigny defeated 348
Submission of Naples 349
Triumphant Entry of Gonsalvo 349
Fortresses of Naples 350
Castel Nuovo stormed 351
Nearly all the Kingdom reduced 352

CHAPTER XIII

Negotiations with France—Unsuccessful Invasion of Spain—Truce

Treaty of Lyons 354
Rejected by Ferdinand 355
His Policy examined 356
Joanna's Despondency 360
First Symptoms of her Insanity 361
The Queen hastens to her 362
Isabella's Distress 363
Her Illness and Fortitude 364
The French invade Spain 364
Siege of Salsas 366
Isabella's Exertions 367
Ferdinand's Successes 369
Truce with France 371
Reflections on the Campaign 372
Impediments to Historic Accuracy 373
Speculative Writers 374

CHAPTER XIV

Italian Wars—Condition of Italy—French and Spanish Armies on the Garigliano

Melancholy Condition of Italy 376
Views of the Italian States 380
Of the Emperor 381
Great Preparations of Louis XII. 382
Death of Alexander VI. 384

PAGE
Electioneering Intrigues 385
Julius II. 387
Gonsalvo repulsed before Gaeta 388
Strength of his Forces 389
Occupies San Germano 390
The French encamp on the Garigliano 392
Passage of the Bridge 394
Desperate Resistance 394
The French resume their Quarters 396
Anxious Expectation of Italy 396
Gonsalvo strengthens his Position 398
Great Distress of the Army 398
Gonsalvo's Resolution 399
Remarkable Instance of it 399
Patience of the Spaniards 401
Situation of the French 401
Their Insubordination 402
Saluzzo takes the Command 402
Heroism of Paredes and Bayard 404

CHAPTER XV

Italian Wars—Rout of the Garigliano—Treaty with France—Gonsalvo's Military Conduct

Gonsalvo secures the Orsini 406
Assumes the Offensive 407
Plan of Attack 408
Consternation of the French 409
They retreat on Gaeta 410
Action at the Bridge of Mola 411
Hotly contested 412
Arrival of the Spanish Rear 412
The French routed 413
Their Loss 414
Gallantry of their Chivalry 415
Capitulation of Gaeta 416
Gonsalvo's Courtesy 418
Chagrin of Louis XII. 419
Suffering of the French 419
The Spaniards occupy Gaeta 420
Public Enthusiasm 421
Extortions of the Spanish Troops 422
Gonsalvo's Liberality to his Officers 423
Apprehensions of Louis XII. 424
Treaty with France 425

PAGE
Gallantry of Louis d'Ars 426
Causes of the French Failures 427
Review of Gonsalvo's Conduct 428
His Reform of the Service 429
Influence over the Army 431
His Confidence in their Character 432
Position of the Army 434
Results of the Campaigns 434
Memoirs of Gonsalvo de Cordova 435
French Chronicles 436

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

PAGE

Duel between Bayard and Sotomayor ..... *Frontispiece*

From a painting especially made for this edition by Maurice Orange.

Map for Gonsalvo de Cordova's Campaigns in Italy..... 47

Gonsalvo de Cordova (El Gran Capitan)..... 52

After the original at Madrid.

Philip the Handsome..... 106

After the painting by Jacob Jansz in the Brussels Museum.

Christopher Columbus received by Ferdinand and Isabella.. 218

After the painting by Tony Robert-Fleury.

Pope Julius II. 386

After the painting in the Uffizi Gallery at Florence.

PART II

1493–1517

The period when, the interior organization of the monarchy having been completed, the Spanish nation entered on its schemes of discovery and conquest; or the period illustrating more particularly the foreign policy of Ferdinand and Isabella

REIGN OF FERDINAND AND ISABELLA

CHAPTER I

ITALIAN WARS—GENERAL VIEW OF EUROPE—INVASION OF ITALY BY CHARLES VIII. OF FRANCE

1493–1495

Europe at the Close of the Fifteenth Century—More intimate Relations between States—Italy the School of Politics—Pretensions of Charles VIII. to Naples—Treaty of Barcelona—The French invade Naples—Ferdinand's Dissatisfaction—Tactics and Arms of the different Nations—Preparations of Spain—Mission to Charles VIII.—Bold Conduct of the Envoys—The French enter Naples

WE have now reached that memorable epoch when the different nations of Europe, surmounting the barriers which had hitherto confined them within their respective limits, brought their forces, as if by a simultaneous impulse, against each other on a common theatre of action. In the preceding part of this work, we have seen in what manner Spain was prepared for the contest, by the concentration of her various states under one government, and by such internal reforms as enabled the government to act with vigor. The genius of Ferdinand will appear as predominant in what concerns the foreign relations of the country as did that of Isabella in its interior administration; so much so, indeed, that the accurate and

well-informed historian who has most copiously illustrated this portion of the national annals does not even mention, in his introductory notice, the name of Isabella, but refers the agency in these events exclusively to her more ambitious consort.[1] In this he is abundantly justified, both by the prevailing character of the policy pursued, widely differing from that which distinguished the queen's measures, and by the circumstance that the foreign conquests, although achieved by the united efforts of both crowns, were undertaken on behalf of Ferdinand's own dominions of Aragon, to which in the end they exclusively appertained.

The close of the fifteenth century presents, on the whole, the most striking point of view in modern history; one from which we may contemplate the consummation of an important revolution in the structure of political society, and the first application of several inventions destined to exercise the widest influence on human civilization. The feudal institutions, or rather the feudal principle, which operated even where the institutions, strictly speaking, did not exist, after having wrought its appointed uses, had gradually fallen into decay; for it had not the power of accommodating itself to the increased demands and improved condition of society. However well suited to a barbarous age, it was found that the distribution of power among the members of an independent aristocracy was unfavorable to that degree of personal security and tranquillity which is indispensable to

[1] Zurita, Historia del Rey Don Hernando el Cathólico (Anales, tom, v. vi., Zaragoza, 1580), lib. 1, introd.

great proficiency in the higher arts of civilization. It was equally repugnant to the principle of patriotism, which is so essential to national independence, but which must have operated feebly among a people whose sympathies, instead of being concentrated on the state, were claimed by a hundred masters, as was the case in every feudal community. The conviction of this reconciled the nation to the transfer of authority into other hands; not those of the people, indeed, who were too ignorant, and too long accustomed to a subordinate, dependent situation, to admit of it,—but into the hands of the sovereign. It was not until three centuries more had elapsed that the condition of the great mass of the people was to be so far improved as to qualify them for asserting and maintaining the political consideration which of right belongs to them.

In whatever degree public opinion and the progress of events might favor the transition of power from the aristocracy to the monarch, it is obvious that much would depend on his personal character; since the advantages of his station alone made him by no means a match for the combined forces of his great nobility. The remarkable adaptation of the characters of the principal sovereigns of Europe to this exigency, in the latter half of the fifteenth century, would seem to have had something providential in it. Henry the Seventh of England, Louis the Eleventh of France, Ferdinand of Naples, John the Second of Aragon and his son Ferdinand, and John the Second of Portugal, however different in other re-

spects, were all distinguished by a sagacity which enabled them to devise the most subtile and comprehensive schemes of policy, and which was prolific in expedients for the circumvention of enemies too potent to be encountered by open force.

Their operations, all directed towards the same point, were attended with similar success, resulting in the exaltation of the royal prerogative at the expense of the aristocracy, with more or less deference to the rights of the people, as the case might be; in France, for example, with almost total indifference to them, while in Spain they were regarded, under the parental administration of Isabella, which tempered the less scrupulous policy of her husband, with tenderness and respect. In every country, however, the nation at large gained greatly by the revolution, which came on insensibly, at least without any violent shock to the fabric of society, and which, by securing internal tranquillity and the ascendency of law over brute force, gave ample scope for those intellectual pursuits that withdraw mankind from sensual indulgence and too exclusive devotion to the animal wants of our nature.

No sooner was the internal organization of the different nations of Europe placed on a secure basis, than they found leisure to direct their views, hitherto confined within their own limits, to a bolder and more distant sphere of action. Their international communication was greatly facilitated by several useful inventions coincident with this period, or then first extensively applied. Such was the art of printing, diffusing knowledge with

the speed and universality of light; the establishment of posts, which, adopted by Louis the Eleventh in the fifteenth century, came into frequent use in the beginning of the sixteenth; * and lastly, the compass, which, guiding the mariner unerringly through the trackless wastes of the ocean, brought the remotest regions into contact. With these increased facilities for intercommunication, the different European states might be said to be brought into as intimate relation with one another as the different provinces of the same kingdom were before. They now for the first time regarded each other as members of one great community, in whose action they were all mutually concerned. A greater anxiety was manifested to detect the springs of every political movement of their neighbors. Missions became frequent, and accredited agents were stationed, as a sort of honorable spies, at the different courts.† The science of diplomacy, on narrower grounds, indeed, than those on which it is now practised, began to be studied.[2] Schemes of aggression and resistance,

[2] The "Legazione," or official correspondence of Machiavelli while stationed at the different European courts, may be regarded as the most complete manual of diplomacy as it existed at the beginning of the sixteenth century. It affords more copious and curious information respecting the interior workings of the governments with which he resided than is to be found in any regular history; and it shows the variety and extent of duties attached to the office of resident minister from the first moment of its creation.

* [The postal system as a means of "international communication" can scarcely be said to have existed before the seventeenth century. The posts established by Louis XI. were merely relays of horses for the conveyance of government messengers.—K.]

† [It is from the reports sent home by the Venetian ambassadors that we derive our most trustworthy information of what was done in foreign courts.—M.]

leading to political combinations the most complex and extended, were gradually formed. We are not to imagine, however, the existence of any well-defined ideas of a balance of power at this early period. The object of these combinations was some positive act of aggression or resistance, for purposes of conquest or defence, not for the maintenance of any abstract theory of political equilibrium. This was the result of much deeper reflection, and of prolonged experience.

The management of the foreign relations of the nation at the close of the fifteenth century was resigned wholly to the sovereign. The people took no further part or interest in the matter than if it had concerned only the disposition of his private property. His measures were, therefore, often characterized by a degree of temerity and precipitation that could not have been permitted under the salutary checks afforded by popular interposition. A strange insensibility, indeed, was shown to the rights and interests of the nation. War was regarded as a game, in which the sovereign parties engaged, not on behalf of their subjects, but exclusively on their own. Like desperate gamblers, they contended for the spoils or the honors of victory with so much the more recklessness as their own station was too elevated to be materially prejudiced by the results. They contended with all the animosity of personal feeling; every device, however paltry, was resorted to; and no advantage was deemed unwarrantable which could tend to secure the victory. The most profligate maxims of state policy were openly avowed by men of

reputed honor and integrity.* In short, the diplomacy of that day is very generally characterized by a low cunning, subterfuge, and petty trickery which would leave an indelible stain on the transactions of private individuals.

Italy was, doubtless, the great school where this political morality was taught. That country was broken up into a number of small states, too nearly equal to allow the absolute supremacy of any one, while at the same time it demanded the most restless vigilance on the part of each to maintain its independence against its neighbors. Hence such a complexity of intrigues and combinations as the world had never before witnessed. A subtile, refined policy was conformable to the genius of the Italians. It was partly the result, moreover, of their higher cultivation, which naturally led them to trust the settlement of their disputes to superior intellectual dexterity, rather than to brute force, like the *barbarians* beyond the Alps.[3] From these and other causes, maxims were gradually established so monstrous in their nature as to give the work which first embodied them in a regular system the air of a satire rather than a serious performance, while the name of its author has been converted into a by-word for political knavery.[4]

[3] "Sed diu," says Sallust, noticing the similar consequence of increased refinement among the ancients, "magnum inter mortales certamen fuit, vine corporis an virtute animi res militaris magis procederet. . . . Tum demum periculo atque negotiis compertum est, in bello plurimum ingenium posse." Bellum Catilinarium, cap. 1, 2.

[4] Machiavelli's political treatises, his "Principe" and "Discorsi sopra Tito Livio," which appeared after his death, excited no scandal at the time of their publication. They came into the world, indeed,

* [Machiavelli's ideal prince was Cæsar Borgia!—M.]

At the period before us, the principal states of Italy were the republics of Venice and Florence, the duchy of Milan, the papal see, and the kingdom of Naples. The others may be regarded merely as satellites, revolving round some one or other of these superior powers, by whom their respective movements were regulated and controlled. Venice may be considered as the most formidable of the Italian powers, taking into consideration her wealth, her powerful navy, her territory in the north, and her princely colonial domain. There was no government in that age which attracted such general admiration, both from natives and foreigners, who seem to have looked upon it as affording the very best model of political wisdom.[5] Yet there was no country where the citizen enjoyed less positive freedom; none whose foreign relations were conducted with more absolute selfishness, and with a more narrow, bargaining spirit, savoring rather of a company of traders than of a great and powerful state. But all this was compensated, in the eyes of her contemporaries, by the stability of her institutions, which still remained

from the pontifical press, under the privilege of the reigning pope, Clement VII. It was not until thirty years later that they were placed in the Index; and this not from any exceptions taken to the immortality of their doctrines, as Ginguené has well proved (Histoire littéraire d'Italie (Paris, 1811–19), tom. viii. pp. 32, 74), but from the imputations they contained on the court of Rome.

[5] "Aquel Senado é Señoría de Venecianos," says Gonzalo de Oviedo, "donde me parece á mi que esta recogido todo el saber é prudencia de los hombres humanos; porque és la gente del mundo que mejor se sabe gobernar; é la republica, que mas tiempo há durado en el mundo por la buena forma de su regimiento, é donde con mejor manera hán los hombres vivido en comunidad sin tener Rey;" etc. Quincuagenas, MS., bat. 1, quinc. 3, dial. 44.

unshaken amidst revolutions which had convulsed or overturned every other social fabric in Italy.[6]

The government of Milan was at this time under the direction of Lodovico Sforza, or Lodovico the Moor, as he is commonly called; an epithet suggested by his complexion, but one which he willingly retained, as indicating the superior craftiness on which he valued himself.[7] He held the reins in the name of his nephew, then a minor, until a convenient season should arrive for assuming them in his own. His cool, perfidious character was stained with the worst vices of the most profligate class of Italian statesmen of that period.

The central parts of Italy were occupied by the republic of Florence, which had ever been the rallying-point of the friends of freedom, too often of faction, but which had now resigned itself to the dominion of the Medici, whose cultivated tastes and munificent patronage shed a splendid illusion over their administration, which blinded the eyes of contemporaries, and even of posterity.

The papal chair was filled by Alexander the Sixth, a pontiff whose licentiousness, avarice, and unblushing effrontery have been the theme of

[6] Of all the incense which poets and politicians have offered to the Queen of the Adriatic, none is more exquisite than that conveyed in these few lines, where Sannazaro notices her position as the bulwark of Christendom:

"Una Italum regina, altæ pulcherrima Romæ
Æmula, quæ terris, quæ dominaris aquis!
Tu tibi vel reges cives facis; O decus! O lux
Ausoniæ, per quam libera turba sumus;
Per quam barbaries nobis non imperat, et Sol
Exoriens nostro clarius orbe micat!"
Opera Latina, lib. 3, eleg. 1, 95.

[7] Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. lib. 3, p. 147.

unmingled reproach with Catholic as well as Protestant writers. His preferment was effected by lavish bribery, and by his consummate address, as well as energy of character. Although a native Spaniard, his election was extremely unpalatable to Ferdinand and Isabella, who deprecated the scandal it must bring upon the church, and who had little to hope for themselves, in a political view, from the elevation of one of their own subjects even, whose mercenary spirit placed him at the control of the highest bidder.[8]

The Neapolitan sceptre was swayed by Ferdinand the First, whose father, Alfonso the Fifth, the uncle of Ferdinand of Aragon, had obtained the crown by the adoption of Joanna of Naples, or rather by his own good sword. Alfonso settled his conquest on his illegitimate son Ferdinand, to the prejudice of the rights of Aragon, by whose blood and treasure he had achieved it. Ferdinand's character, the very opposite of his noble father's, was dark, wily, and ferocious. His life was spent in conflict with his great feudal nobility, many of whom supported the pretensions of the Angevin family. But his superior craft enabled him to foil every attempt of his enemies. In

[8] Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 119, 123.—Fleury, Historie ecclésiastique, contin. (Paris, 1722), tom. xxiv. lib. 117, p. 545.—Peter Martyr, whose residence and rank at the Spanish court gave him access to the best sources of information as to the repute in which the new pontiff was held there, expresses himself in one of his letters to Cardinal Sforza, who had assisted at his election, in the following unequivocal language: "Sed hoc habeto, princeps illustrissime, non placuisse meis Regibus pontificatum ad Alexandrum, quamvis eorum ditionarium, pervenisse. Verentur namque ne illius cupiditas, ne ambitio, ne (quod gravius) mollities filialis Christianam religionem in præceps trahat." Epist. 119.

effecting this, indeed, he shrunk from no deed of treachery or violence, however atrocious, and in the end had the satisfaction of establishing his authority, undisputed, on the fears of his subjects. He was about seventy years of age at the period of which we are treating, 1493. The heir apparent, Alfonso, was equally sanguinary in his temper, though possessing less talent for dissimulation than his father.

Such was the character of the principal Italian courts at the close of the fifteenth century. The politics of the country were necessarily regulated by the temper and views of the leading powers. They were essentially selfish and personal. The ancient republican forms had been gradually effaced during this century, and more arbitrary ones introduced. The name of freedom, indeed, was still inscribed on their banners, but the spirit had disappeared. In almost every state, great or small, some military adventurer or crafty statesman had succeeded in raising his own authority on the liberties of his country; and his sole aim seemed to be to enlarge it still further, and to secure it against the conspiracies and revolutions which the reminiscence of ancient independence naturally called forth. Such was the case with Tuscany, Milan, Naples, and the numerous subordinate states. In Rome, the pontiff proposed no higher object than the concentration of wealth and public honors in the hands of his own family. In short, the administration of every state seemed to be managed with exclusive reference to the personal interests of its chief. Venice was the only

power of sufficient strength and stability to engage in more extended schemes of policy, and even these were conducted, as has been already noticed, in the narrow and calculating spirit of a trading corporation.

But while no spark of generous patriotism seemed to warm the bosoms of the Italians, while no sense of public good, or even menace of foreign invasion, could bring them to act in concert with one another,[9] the internal condition of the country was eminently prosperous. Italy had far outstripped the rest of Europe in the various arts of civilized life; and she everywhere afforded the evidence of faculties developed by unceasing intellectual action. The face of the country itself was like a garden; "cultivated through all its plains to the very tops of the mountains; teeming with population, with riches, and an unlimited commerce; illustrated by many munificent princes, by the splendor of many noble and beautiful cities, and by the majesty of religion; and adorned with all those rare and precious gifts which render a name glorious among the nations."[10] Such are the glowing strains in which the Tuscan historian celebrates the prosperity of his country, ere yet the storm of war had descended on her beautiful valleys.

This scene of domestic tranquillity was destined

[9] A remarkable example of this occurred in the middle of the fifteenth century, when the inundation of the Turks, which seemed ready to burst upon them, after overwhelming the Arabian and Greek empires, had no power to still the voice of faction, or to concentrate the attention of the Italian states, even for a moment.

[10] Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. lib. 1, p. 2.

to be changed by that terrible invasion which the ambition of Lodovico Sforza brought upon his country. He had already organized a coalition of the northern powers of Italy, to defeat the interference of the king of Naples in behalf of his grandson, the rightful duke of Milan, whom his uncle held in subjection during a protracted minority, while he exercised all the real functions of sovereignty in his name. Not feeling sufficiently secure from his Italian confederacy, Sforza invited the king of France to revive the hereditary claims of the house of Anjou to the crown of Naples, promising to aid him in the enterprise with all his resources. In this way, this wily politician proposed to divert the storm from his own head by giving Ferdinand sufficient occupation at home.

The throne of France was at that time filled by Charles the Eighth, a monarch scarcely twenty-two years of age. His father, Louis the Eleventh, had given him an education unbecoming not only a great prince, but even a private gentleman. He would allow him to learn no other Latin, says Brantôme, than his favorite maxim, "Qui nescit dissimulare, nescit regnare." [11] Charles made some amends for this, though with little judgment, in later life, when left to his own disposal. His favorite studies were the exploits of celebrated conquerors, of Cæsar and Charlemagne particularly, which filled his young mind with vague and visionary ideas of glory. These dreams were still

[11] Brantôme, Vies des Hommes illustres, Œuvres complètes (Paris, 1822–3), tom. ii. disc. 1, pp. 2, 20.

further nourished by the tourneys and other chivalrous spectacles of the age, in which he delighted, until he seems to have imagined himself some doughty paladin of romance, destined to the achievement of a grand and perilous enterprise. It affords some proof of this exalted state of his imagination, that he gave his only son the name of Orlando, after the celebrated hero of Roncesvalles.[12]

With a mind thus excited by chimerical visions of military glory, he lent a willing ear to the artful propositions of Sforza. In the extravagance of vanity, fed by the adulation of interested parasites, he affected to regard the enterprise against Naples as only opening the way to a career of more splendid conquests, which were to terminate in the capture of Constantinople and the recovery of the Holy Sepulchre. He even went so far as to purchase of Andrew Paleologus, the nephew and heir of Constantine, the last of the Cæsars, his title to the Greek empire.[13]

Nothing could be more unsound, according to the principles of the present day, than Charles's claims to the crown of Naples. Without discussing the original pretensions of the rival houses of Aragon and Anjou, it is sufficient to state that at

[12] Sismondi, Hist. des Français, tom. xv. p. 112.—Gaillard, Rivalité, tom. iv. 2, 3.

[13] Daru, Histoire de la République de Venise (Paris, 1821), tom. iii. liv. 20.—See the deed of cession, in the memoir of M. de Foncemagne. (Mémoires de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, tom. xvii. pp. 539–579.) This document, as well as some others which appeared on the eve of Charles's expedition, breathes a tone of Quixotic and religious enthusiasm that transports us back to the days of the crusades.

the time of Charles the Eighth's invasion the Neapolitan throne had been in the possession of the Aragonese family more than half a century, under three successive princes solemnly recognized by the people, sanctioned by repeated investitures of the papal suzerain, and admitted by all the states of Europe. If all this did not give validity to their title, when was the nation to expect repose? Charles's claim, on the other hand, was derived originally from a testamentary bequest of René, count of Provence, operating to the exclusion of the son of his own daughter, the rightful heir of the house of Anjou;* Naples being too notoriously a female fief to afford any pretext for the action of the Salic law. The pretensions of Ferdinand of Spain, as representative of the legitimate branch of Aragon, were far more plausible.[14]

Independently of the defects in Charles's title, his position was such as to make the projected expedition every way impolitic. A misunderstanding had for some time subsisted between him and

[14] The conflicting claims of Anjou and Aragon are stated at length by Gaillard, with more candor and impartiality than were to be expected from a French writer. (Histoire de François I. (Paris, 1769), tom. i. pp. 71–92.) They form the subject of a juvenile essay of Gibbon, in which we may discern the germs of many of the peculiarities which afterwards characterized the historian of the Decline and Fall. Miscellaneous Works (London, 1814), vol. iii. pp. 206–222.

* [This is somewhat incorrectly stated. The French claim was derived, not from the testament of René, under which his nephew, Charles of Maine, succeeded him, in July, 1480, as count of Provence and titular king of Sicily, but from the will of this latter prince, who died childless in December, 1481, coupled with alleged earlier settlements uniting Naples and Provence, with the effect, as was maintained, of excluding female branches from the succession. Conf. Comines Mémoires, liv. 7, chap. 1, and documents in Lenglet, tom. iii. pp. 324–336, tom. iv. par. 2, pp. 5–13.—K.]

the Spanish sovereigns, and he was at open war with Germany and England; so that it was only by large concessions that he could hope to secure their acquiescence in an enterprise most precarious in its character, and where even complete success could be of no permanent benefit to his kingdom. "He did not understand," says Voltaire, "that a dozen villages adjacent to one's territory are of more value than a kingdom four hundred leagues distant."[15] By the treaties of Etaples and Senlis, he purchased a reconciliation with Henry the Seventh of England, and with Maximilian, the emperor elect; and finally, by that of Barcelona, effected an amicable adjustment of his difficulties with Spain.[16]

This treaty, which involved the restoration of Roussillon and Cerdagne, was of great importance to the crown of Aragon. These provinces, it will be remembered, had been originally mortgaged by Ferdinand's father, King John the Second, to Louis the Eleventh of France, for the sum of three hundred thousand crowns, in consideration of aid to be afforded by the latter monarch against the Catalan insurgents. Although the stipulated sum had never been paid by Aragon,

[15] Essai sur les Mœurs, chap. 107.—His politic father, Louis XI., acted on this principle, for he made no attempt to maintain his pretensions to Naples; although Mably affects to doubt whether this was not the result of necessity rather than policy. "Il est douteux si cette modération fut l'ouvrage d'une connoissance approfondie de ses vrais intérêts, ou seulement de cette défiance qu'il avoit des grands de son royaume, et qu'il n'osoit perdre de vue." Observations sur l'Histoire de France, Œuvres (Paris, 1794–5), liv. 6, chap. 4.

[16] Flassan, Histoire de la Diplomatie Française (Paris, 1809), tom. i. pp. 254–259.—Dumont, Corps universel diplomatique du Droit des Gens (Amsterdam, 1726–31), tom. iii. pp. 297–300.

yet a plausible pretext for requiring the restitution was afforded by Louis the Eleventh's incomplete performance of his engagements, as well as by the ample reimbursement which the French government had already derived from the revenues of these countries.[17] This treaty had long been a principal object of Ferdinand's policy. He had not, indeed, confined himself to negotiation, but had made active demonstrations more than once of occupying the contested territory by force. Negotiation, however, was more consonant to his habitual policy; and, after the termination of the Moorish war, he pressed it with the utmost vigor, repairing with the queen to Barcelona, in order to watch over the deliberations of the envoys of the two nations at Figueras.[18]

The French historians accuse Ferdinand of

[17] See the narrative of these transactions in the fifth and sixth chapters of Part I. of this History.—Most historians seem to take it for granted that Louis XI. advanced a sum of money to the king of Aragon; and some state that payment of the debt for which the provinces were mortgaged was subsequently tendered to the French king. (See, among others, Sismondi, Républiques Italiennes, tom. xii. p. 93.—Roscoe, Life and Pontificate of Leo X. (London, 1827), vol. i. p. 147). The first of these statements is a palpable error; and I find no evidence of the last in any Spanish authority, where, if true, it would naturally have been noticed. I must, indeed, except Bernaldez, who says that Ferdinand, having repaid the money, borrowed by his father from Louis XI., to Charles VIII., the latter monarch returned it to Isabella, in consideration of the great expenses incurred by the Moorish war. It is a pity that this romantic piece of gallantry does not rest on any better authority than that of the Curate of Los Palacios, who shows a degree of ignorance in the first part of his statement that entitles him to little credit in the last. Indeed, the worthy Curate, although much to be relied on for what passed in his own province, may be found frequently tripping in the details of what passed out of it. Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap, 117.

[18] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 1, cap. 4, 7, 10.

bribing two ecclesiastics, in high influence at their court, to make such a representation of the affair as should alarm the conscience of the young monarch. These holy men insisted on the restoration of Roussillon as an act of justice; since the sums for which it had been mortgaged, though not repaid, had been spent in the common cause of Christendom, the Moorish war. The soul, they said, could never hope to escape from purgatory until restitution was made of all property unlawfully held during life. His royal father, Louis the Eleventh, was clearly in this predicament, as he himself would hereafter be, unless the Spanish territories should be relinquished; a measure, moreover, the more obligatory on him, since it was well known to be the dying request of his parent. These arguments made a suitable impression on the young monarch, and a still deeper on his sister, the duchess of Beaujeu, who exercised great influence over him, and who believed her own soul in peril of eternal damnation by deferring the act of restoration any longer. The effect of this cogent reasoning was no doubt greatly enhanced by the reckless impatience of Charles, who calculated no cost in the prosecution of his chimerical enterprise. With these amicable dispositions an arrangement was at length concluded, and received the signatures of the respective monarchs on the same day, being signed by Charles at Tours, and by Ferdinand and Isabella at Barcelona, January 19th, 1493.[19]

[19] Fleury, Histoire ecclésiastique, contin., tom. xxiv. pp. 533–555.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 1, cap. 14.—Daru, Hist. de Ve-

The principal articles of the treaty provided that the contracting parties should mutually aid each other against all enemies; that they should reciprocally prefer this alliance to that with any other, *the vicar of Christ excepted;* that the Spanish sovereigns should enter into no understanding with any power, *the vicar of Christ excepted,* prejudicial to the interests of France; that their children should not be disposed of in marriage to the kings of England or of the Romans, or to any enemy of France, without the French king's consent. It was finally stipulated that Roussillon and Cerdagne should be restored to Aragon, but that, as doubts might be entertained to which power the possession of these countries rightfully appertained, arbitrators *named by Ferdinand and Isabella* should be appointed, if requested by the French monarch, with full power to decide the question, by whose judgment the contracting parties mutually promised to abide. This last provision, obviously too well guarded to jeopard the interests of the Spanish sovereigns, was introduced to allay in some measure the discontents of the French, who loudly inveighed against their cabinet, as sacrificing the interests of the nation; accusing, indeed, the cardinal D'Albi, the principal

nise, tom. iii. pp. 51, 52.—Gaillard, Rivalité, tom. iv. p. 10.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 6.—Comines, alluding to the affair of Roussillon, says that Ferdinand and Isabella, whether from motives of economy or hypocrisy, always employed priests in their negotiations: "Car toutes leurs œuvres ont fait mener et conduire par telles gens (religieux), ou par hypocrisie, ou afin de moins dependre." (Mémoires, p. 211.) The French king, however, made more use of the clergy in this very transaction than the Spanish. Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 1, cap. 10.

agent in the negotiation, of being in the pay of Ferdinand.[20]

The treaty excited equal surprise and satisfaction in Spain, where Roussillon was regarded as of the last importance, not merely from the extent of its resources, but from its local position, which made it the key of Catalonia. The nation, says Zurita, looked on its recovery as scarcely less important than the conquest of Granada; and they doubted some sinister motive, or deeper policy than appeared in the conduct of the French king. He was influenced, however, by no deeper policy than the cravings of a puerile ambition.[21]

The preparations of Charles, in the mean while, excited general alarm throughout Italy. Ferdinand, the old king of Naples, who in vain endeavored to arrest them by negotiation, had died in the beginning of 1494. He was succeeded by his son Alfonso, a prince of bolder but less politic character, and equally odious, from the cruelty of his disposition, with his father. He lost no time in putting his kingdom in a posture of defence;

[20] Paolo Giovio, Hist. sui Temporis (Basiliæ, 1578), lib. 1, p. 16. —The treaty of Barcelona is given at length by Dumont (Corps diplomatique, tom. iii. pp. 297–300). It is reported with sufficient inaccuracy by many historians, who make no hesitation in saying that Ferdinand expressly bound himself, by one of the articles, not to interfere with Charles's meditated attempt on Naples. (Gaillard, Rivalité, tom. iv. p. 11.—Voltaire, Essai sur les Mœurs, chap. 107.—Comines, Mémoires, liv. 8, chap. 23.—Giovio, Hist. sui Temporis, lib. 1, p. 16.—Varillas, Politique d'Espagne, ou du Roi Ferdinand (Amsterdam, 1688), pp. 11, 12.—Roscoe, Life of Leo X., tom. i. chap. 3.) So far from this, there is no allusion whatever to the proposed expedition in the treaty, nor is the name of Naples once mentioned in it.

[21] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 1, cap. 18.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, ubi supra.

but he wanted the best of all defences, the attachment of his subjects. His interests were supported by the Florentine republic and the pope, whose family had intermarried with the royal house of Naples. Venice stood aloof, secure in her remoteness, unwilling to compromise her interests by too precipitate a declaration in favor of either party.

The European powers regarded the expedition of Charles the Eighth with somewhat different feelings; most of them were not unwilling to see so formidable a prince waste his resources in a remote and chimerical expedition; Ferdinand, however, contemplated with more anxiety an event which might terminate in the subversion of the Neapolitan branch of his house, and bring a powerful and active neighbor in contact with his own dominions in Sicily. He lost no time in fortifying the faltering courage of the pope by assurances of support. His ambassador then resident at the papal court was Garcilasso de la Vega, father of the illustrious poet of that name, and familiar to the reader by his exploits in the Granadine war. This personage with rare political sagacity combined an energy of purpose which could not fail to infuse courage into the hearts of others. He urged the pope to rely on his master, the king of Aragon, who, he assured him, would devote all his resources, if necessary, to the protection of his person, honor, and estate. Alexander would gladly have had this promise under the hand of Ferdinand; but the latter did not think it expedient, considering his delicate relations with

France, to put himself so far in the power of the wily pontiff.[22]

In the mean time, Charles's preparations went forward with the languor and vacillation resulting from divided councils and multiplied embarrassments. "Nothing essential to the conduct of a war was at hand," says Comines. The king was very young, weak in person, headstrong in will, surrounded by few discreet counsellors, and wholly destitute of the requisite funds.[23] His own impatience, however, was stimulated by that of the youthful chivalry of his court, who burned for an opportunity of distinction; as well as by the representations of the Neapolitan exiles, who hoped, under his protection, to re-establish themselves in their own country. Several of these, weary with the delay already experienced, made overtures to King Ferdinand to undertake the enterprise on his own behalf, and to assert his legitimate pretensions to the crown of Naples, which, they assured him, a large party in the country was ready to sustain. The sagacious monarch, however, knew how little reliance was to be placed on the reports of these exiles, whose imaginations readily exaggerated the amount of disaffection in their own country. But, although the season had not yet arrived for asserting his own paramount claims, he was determined to tolerate those of no other potentate.[24]

[22] Zurita, Hist. del Rey. Hernando, lib. 1, cap. 28.—Bembo, Istoria Viniziana (Milano, 1809), tom. i. lib. 2, pp. 118, 119.—Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS., bat. 1, quinc. 3, dial. 43.

[23] Comines, Mémoires, liv. 7, introd.

[24] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 1, cap. 20.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 123.—Comines, Mémoires, liv. 7, chap. 3.—Ma-

Charles entertained so little suspicion of this, that in the month of June he despatched an envoy to the Spanish court, requiring Ferdinand's fulfilment of the treaty of Barcelona, by aiding him with men and money, and by throwing open his ports in Sicily for the French navy. "This gracious proposition," says the Aragonese historian, "he accompanied with information of his proposed expedition against the Turks; stating incidentally, as a thing of no consequence, his intention to take Naples by the way."[25]

Ferdinand saw the time was arrived for coming to an explicit declaration with the French court. He appointed a special mission, in order to do this in the least offensive manner possible. The person selected for this delicate task was Alonso de Silva, brother of the count of Cifuentes, and *clavero* of Calatrava, a cavalier possessed of the coolness and address requisite for diplomatic success.[26]

The ambassador, on arriving at the French court, found it at Vienne in all the bustle of preparation for immediate departure. After seeking in vain a private audience from King Charles, he explained to him the purport of his mission in the presence of his courtiers. He assured him of the

riana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 26, cap. 6.—Zurita concludes the arguments which decided Ferdinand against assuming the enterprise, with one which may be considered the gist of the whole matter: "El Rey entendia bien que no era tan facil la causa que se proponia," lib. 1, cap. 20.

[25] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 1, cap. 31.

[26] Oviedo notices Silva as one of three brothers, all gentle cavaliers, of unblemished honor, remarkable for the plainness of their persons, the elegance and courtesy of their manners, and the magnificence of their style of living. This one, Alonso, he describes as a man of a singularly clear head. Quincuagenas, MS., bat. 1, quinc. 4.

satisfaction which the king of Aragon had experienced at receiving intelligence of his projected expedition against the infidel. Nothing gave his master so great contentment as to see his brother monarchs employing their arms and expending their revenues against the enemies of the Cross; where even failure was greater gain than success in other wars. He offered Ferdinand's assistance in the prosecution of such wars, even though they should be directed against the Mahometans of Africa, over whom the papal sanction had given Spain exclusive rights of conquest. He besought the king not to employ the forces destined to so glorious a purpose against any one of the princes of Europe, but to reflect how great a scandal this must necessarily bring on the Christian cause; above all, he cautioned him against forming any designs on Naples, since that kingdom was a fief of the church, in whose favor an exception was expressly made by the treaty of Barcelona, which recognized her alliance and protection as paramount to every other obligation. Silva's discourse was responded to by the president of the parliament of Paris in a formal Latin oration, asserting generally Charles's right to Naples, and his resolution to enforce it previously to his crusade against the infidel. As soon as it was concluded, the king rose and abruptly quitted the apartment.[27]

Some days after, he interrogated the Spanish ambassador, whether his master would not, in case of a war with Portugal, feel warranted by the

[27] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, ubi supra.

terms of the late treaty in requiring the co-operation of France, and on what plea the latter power could pretend to withhold it. To the first of these propositions the ambassador answered in the affirmative, if it were a defensive war, but not, if an offensive one, of his own seeking; an explanation by no means satisfactory to the French monarch. Indeed, he seems not to have been at all prepared for this interpretation of the compact. He had relied on this, as securing without any doubt the non-interference of Ferdinand, if not his actual co-operation in his designs against Naples. The clause touching the rights of the church was too frequent in public treaties to excite any particular attention; and he was astounded at the broad ground which it was now made to cover, and which defeated the sole object proposed by the cession of Roussillon. He could not disguise his chagrin and indignation at what he deemed the perfidy of the Spanish court. He refused all further intercourse with Silva, and even stationed a sentinel at his gate, to prevent his communication with his subjects; treating him as the envoy, not of an ally, but of an open enemy.[28]

The unexpected and menacing attitude, however, assumed by Ferdinand, failed to arrest the operations of the French monarch, who, having completed his preparations, left Vienne in the month of August, 1494, and crossed the Alps at the head of the most formidable host which had scaled that mountain barrier since the irruption

[28] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 1, cap. 31, 41.

of the northern barbarians.[29] It will be unnecessary to follow his movements in detail. It is sufficient to remark that his conduct throughout was equally defective in principle and in sound policy. He alienated his allies by the most signal acts of perfidy, seizing their fortresses for himself, and entering their capitals with all the vaunt and insolent port of a conqueror. On his approach to Rome, the pope and the cardinals took refuge in the castle of St. Angelo, and on the 31st of December, 1494, Charles defiled into the city at the head of his victorious chivalry; if victorious they could be called, when, as an Italian historian remarks, they had scarcely broken a lance, or spread a tent, in the whole of their progress.[30]

The Italians were panic-struck at the aspect of troops so different from their own, and so superior to them in organization, science, and military

[29] Villeneuve, Mémoires, apud Petitot, Collection des Mémoires, tom. xiv. pp. 255, 256.—The French army consisted of 3600 gens d'armes, 20,000 French infantry, and 8000 Swiss, without including the regular camp-followers. (Sismondi, Républiques Italiennes, tom. xii. p. 132.) The splendor and novelty of their appearance excited a degree of admiration which disarmed in some measure the terror of the Italians. Peter Martyr, whose distance from the theatre of action enabled him to contemplate more calmly the operation of events, beheld with a prophetic eye the magnitude of the calamities impending over his country. In one of his letters, he writes thus: "Scribitur exercitum visum fuisse nostrâ tempestate nullum unquam nitidiorem. Et qui futuri sunt calamitatis participes, Carolum aciesque illius ac peditum turmas laudibus extollunt; sed Italorum impensâ instructas." (Opus Epist., epist. 143.) He concludes another with this remarkable prediction: "Perimeris, Galle, ex majori parte, nec in patriam redibis. Jacebis insepultus; sed tua non restituetur strages Italia." Epist. 123.

[30] Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. lib. 1, p. 71.—Scipione Ammirato, Istorie Fiorentine (Firenze, 1647), p. 205.—Giannone, Istoria di Napoli, tom. iii. lib. 29, introd.—Comines, Mémoires, liv. 7, chap. 17.—Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS., bat. 1, quinc. 3, dial. 43.

equipment; and still more in a remorseless ferocity of temper which had rarely been witnessed in their own feuds. Warfare was conducted on peculiar principles in Italy, adapted to the character and circumstances of the people. The business of fighting, in her thriving communities, instead of forming part of the regular profession of a gentleman, as in other countries at this period, was intrusted to the hands of a few soldiers of fortune, *condottieri,* as they were called, who hired themselves out, with the forces under their command, consisting exclusively of heavy-armed cavalry, to whatever state would pay them best. These forces constituted the capital, as it were, of the military chief, whose obvious interest it was to economize as far as possible, avoiding all unnecessary expenditure of his resources. Hence the science of defence was almost exclusively studied. The object seemed to be, not so much the annoyance of the enemy, as self-preservation. The common interests of the *condottieri* being paramount to every obligation to the state which they served, they easily came to an understanding with one another to spare their troops as much as possible; until at length battles were fought with little more personal hazard than would be incurred in an ordinary tourney. The man-at-arms was riveted into plates of steel of sufficient thickness to turn a musket-ball. The ease of the soldier was so far consulted that the artillery, in a siege, was not allowed to be fired on either side from sunset to sunrise, for fear of disturbing his repose. Prisoners were made for the sake of their ransom, and but little blood

was spilled in an action. Machiavelli records two engagements, at Anghiari and Castracaro, among the most noted of the time for their important consequences. The one lasted four hours, and the other half a day. The reader is hurried along through all the bustle of a well-contested fight, in the course of which the field is won and lost several times; but, when he comes to the close, and looks for the list of killed and wounded, he finds to his surprise not a single man slain in the first of these actions, and in the second only one, who, having tumbled from his horse, and being unable to rise, from the weight of his armor, was suffocated in the mud! Thus war became disarmed of its terrors. Courage was no longer essential in a soldier; and the Italian, made effeminate, if not timid, was incapable of encountering the adventurous daring and severe discipline of the northern warrior.[31]

The astonishing success of the French was still more imputable to the free use and admirable organization of their infantry, whose strength lay in the Swiss mercenaries. Machiavelli ascribes the misfortunes of his nation chiefly to its exclusive reliance on cavalry.[32] This service, during the whole of the Middle Ages, was considered among the European nations the most important; the horse being styled by way of eminence "the battle." The memorable conflict of Charles the Bold with the Swiss mountaineers, however, in

[31] Du Bos, Histoire de la Ligue faite à Cambray (Paris, 1728), tom. i. dissert. prélim.—Machiavelli, Istorie Fiorentine, lib. 5.—Denina, Rivoluzioni d'Italia, lib. 18, cap. 3.

[32] Arte della Guerra, lib. 2.

which the latter broke in pieces the celebrated Burgundian *ordonnances,* constituting the finest body of chivalry of the age, demonstrated the capacity of infantry; and the Italian wars, with which we are now engaged, at length fully re-established its ancient superiority.

The Swiss were formed into battalions varying from three to eight thousand men each. They wore little defensive armor, and their principal weapon was the pike, eighteen feet long. Formed into these solid battalions, which, bristling with spears all around, received the technical appellation of the *hedgehog,* they presented an invulnerable front on every quarter. In the level field, with free scope allowed for action, they bore down all opposition, and received unshaken the most desperate charges of the steel-clad cavalry on their terrible array of pikes. They were too unwieldy, however, for rapid or complicated manœuvres; they were easily disconcerted by any unforeseen impediment, or irregularity of the ground; and the event proved that the Spanish foot, armed with its short swords and bucklers, by breaking in under the long pikes of its enemy, could succeed in bringing him to close action, where his formidable weapon was of no avail. It was repeating the ancient lesson of the Roman legion and the Macedonian phalanx.[33]

[33] Machiavelli, Arte della Guerra, lib. 3.—Du Bos, Ligue de Cambray, tom. i. dis. prélim.—Giovio, Hist. sui Temporis, lib. 2, p. 41. —Polybius, in his minute account of this celebrated military institution of the Greeks, has recapitulated nearly all the advantages and defects imputed to the Swiss *hérisson* by modern European writers. (See lib. 17, sec. 25 et seq.) It is singular that these exploded arms

In artillery the French were at this time in advance of the Italians, perhaps of every nation in Europe. The Italians, indeed, were so exceedingly defective in this department that their best field-pieces consisted of small copper tubes covered with wood and hides. They were mounted on unwieldy carriages drawn by oxen, and followed by cars or wagons loaded with stone balls. These guns were worked so awkwardly that the besieged, says Guicciardini, had time between the discharges to repair the mischief inflicted by them. From these circumstances, artillery was held in so little repute that some of the most competent Italian writers thought it might be dispensed with altogether in field engagements.[34]

The French, on the other hand, were provided with a beautiful train of ordnance, consisting of bronze cannon about eight feet in length, and many smaller pieces.[35] They were lightly mounted, drawn by horses, and easily kept pace with the rapid movements of the army. They discharged iron balls, and were served with admirable skill, intimidating their enemies by the rapidity and accuracy of their fire, and easily demolishing their fortifications, which, before this invasion, were constructed with little strength or science.[36]

and tactics should be revived, after the lapse of nearly seventeen centuries, to be foiled again in the same manner as before.

[34] Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. pp. 45, 46.—Machiavelli, Arte della Guerra, lib. 3.—Du Bos, Ligue de Cambray, ubi supra.

[35] Guicciardini speaks of the name of "cannon," which the French gave to their pieces, as a novelty at that time in Italy, Istoria, pp. 45. 46.

[36] Giovio, Hist. sui Temporis, lib. 2, p. 42.—Machiavelli, Arte della Guerra, lib. 7.

The rapid successes of the French spread consternation among the Italian states, who now for the first time seemed to feel the existence of a common interest and the necessity of efficient concert. Ferdinand was active in promoting these dispositions, through his ministers, Garcilasso de la Vega and Alonso de Silva. The latter had quitted the French court on its entrance into Italy, and withdrawn to Genoa. From this point he opened a correspondence with Lodovico Sforza, who now began to understand that he had brought a terrible engine into play, the movements of which, however mischievous to himself, were beyond his strength to control. Silva endeavored to inflame still further his jealousy of the French, who had already given him many serious causes of disgust, and, in order to detach him more effectually from Charles's interests, encouraged him with the hope of forming a matrimonial alliance for his son with one of the infantas of Spain. At the same time, he used every effort to bring about a co-operation between the duke and the republic of Venice, thus opening the way to the celebrated league which was concluded in the following year.[37]

The Roman pontiff had lost no time, after the appearance of the French army in Italy, in pressing the Spanish court to fulfil its engagements.

[37] Zurita, Hist. del Ray Hernando, lib. 1, cap. 35.—Alonso de Silva acquitted himself to the entire satisfaction of the sovereigns in his difficult mission. He was subsequently sent on various others to the different Italian courts, and uniformly sustained his reputation for ability and prudence. He did not live to be old. Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS., bat. 1, quinc. 4.

He endeavored to propitiate the good will of the sovereigns by several important concessions. He granted to them and their successors the *tercias*, or two-ninths of the tithes, throughout the dominions of Castile; an impost still forming part of the regular revenue of the crown.[38] He caused bulls of crusade to be promulgated throughout Spain, granting at the same time a tenth of the ecclesiastical rents, with the understanding that the proceeds should be devoted to the protection of the Holy See. Towards the close of this year, 1494, or the beginning of the following, he conferred the title of Catholic on the Spanish sovereigns, in consideration, as is stated, of their eminent virtues, their zeal in defence of the true faith and the apostolic see, their reformation of conventual discipline, their subjugation of the Moors of Granada, and the purification of their dominions from the Jewish heresy. This orthodox title, which still continues to be the jewel most prized in the Spanish crown, has been appropriated in a peculiar manner to Ferdinand and Isabella, who are universally recognized in history as *Los Reyes Católicos*.[39]

[38] Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 26, cap. 6.—Salazar de Mendoza, Monarquía, lib. 3, cap. 14.—This branch of the revenue yields at the present day, according to Laborde, about 6,000,000 reals, or 1,500,000 francs. Itinéraire, tom. vi. p. 51.

[39] Zurita, Abarca, and other Spanish historians fix the date of Alexander's grant at the close of 1496. (Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, cap. 40.—Reyes de Aragon, rey 30, cap. 9.) Martyr notices it with great particularity as already conferred, in a letter of February, 1495. (Opus Epist., epist. 157.) The pope, according to Comines, designed to compliment Ferdinand and Isabella for their conquest of Granada, by transferring to them the title of Most Christian, hitherto enjoyed by the kings of France. He had even gone so far as to address them

Ferdinand was too sensible of the peril to which the occupation of Naples by the French would expose his own interests, to require any stimulant to action from the Roman pontiff. Naval preparations had been going forward during the summer, in the ports of Galicia and Guipuscoa. A considerable armament was made ready for sea by the latter part of December, at Alicant, and placed under the command of Galceran de Requesens, count of Trevento. The land-forces were intrusted to Gonsalvo de Cordova, better known in history as the Great Captain. Instructions were at the same time sent to the viceroy of Sicily to provide for the security of that island, and to hold himself in readiness to act in concert with the Spanish fleet.[40]

Ferdinand, however, determined to send one more embassy to Charles the Eighth, before coming to an open rupture with him. He selected for this mission Juan de Albion and Antonio de

thus in more than one of his briefs. This produced a remonstrance from a number of the cardinals; which led him to substitute the title of Most Catholic. The epithet of Catholic was not new in the royal house of Castile, nor indeed of Aragon; having been given to the Asturian prince Alfonso I. about the middle of the eighth, and to Pedro II. of Aragon at the beginning of the thirteenth century. I will remark, in conclusion, that although the phrase *Los Reyes Católicos,* as applied to a female equally with a male, would have a whimsical appearance literally translated into English, it is perfectly consonant to the Spanish idiom, which requires that all words having reference to both a masculine and a feminine noun should be expressed in the former gender. So also in the ancient languages: *Ἡμεν τύραννοι*, says Queen Hecuba (Euripides, *ΤΡΩΙΑΔ.* v. 474). But it is clearly incorrect to render *Los Reyes Católicos,* as usually done by English writers, by the corresponding term of "Catholic kings."

[40] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, cap. 41.—Quintana, Vidas de Españoles célebres (Madrid, 1807, 1830), tom. i. p. 222.—Carbajal, Anales, MS., año 1495.

Fonseca, brother of the bishop of that name, whom we have already noticed as superintendent of the Indian department. The two envoys reached Rome, January 28th, 1495, the same day on which Charles set out on his march for Naples. They followed the army, and on arriving at Velletri, about twenty miles from the capital, were admitted to an audience by the monarch, who received them in the presence of his officers. The ambassadors freely enumerated the various causes of complaint entertained by their master against the French king: the insult offered to him in the person of his minister Alonso de Silva; the contumelious treatment of the pope, and forcible occupation of the fortresses and estates of the church; and finally the enterprise against Naples, the claims to which, as a papal fief, could of right be determined in no other way than by the arbitration of the pontiff himself. Should King Charles consent to accept this arbitration, they tendered the good offices of their master as mediator between the parties; should he decline it, however, the king of Spain stood absolved from all further obligations of amity with him, by the terms of the treaty of Barcelona, which expressly recognized his right to interfere in defence of the church.[41]

Charles, who could not dissemble his indignation during this discourse, retorted with great acrimony, when it was concluded, on the conduct of Ferdinand, which he stigmatized as perfidious, ac-

[41] Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 138.—Sismondi, Républiques Italiennes, tom. xii. pp. 192–194.—Garibay, Compendio, lib. 19. cap. 4.

cusing him, at the same time, of a deliberate design to circumvent him, by introducing into their treaty the clause respecting the pope. As to the expedition against Naples, he had now gone too far to recede; and it would be soon enough to canvass the question of right, when he had got possession of it. His courtiers, at the same time, with the impetuosity of their nation, heightened by the insolence of success, told the envoys that they knew well enough how to defend their rights with their arms, and that King Ferdinand would find the French chivalry enemies of quite another sort from the holiday tilters of Granada.

These taunts led to mutual recrimination, until at length, Fonseca, though naturally a sedate person, was so far transported with anger that he exclaimed, " The issue, then, must be left to God, —arms must decide it; " and, producing the original treaty, bearing the signatures of the two monarchs, he tore it in pieces before the eyes of Charles and his court. At the same time he commanded two Spanish knights who served in the French army to withdraw from it, under pain of incurring the penalties of treason. The French cavaliers were so much incensed by this audacious action that they would have seized the envoys, and, in all probability, offered violence to their persons, but for the interposition of Charles, who with more coolness caused them to be conducted from his presence and sent back under a safe escort to Rome. Such are the circumstances reported by the French and Italian writers of this remarkable interview. They were not aware that the dramatic

exhibition, as far as the ambassadors were concerned, was all previously concerted before their departure from Spain.[42]

Charles pressed forward on his march without further delay. Alfonso the Second, losing his confidence and martial courage, the only virtues that he possessed, at the crisis when they were most demanded, had precipitately abandoned his kingdom while the French were at Rome, and taken refuge in Sicily, where he formally abdicated the crown in favor of his son, Ferdinand the Second. This prince, then twenty-five years of age, whose amiable manners were rendered still more attractive by contrast with the ferocious temper of his father, was possessed of talent and energy competent to the present emergency, had he been sustained by his subjects. But the latter, besides being struck with the same panic which had paralyzed the other people of Italy, had too little interest in the government to be willing to hazard much in its defence. A change of dynasty was only a change of masters, by which they had little either to gain or to lose. Though favorably inclined to Ferdinand, they refused to stand by him in his perilous extremity. They gave way in every direc-

[42] Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS., bat. 1, quinc. 3, dial. 43.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 1, cap. 43.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 138.—Giovio, Hist. sui Temporis, lib. 2, p. 46.—Lanuza, Historias, tom. i. lib. 1, cap. 6.—This appears from a letter of Martyr's, dated three months before the interview; in which he says, "Antonius Fonseca, vir equestris ordinis, et armis clarus, destinatus est orator, qui eum moneat, ne, priusquam de jure inter ipsum et Alfonsum regem Neapolitanum decernatur, ulterius procedat. Fert in mandatis Antonius Fonseca, ut Carolo capitulum id sonans ostendat, anteque ipsius oculos (si detrectaverit) pacti veteris chirographum laceret, atque indicat inimicitias." Opus Epist., epist. 144.

tion, as the French advanced, rendering hopeless every attempt of their spirited young monarch to rally them, till at length no alternative was left but to abandon his dominions to the enemy without striking a blow in their defence. He withdrew to the neighboring island of Ischia, whence he soon after passed into Sicily, and occupied himself there in collecting the fragments of his party, until the time should arrive for more decisive action.[43]

Charles the Eighth made his entrance into Naples at the head of his legions, February 22d, 1495, having traversed this whole extent of hostile territory in less time than would be occupied by a fashionable tourist of the present day. The object of his expedition was now achieved. He seemed to have reached the consummation of his wishes; and, although he assumed the titles of King of Sicily and of Jerusalem, and affected the state and authority of Emperor, he took no measures for prosecuting his chimerical enterprise further. He even neglected to provide for the security of his present conquest, and, without bestowing a thought on the government of his new dominions, resigned himself to the licentious and effeminate pleasures so congenial with the soft voluptuousness of the climate and his own character.[44]

While Charles was thus wasting his time and

[43] Comines, Mémoires, liv. 7, chap. 16.—Villeneuve, Mémoires, apud Petitot, Collection des Mémoires, tom. xii. p. 260.—Ammirato, Istorie Fiorentine, tom. iii. lib. 26.—Summonte, Hist. di Napoli, tom. iii. lib. 6, cap. 1, 2.

[44] Giovio, Hist. sui Temporis, lib. 2, p. 55.—Giannone, Istoria di Napoli, lib. 29, cap. 1, 2.—André de la Vigne, Histoire de Charles VIII. (Paris, 1617), p. 201.

resources in frivolous amusements, a dark storm was gathering in the north. There was not a state through which he had passed, however friendly to his cause, which had not complaints to make of his insolence, his breach of faith, his infringement of their rights, and his exorbitant exactions. His impolitic treatment of Sforza had long since alienated that wily and restless politician, and raised suspicions in his mind of Charles's designs against his own duchy of Milan. The emperor elect, Maximilian, whom the French king thought to have bound to his interests by the treaty of Senlis, took umbrage at his assumption of the imperial title and dignity. The Spanish ambassadors, Garcilasso de la Vega, and his brother, Lorenzo Suarez, the latter of whom resided at Venice, were indefatigable in stimulating the spirit of discontent. Suarez, in particular, used every effort to secure the co-operation of Venice, representing to the government, in the most urgent terms, the necessity of general concert and instant action among the great powers of Italy, if they would preserve their own liberties.[45]

Venice, from its remote position, seemed to afford the best point for coolly contemplating the general interests of Italy. Envoys of the different European powers were assembled there, as if by common consent, with the view of concerting some scheme of operation for their mutual good. The conferences were conducted by night, and

[45] Giovio, Hist. sui Temporis, lib. 2, p. 56.—Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. pp. 86, 87.—Bembo, Istoria Viniziana, tom. i. lib. 2, p. 120. —Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, chap. 3, 5.—Comines, Mémoires, liv. 7, chap. 19.

with such secrecy as to elude for some time the vigilant eye of Comines, the sagacious minister of Charles, then resident at the capital. The result was the celebrated league of Venice. It was signed the last day of March, 1495, on the part of Spain, Austria, Rome, Milan, and the Venetian republic. The ostensible object of the treaty, which was to last twenty-five years, was the preservation of the estates and rights of the confederates, especially of the Roman see. A large force, amounting in all to thirty-four thousand horse and twenty thousand foot, was to be assessed in stipulated proportions on each of the contracting parties. The secret articles of the treaty, however, went much further, providing a formidable plan of offensive operations. It was agreed in these that King Ferdinand should employ the Spanish armament, now arrived in Sicily, in re-establishing his kinsman on the throne of Naples; that a Venetian fleet, of forty galleys, should attack the French position on the Neapolitan coasts; that the duke of Milan should expel the French from Asti, and blockade the passes of the Alps, so as to intercept the passage of further reinforcements; and that the emperor and the king of Spain should invade the French frontiers, and their expenses be defrayed by subsidies from the allies.[46] Such were the terms of this treaty, which may be regarded as forming an era in modern political history, since it exhibits the first example of those

[46] Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. lib. 2, p. 88.—Comines, Mémoires, liv. 7, chap. 20.—Bembo, Istoria Viniziana, tom. i. lib. 2, pp. 122, 123. —Daru, Hist. de Venise, tom. iii. pp. 255, 256.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, cap. 5.

extensive combinations among European princes, for mutual defence, which afterwards became so frequent. It shared the fate of many other coalitions, where the name and authority of the whole have been made subservient to the interests of some one of the parties, more powerful or more cunning than the rest.

The intelligence of the new treaty diffused general joy throughout Italy. In Venice, in particular, it was greeted with *fêtes,* illuminations, and the most emphatic public rejoicing, under the very eyes of the French minister, who was compelled to witness this unequivocal testimony of the detestation in which his countrymen were held.[47]

[47] Comines, Mémoires, p. 96.—Comines takes great credit to himself for his perspicacity in detecting the secret negotiations carried on at Venice against his master. According to Bembo, however, the affair was managed with such profound caution as to escape his notice until it was officially announced by the doge himself; when he was so much astounded by the intelligence that he was obliged to ask the secretary of the senate, who accompanied him home, the particulars of what the doge had said, as his ideas were so confused at the time that he had not perfectly comprehended it. Istoria Viniziana, lib. 2, pp. 128, 129.*

* [The account given by Bembo is based apparently on that of the contemporary Venetian diarist Malipiero, whose Annali Veneti have been published in the Archivio storico Italiano, tom. viii. But the veracity of Comines in this, as in other cases in which it has been hastily impugned, can be established on the highest possible authority. The minutes of the Venetian senate at this period are still preserved in the so-called "Secret Archives," and it is there recorded that on the 30th of March, the day *before* the treaty was signed, the French ambassador *presented himself* before the senate and urged the inexpediency of the league,—"dimostrava l'inutilità della lega." See Romanin, Storia documentata di Venezia, tom. v. (Venezia, 1856). His consternation when informed, in the public audience to which he was summonded two days later, that the treaty had been concluded on the previous evening, is admitted by himself. It proceeded not from any previous ignorance of the negotiations, but from a natural inference that the preparations to give effect to the agreement were

The tidings fell heavily on the ears of the French in Naples. It dispelled the dream of idle dissipation in which they were dissolved. They felt little concern, indeed, on the score of their Italian enemies, whom their easy victories taught them to regard with the same insolent contempt that the paladins of romance are made to feel for the unknightly rabble, myriads of whom they could overturn with a single lance. But they felt serious alarm as they beheld the storm of war gathering from other quarters,—from Spain and Germany, in defiance of the treaties by which they had hoped to secure the neutrality of those powers. Charles saw the necessity of instant action. Two courses presented themselves; either to strengthen himself in his new conquests and prepare to maintain them until he could receive fresh reinforcements from home, or to abandon them altogether and retreat across the Alps before the allies could muster in

in a more advanced state than was actually the case, and from consequent alarm for the safety of the king. ("J'avoye le cœur serré et estoye en grant doubte de la personne du Roy et de toute sa compaignie, et cuydoye leur cas plus prest qu'il n'estoit.") It would have been strange indeed if so astute a diplomatist had observed the extraordinary conflux of envoys at Venice and found himself excluded from their conclaves, without, as Bembo pretends, "having the least suspicion of what was going on." The ignorance was on the side of the diarists, who knew only of the public audience to which Comines was summoned, not of the previous private one of his own seeking. The fragments which have been preserved of his correspondence at this period, and two letters of the duke of Orleans to the duke of Bourbon, attest his activity in gathering information and communicating it to his master, besides confirming particulars mentioned in his memoirs. (See Mlle. Dupont's edition, tom. iii., preuves.) Nor is it just to say that he "takes great credit to himself for his perspicacity in detecting the secret negotiations." He merely tells us that he had good means of procuring information, which he paid for, and he says that the king received similar warnings from his agents at Rome and Milan.—K.]

sufficient strength to oppose him. With the indiscretion characteristic of his whole enterprise, he embraced a middle course, and lost the advantages which would have resulted from the exclusive adoption of either.

The principal light by which we are to be guided through the remainder of this history is the Aragonese annalist, Zurita, whose great work, although less known abroad than those of some more recent Castilian writers, sustains a reputation at home unsurpassed by any other in the great, substantial qualities of an historian. The notice of his life and writings has been swelled into a bulky quarto by Dr. Diega Dormer, in a work entitled "Progressos de la Historia en el Reyno de Aragon. Zaragoza, 1680;" from which I extract a few particulars.

Gerónimo Zurita, descended from an ancient and noble family, was born at Saragossa, December 4th, 1512. He was matriculated at an early age in the university of Alcalá. He there made extraordinary proficiency, under the immediate instruction of the learned Nuñez de Guzman, commonly called El Pinciano. He became familiar with the ancient and a variety of modern tongues, and attracted particular attention by the purity and elegance of his Latinity. His personal merits, and his father's influence, recommended him, soon after quitting the university, to the notice of the emperor Charles V. He was consulted and employed in affairs of public importance, and subsequently raised to several posts of honor, attesting the entire confidence reposed in his integrity and abilities. His most honorable appointment, however, was that of national historiographer.

In 1547, an act passed the cortes general of Aragon, providing for the office of national chronicler, with a fixed salary, whose duty it should be to compile, from authentic sources, a faithful history of the monarchy. The talents and eminent qualifications of Zurita recommended him to this post, and he was raised to it by the unanimous consent of the legislature, in the following year, 1548. From this time be conscientiously devoted himself to the execution of his great task. He visited every part of his own country, as well as Sicily and Italy, for the purpose of collecting materials. The public archives, and every accessible source of information, were freely thrown open to his inspection by order of the government; and he returned from his literary pilgrimage with a large accumulation of rare and original documents. The first portion of his annals was published at Saragossa, in two volumes folio, 1562. The work was not completed until nearly twenty years later, and the last two volumes were printed under his own eye at Saragossa, in 1580, a few months only before his death. This edition, being one of those

used in the present history, is in large folio, fairly executed, with double columns on the page, in the fashion of most of the ancient Spanish historians. The whole work was again published, as before, at the expense of the state, in 1585, by his son, amended and somewhat enlarged, from the manuscripts left by his father. Bouterwek has fallen into the error of supposing that no edition of Zurita's Annals appeared till after the reign of Philip II., who died in 1592. (Geschichte der Poesie und Beredsamkeit, Band iii. S. 319.)

No incidents worthy of note seem to have broken the peaceful tenor of Zurita's life; which he terminated at Saragossa, in the sixty-eighth year of his age, in the monastery of Santa Engracia, to which he had retired during a temporary residence in the city, to superintend the publication of his Annals. His rich collection of books and manuscripts was left to the Carthusian monastery of Aula Dei; but, from accident or neglect, the greater part have long since perished. His remains were interred in the convent where he died, and a monument, bearing a modest inscription, was erected over them by his son.

The best monument of Zurita, however, is his Annals. They take up the history of Aragon from its first rise after the Arabic conquest, and continue it to the death of Ferdinand the Catholic. The reign of this prince, as possessing the largest interest and importance, is expanded into two volumes folio; being one-third of the whole work.

The minuteness of Zurita's investigations has laid him open to the charge of prolixity, especially in the earlier and less important periods. It should be remembered, however, that his work was to be the great national repository of facts, interesting to his own countrymen, but which, from difficulty of access to authentic sources, could never before be fully exhibited to their inspection. But, whatever be thought of his redundancy, in this or the subsequent parts of his narrative, it must be admitted that he has uniformly and emphatically directed the attention of the reader to the topics most worthy of it; sparing no pains to illustrate the constitutional antiquities of the country, and to trace the gradual formation of her liberal polity, instead of wasting his strength on mere superficial gossip, like most of the chroniclers of the period.

There is no Spanish historian less swayed by party or religious prejudice, or by the feeling of nationality, which is so apt to overflow in the loyal effusions of the Castilian writers. This laudable temperance, indeed, has brought on him the rebuke of more than one of his patriotic countrymen. There is a sobriety and coolness in his estimate of historical evidence, equally removed from temerity on the one hand, and credulity on the other; in short, his whole manner is that of a man conversant with public business and free from the closet pedantry which too often characterizes the monkish annalists. The greater part of his life was passed under the reign of Charles

V., when the spirit of the nation was not yet broken by arbitrary power, nor debased by the melancholy superstition which settled on it under his successor; an age in which the memory of ancient liberty had not wholly faded away, and when, if men did not dare express all they thought, they at least thought with a degree of independence which gave a masculine character to their expression. In this, as well as in the liberality of his religious sentiments, he may be compared favorably with his celebrated countryman Mariana, who, educated in the cloister, and at a period when the nation was schooled to maxims of depotism, exhibits few glimpses of the sound criticism and reflection which are to be found in the writings of his Aragonese rival. The seductions of style, however, the more fastidious selection of incidents, in short, the superior graces of narration, have given a wider fame to the former, whose works have passed into most of the cultivated languages of Europe, while those of Zurita remain, as far as I am aware, still undisturbed in the vernacular.

STATES of the CHURCH
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
ROME
Ostia
Veletri
St. Germano
Fondi
Itri
Mola
Gaeta
Garigliano R.
Ponte Corvo
Sessa
TERRA DE LA VORO
Capua
NAPLES
Benevento
ABRUZZI
CAPITINATE
APULIA
PRINCIPALITY ULTERIOR
PRINCIPALITY OF SALERNO
Ofanto R.
Melfi
Cerignola
Venosa
Trani
Barletta
Bari
BASILICATE
UPPER CALABRIA
Tarento
GULF OF TARENTO
Messina
Seminara
Reggio
LOWER CALABRIA
MAP FOR
Gonsalvo de Cordova's
campaigns in
ITALY.

CHAPTER II

ITALIAN WARS—RETREAT OF CHARLES VIII.—CAMPAIGNS OF GONSALVO DE CORDOVA—FINAL EXPULSION OF THE FRENCH

1495–1496

Impolitic Conduct of Charles—He plunders the Works of Art—Gonsalvo de Cordova—His Brilliant Qualities—Raised to the Italian Command—Battle of Seminaria—Gonsalvo's Successes—Decline of the French—He receives the Title of Great Captain—Expulsion of the French from Italy

CHARLES THE EIGHTH might have found abundant occupation, during his brief residence at Naples, in placing the kingdom in a proper posture of defence, and in conciliating the good will of the inhabitants, without which he could scarcely hope to maintain himself permanently in his conquest. So far from this, however, he showed the utmost aversion to business, wasting his hours, as has been already noticed, in the most frivolous amusements. He treated the great feudal aristocracy of the country with utter neglect; rendering himself difficult of access, and lavishing all dignities and emoluments with partial prodigality on his French subjects. His followers disgusted the nation still further by their insolence and unbridled licentiousness. The people naturally called to mind the virtues of the exiled Ferdinand, whose temperate rule they contrasted with the rash and rapacious conduct of their new mas-

ters. The spirit of discontent spread more widely, as the French were too thinly scattered to enforce subordination. A correspondence was entered into with Ferdinand in Sicily, and in a short time several of the most considerable cities of the kingdom openly avowed their allegiance to the house of Aragon.[1]

In the mean time, Charles and his nobles, satiated with a life of inactivity and pleasure, and feeling that they had accomplished the great object of the expedition, began to look with longing eyes towards their own country. Their impatience was converted into anxiety on receiving tidings of the coalition mustering in the north. Charles, however, took care to secure to himself some of the spoils of victory, in a manner which we have seen practised on a much greater scale by his countrymen in our day. He collected the various works of art with which Naples was adorned, precious antiques, sculptured marble and alabaster, gates of bronze curiously wrought, and such architectural ornaments as were capable of transportation, and caused them to be embarked on board his fleet for the south of France, "endeavoring," says the Curate of Los Palacios, "to build up his own renown on the ruins of the kings of Naples, of glorious memory." His vessels, however, did not reach their place of destination, but were captured by a Biscayan and Genoese fleet off Pisa.[2]

[1] Comines, Mémoires, liv. 7, chap. 17.—Summonte, Hist. di Napoli, tom. iii. lib. 6, cap. 2.—Giannone, Istoria di Napoli, lib. 29, cap. 2.

[2] Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 140–143.—Cicero, in his charges against Verres, makes a remark respecting the Greeks, that

Charles had entirely failed in his application to Pope Alexander the Sixth for a recognition of his right to Naples by a formal act of investiture.[3] He determined, however, to go through the ceremony of a coronation; and, on the 12th of May, he made his public entrance into the city, arrayed in splendid robes of scarlet and ermine, with the imperial diadem on his head, a sceptre in one hand, and a globe, the symbol of universal sovereignty, in the other; while the adulatory populace saluted his royal ear with the august title of Emperor. After the conclusion of this farce, he made preparations for his instant departure from Naples. On the 20th of May he set out on his homeward march, at the head of one-half of his army, amounting in all to not more than nine thousand fighting-men. The other half was left for the defence of his new conquest. This arrangement was highly impolitic, since he neither took with him enough to cover his retreat, nor left enough to secure the preservation of Naples.[4]

may well apply to the plundered Italians of Charles VIII.'s day and our own: "Deinde hic ornatus, hæc opera, atque artificia, signa, tabulæ pictæ, Græcos homines nimio opere delectant. Itaque ex illorum querimoniis intelligere possumus hæc illis acerbissima videri, quæ nobis forsitan levia et contemnenda esse videantur. Mihi credite, judices, cùm multas acceperint per hosce annos socii atque exteræ nationes calamitates et injurias, nullas Græci homines graviùs tulerunt, nec ferunt, quàm hujuscemodi spoliationes fanorum atque oppidorum."—Actio ii. lib. 4, cap. 59.

[3] Summonte, Hist. di Napoli, tom. iii. lib. 6, cap. 2.—According to Giannone (Istoria di Napoli, lib. 29, cap. 2), he did obtain the investiture from the pope; but this statement is contradicted by several, and confirmed by none, of the authorities I have consulted.

[4] Brantôme, Hommes illustres, Œuvres, tom. ii. pp. 3–5.—Comines, Mémoires, liv. 8, chap. 2.—The particulars of the coronation are recorded with punctilious precision by André de la Vigne, secretary of Queen Anne. (Hist. de Charles VIII., p. 201.) Daru has con-

It is not necessary to follow the French army in its retrograde movement through Italy. It is enough to say that this was not conducted with sufficient despatch to anticipate the junction of the allied forces, who assembled to dispute its passage on the banks of the Taro, near Fornovo. An action was there fought, in which King Charles, at the head of his loyal chivalry, achieved such deeds of heroism as shed a lustre over his ill-concerted enterprise, and which, if they did not gain him an undisputed victory, secured the fruits of it, by enabling him to effect his retreat without further molestation. At Turin he entered into negotiation with the calculating duke of Milan, which terminated in the treaty of Vercelli, October 10th, 1495. By this treaty Charles obtained no other advantage than that of detaching his cunning adversary from the coalition. The Venetians, although refusing to accede to it, made no opposition to any arrangement which would expedite the removal of their formidable foe beyond the Alps. This was speedily accomplished; and Charles, yielding to his own impatience and that of his nobles, recrossed that mountain rampart which nature has so ineffectually provided for the security of Italy, and reached Grenoble with his army on the 27th of the month. Once more restored to his own dominions, the young monarch abandoned himself without reserve to the licentious pleasures to which he was passionately addicted, forgetting alike his dreams of ambition,

founded this farce with Charles's original entry into Naples in February. Hist. de Venise, tom. iii. liv. 20, p. 247.

and the brave companions-in-arms whom he had deserted in Italy. Thus ended this memorable expedition, which, though crowned with complete success, was attended with no other permanent result to its authors than that of opening the way to those disastrous wars which wasted the resources of their country for a great part of the sixteenth century.[5]

Charles the Eighth had left as his viceroy in Naples Gilbert de Bourbon, duke of Montpensier, a prince of the blood, and a brave and loyal nobleman, but of slender military capacity, and so fond of his bed, says Comines, that he seldom left it before noon. The command of the forces in Calabria was intrusted to M. d'Aubigny, a Scottish cavalier of the house of Stuart, raised by Charles to the dignity of grand constable of France. He was so much esteemed for his noble and chivalrous qualities that he was styled by the annalists of that day, says Brantôme, "grand chevalier sans reproche." He had large experience in military matters, and was reputed one of the best officers in the French service. Besides these principal commanders, there were others of subordinate rank stationed at the head of small detachments on different points of the kingdom, and especially in the fortified cities along the coasts.[6]

[5] Villeneuve, Mémoires, apud Petitot, Collection de Mémoires, tom. xiv. pp. 262, 263.—Flassan, Diplomatie Française, tom. i. pp. 267–269.—Comines, Mémoires, liv. 8, chap. 10–12, 18.—"Les conquêtes," observes Montesquieu, "sont aisées à faire, parce qu'on les fait avec toutes ses forces; elles sont difficiles à conserver, parce qu'on ne les défend qu'avec une partie de ses forces."—Grandeur et Décadence des Romains, chap. 4.

[6] Comines, Mémoires, liv. 8, chap. 1.—Brantôme, Hommes illustres, tom. ii. p. 59.

Scarcely had Charles the Eighth quitted Naples, when his rival, Ferdinand, who had already completed his preparations in Sicily, made a descent on the southern extremity of Calabria. He was supported in this by the Spanish levies under the admiral Requesens, and Gonsalvo of Cordova, who reached Sicily in the month of May. As the latter of these commanders was destined to act a most conspicuous part in the Italian wars, it may not be amiss to give some account of his early life.

Gonzalo Fernandez de Cordova, or Aguilar, as he is sometimes styled from the territorial title assumed by his branch of the family, was born at Montilla, in 1453. His father died early, leaving two sons, Alonso de Aguilar, whose name occurs in some of the most brilliant passages of the war of Granada, and Gonsalvo, three years younger than his brother. During the troubled reigns of John the Second and Henry the Fourth, the city of Cordova was divided by the feuds of the rival families of Cabra and Aguilar; and it is reported that the citizens of the latter faction, after the loss of their natural leader, Gonsalvo's father, used to testify their loyalty to his house by bearing the infant children along with them in their rencontres: thus Gonsalvo may be said to have been literally nursed amid the din of battle.[7]

On the breaking out of the civil wars, the two brothers attached themselves to the fortunes of Alfonso and Isabella. At their court, the young Gonsalvo soon attracted attention by the uncom-

[7] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernado, lib. 2, cap. 7.—Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, lib. 1, pp. 204, 205.

GONSALVO DE CÓRDOVA (EL GRAN CAPITAN)

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[illegible] wars, the two [illegible] to the fortunes of [illegible] their court, the young [illegible] by the uncom-

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Goupil & Cie. Paris.

mon beauty of his person, his polished manners, and proficiency in all knightly exercises. He indulged in a profuse magnificence in his apparel, equipage, and general style of living; a circumstance which, accompanied with his brilliant qualities, gave him the title at the court of *el príncipe de los cavalleros,* the prince of cavaliers. This carelessness of expense, indeed, called forth more than once the affectionate remonstrance of his brother Alonso, who, as the elder son, had inherited the *mayorazgo,* or family estate, and who provided liberally for Gonsalvo's support. He served during the Portuguese war under Alonso de Cardenas, grand master of St. James, and was honored with the public commendations of his general for his signal display of valor at the battle of Albuera; where, it was remarked, the young hero incurred an unnecessary degree of personal hazard by the ostentatious splendor of his armor. Of his commander, and of the count of Tendilla, Gonsalvo always spoke with the greatest deference, acknowledging that he had learned the rudiments of war from them.[8]

The long war of Granada, however, was the great school in which his military discipline was perfected. He did not, it is true, occupy so eminent a position in these campaigns as some other chiefs of riper years and more enlarged experience; but on various occasions he displayed uncommon proofs both of address and valor. He particularly distinguished himself at the capture

[8] Pulgar, Sumario de las Hazañas del Gran Capitan (Madrid, 1834), p. 145.—Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, lib. 1, pp. 205 et seq.

of Tajara, Illora, and Monte Frio. At the last place, he headed the scaling-party, and was the first to mount the walls in the face of the enemy. He wellnigh closed his career in a midnight skirmish before Granada, which occurred a short time before the end of the war. In the heat of the struggle his horse was slain; and Gonsalvo, unable to extricate himself from the morass in which he was entangled, would have perished, but for a faithful servant of the family, who mounted him on his own horse, briefly commending to his master the care of his wife and children. Gonsalvo escaped, but his brave follower paid for his loyalty with his life. At the conclusion of the war, he was selected, together with Ferdinand's secretary Zafra, in consequence of his plausible address, and his familiarity with the Arabic, to conduct the negotiation with the Moorish government. He was secretly introduced for this purpose by night into Granada, and finally succeeded in arranging the terms of capitulation with the unfortunate Abdallah, as has been already stated. In consideration of his various services, the Spanish sovereigns granted him a pension and a large landed estate in the conquered territory.[9]

After the war, Gonsalvo remained with the

[9] Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 90.—Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, lib. 1, pp. 211, 212.—Conde, Dominacion de los Arabes, tom, iii. cap. 42.—Quintana, Españoles célebres, tom. i. pp. 207–216.—Pulgar, Sumario, p. 193.—Florian has given circulation to a popular error by his romance of "Gonsalve de Cordoue," where the young warrior is made to play a part he is by no means entitled to, as hero of the Granadine war. Graver writers, who cannot lawfully plead the privilege of romancing, have committed the same error. See, among others, Varillas, Politique de Ferdinand, p. 3.

court, and his high reputation and brilliant exterior made him one of the most distinguished ornaments of the royal circle. His manners displayed all the romantic gallantry characteristic of the age, of which the following, among other instances, is recorded. The queen accompanied her daughter Joanna on board the fleet which was to bear her to Flanders, the country of her destined husband. After bidding adieu to the infanta, Isabella returned in her boat to the shore; but the waters were so swollen that it was found difficult to make good a footing for her on the beach. As the sailors were preparing to drag the bark higher up the strand, Gonsalvo, who was present, and dressed, as the Castilian historians are careful to inform us, in a rich suit of brocade and crimson velvet, unwilling that the person of his royal mistress should be profaned by the touch of such rude hands, waded into the water, and bore the queen in his arms to the shore, amid the shouts and plaudits of the spectators. The incident may form a counterpart to the well-known anecdote of Sir Walter Raleigh.[10]

Isabella's long and intimate acquaintance with Gonsalvo enabled her to form a correct estimate

[10] Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, p. 214.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan Gonzalo Hernandez de Cordova y Aguilar (Alcalá de Henares, 1584), cap. 23.—Another example of his gallantry occurred during the Granadine war, when the fire of Santa Fe had consumed the royal tent, with the greater part of the queen's apparel and other valuable effects, Gonsalvo, on learning the disaster, at his castle of Illora, supplied the queen so abundantly from the magnificent wardrobe of his wife, Doña Maria Manrique, as led Isabella pleasantly to remark that "the fire had done more execution in his quarters than in her own." Pulgar, Sumario, p. 187.

of his great talents. When the Italian expedition was resolved on, she instantly fixed her eyes on him as the most suitable person to conduct it. She knew that he possessed the qualities essential to success in a new and difficult enterprise,—courage, constancy, singular prudence, dexterity in negotiation, and inexhaustible fertility of resource. She accordingly recommended him, without hesitation, to her husband, as the commander of the Italian army. He approved her choice, although it seems to have caused no little surprise at the court, which, notwithstanding the favor in which Gonsalvo was held by the sovereigns, was not prepared to see him advanced over the heads of veterans, of so much riper years and higher military renown than himself. The event proved the sagacity of Isabella.[11]

The part of the squadron destined to convey the new general to Sicily was made ready for sea in the spring of 1495. After a tempestuous voyage, he reached Messina on the 24th of May. He found that Ferdinand of Naples had already begun operations in Calabria, where he had occupied Reggio with the assistance of the admiral Requesens, who reached Sicily with a part of the armament a short time previous to Gonsalvo's arrival. The whole effective force of the Spaniards did not exceed six hundred lances and fifteen hundred foot, besides those employed in the fleet, amounting to about three thousand five hundred more. The finances of Spain had been too freely

[11] Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, p. 214.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 23.

drained in the late Moorish war to authorize any extraordinary expenditure; and Ferdinand designed to assist his kinsman rather with his name than with any great accession of numbers. Preparations, however, were going forward for raising additional levies, especially among the hardy peasantry of the Asturias and Galicia, on which the war of Granada had fallen less heavily than on the south.[12]

On the 26th of May, Gonsalvo de Cordova crossed over to Reggio in Calabria, where a plan of operations was concerted between him and the Neapolitan monarch. Before opening the campaign, several strong places in the province, which owed allegiance to the Aragonese family, were placed in the hands of the Spanish general, as security for the reimbursement of expenses incurred by his government in the war. As Gonsalvo placed little reliance on his Calabrian or Sicilian recruits, he was obliged to detach a considerable part of his Spanish forces to garrison these places.[13]

[12] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, cap. 7, 24.—Quintana, Españoles célebres, tom. i. p. 222.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, ubi supra.—Giovio, in his biography of Gonsalvo, estimates these forces at 5000 foot and 600 horse, which last in his History he raises to 700. I have followed Zurita, as presenting the more probable statement, and as generally more accurate in all that relates to his own nation. It is a hopeless task to attempt to reconcile the manifold inaccuracies, contradictions, and discrepancies which perplex the narratives of the writers on both sides, in everything relating to numerical estimates. The difficulty is greatly increased by the extremely vague application of the term *lance,* as we meet with it including six, four, three, or even a less number of followers, as the case might be.

[13] Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 26, cap. 10.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, cap. 7.—The occupation of these places by Gonsalvo excited the pope's jealousy as to the designs of the Spanish

The presence of their monarch revived the dormant loyalty of his Calabrian subjects. They thronged to his standard, till at length he found himself at the head of six thousand men, chiefly composed of the raw militia of the country. He marched at once with Gonsalvo on St. Agatha, which opened its gates without resistance. He then directed his course towards Seminara, a place of some strength about eight leagues from Reggio. On his way he cut in pieces a detachment of French on its march to reinforce the garrison there. Seminara imitated the example of St. Agatha, and, receiving the Neapolitan army without opposition, unfurled the standard of Aragon on its walls. While this was going forward, Antonio Grimani, the Venetian admiral, scoured the eastern coasts of the kingdom with a fleet of four-and-twenty galleys, and, attacking the strong town of Monopoli, in the possession of the French, put the greater part of the garrison to the sword.

D'Aubigny, who lay at this time with an inconsiderable body of French troops in the south of Calabria, saw the necessity of some vigorous movement to check the further progress of the enemy. He determined to concentrate his forces, scattered through the province, and march against

sovereigns. In consequence of his remonstrances, the Castilian envoy, Garcilasso de la Vega, was instructed to direct Gonsalvo that, "in case any inferior places had been since put into his hands, he should restore them; if they were of importance, however, he was first to confer with his own government." King Ferdinand, as Abarca assures his readers, "was unwilling to give cause of complaint to any one, *unless he were greatly a gainer by it.*" Reyes de Aragon, rey 30, cap. 8.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. v. lib. 2, cap. 8.

Ferdinand, in the hope of bringing him to a decisive action. For this purpose, in addition to the garrisons dispersed among the principal towns, he summoned to his aid the forces, consisting principally of Swiss infantry, stationed in the Basilicate under Précy, a brave young cavalier, esteemed one of the best officers in the French service. After the arrival of this reinforcement, aided by the levies of the Angevin barons, D'Aubigny, whose effective strength now greatly surpassed that of his adversary, directed his march towards Seminara.[14]

Ferdinand, who had received no intimation of his adversary's junction with Précy, and who considered him much inferior to himself in numbers, no sooner heard of his approach than he determined to march out at once, before he could reach Seminara, and give him battle. Gonsalvo was of a different opinion. His own troops had too little experience in war with the French and Swiss veterans to make him willing to risk all on the chances of a single battle. The Spanish heavy-armed cavalry, indeed, were a match for any in Europe, and were even said to surpass every other in the beauty and excellence of their appointments, at a period when arms were finished to luxury.[15] He had but a handful of these, however; by far the greatest part of his cavalry consisting

[14] Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, pp. 215–217.—Idem, Hist. sui Temporis, pp. 83–85.—Bembo, Istoria Viniziana, lib. 3, pp. 160, 185.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, cap. 8.—Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 2, pp. 88, 92.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 25.

[15] Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, lib. 1.—Du Bos, Ligue de Cambray, introd., p. 58.

of *ginetes,* or light-armed troops, of inestimable service in the wild guerilla warfare to which they had been accustomed in Granada, but obviously incapable of coping with the iron *gendarmerie* of France. He felt some distrust, too, in bringing his little corps of infantry without further preparation, armed, as they were, only with short swords and bucklers, and much reduced, as has been already stated, in number, to encounter the formidable phalanx of Swiss pikes. As for the Calabrian levies, he did not place the least reliance on them. At all events, he thought it prudent, before coming to action, to obtain more accurate information than they now possessed of the actual strength of the enemy.[16]

In all this, however, he was overruled by the impatience of Ferdinand and his followers. The principal Spanish cavaliers, indeed, as well as the Italian, among whom may be found names which afterwards rose to high distinction in these wars, urged Gonsalvo to lay aside his scruples; representing the impolicy of showing any distrust of their own strength at this crisis, and of balking the ardor of their soldiers, now hot for action. The Spanish chief, though far from being convinced, yielded to these earnest remonstrances, and King Ferdinand led out his little army without further delay against the enemy.

After traversing a chain of hills stretching in an easterly direction from Seminara, at the distance of about three miles he arrived before a

[16] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, cap. 7.—Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, ubi supra.

small stream, on the plains beyond which he discerned the French army in rapid advance against him. He resolved to await its approach; and, taking position on the slope of the hills towards the river, he drew up his horse on the right wing, and his infantry on the left.[17]

The French generals, D'Aubigny and Précy, putting themselves at the head of their cavalry on the left, consisting of about four hundred heavy-armed and twice as many light horse, dashed into the water without hesitation. Their right was occupied by the bristling phalanx of Swiss spearmen in close array; behind these were the militia of the country. The Spanish *ginetes* succeeded in throwing the French gendarmerie into some disorder before it could form after crossing the stream; but no sooner was this accomplished than the Spaniards, incapable of withstanding the charge of their enemy, suddenly wheeled about and precipitately retreated, with the intention of again returning on their assailants, after the fashion of the Moorish tactics. The Calabrian militia, not comprehending this manœuvre, interpreted it into a defeat. They thought the battle lost, and, seized with a panic, broke their ranks, and fled to a man, before the Swiss infantry had time so much as to lower its lances against them.

King Ferdinand in vain attempted to rally the dastardly fugitives. The French cavalry was soon upon them, making frightful slaughter in

[17] Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, lib. 1, pp. 216, 217.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 24.—Quintana, Españoles célebres, tom. i. pp. 223–227.

their ranks. The young monarch, whose splendid arms and towering plumes made him a conspicuous mark in the field, was exposed to imminent peril. He had broken his lance in the body of one of the foremost of the French cavaliers, when his horse fell under him, and, as his feet were entangled in the stirrups, he would inevitably have perished in the mêlée, but for the prompt assistance of a young nobleman named Juan de Altavilla, who mounted his master on his own horse and calmly awaited the approach of the enemy, by whom he was immediately slain. Instances of this affecting loyalty and self-devotion not unfrequently occur in these wars, throwing a melancholy grace over the darker and more ferocious features of the time.[18]

Gonsalvo was seen in the thickest of the fight, long after the king's escape, charging the enemy briskly at the head of his handful of Spaniards, not in the hope of retrieving the day, but of covering the flight of the panic-struck Neapolitans. At length he was borne along by the rushing tide, and succeeded in bringing off the greater part of his cavalry safe to Seminara. Had the French followed up the blow, the greater part of the royal army, with probably King Ferdinand and Gonsalvo at its head, would have fallen into their hands; and thus not only the fate of the campaign, but of Naples itself, would have been permanently decided by this battle. Fortunately,

[18] Giovio, Hist. sui Temporis, lib. 3, pp. 83–85.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 24.—Summonte, Hist. di Napoli, tom. iii. lib. 6, cap. 2.—Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 2, p. 112.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, p. 690.

the French did not understand so well how to use a victory as how to gain it. They made no attempt to pursue. This is imputed to the illness of their general, D'Aubigny, occasioned by the extreme unhealthiness of the climate. He was too feeble to sit long on his horse, and was removed into a litter as soon as the action was decided. Whatever was the cause, the victors by this inaction suffered the golden fruits of victory to escape them. Ferdinand made his escape on the same day on board a vessel which conveyed him back to Sicily; and Gonsalvo, on the following morning before break of day, effected his retreat across the mountains to Reggio, at the head of four hundred Spanish lances. Thus terminated the first battle of importance in which Gonsalvo of Cordova held a distinguished command; the only one which he lost during his long and fortunate career. Its loss, however, attached no discredit to him, since it was entered into in manifest opposition to his judgment. On the contrary, his conduct throughout this affair tended greatly to establish his reputation, by showing him to be no less prudent in council than bold in action.[19]

King Ferdinand, far from being disheartened by his defeat, gained new confidence from his experience of the favorable dispositions existing towards him in Calabria. Relying on a similar feeling of loyalty in his capital, he determined to hazard a bold stroke for its recovery, and that, too, instantly, before his late discomfiture should have

[19] Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 1, p. 112.—Giovio, Hist. sui Temporis, lib. 3, p. 85—Lanuza, Historias, tom. i. lib. 1, cap. 7.

time to operate on the spirits of his partisans. He accordingly embarked at Messina, with a handful of troops only, on board the fleet of the Spanish admiral, Requesens. It amounted in all to eighty vessels, most of them of inconsiderable size. With this armament, which, notwithstanding its formidable show, carried little effective force for land-operations, the adventurous young monarch appeared off the harbor of Naples before the end of June.

Charles's viceroy, the duke of Montpensier, at that time garrisoned Naples with six thousand French troops. On the appearance of the Spanish navy, he marched out to prevent Ferdinand's landing, leaving a few only of his soldiers to keep the city in awe. But he had scarcely quitted it before the inhabitants, who had waited with impatience an opportunity for throwing off the yoke, sounded the tocsin, and, rising to arms through every part of the city and massacring the feeble remains of the garrison, shut the gates against him; while Ferdinand, who had succeeded in drawing off the French commander in another direction, no sooner presented himself before the walls than he was received with transports of joy by the enthusiastic people.[20]

The French, however, though excluded from the city, by making a circuit effected an entrance into the fortresses which commanded it. From

[20] Summonte, Hist. di Napoli, tom. vi. p. 519.—Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 2, pp. 113, 114.—Giovio, Hist. sui Temporis, lib. 3, pp. 87, 88.—Villeneuve, Mémoires, apud Petitot, Collection des Mémoires, tom. xiv. pp. 264, 265.

these posts, Montpensier sorely annoyed the town, making frequent attacks on it, day and night, at the head of his gendarmerie, until they were at length checked in every direction by barricades which the citizens hastily constructed with wagons, casks of stones, bags of sand, and whatever came most readily to hand. At the same time, the windows, balconies, and house-tops were crowded with combatants, who poured down such a deadly shower of missiles on the heads of the French as finally compelled them to take shelter in their defences. Montpensier was now closely besieged, till at length, reduced by famine, he was compelled to capitulate. Before the term prescribed for his surrender had arrived, however, he effected his escape at night, by water, to Salerno, at the head of twenty-five hundred men. The remaining garrison, with the fortresses, submitted to the victorious Ferdinand in the beginning of the following year. And thus, by one of those sudden turns which belong to the game of war, the exiled prince, whose fortunes a few weeks before had appeared perfectly desperate, was again established in the palace of his ancestors.[21]

Montpensier did not long remain in his new quarters. He saw the necessity of immediate action, to counteract the alarming progress of the enemy. He quitted Salerno before the end of winter, strengthening his army by such reinforce-

[21] Giovio, Hist. sui Temporis, lib. 3, pp. 88–90, 114–119.—Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 2, pp. 114–117.—Summonte, Hist. di Napoli, tom. vi. pp. 520, 521.

ments as he could collect from every quarter of the country. With this body he directed his course towards Apulia, with the intention of bringing Ferdinand, who had already established his headquarters there, to a decisive engagement. Ferdinand's force, however, was so far inferior to that of his antagonist as to compel him to act on the defensive until he had been reinforced by a considerable body of troops from Venice. The two armies were then so equally matched that neither cared to hazard all on the chances of a battle; and the campaign wasted away in languid operations, which led to no important result.

In the mean time, Gonsalvo de Cordova was slowly fighting his way up through southern Calabria. The character of the country, rough and mountainous, like the Alpujarras, and thickly sprinkled with fortified places, enabled him to bring into play the tactics which he had learned in the war of Granada. He made little use of heavy-armed troops, relying on his *ginetes,* and still more on his foot; taking care, however, to avoid any direct encounter with the dreaded Swiss battalions. He made amends for paucity of numbers and want of real strength by rapidity of movement and the wily tactics of Moorish warfare; darting on the enemy where least expected, surprising his strongholds at dead of night, entangling him in ambuscades, and desolating the country with those terrible forays whose effects he had so often witnessed on the fair vegas of Granada. He adopted the policy practised by his master, Ferdinand the Catholic, in the Moorish

war, lenient to the submissive foe, but wreaking terrible vengeance on such as resisted.[22]

The French were sorely disconcerted by these irregular operations, so unlike anything to which they were accustomed in European warfare. They were further disheartened by the continued illness of D'Aubigny, and by the growing disaffection of the Calabrians, who in the southern provinces contiguous to Sicily were particularly well inclined to Spain.

Gonsalvo, availing himself of these friendly dispositions, pushed forward his successes, carrying one stronghold after another, until by the end of the year he had overrun the whole of Lower Calabria. His progress would have been still more rapid but for the serious embarrassments which he experienced from want of supplies. He had received some reinforcements from Sicily, but very few from Spain; while the boasted Galician levies, instead of fifteen hundred, had dwindled to scarcely three hundred men; who arrived in the most miserable plight, destitute of clothing and munitions of every kind. He was compelled to weaken still further his inadequate force by garrisoning the conquered places, most of which, however, he was obliged to leave without any defence at all. In addition to this, he was so destitute of the necessary funds for the payment of his troops that he was detained nearly two months at Nicastro, until February, 1496, when he re-

[22] Bembo, Istoria Viniziana, lib. 3, pp. 173, 174.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 26.—Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, lib. 1, p. 218.—Villeneuve, Mémoires, p. 313.—Sismondi, Républiques Italiennes, tom. xii. p. 386.

ceived a remittance from Spain. After this, he resumed operations with such vigor that by the end of the following spring he had reduced all Upper Calabria, with the exception of a small corner of the province, in which D'Aubigny still maintained himself. At this crisis he was summoned from the scene of his conquests to the support of the king of Naples, who lay encamped before Atella, a town intrenched among the Apennines, on the western borders of the Basilicate.[23]

The campaign of the preceding winter had terminated without any decisive results, the two armies of Montpensier and King Ferdinand having continued in sight of each other without ever coming to action. These protracted operations were fatal to the French. Their few supplies were intercepted by the peasantry of the country; their Swiss and German mercenaries mutinied and deserted for want of pay; and the Neapolitans in their service went off in great numbers, disgusted with the insolent and overbearing manners of their new allies. Charles the Eighth, in the mean while, was wasting his hours and health in the usual round of profligate pleasures. From the moment of recrossing the Alps he seemed to have shut out Italy from his thoughts. He was equally insensible to the supplications of the few Italians at his court, and the remonstrances of his French nobles, many of whom,

[23] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, cap. 11, 20.—Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 2, p. 140.—Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, lib. 1, pp. 219, 220.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 25, 26.

although opposed to the first expedition, would willingly have undertaken a second to support their brave comrades, whom the heedless young monarch now abandoned to their fate.[24]

At length Montpensier, finding no prospect of relief from home, and straitened by the want of provisions, determined to draw off from the neighborhood of Benevento, where the two armies lay encamped, and retreat to the fruitful province of Apulia, whose principal places were still garrisoned by the French. He broke up his camp secretly at dead of night, and gained a day's march on his enemy before the latter began his pursuit. This Ferdinand pushed with such vigor, however, that he overtook the retreating army at the town of Atella, and completely intercepted its further progress. This town, which, as already noticed, is situated on the western skirts of the Basilicate, lies in a broad valley encompassed by a lofty amphitheatre of hills, through which flows a little river, tributary to the Ofanto, watering the town, and turning several mills which supplied it with flour. At a few miles' distance was the strong place of Ripa Candida, garrisoned by the

[24] Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 3, pp. 140, 157, 158.—Comines, Mémoires, liv. 8, chap. 23, 24.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 183.—Du Bos discriminates between the character of the German levies or *landsknechts* and the Swiss, in the following terms: "Les lansquenets étoient même de beaucoup mieux faits, généralement parlant, et de bien meilleure mine sous les armes, que les fantassins Suisses; mais ils étoient incapables de discipline. Au contraire des Suisses, ils étoient sans obéissance pour leurs chefs, et sans amitié pour leurs camarades." (Ligue de Cambray, tom. i., dissert. prélim., p. 66.) Comines confirms the distinction, with a high tribute to the loyalty of the Swiss, which has continued their honorable characteristic to the present day. Mémoires, liv. 8, chap. 21.

French, through which Montpensier hoped to maintain his communications with the fertile regions of the interior.

Ferdinand, desirous if possible to bring the war to a close by the capture of the whole French army, prepared for a vigorous blockade. He disposed his forces so as to intercept supplies by commanding the avenues to the town in every direction. He soon found, however, that his army, though considerably stronger than his rival's, was incompetent to this without further aid. He accordingly resolved to summon to his support Gonsalvo de Cordova, the fame of whose exploits now resounded through every part of the kingdom.[25]

The Spanish general received Ferdinand's summons while encamped with his army at Castrovillari, in the north of Upper Calabria. If he complied with it, he saw himself in danger of losing all the fruits of his long campaign of victories; for his active enemy would not fail to profit by his absence to repair his losses. If he refused obedience, however, it might defeat the most favorable opportunity which had yet presented itself for bringing the war to a close. He resolved, therefore, at once to quit the field of his triumphs and march to King Ferdinand's relief. But, before his departure, he prepared to strike such a blow as should, if possible, incapacitate his enemy for any effectual movement during his absence.

[25] Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, lib. 1, pp. 218, 219.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 28.—Quintana, Españoles célebres, tom. i. p. 226.—Bembo, Istoria Viniziana, lib. 3, p. 184.—Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 3, p. 158.

He received intelligence that a considerable number of Angevin lords, mostly of the powerful house of San Severino, with their vassals and a reinforcement of French troops, were assembled at the little town of Laino, on the northwestern borders of Upper Calabria, where they lay awaiting a junction with D'Aubigny. Gonsalvo determined to surprise this place, and capture the rich spoils which it contained, before his departure. His road lay through a wild and mountainous country. The passes were occupied by the Calabrian peasantry in the interest of the Angevin party. The Spanish general, however, found no difficulty in forcing a way through this undisciplined rabble, a large body of whom he surrounded and cut to pieces as they lay in ambush for him in the valley of Murano. Laino, whose base is washed by the waters of the Lao, was defended by a strong castle built on the opposite side of the river, and connected by a bridge with the town. All approach to the place by the highroad was commanded by this fortress. Gonsalvo obviated this difficulty, however, by a circuitous route across the mountains. He marched all night, and, fording the waters of the Lao about two miles above the town, entered it with his little army before break of day, having previously detached a small corps to take possession of the bridge. The inhabitants, startled from their slumbers by the unexpected appearance of the enemy in their streets, hastily seized their arms and made for the castle on the other side of the river. The pass, however, was occupied by the

Spaniards; and the Neapolitans and French, hemmed in on every side, began a desperate resistance, which terminated with the death of their chief, Americo San Severino and the capture of such of his followers as did not fall in the mêlée. A rich booty fell into the hands of the victors. The most glorious prize, however, was the Angevin barons, twenty in number, whom Gonsalvo, after the action, sent prisoners to Naples. This decisive blow, of which the tidings spread like wild-fire throughout the country, settled the fate of Calabria. It struck terror into the hearts of the French, and crippled them so far as to leave Gonsalvo little cause for anxiety during his proposed absence.[26]

The Spanish general lost no time in pressing forward on his march towards Atella. Before quitting Calabria he had received a reinforcement of five hundred soldiers from Spain; and his whole Spanish forces, according to Giovio, amounted to one hundred men-at-arms, five hundred light cavalry, and two thousand foot, picked men, and well schooled in the hardy service of the late campaign.[27] Although a great part of his march lay through a hostile country, he encountered little opposition; for the terror of his name, says the writer last quoted, had everywhere gone before him. He arrived before Atella at the be-

[26] Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, pp. 219, 220.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 27.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 2, cap. 26.—Quintana, Españoles célebres, tom. i. pp. 227, 228.—Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 3, pp. 158, 159.—Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 26, cap. 12.

[27] Giovio, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 4, p. 132.

ginning of July. The king of Naples was no sooner advised of his approach than he marched out of the camp, attended by the Venetian general, the marquis of Mantua, and the papal legate, Cæsar Borgia, to receive him. All were eager to do honor to the man who had achieved such brilliant exploits; who, in less than a year, had made himself master of the larger part of the kingdom of Naples, and that with the most limited resources, in defiance of the bravest and best-disciplined soldiery in Europe. It was then, according to the Spanish writers, that he was by general consent greeted with the title of the Great Captain; by which he is much more familiarly known in Spanish, and, it may be added, in most histories of the period, than by his own name.[28]

[28] Quintana, Españoles célebres, tom. i. p. 228.—Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, lib. 1, p. 220.—The Aragonese historians are much ruffled by the irreverent manner in which Guicciardini notices the origin of the cognomen of the Great Captain; which even his subsequent panegyric cannot atone for: "Era capitano Consalvo Ernandes, di casa d' Aghilar, di patria Cordovese, uomo di molto valore, ed esercitato lungamente nelle guerre di Granata, il quale nel principio della venuta sua in Italia, cognominato *dalla jattanza Spagnuola* il Gran Capitano, per significare con questo titolo la suprema podestà sopra loro, meritò per le preclare vittorie che ebbe dipoi, che per consentimento universale gli fosse confermato e perpetuato questo sopranome, per significazione di virtù grande, e di grande eccellenza nella disciplina militare." (Istora, tom. i. p. 112.) According to Zurita, the title was not conferred till the Spanish general's appearance before Atella, and the first example of its formal recognition was in the instrument of capitulation at that place. (Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, cap. 27.) This seems to derive support from the fact that Gonsalvo's biographer and contemporary, Giovio, begins to distinguish him by that epithet from this period. Abarca assigns a higher antiquity to it, quoting the words of the royal grant of the duchy of Sessa, made to Gonsalvo, as authority. (Reyes de Aragon, rey 39, cap. 9.) In a former edition I intimated my doubt of the historian's accuracy. A subsequent inspection of the instrument itself, in a work since come into my possession,

Gonsalvo found the French sorely distressed by the blockade, which was so strictly maintained as to allow few supplies from abroad to pass into the town. His quick eye discovered at once, however, that in order to render it perfectly effectual it would be necessary to destroy the mills in the vicinity, which supplied Atella with flour. He undertook this, on the day of his arrival, at the head of his own corps. Montpensier, aware of the importance of these mills, had stationed a strong guard for their defence, consisting of a body of Gascon archers and the Swiss pikemen. Although the Spaniards had never been brought into direct collision with any large masses of this formidable infantry, yet occasional rencontres with small detachments, and increased familiarity with its tactics, had stripped it of much of its terrors. Gonsalvo had even so far profited by the example of the Swiss as to strengthen his infantry by mingling the long pikes with the short swords and bucklers of the Spaniards.[29]

He formed his cavalry into two divisions, posting his handful of heavy-armed with some of the light horse, so as to check any sally from the town, while he destined the remainder to support the infantry in the attack upon the enemy. Having made these arrangements, the Spanish chieftain led on his men confidently to the charge. The

shows this distrust to have been well founded; for it is there simply said that the title was conferred in Italy. Pulgar, Sumario, p. 138.

[29] This was improving on the somewhat similar expedient ascribed by Polybius to King Pyrrhus, who mingled alternate cohorts, armed with short weapons after the Roman fashion, with those of his Macedonian spearmen. Lib. 17, sec. 24.

Gascon archery, however, seized with a panic, scarcely awaited his approach, but fled shamefully, before they had time to discharge a second volley of arrows, leaving the battle to the Swiss. These latter, exhausted by the sufferings of the siege, and dispirited by long reverses and by the presence of a new and victorious foe, did not behave with their wonted intrepidity, but, after a feeble resistance, abandoned their position and retreated towards the city. Gonsalvo, having gained his object, did not care to pursue the fugitives, but instantly set about demolishing the mills, every vestige of which, in a few hours, was swept from the ground. Three days after, he supported the Neapolitan troops in an assault on Ripa Candida, and carried that important post, by means of which Atella maintained a communication with the interior.[30]

Thus cut off from all their resources, and no longer cheered by hopes of succor from their own country, the French, after suffering the severest privations and being reduced to the most loathsome aliment for subsistence, made overtures for a capitulation. The terms were soon arranged with the king of Naples, who had no desire but to rid his country of the invaders. It was agreed that if the French commander did not receive assistance in thirty days, he should evacuate Atella, and cause every place holding under him in the kingdom of Naples, with all its artillery,

[30] Giovio, Hist. sui Temporis, lib. 4, p. 133.—Idem, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, pp. 220, 221.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, cap. 27.—Chrònica del Gran Capitan, cap. 28.—Quintana, Españoles célebres, tom. i. p. 229.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, rey 30, cap. 9.

to be surrendered to King Ferdinand, and that, on these conditions, his soldiers should be furnished with vessels to transport them back to France; that the foreign mercenaries should be permitted to return to their own homes; and that a general amnesty should be extended to such Neapolitans as returned to their allegiance in fifteen days.[31]

Such were the articles of capitulation, signed on the 21st of July, 1496, which Comines, who received the tidings at the court of France, does not hesitate to denounce as "a most disgraceful treaty, without parallel, save in that made by the Roman consuls at the Caudine Forks, which was too dishonorable to be sanctioned by their countrymen." The reproach is certainly unmerited, and comes with ill grace from a court which was wasting in riotous indulgence the very resources indispensable to the brave and loyal subjects who were endeavoring to maintain its honor in a foreign land.[32]

Unfortunately, Montpensier was unable to enforce the full performance of his own treaty; as many of the French refused to deliver up the places intrusted to them, under the pretence that their authority was derived, not from the viceroy, but from the king himself. During the discussion of this point the French troops were removed to Baia and Pozzuolo and the adjacent places on the coast. The unhealthiness of the situation, to-

[31] Villeneuve, Mémoires, p. 318.—Comines, Mémoires, liv. 8, chap. 21.—Giovio, Hist. sui Temporis, lib. 4, p. 136.

[32] Comines, Mémoires, liv. 8, chap. 21.

gether with that of the autumnal season, and an intemperate indulgence in fruits and wine, soon brought on an epidemic among the soldiers, which swept them off in great numbers. The gallant Montpensier was one of the first victims. He refused the earnest solicitations of his brother-in-law, the marquis of Mantua, to quit his unfortunate companions and retire to a place of safety in the interior. The shore was literally strewed with the bodies of the dying and the dead. Of the whole number of Frenchmen, amounting to not less than five thousand, who marched out of Atella, not more than five hundred ever reached their native country. The Swiss and other mercenaries were scarcely more fortunate. "They made their way back as they could through Italy," says a writer of the period, "in the most deplorable state of destitution and suffering, the gaze of all, and a sad example of the caprice of fortune." [33] Such was the miserable fate of that brilliant and formidable array which scarcely two years before had poured down on the fair fields of Italy in all the insolence of expected conquest. Well would it be if the name of every conqueror, whose successes, though built on human misery, are so dazzling to the imagination, could be made to point a moral for the instruction of his species, as effectually as that of Charles the Eighth.

The young king of Naples did not live long to enjoy his triumphs. On his return from Atella

[33] Giovio, Hist. sui Temporis, p. 137.—Comines, Mémoires, liv. 8, chap. 21.—Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, lib. 1, p. 221.—Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 3, p. 160.—Villeneuve, Mémoires, apud Petitot, tom. xiv. p. 318.

he contracted an inauspicious marriage with his aunt, a lady of nearly his own age, to whom he had been long attached. A careless and somewhat intemperate indulgence in pleasure, succeeding the hardy life which he had been lately leading, brought on a flux which carried him off in the twenty-eighth year of his age and second of his reign. (Sept. 7th, 1496.) He was the fifth monarch who, in the brief compass of three years, had sat on the disastrous throne of Naples.

Ferdinand possessed many qualities suited to the turbulent times in which he lived. He was vigorous and prompt in action, and naturally of a high and generous spirit. Still, however, he exhibited glimpses, even in his last hours, of an obliquity, not to say ferocity, of temper, which characterized many of his line, and which led to ominous conjectures as to what would have been his future policy.[34] He was succeeded on the throne by his uncle Frederick, a prince of a gentle disposition, endeared to the Neapolitans by repeated acts of benevolence, and by a magnanimous regard for justice, of which the remarkable fluctuations of his fortune had elicited more than one example. His amiable virtues, however, required a kindlier soil and season for their expansion, and, as the event proved, made him no match

[34] Giannone, Istoria di Napoli, lib. 29, cap. 2.—Summonte, Hist. di Napoli, lib. 6, cap. 2.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 188.—While stretched on his death-bed, Ferdinand, according to Bembo, caused the head of his prisoner, the Bishop of Teano, to be brought to him and laid at the foot of his couch, that he might be assured with his own eyes of the execution of the sentence. Istoria Viniziana, lib. 3, p. 189.

for the subtle and unscrupulous politicians of the age.

His first act was a general amnesty to the disaffected Neapolitans, who felt such confidence in his good faith that they returned, with scarcely an exception, to their allegiance. His next measure was to request the aid of Gonsalvo de Cordova in suppressing the hostile movements made by the French during his absence from Calabria. At the name of the Great Captain, the Italians flocked from all quarters, to serve without pay under a banner which was sure to lead them to victory. Tower and town, as he advanced, went down before him; and the French general, D'Aubigny, soon saw himself reduced to the necessity of making the best terms he could with his conqueror, and evacuating the province altogether. The submission of Calabria was speedily followed by that of the few remaining cities in other quarters, still garrisoned by the French; comprehending the last rood of territory possessed by Charles the Eighth in the kingdom of Naples.[35]

Our narrative now leads us on the beaten track of Italian history. I have endeavored to make the reader acquainted with the peculiar character and pretensions of the principal Spanish authorities on whom I have relied in the progress of the work. This would be superfluous in regard to the Italians, who enjoy the rank of classics, not only in their own country, but throughout Europe, and have furnished the earliest models among the moderns of historic composition. Fortunately, two of the most eminent of them, Guicciardini and Paolo Giovio, lived at the period of our narrative, and have embraced the whole extent of it in their histories. These two

[35] Giovio, Hist. sui Temporis, lib. 4, p. 139.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, cap. 30, 33.—Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 3, p. 160.—Giannone, Istoria di Napoli, tom. iii. lib. 29, cap. 3.

writers, besides the attractions of elegant scholarship, and talent, occupied a position which enabled them to take a clear view of all the principal political movements of their age; circumstances which have made their accounts of infinite value in respect to foreign transactions, as well as domestic. Guicciardini was a conspicuous actor in the scenes he describes; and a long residence at the court of Ferdinand the Catholic opened to him the most authentic sources of information in regard to Spain. Giovio, from his intimate relations with the principal persons of his time, had also access to the best sources of knowledge; while in the notice of foreign transactions he was but little exposed to those venal influences which led him too often to employ the golden or iron pen of history as interest dictated. Unfortunately, a lamentable hiatus occurs in his greatest work, "Historiæ sui Temporis," embracing the whole period intervening between the end of Charles VIII.'s expedition and the accession of Leo X., in 1513. At the time of the memorable sack of Rome by the Duke of Bourbon, in 1527, Giovio deposited his manuscript, with a quantity of plate, in an iron chest, which he hid in an obscure corner of the church of Santa Maria sopra Minerva. The treasure, however, did not escape the searching eyes of two Spanish soldiers, who broke open the chest, and one of them seized on the plate, regarding the papers of no value. The other, not being quite such a fool, says Giovio, preserved such of the manuscripts as were on vellum and ornamented with rich bindings, but threw away what was written on paper.

The part thus thrown away contained six books, relating to the period above mentioned, which were never afterwards recovered. The soldier brought the remainder to their author, who bought them at the price of a vacant benefice, which he persuaded the pope to confer on the freebooter, in his native land of Cordova. It is not often that simony has found so good an apology. The deficiency, although never repaired by Giovio, was in some degree supplied by his biographies of eminent men, and, among others, by that of Gonsalvo de Cordova, in which he has collected with great industry all the events of any interest in the life of this great commander. The narrative is in general corroborated by the Spanish authorities, and contains some additional particulars, especially respecting his early life, which Giovio's personal intimacy with the principal characters of the period might easily have furnished.

This portion of our story is, moreover, illustrated by the labors of M. Sismondi, in his "Républiques Italiennes," which may undoubtedly claim to be ranked among the most remarkable historical achievements of our time; whether we consider the dexterous management of the narrative, or the admirable spirit of philosophy by which it is illumined. It must be admitted that he has perfectly succeeded in unravelling the intricate web of Italian politics; and, notwithstanding the complicated and, indeed, motley character of

his subject, the historian has left a uniform and harmonious impression on the mind of the reader. This he has accomplished by keeping constantly in view the principle which regulated all the various movements of the complex machinery; so that his narrative becomes, what he terms it in his English abridgment, a history of Italian liberty. By keeping this principle steadily before him, he has been able to solve much that hitherto was dark and problematical in his subject; and, if he has occasionally sacrificed something to theory, he has, on the whole, pursued the investigation in a truly philosophical manner, and arrived at results the most honorable and cheering to humanity.

Fortunately, his own mind was deeply penetrated with reverence for the free institutions which he has analyzed. If it is too much to say that the historian of republics should be himself a republican, it is at least true that his soul should be penetrated to its very depths with the spirit which animates them. No one who is not smitten with the love of freedom can furnish the key to much that is enigmatical in her character, and reconcile his readers to the harsh and repulsive features that she sometimes wears, by revealing the beauty and grandeur of the soul within.

That portion of our narrative which is incorporated with Italian story is too small to occupy much space on Sismondi's plan. He has discussed it, moreover, in a manner not very favorable to the Spaniards, whom he seems to have regarded with somewhat of the aversion with which an Italian of the sixteenth century viewed the ultramontane barbarians of Europe. Perhaps the reader may find some advantage in contemplating another side of the picture, and studying the less familiar details presented by the Spanish authorities.

CHAPTER III

ITALIAN WARS—GONSALVO SUCCORS THE POPE—TREATY WITH FRANCE—ORGANIZATION OF THE SPANISH MILITIA

1496–1498

Gonsalvo succors the Pope—Storms Ostia—Reception in Rome—Peace with France—Ferdinand's Reputation advanced by his Conduct in the War—Organization of the Militia

IT had been arranged by the treaty of Venice, that, while the allies were carrying on the war in Naples, the emperor elect and the king of Spain should make a diversion in their favor, by invading the French frontiers. Ferdinand had performed his part of the engagement. Ever since the beginning of the war, he had maintained a large force along the borders from Fontarabia to Perpignan. In 1496, the regular army kept in pay amounted to ten thousand horse and fifteen thousand foot; which, together with the Sicilian armament, necessarily involved an expenditure exceedingly heavy under the financial pressure occasioned by the Moorish war. The command of the levies in Roussillon was given to Don Enrique Enriquez de Guzman, who, far from acting on the defensive, carried his men repeatedly over the border, sweeping off fifteen or twenty thousand head of cattle in a single foray, and ravaging the

country as far as Carcassona and Narbonne.[1] The French, who had concentrated a considerable force in the south, retaliated by similar inroads, in one of which they succeeded in surprising the fortified town of Salsas. The works, however, were in so dilapidated a state that the place was scarcely tenable, and it was abandoned on the approach of the Spanish army. A truce soon followed, which put an end to further operations in that quarter.[2]

The submission of Calabria seemed to leave no further occupation for the arms of the Great Captain in Italy. Before quitting that country, however, he engaged in an adventure which, as narrated by his biographers, forms a brilliant episode to his regular campaigns. Ostia, the seaport of Rome, was among the places in the papal territory forcibly occupied by Charles the Eighth, and on his retreat had been left to a French garrison under the command of a Biscayan adventurer named Menaldo Guerri. The place was so situated as entirely to command the mouth of the Tiber, enabling the piratical horde who garrisoned it almost wholly to destroy the commerce of Rome, and even to reduce the city to great distress for

[1] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, cap. 12, 14, 16, 24.—Giovio says, in allusion to King Ferdinand's show of preparation on the frontier, "Ferdinandus, maximè cautus et pecuniæ tenax, speciem ingentis coacti exercitûs ad deterrendos hostes præbere, quam bellum gerere mallet, quum id sine ingenti pecuniâ administrari non posse intelligeret." Hist. sui Temporis, p. 140.

[2] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, cap. 35, 36.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, rey 30, cap. 9.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 5.—Comines, Mémoires, liv. 8, chap. 23.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 169.

want of provisions. The imbecile government, incapable of defending itself, implored Gonsalvo's aid in dislodging this nest of formidable freebooters. The Spanish general, who was now at leisure, complied with the pontiff's solicitations, and soon after presented himself before Ostia with his little corps of troops, amounting in all to three hundred horse and fifteen hundred foot.[3]

Guerri, trusting to the strength of his defences, refused to surrender. Gonsalvo, after coolly preparing his batteries, opened a heavy cannonade on the place, which at the end of five days effected a practicable breach in the walls. In the mean time, Garcilasso de la Vega, the Castilian ambassador at the papal court, who could not bear to remain inactive so near the field where laurels were to be won, arrived to Gonsalvo's support, with a handful of his own countrymen resident in Rome. This gallant little band, scaling the walls on the opposite side to that assailed by Gonsalvo, effected an entrance into the town, while the garrison was occupied with maintaining the breach against the main body of the Spaniards. Thus surprised, and hemmed in on both sides, Guerri and his associates made no further resistance, but surrendered themselves prisoners of war; and Gonsalvo, with more clemency than was usually shown on such occasions, stopped the carnage, and reserved his captives to grace his entry into the capital.[4]

[3] Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, lib. 1, p. 221.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 30.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 3, cap. 1, —Villeneuve, Mémoires, p. 317.

[4] Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, p. 222.—Quintana, Españoles célebres, tom. i. p. 234.

This was made a few days after, with all the pomp of a Roman triumph. The Spanish general entered by the gate of Ostia, at the head of his martial squadrons in battle-array, with colors flying and music playing, while the rear was brought up by the captive chief and his confederates, so long the terror, now the derision of the populace. The balconies and windows were crowded with spectators, and the streets lined with multitudes, who shouted forth the name of Gonsalvo de Cordova, the "deliverer of Rome!" The procession took its way through the principal streets of the city towards the Vatican, where Alexander the Sixth awaited its approach, seated under a canopy of state in the chief saloon of the palace, surrounded by his great ecclesiastics and nobility. On Gonsalvo's entrance, the cardinals rose to receive him. The Spanish general knelt down to receive the benediction of the pope; but the latter, raising him up, kissed him on the forehead, and complimented him with the golden rose, which the Holy See was accustomed to dispense as the reward of its most devoted champions.

In the conversation which ensued, Gonsalvo obtained the pardon of Guerri and his associates, and an exemption from taxes for the oppressed inhabitants of Ostia. In a subsequent part of the discourse, the pope taking occasion most inopportunely to accuse the Spanish sovereigns of unfavorable dispositions towards himself, Gonsalvo replied with much warmth, enumerating the various good offices rendered by them to the church, and, soundly taxing the pope with ingratitude,

somewhat bluntly advised him to reform his life and conversation, which brought scandal on all Christendom. His Holiness testified no indignation at this unsavory rebuke of the Great Captain, though, as the historians with some *naïveté* inform us, he was greatly surprised to find the latter so fluent in discourse, and so well instructed in matters foreign to his profession.[5]

Gonsalvo experienced the most honorable reception from King Frederick on his return to Naples. During his continuance there, he was lodged and sumptuously entertained in one of the royal fortresses; and the grateful monarch requited his services with the title of Duke of St. Angelo, and an estate in Abruzzo containing three thousand vassals. He had before pressed these honors on the victor, who declined accepting them till he had obtained the consent of his own sovereigns. Soon after, Gonsalvo, quitting Naples, revisited Sicily, where he adjusted certain differences which had arisen betwixt the viceroy and the inhabitants respecting the revenues of the island. Then embarking with his whole force, he reached the shores of Spain in the month of August, 1498. His return to his native land was greeted with a general enthusiasm far more grateful to his patriotic heart than any homage or honors conferred by foreign princes. Isabella welcomed him with pride and satisfaction, as having fully vindicated her preference of him to

[5] Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, p. 222.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 3, cap. 1.—Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 3, p. 175.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 30.

his more experienced rivals for the difficult post of Italy; and Ferdinand did not hesitate to declare that the Calabrian campaigns reflected more lustre on his crown than the conquest of Granada.[6]

The total expulsion of the French from Naples brought hostilities between that nation and Spain to a close. The latter had gained her point, and the former had little heart to resume so disastrous an enterprise. Before this event, indeed, overtures had been made by the French court for a separate treaty with Spain. The latter, however, was unwilling to enter into any compact without the participation of her allies. After the total abandonment of the French enterprise, there seemed to exist no further pretext for prolonging the war. The Spanish government, moreover, had little cause for satisfaction with its confederates. The emperor had not co-operated in the descent on the enemy's frontier, according to agreement; nor had the allies ever reimbursed Spain for the heavy charges incurred in fulfilling her part of the engagements. The Venetians were taken up with securing to themselves as much of the Neapolitan territory as they could, by way of indemnification for their own expenses.[7] The duke of Milan had already made a separate treaty with King Charles. In short, every member of the

[6] Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, p. 223.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 31, 32.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 3, cap. 38.

[7] Comines says, with some *naïveté*, in reference to the places in Naples which the Venetians had got into their possession, "Je croy que leur intention n'est point de les rendre; car ils ne l'ont point de coustume quand elles leur sont bienséantes comme sont cellescy, qui sont du costé de leur goufre de Venise." Mémoires, p. 194.

league, after the first alarm subsided, had shown itself ready to sacrifice the common weal to its own private ends. With these causes of disgust, the Spanish government consented to a truce with France, to begin for itself on the 5th of March, and for the allies, if they chose to be included in it, seven weeks later, and to continue till the end of October, 1497. This truce was subsequently prolonged, and, after the death of Charles the Eighth, terminated in a definitive treaty of peace, signed at Marcoussi, August 5th, 1498.[8]

In the discussions to which these arrangements gave rise, the project is said to have been broached for the conquest and division of the kingdom of Naples by the combined powers of France and Spain, which was carried into effect some years later. According to Comines, the proposition originated with the Spanish court, although it saw fit, in a subsequent period of the negotiations, to disavow the fact.[9] The Spanish writers, on the other hand, impute the first suggestion of it to the French, who, they say, went so far as to specify the details of the partition subsequently adopted; according to which the two Calabrias were assigned to Spain. However this may be, there is little doubt that Ferdinand had long since enter-

[8] Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 3, p. 178.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, cap. 44; lib. 3, cap. 13, 19, 21, 26.—Comines, Mémoires, liv. 8, chap. 23.

[9] Comines gives some curious details respecting the French embassy, which he considers to have been completely outwitted by the superior management of the Spanish government; who intended nothing further at this time by the proposal of a division than to amuse the French court until the fate of Naples should be decided. Mémoires, liv. 8, chap. 23.

tained the idea of asserting his claim, at some time or other, to the crown of Naples. He, as well as his father, and indeed the whole nation, had beheld with dissatisfaction the transfer of what they deemed their rightful inheritance, purchased by the blood and treasure of Aragon, to an illegitimate branch of the family. The accession of Frederick, in particular, who came to the throne with the support of the Angevin party, the old enemies of Aragon, had given great umbrage to the Spanish monarch.

The Castilian envoy, Garcilasso de la Vega, agreeably to the instructions of his court, urged Alexander the Sixth to withhold the investiture of the kingdom from Frederick, but unavailingly, as the pope's interests were too closely connected by marriage with those of the royal family of Naples. Under these circumstances, it was somewhat doubtful what course Gonsalvo should be directed to pursue in the present exigency. That prudent commander, however, found the new monarch too strong in the affections of his people to be disturbed at present. All that now remained for Ferdinand, therefore, was to rest contented with the possession of the strong posts pledged for the reimbursement of his expenses in the war, and to make such use of the correspondence which the late campaigns had opened to him in Calabria, that, when the time arrived for action, he might act with effect.[10]

[10] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, cap. 26, 33.—Mariana, Hist. de España, lib. 26, cap. 16.—Salazar de Mendoza, Monarquía, tom. i. lib. 3, cap. 10.

Ferdinand's conduct through the whole of the Italian war had greatly enhanced his reputation throughout Europe for sagacity and prudence. It afforded a most advantageous comparison with that of his rival, Charles the Eighth, whose very first act had been the surrender of so important a territory as Roussillon. The construction of the treaty relating to this, indeed, laid the Spanish monarch open to the imputation of artifice. But this, at least, did no violence to the political maxims of the age, and only made him regarded as the more shrewd and subtile diplomatist; while, on the other hand, he appeared before the world in the imposing attitude of the defender of the church, and of the rights of his injured kinsman. His influence had been clearly discernible in every operation of moment, whether civil or military. He had been most active, through his ambassadors at Genoa, Venice, and Rome, in stirring up the great Italian confederacy, which eventually broke the power of King Charles; and his representations had tended, as much as any other cause, to alarm the jealousy of Sforza, to fix the vacillating politics of Alexander, and to quicken the cautious and dilatory movements of Venice. He had shown equal vigor in action, and contributed mainly to the success of the war by his operations on the side of Roussillon, and still more in Calabria. On the latter, indeed, he had not lavished any extraordinary expenditure; a circumstance partly attributable to the state of his finances, severely taxed, as already noticed, by the Granadine war, as well as by the operations in Roussillon,

but in part, also, to his habitual frugality, which, with a very different spirit from that of his illustrious consort, always stinted the measure of his supplies to the bare exigency of the occasion. Fortunately, the genius of the Great Captain was so fruitful in resources as to supply every deficiency, enabling him to accomplish such brilliant results as effectually concealed any poverty of preparation on the part of his master.

The Italian wars were of signal importance to the Spaniards. Until that time, they had been cooped up within the narrow limits of the Peninsula, uninstructed and taking little interest in the concerns of the rest of Europe.* A new world

* [Lafuente, Historia General de España, vol. x. pp. 58, 59, takes Prescott to task for this statement. He mentions eight kings of Aragon (1213–1479) who were all more or less interested in matters outside the Peninsula. James I. (the Conqueror), Pedro III. (who was forced to grant to his subjects the "General Privilege," the Magna Charta of Aragon, in order to secure their support in his Sicilian wars), Alfonso III., James II., Alfonso IV., Pedro IV., Alfonso V., John II., were all somewhat involved in European affairs because of their relations with the "Two Sicilies." Of Castilian kings, who had outside interests, he mentions Alfonso X. (the Wise) (1252–1284), and Henry II. (1369–1379). The former, during the "Great Interregnum" which came after the fall of the Hohenstauffen, claimed, as did the English "Richard of Cornwall," the title of "King of the Romans" (and showed great wisdom in wasting neither money nor troops to support his claim). The alliances of the latter were entered into that he might humble Portugal. Lafuente also specifies somewhat vaguely "las reciprocas embajadas del Gran Tamorlan y Enrique III. de Castilla (Siglo xiv.) y la Conquista de Canarias," and "la parte que tomaron y la influencia grande que ejercieron los reyes y los prelados de Castilla y Aragon en el asunte del cisma de la Iglesia (Siglos xiv. y xv.) en las Córtes de Europa, en Roma, en los Concilios de Pisa, de Perpiñan, de Constanza, de Basilea, y de Ferrara, sus tratados con el papa, con el rey Francia, con el Emperador y rey de Romanos, y su influjo en el restablecimiento de la unidad de la iglesia."

And yet in his broadly general statement Prescott was right.

was now opened to them. They were taught to measure their own strength by collision with other powers on a common scene of action; and success, inspiring them with greater confidence, seemed to beckon them on towards the field where they were destined to achieve still more splendid triumphs.

This war afforded them also a most useful lesson of tactics. The war of Granada had insensibly trained up a hardy militia, patient and capable of every privation and fatigue, and brought under strict subordination. This was a great advance beyond the independent and disorderly habits of the feudal service. A most valuable corps of light troops had been formed, schooled in all the wild, irregular movements of guerilla warfare. But the nation was still defective in that steady, well-disciplined infantry, which, in the improved condition of military science, seemed destined to decide the fate of battles in Europe thenceforward.

The Calabrian campaigns, which were suited in some degree to the display of their own tactics, fortunately gave the Spaniards opportunity for studying at leisure those of their adversaries. The lesson was not lost. Before the end of the war, important innovations were made in the discipline

The parts the rulers Lafuente specifies took in European affairs they took not as Spanish kings, but as sovereigns of Castile and Aragon, two small states of the Spanish peninsula. Until this time there had not been a Spain in the modern sense of that word. The influence the kings and prelates of Castile and Aragon exerted in healing the "great Schism of the West," and in re-establishing the unity of the church, is not, to put it mildly, largely dilated upon by any of the great church historians.—M.]

and arms of the Spanish soldier. The Swiss pike, or lance, which, as has been already noticed, Gonsalvo de Cordova had mingled with the short sword of his own legions, now became the regular weapon of one-third of the infantry. The division of the various corps in the cavalry and infantry services was arranged on more scientific principles, and the whole, in short, completely reorganized.[11]

Before the end of the war, preparations were made for embodying a national militia, which should take the place of the ancient hermandad. Laws were passed regulating the equipment of every individual according to his property. A man's arms were declared not liable for debt, even to the crown; and smiths and other artificers were restricted, under severe penalties, from working them up into other articles.[12] In 1496, a census

[11] Mem. de la Acad. de Hist., tom. vi. Ilust. 6.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 3, cap. 6.—The ancient Spaniards, who were as noted as the modern for the temper and finish of their blades, used short swords, in the management of which they were very adroit. "Hispano," says Livy, "punctim magis, quam cæsim, adsueto petere hostem, brevitate habiles [gladii] et cum mucronibus." (Hist., lib. 22, cap. 47.) Sandoval notices the short sword, "cortas espadas," as the peculiar weapon of the Spanish soldier in the twelfth century. Historia de los Reyes de Castilla y de Leon (Madrid, 1792), tom. ii. p. 240.

[12] Pragmáticas del Reyno, fol. 83, 127, 129.—The former of these ordinances, dated Taraçona, Sept. 18th, 1495, is extremely precise in specifying the appointments required for each individual. Among other improvements, introduced somewhat earlier, may be mentioned that of organizing and thoroughly training a small corps of heavy-armed cavalry, amounting to twenty-five hundred. The number of men-at-arms had been greatly reduced in the kingdom of late years, in consequence of the exclusive demand for the *ginetes* in the Moorish war. Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS.—Ordinances were also passed for encouraging the breed of horses, which had suffered greatly from the preference very generally

was taken of all persons capable of bearing arms; and by an ordinance, dated at Valladolid, February 22d, in the same year, it was provided that one out of every twelve inhabitants between twenty and forty-five years of age should be enlisted in the service of the state, whether for foreign war or the suppression of disorders at home. The remaining eleven were liable to be called on in case of urgent necessity. These recruits were to be paid during actual service, and excused from taxes; the only legal exempts were the clergy, hidalgos, and paupers. A general review and inspection of arms were to take place every year, in the months of March and September, when prizes were to be awarded to those best accoutred and most expert in the use of their weapons.

given by the Spaniards to mules. This had been carried to such a length that, while it was nearly impossible, according to Bernaldez, to mount ten or twelve thousand cavalry on horses, ten times that number could be provided with mules. (Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 184.) "E porque si a esto se diesse lugar," says one of the *pragmáticas*, adverting to this evil, "muy prestamente se perderia en nuestros reynos la nobleza de la cauellería que en ellos suele auer, e se oluidaria el exercicio militar de que en los tiempos passados nuestra nacion de España ha alcançado gran fama e loor," it was ordered that no person in the kingdom should be allowed to keep a mule unless he owned a horse also, and that none but ecclesiastics and women should be allowed the use of mules in the saddle. These edicts were enforced with the utmost rigor, the king himself setting the example of conformity to them. By these seasonable precautions, the breed of Spanish horses, so long noted throughout Europe, was restored to its ancient credit, and the mule consigned to the humble and appropriate offices of drudgery, or raised only for exportation. For these and similar provisions, see Pragmáticas del Reyno, fol. 127–132.—Matéo Aleman's whimsical *picaresco* novel, Guzman d'Alfarache, contains a comic adventure showing the excessive rigor with which the edict against mules was enforced, as late as the close of Philip II.'s reign. The passage is extracted in Roscoe's elegant version of the Spanish Novelists, vol. i. p. 132.

Such were the judicious regulations by which every citizen, without being withdrawn from his regular occupation, was gradually trained up for the national defence, and which, without the oppressive incumbrance of a numerous standing army, placed the whole effective force of the country, prompt and fit for action, at the disposal of the government, whenever the public good should call for it.[13]

[13] See a copy of the ordinance taken from the Archives of Simancas; apud Mem. de la Acad. de Hist., tom. vi. apend 13. —When Francis I., who was destined to feel the effects of this careful military discipline, beheld, during his detention in Spain in the beginning of the following century, striplings with scanty down upon the chin, all armed with swords at their sides, he is said to have cried out, "O bienaventurada España, que pare y cria los hombres armados!" (L. Marineo, Cosas memorables, lib. 5.) An exclamation not unworthy of a Napoleon,—or an Attila.

CHAPTER IV

ALLIANCES OF THE ROYAL FAMILY—DEATH OF PRINCE JOHN AND PRINCESS ISABELLA

Royal Family of Castile—Matrimonial Alliances with Portugal—With Austria—Marriage of John and Margaret—Death of Prince John—The Queen's Resignation—Independence of the Cortes of Aragon—Death of the Princess Isabella—Recognition of her infant Son Miguel

THE credit and authority which the Spanish sovereigns established by the success of their arms were greatly raised by the matrimonial connections which they formed for their children. This was too important a spring of their policy to be passed over in silence. Their family consisted of one son and four daughters, whom they carefully educated in a manner befitting their high rank, and who repaid their solicitude by exemplary filial obedience, and the early manifestation of virtues rare even in a private station.[1] They seem to have inherited many of the qualities which distinguished their illustrious mother; great decorum

[1] The princess Doña Isabel, the eldest daughter, was born at Dueñas, October 1st, 1470. Their second child and only son, Juan, prince of Asturias, was not born until eight years later, June 30th, 1478, at Seville. Doña Juana, whom the queen used playfully to call her "mother-in-law," *suegra*, from her resemblance to King Ferdinand's mother, was born at Toledo, November 6th, 1479. Doña Maria was born at Cordova, in 1482, and Doña Catalina, the fifth and last child, at Alcalá de Henares, December 5th, 1485. The daughters all lived to reign; but their brilliant destinies were clouded with domestic afflictions, from which royalty could afford no refuge. Carbajal, Anales, MS., loc. mult.

and dignity of manners, combined with ardent sensibilities, and unaffected piety, which, at least in the eldest and favorite daughter, Isabella, was, unhappily, strongly tinctured with bigotry. They could not, indeed, pretend to their mother's comprehensive mind and talent for business, although there seems to have been no deficiency in these respects, or, if any, it was most effectually supplied by their excellent education.[2]

The marriage of the princess Isabella with Alonso, the heir of the Portuguese crown, in 1490, has been already noticed. This had been eagerly desired by her parents, not only for the possible contingency which it afforded of bringing the various monarchies of the Peninsula under one head (a design of which they never wholly lost sight), but from the wish to conciliate a formidable neighbor, who possessed various means of annoyance, which he had shown no reluctance to exert. The reigning monarch, John the Second, a bold and crafty prince, had never forgotten his ancient quarrel with the Spanish sovereigns in support of their rival, Joanna Beltraneja, or Joanna the Nun, as she was generally called in the Castilian court after she had taken the veil. John, in open contempt of the treaty of Alcantara, and indeed of all monastic rule, had not only removed his relative from the convent of Santa Clara, but had permitted her to assume a royal state and subscribe herself "I the Queen." This empty insult

[2] The only exception to these remarks was that afforded by the infanta Joanna, whose unfortunate eccentricities, developed in later life, must be imputed, indeed, to bodily infirmity.

he accompanied with more serious efforts to form such a foreign alliance for the liberated princess as should secure her the support of some arm more powerful than his own, and enable her to renew the struggle for her inheritance with better chance of success.[3] These flagrant proceedings had provoked the admonitions of the Roman see, and had formed the topic, as may be believed, of repeated, though ineffectual, remonstrance from the court of Castile.[4]

It seemed probable that the union of the princess of Asturias with the heir of Portugal, as originally provided by the treaty of Alcantara, would so far identify the interests of the respective parties as to remove all further cause of disquietude. The new bride was received in Portugal in a spirit which gave cordial assurance of these friendly relations for the future; and the court of Lisbon celebrated the auspicious nuptials with the gorgeous magnificence for which, at this period of its successful enterprise, it was distinguished above every other court in Christendom.[5] (Nov. 22d, 1490.)

[3] Nine different matches were proposed for Joanna in the course of her life; but they all vanished into air, and "the excellent lady," as she was usually called by the Portuguese, died as she had lived, in single blessedness, at the ripe age of sixty-eight. In the Mem. de la Acad. de Hist., tom. vi., the 19th Ilustracion is devoted to this topic, in regard to which Father Florez shows sufficient ignorance, or inaccuracy. Reynas Cathólicas, tom. ii. p. 780.

[4] Instructions relating to this matter, written with the queen's own hand, still exist in the Archives of Simancas. Mem. de la Acad. de Hist., ubi supra.

[5] La Clède, Histoire de Portugal, tom. iv. p. 100. The Portuguese historian, Faria y Sousa, expends half a dozen folio pages

Alonso's death, a few months after this event, however, blighted the fair hopes which had begun to open of a more friendly feeling between the two countries. His unfortunate widow, unable to endure the scenes of her short-lived happiness, soon withdrew into her own country, to seek such consolation as she could find in the bosom of her family. There, abandoning herself to the melancholy regrets to which her serious and pensive temper naturally disposed her, she devoted her hours to works of piety and benevolence, resolved to enter no more into engagements which had thrown so dark a cloud over the morning of her life.[6]

On King John's death, in 1495, the crown of Portugal devolved on Emanuel, that enlightened monarch who had the glory in the very commencement of his reign of solving the grand problem, which had so long perplexed the world, of the existence of an undiscovered passage to the East. This prince had conceived a passion for the young and beautiful Isabella during her brief residence in Lisbon; and soon after his accession to the throne he despatched an embassy to the Spanish court inviting her to share it with him. But the princess, wedded to the memory of her early love, declined the proposals, notwithstanding they were

on these royal revelries, which cost six months' preparation, and taxed the wits of the most finished artists and artificers in France, England, Flanders, Castile, and Portugal. (Europa Portuguesa, tom. ii. pp. 452 et seq. We see, throughout, the same luxury of spectacle, the same elegant games of chivalry, as the tilt of reeds, the rings, and the like, which the Castilians adopted from the Spanish Arabs.

[6] Zurita, Hist, del Rey Hernando, tom. v. fol. 38.—Abarca. Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. fol. 312.

strongly seconded by the wishes of her parents, who, however, were unwilling to constrain their daughter's inclinations on so delicate a point, trusting perhaps to the effects of time and the perseverance of her royal suitor.[7]

In the mean while, the Catholic sovereigns were occupied with negotiations for the settlement of the other members of their family. The ambitious schemes of Charles the Eighth established a community of interests among the great European states, such as had never before existed, or, at least, been understood; and the intimate relations thus introduced naturally led to intermarriages between the principal powers, who until this period seem to have been severed almost as far asunder as if oceans had rolled between them. The Spanish monarchs, in particular, had rarely gone beyond the limits of the Peninsula for their family alliances.* The new confederacy into

[7] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. v. fol. 78, 82.—La Clède, Hist. de Portugal, tom. iv. p. 95.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 146.—Martyr, in a letter written at the close of 1496, thus speaks of the princess Isabella's faithful attachment to her husband's memory: "Mira fuit hujus fœminæ in abjiciendis secundis nuptiis constantia. Tanta est ejus modestia, tanta vidualis castitas, ut nec mensâ post mariti mortem comederit, nec lauti quicquam degustaverit. Jejuniis sese vigiliisque ita maceravit, ut sicco stipite siccior sit effecta. Suffulta rubore perturbatur, quandocunque de jugali thalamo sermo intexitur. Parentum tamen aliquando precibus, veluti olfacimus, inflectetur. Viget fama, futuram vestri regis Emmanuelis uxorem." Epist. 171.

* [Lafuente, Historia General de España, x. pp. 65, 66, specifies eighteen rulers of Spanish states who sought family alliances outside the limits of the Peninsula. Most constant in the practice was Alfonso VI. of Castile. He married in succession Ines de Aquitania, Constanza de Borgoña, Beatriz, de familia francesa y toscana, and Isabel, hija del Emperador de Alemania.—M.]

which Spain had entered now opened the way to more remote connections, which were to exercise a permanent influence on the future politics of Europe. It was while Charles the Eighth was wasting his time at Naples that the marriages were arranged between the royal houses of Spain and Austria, by which the weight of these great powers was thrown into the same scale, and the balance of Europe unsettled for the greater part of the following century.[8]

The treaty provided that Prince John, the heir of the Spanish monarchies, then in his eighteenth year, should be united with the princess Margaret, daughter of the emperor Maximilian, and that the archduke Philip, his son and heir, and sovereign of the Low Countries in his mother's right, should marry Joanna, second daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella. No dowry was to be required with either princess.[9]

In the course of the following year, arrangements were also concluded for the marriage of the youngest daughter of the Castilian sovereigns with a prince of the royal house of England, the first example of the kind for more than a century.[10] * Ferdinand had cultivated the good will

[8] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. v. fol. 63.

[9] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. v. lib. 2, cap. 5.—Ferreras, Hist. d'Espagne, tom. viii. p. 160.

[10] I believe there is no instance of such a union, save that of John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster, with Doña Constanza, daughter of Peter the Cruel, in 1371, from whom Queen Isabella was lineally

* [" Another instance which ought not to be passed by was the marriage, in 1388, of Prince Henry of Castile, son of John I., with the princess Catharine, daughter of the same John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster." Lafuente, Hist., Gen. di España, x. p. 67.—M.]

of Henry the Seventh, in the hope of drawing him into the confederacy against the French monarch, and in this had not wholly failed, although the wary king seems to have come into it rather as a silent partner, if we may so say, than with the intention of affording any open or very active co-operation.[11] The relations of amity between the two courts were still further strengthened by the treaty of marriage above alluded to, finally adjusted October 1st, 1496, and ratified the following year, between Arthur, prince of Wales, and the infanta Doña Catalina, conspicuous in English history, equally for her misfortunes and her virtues, as Catharine of Aragon.[12] The

descended on the father's side. The title of *Prince of Asturias,* appropriated to the heir apparent of Castile, was first created for the infant Don Henry, afterwards Henry III., on occasion of his marriage with John of Gaunt's daughter, in 1388. It was professedly in imitation of the English title of Prince of Wales; and Asturias was selected, as that portion of the ancient Gothic monarchy which had never bowed beneath the Saracen yoke. Florez, Reynas Cathòlicas, tom. ii. pp. 708-715.—Mendoza, Dignidades, lib. 3, cap. 23.

[11] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, cap. 25.—Rymer, Fœdera (London, 1727), vol. xii. pp. 638-642.—Ferdinand used his good offices to mediate a peace between Henry VII. and the king of Scots; and it is a proof of the respect entertained for him by both these monarchs, that they agreed to refer their disputes to his arbitration. (Rymer, Fœdera, vol. xii. p. 671.) "And so," says the old chronicler Hall, of the English prince, "beying confederate and alied by treatie and league with al his neighbors, he gratefied with his moost heartie thanks kyng Ferdinand and the quene his wife, to which woman none other was comparable in her tyme, for that they were the mediators, organes, and instrumentes by the which the truce was concluded betwene the Scottish kynge and him, and rewarded his ambassadoure moost liberally and bountefully." Chronicle, p. 483.

[12] See the marriage treaty in Rymer. (Fœdera, vol. xii. pp. 658–666.) The contract had been arranged between the Spanish and English courts as far back as March, 1489, when the elder of the parties had not yet reached the fifth year of her age. This was confirmed by another, more full and definite, in the following year,

French viewed with no little jealousy the progress of these various negotiations, which they zealously endeavored to thwart by all the artifices of diplomacy. But King Ferdinand had sufficient address to secure in his interests persons of the highest credit at the courts of Henry and Maximilian, who promptly acquainted him with the intrigues of the French government and effectually aided in counteracting them.[13]

The English connection was necessarily deferred for some years, on account of the youth of the parties, neither of whom exceeded eleven years of age. No such impediment existed in regard to the German alliances, and measures were taken at once for providing a suitable conveyance for the infanta Joanna into Flanders, which should bring back the princess Margaret on its return.

1490. By this treaty it was stipulated that Catharine's portion should be 200,000 gold crowns, one-half to be paid down at the date of her marriage, and the remainder in two equal payments in the course of the two years ensuing. The prince of Wales was to settle on her one-third of the revenues of the principality of Wales, the dukedom of Cornwall, and the earldom of Chester. Rymer, Fœdera, vol. xii. pp. 411–417.*

[13] "Procuro," says Zurita, "que se effectuassen los matrimonios de sus hijos, no solo con promesas, pero con dadivas que se hizieron a los privados de aquellos principes, que en ello entendian." Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, cap. 3.

* [For the details of the negotiation which preceded the marriage treaty,—characterized by more than the usual amount of meanness and deceit, especially on the side of Henry,—see Bergenroth, Letters, Despatches, and State Papers, vol. i. In the Supplementary Volume the learned editor has devoted much space to documents relating to Catharine's life in England from 1501 to 1510, and to an investigation into her character and conduct during that period. The views which he advances—founded on testimony interesting and important indeed, but inconclusive alike from want of fulness and its often doubtful nature—have not been generally accepted.—K.]

By the end of summer, in 1496, a fleet consisting of one hundred and thirty vessels, large and small, strongly manned and thoroughly equipped with all the means of defence against the French cruisers, was got ready for sea in the ports of Guipuscoa and Biscay.[14] The whole was placed under the direction of Don Fadrique Enriquez,

[14] Historians differ, as usual, as to the strength of this armament. Martyr makes it 110 vessels, and 10,000 soldiers (Opus Epist., epist. 168); while Bernaldez carries the number to 130 sail, and 25,000 soldiers (Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 153). Ferreras adopts the latter estimate (tom. viii. p. 173). Martyr may have intended only the galleys and regular troops, while Bernaldez, more loosely, included vessels and seamen of every description. See also the royal ordinances ap. Coleccion de Cédulas (tom. i. nos. 79, 80, 82), whose language implies a very large number, without specifying it.*

* [Lafuente gives the following account of the armament, copied from the archives of Simancas:

"Armada y provisiones para llevar á Flandes á doña Juana, hÿa de los Reyes Catolicos, quando fué á casarse con el archiduque don Felipe I., en 1496.

"El Armada que con ayuda de N. S. é de su gloriosa Madre tienen acordado el Rey é Reyna Nuestros S. de mandar proveer en buen hora para el viage de la señora achiduquesa es lo siguiente:

	Hombres
Dos Carracas alterosas de Castillos de Cada mil toneladas Cada una con	500
Dos naos de á 500 toneles con	500
Dos naos de á 400 toneles con	400
Seis naos de á 300 toneles con	900
Cuatro naos de á 200 toneles con	400
Cuatro Carabelas vasas, Equipadas de remos con	300
	3000

"En las tripulaciones no se habian de incluir los de la servidumbre de la archiduquesa.

Pilotos, maestres, marineros y demas personas	1000
El Señor Almirante don Fadrique Enriquez con 300 Escuderos, con los Caballeros é continos de su Casa, 100 Espingarderos y 50 ballisteros	450
El Señor Marqués de Astorga 150 Escuderos, 50 Espingarderos y 50 ballisteros	250
El Conde de Luna 100 Escuderos, 50 Espingarderos y ballisteros	150
De Castilia la Vieja peones	400
De Asturias de Saltillana	300
De Trasmiera	200
De Viscaya	550
	3300"

Historia general de España, x. pp. 67–68.—M.]

admiral of Castile, who carried with him a splendid show of chivalry, chiefly drawn from the northern provinces of the kingdom. A more gallant and beautiful armada never before quitted the shores of Spain. The infanta Joanna, attended by a numerous suite, arrived on board the fleet towards the end of August, at the port of Laredo, on the eastern borders of Asturias, where she took a last farewell of the queen her mother, who had postponed the hour of separation as long as possible, by accompanying her daughter to the place of embarkation.

The weather, soon after her departure, became extremely rough and tempestuous; and it was so long before any tidings of the squadron reached the queen, that her affectionate heart was filled with the most distressing apprehensions. She sent for the oldest and most experienced navigators in these boisterous northern seas, consulting them, says Martyr, day and night on the probable causes of delay, the prevalent courses of the winds at that season, and the various difficulties and dangers of the voyage; bitterly regretting that the troubles with France prevented any other means of communication than the treacherous element to which she had trusted her daughter.[15] Her spirits were still further depressed at this juncture by the death of her own mother, the dowager Isabella, who, under the mental infirmity with which she had been visited for many years, had always experienced the most devoted atten-

[15] Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 172.—Carbajal, Anales, MS. año 1496.—Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 26, cap. 12.

tion from her daughter, who ministered to her necessities with her own hands, and watched over her declining years with the most tender solicitude.[16]

At length, the long-desired intelligence came of the arrival of the Castilian fleet at its place of destination. It had been so grievously shattered, however, by tempests, as to require being refitted in the ports of England. Several of the vessels were lost, and many of Joanna's attendants perished from the inclemency of the weather and the numerous hardships to which they were exposed. The infanta, however, happily reached Flanders in safety, and, not long after, her nuptials with the archduke Philip were celebrated at Lille with all suitable pomp and solemnity.

The fleet was detained until the ensuing winter, to transport the destined bride of the young prince of Asturias to Spain. This lady, who had been affianced in her cradle to Charles the Eighth of France, had received her education in the court of Paris. On her intended husband's marriage with the heiress of Brittany, she had been returned to her native land under circumstances of indignity never to be forgiven by the house of Austria. She was now in the seventeenth year of her age, and had already given ample promise of those uncommon powers of mind which distinguished her in riper years, and of which she has left abundant evidence in various written compositions.[17]

[16] Carbajal, Anales, MS., año 1496.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 172.

[17] Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 174.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 6.—Gaillard, Rivalité, tom. iii. pp. 416, 423.—

PHILIP THE HANDSOME

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[16] Peter Martyr, Opus Epist.,

[17] Gaillard, Compendio, [illegible] 416, 423.—

Imp. de Paris

On her passage to Spain, in midwinter, the fleet encountered such tremendous gales that part of it was shipwrecked, and Margaret's vessel had well-nigh foundered. She retained, however, sufficient composure amidst the perils of her situation to indite her own epitaph, in the form of a pleasant distich, which Fontenelle has made the subject of one of his amusing dialogues, where he affects to consider the fortitude displayed by her at this awful moment as surpassing that of the philosophic Adrian in his dying hour, or the vaunted heroism of Cato of Utica.[18] Fortunately, however, Margaret's epitaph was not needed; she arrived in safety at the port of Santander, early in March, 1497.

The young prince of Asturias, accompanied by the king his father, hastened towards the north to receive his royal mistress, whom they met and escorted to Burgos, where she was received with the highest marks of satisfaction by the queen and the whole court. Preparations were instantly made for solemnizing the nuptials of the royal

Sandoval, Historia del Emperador Carlos V. (Amberes, 1681), tom. i. p. 2.—These, comprehending her verses, public addresses, and discourse on her own life, have been collected into a single volume, under the title of "La Couronne Margaritique," Lyons, 1549, by the French writer Jean la Maire de Belges, her faithful follower, whose greatest glory it is to have been the instructor of Clément Marot.

[18] Fontenelle, Œuvres, tom. i. dial. 4.

"Ci gist Margot, la gentil' damoiselle
Qu'a deux maris, et encore est pucelle."

It must be allowed that Margaret's quiet *nonchalance* was much more suited to Fontenelle's habitual taste than the imposing scene of Cato's death. Indeed, the French satirist was so averse to *scenes* of all kinds, that he has contrived to find a ridiculous side in this last act of the patriot Roman.

pair, after the expiration of Lent, in a style of magnificence such as had never before been witnessed under the present reign. The marriage ceremony took place on the 3d of April, and was performed by the archbishop of Toledo in the presence of the grandees and principal nobility of Castile, the foreign ambassadors, and the delegates from Aragon. Among these latter were the magistrates of the principal cities, clothed in their municipal insignia and crimson robes of office, who seem to have had quite as important parts assigned them by their democratic communities, in this and all similar pageants, as any of the nobility or gentry. The nuptials were followed by a brilliant succession of *fêtes,* tourneys, tilts of reeds, and other warlike spectacles, in which the matchless chivalry of Spain poured into the lists to display their magnificence and prowess in the presence of their future queen.[19] The chronicles of the day remarked on the striking contrast exhibited at these entertainments between the gay and familiar manners of Margaret and her Flemish nobles and the pomp and stately ceremonial of the Castilian court, to which, indeed, the Austrian princess, nurtured as she had been in a Parisian atmosphere, could never be wholly reconciled.[20]

[19] That these were not mere holiday sports, was proved by the melancholy death of Alonso de Cardenas, son of the comendador of Leon, who lost his life in a tourney. Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS., bat. 1, quinc. 2, dial. 1.

[20] Carbajal, Anales, MS., año 1497.—Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 26, cap. 16.—Lanuza, Historias, lib. 1, cap. 8.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. fol. 330.—"Y aunque," says the last author, "a la princessa se le dexaron todos sus criados, estilos, y entretenimientos, se la advirtio, que en las ceremonias no havia de

The marriage of the heir apparent could not have been celebrated at a more auspicious period. It was in the midst of negotiations for a general peace, when the nation might reasonably hope to taste the sweets of repose after so many uninterrupted years of war. Every bosom swelled with exultation in contemplating the glorious destinies of the country under the beneficent sway of a prince, the first heir of the hitherto divided monarchies of Spain. Alas! at the moment when Ferdinand and Isabella, blessed in the affections of their people, and surrounded by all the trophies of a glorious reign, seemed to have reached the very zenith of human felicity, they were doomed to receive one of those mournful lessons which admonish us that all earthly prosperity is but a dream.[21]

Not long after Prince John's marriage, the sovereigns had the satisfaction to witness that of

tratar a las personas Reales, y Grandes con la familiaridad y llaneza de las casas de Austria, Borgoñia, y Francia, sino con la gravedad, y mesurada autoridad de los Reyes y naciones de España!" The sixth volume of the Spanish Academy of History contains an inventory, taken from the Archives of Simancas, of the rich plate and jewels presented to the princess Margaret on the day of her marriage. They are said to be "of such value and perfect workmanship that the like was never before seen." (Illust. 11, pp. 338–342.) Isabella had turned these baubles to good account in the war of Granada. She was too simple in her taste to attach much value to luxury of apparel.

[21] It is precisely this period, or rather the whole period from 1493 to 1497, which Oviedo selects as that of the greatest splendor and festivity at the court of the Catholic sovereigns. "El año de 1493, y uno ó dos despues, y aun hasta el de 1497 años fué cuando la corte de los Reyes Católicos Don Fernando é Doña Isabel de gloriosa memoria, mas alegres tiempos é mas regozijados, vino en su corte, é mas encumbrada andubo la gala é las fiestas é servicios de galanes é damas." Quincuagenas, MS., bat. 1, quinc. 4, dial. 44.

their daughter Isabella, who, notwithstanding her repugnance to a second union, had yielded at length to the urgent entreaties of her parents to receive the addresses of her Portuguese lover. She required as the price of this, however, that Emanuel should first banish the Jews from his dominions, where they had bribed a resting-place since their expulsion from Spain; a circumstance to which the superstitious princess imputed the misfortunes which had fallen of late on the royal house of Portugal. Emanuel, whose own liberal mind revolted at this unjust and impolitic measure, was weak enough to allow his passion to get the better of his principles, and passed sentence of exile on every Israelite in his kingdom; furnishing, perhaps, the only example in which love has been made one of the thousand motives for persecuting this unhappy race.[22]

The marriage, ushered in under such ill-omened auspices, was celebrated at the frontier town of Valencia de Alcantara, in the presence of the Catholic sovereigns, without pomp or parade of any kind. While they were detained there, an express arrived from Salamanca, bringing tidings of the dangerous illness of their son, the prince of Asturias. He had been seized with a fever in the midst of the public rejoicings to which his arrival with his youthful bride in that city had given rise. The symptoms speedily assumed an alarming character. The prince's constitution, naturally

[22] Faria y Sousa, Europa Portuguesa, tom. ii. pp. 498, 499.—La Clède, Hist. de Portugal, tom. iv. p. 95.—Zurita, tom. v. lib. 3, cap. 6.—Lanuza, Historias, ubi supra.

delicate, though strengthened by a life of habitual temperance, sunk under the violence of the attack; and when his father, who posted with all possible expedition to Salamanca, arrived there, no hopes were entertained of his recovery.[23]

Ferdinand, however, endeavored to cheer his son with hopes which he did not feel himself; but the young prince told him that it was too late to be deceived; that he was prepared to part with a world which, in its best estate, was filled with vanity and vexation; and that all he now desired was that his parents might feel the same sincere resignation to the divine will which he experienced himself. Ferdinand gathered new fortitude from the example of his heroic son, whose presages were unhappily too soon verified. He expired on the 4th of October, 1497, in the twentieth year of his age, in the same spirit of Christian philosophy which he had displayed during his whole illness.[24]

[23] Carbajal, Anales, MS., año 1497.—Florez, Reynas Cathólicas, tom. ii. pp. 846, 848.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom, v. fol. 127, 128.—La Clède, Hist. de Portugal, tom. iv. p. 101.—The physicians recommended a temporary separation of John from his young bride; a remedy, however, which the queen opposed from conscientious scruples somewhat singular. "Hortantur medici Reginam, hortatur et Rex, ut a principis latere Margaritam aliquando semoveat, interpellet. Inducias precantur. Protestantur periculum ex frequenti copulâ ephebo imminere; qualiter eum suxerit, quamve subtristis incedat, consideret iterum atque iterum monent; medullas lædi, stomachum hebetari se sentire Reginæ renunciant. Intercidat, dum licet, obstetque principiis, instant. Nil proficiunt. Respondet Regina, homines non oportere, quos Deus jugali vinculo junxerit, separare." Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 176.

[24] Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 182.—L. Marineo, Cosas memorables, fol. 182.—Carbajal, Anales, MS., año 1497.—Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS., dial. de Deza.—Peter Martyr, in more of a classic than a Christian vein, refers Prince John's composure in his latter hours to his familiarity with the divine Aristotle: "Ætatem quæ

Ferdinand, apprehensive of the effect which the abrupt intelligence of this calamity might have on the queen, caused letters to be sent at brief intervals, containing accounts of the gradual decline of the prince's health, so as to prepare her for the inevitable stroke. Isabella, however, who through all her long career of prosperous fortune may be said to have kept her heart in constant training for the dark hour of adversity, received the fatal tidings in a spirit of meek and humble acquiescence, testifying her resignation in the beautiful language of Scripture, "The Lord hath given, and the Lord hath taken away, blessed be his name!" [25]

"Thus," says Martyr, who had the melancholy satisfaction of rendering the last sad offices to his royal pupil, "was laid low the hope of all Spain." "Never was there a death," says another chronicler, "which occasioned such deep and general lamentation throughout the land." All the unavailing honors which affection could devise were paid to his memory. His funeral obsequies were celebrated with melancholy splendor, and his remains deposited in the noble Dominican monastery of St. Thomas at Avila, which had been

ferebat superabat; nec mirum tamen. Perlegerat namque divini Aristotelis pleraque volumina," etc. Ubi supra.

[25] Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 183.—Martyr draws an affecting picture of the anguish of the bereaved parents, which betrayed itself in looks more eloquent than words: "Reges tantam dissimulare ærumnam nituntur; ast nos prostratum in internis ipsorum animum cernimus; oculos alter in faciem alterius crebro conjiciunt, in propatulo sedentes. Unde quid lateat proditur. Nimirum tamen, desinerent humanâ carne vestiti esse homines, essentque adamante duriores, nisi quid amiserint sentirent."

erected by his parents. The court put on a new and deeper mourning than that hitherto used, as if to testify their unwonted grief.[26] All offices, public and private, were closed for forty days; and sable-colored banners were suspended from the walls and portals of the cities. Such extraordinary tokens of public sorrow bear strong testimony to the interest felt in the young prince, independently of his exalted station; similar and perhaps more unequivocal evidence of his worth is afforded by abundance of contemporary notices, not merely in works designed for the public, but in private correspondence. The learned Martyr, in particular, whose situation as Prince John's preceptor afforded him the best opportunities of observation, is unbounded in commendations of his royal pupil, whose extraordinary promise of intellectual and moral excellence had furnished him with the happiest—alas! delusive—auguries for the future destiny of his country.[27]

By the death of John without heirs, the succession devolved on his eldest sister, the queen of

[26] Blancas, Coronaciones de los serenissimos Reyes de Aragon (Zaragoza, 1641), lib. 3, cap. 18.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 6.—Sackcloth was substituted for the white serge which till this time had been used as the mourning dress.

[27] Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 182.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 6.—L. Marineo, Cosas memorables, fol. 182.—Blancas, Coronaciones, p. 248.—It must be allowed to furnish no mean proof of the excellence of Prince John's heart, that it was not corrupted by the liberal doses of flattery with which his worthy tutor was in the habit of regaling him from time to time. Take the beginning of one of Martyr's letters to his pupil, in the following modest strain: "Mirande in pueritiâ senex, salve. Quotquot tecum versantur homines, sive genere polleant, sive ad obsequium fortunæ humiliores destinati ministri, te laudant, extollunt, admirantur." Opus Epist., epist. 98.

Portugal.[28] Intelligence, however, was received, soon after that event, that the archduke Philip, with the restless ambition which distinguished him in later life, had assumed for himself and his wife Joanna the title of "princes of Castile." Ferdinand and Isabella, disgusted with this proceeding, sent to request the attendance of the king and queen of Portugal in Castile, in order to secure a recognition of their rights by the national legislature. The royal pair, accordingly, in obedience to the summons, quitted their capital of Lisbon early in the spring of 1498. In their progress through the country they were magnificently entertained at the castles of the great Castilian lords, and towards the close of April reached the ancient city of Toledo, where the cortes had been convened to receive them.[29]

[28] Hopes were entertained of a male heir at the time of John's death, as his widow was left pregnant; but these were frustrated by her being delivered of a still-born infant at the end of a few months. Margaret did not continue long in Spain. She experienced the most affectionate treatment from the king and queen, who made her an extremely liberal provision. (Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. v. lib. 3, cap. 4.) But her Flemish followers could not reconcile themselves to the reserve and burdensome ceremonial of the Castilian court, so different from the free and jocund life to which they had been accustomed at home; and they prevailed on their mistress to return to her native land in the course of the year 1499. She was subsequently married to the duke of Savoy, who died without issue in less than three years, and Margaret passed the remainder of her life in widowhood, being appointed by her father, the emperor, to the government of the Netherlands, which she administered with ability. She died in 1530.

[29] Marina has transcribed from the archives of Toledo the writ of summons to that city on this occasion. Teoría, tom. ii. p. 16.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. v. lib. 3, cap. 18.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 154.—La Clède, Hist. de Portugal, tom. iv. p. 101.—Carbajal, Anales, MS., año 1498.—Faria y Sousa, Eu-

After the usual oaths of recognition had been tendered, without opposition, by the different branches to the Portuguese princes, the court adjourned to Saragossa, where the legislature of Aragon was assembled for a similar purpose.

Some apprehensions were entertained, however, of the unfavorable disposition of that body, since the succession of females was not countenanced by the ancient usage of the country; and the Aragonese, as Martyr remarks in one of his Epistles, "were well known to be a pertinacious race, who would leave no stone unturned, in the maintenance of their constitutional rights." [30]

These apprehensions were fully realized; for no sooner was the object of the present meeting laid before cortes in a speech from the throne, with which parliamentary business in Aragon was always opened, than decided opposition was manifested to a proceeding which it was declared had no precedent in their history. The succession of the crown, it was contended, had been limited by

ropa Portuguesa, tom. ii. pp. 500, 501.—The last writer expatiates with great satisfaction on the stately etiquette observed at the reception of the Portuguese monarchs and their suite by the Spanish sovereigns. "Queen Isabella," he says, "appeared leaning on the arm of her old favorite Gutierre de Cardenas, comendador of Leon, and of a Portuguese noble, Don Juan de Sousa. The latter took care to acquaint her with the rank and condition of each of his countrymen, as they were presented, in order that she might the better adjust the measure of condescension and courtesy due to each; a perilous obligation," he continues, "with all nations, but with the Portuguese most perilous!"

[30] Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 194.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. fol. 334.—Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 27, cap. 3.

repeated testaments of their princes to male heirs; and practice and public sentiment had so far coincided with this, that the attempted violation of the rule by Peter the Fourth, in favor of his own daughters, had plunged the nation in a civil war. It was further urged that by the will of the very last monarch, John the Second, it was provided that the crown should descend to the male issue of his son Ferdinand, and, in default of such, to the male issue of Ferdinand's daughters, to the entire exclusion of the females. At all events, it was better to postpone the consideration of this matter until the result of the queen of Portugal's pregnancy, then far advanced, should be ascertained; since, should it prove to be a son, all doubts of constitutional validity would be removed.

In answer to these objections, it was stated that no express law existed in Aragon excluding females from the succession; that an example had already occurred, as far back indeed as the twelfth century, of a queen who held the crown in her own right; that the acknowledged power of females to transmit the right of succession necessarily inferred that right existing in themselves; that the present monarch had doubtless as competent authority as his predecessors to regulate the law of inheritance, and that his act, supported by the supreme authority of cortes, might set aside any former disposition of the crown; that this interference was called for by the present opportunity of maintaining the permanent union of Castile and Aragon, without which they must

return to their ancient divided state and comparative insignificance.[31]

These arguments, however cogent, were far from being conclusive with the opposite party; and the debate was protracted to such length that Isabella, impatient of an opposition to what the practice in her own dominions had taught her to regard as the inalienable right of her daughter, inconsiderately exclaimed, "It would be better to reduce the country by arms at once, than endure this insolence of the cortes." To which Antonio de Fonseca, the same cavalier who had spoken his mind so fearlessly to King Charles the Eighth on his march to Naples, had the independence to reply, "That the Aragonese had only acted as good and loyal subjects, who, as they were accustomed to keep their oaths, considered well before they took them; and that they must certainly stand excused if they moved with caution in an affair which they found so difficult to justify by precedent in their history."[32] This blunt expostulation of the

[31] Blancas, Commentarii, p. 273.—Idem, Coronaciones, lib. 1, cap. 18.—Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 27, cap. 3.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. v. fol. 55, 56.—It is remarkable that the Aragonese should so readily have acquiesced in the right of females to convey a title to the crown which they could not enjoy themselves. This was precisely the principle on which Edward III. set up his claim to the throne of France, a principle too repugnant to the commonest rules of inheritance to obtain any countenance. The exclusion of females in Aragon could not pretend to be founded on any express law, as in France, but the practice, with the exception of a single example three centuries old, was quite as uniform.

[32] Blancas, Coronaciones, lib. 3, cap. 18.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. v. lib. 3, cap. 30.—It is a proof of the high esteem in which Isabella held this independent statesman, that we find his name mentioned in her testament among half a dozen others whom she particularly recommended to her successors for their meritorious

honest courtier, equally creditable to the sovereign who could endure and the subject who could make it, was received in the frank spirit in which it was given, and probably opened Isabella's eyes to her own precipitancy, as we find no further allusion to coercive measures.

Before any thing was determined, the discussion was suddenly brought to a close by an unforseen and most melancholy event,—the death of the queen of Portugal, the unfortunate subject of it. That princess had possessed a feeble constitution from her birth, with a strong tendency to pulmonary complaints. She had early felt a presentiment that she should not survive the birth of her child; this feeling strengthened as she approached the period of her delivery; and in less than one hour after that event, which took place on the 23d of August, 1498, she expired in the arms of her afflicted parents.[33]

This blow was almost too much for the unhappy mother, whose spirits had not yet had time to rally since the death of her only son. She, indeed, exhibited the outward marks of composure, testifying the entire resignation of one who had learned to rest her hopes of happiness on a better world. She schooled herself so far as to continue to take an interest in all her public duties, and to watch over the common weal with the same maternal solicitude as before; but her health

and loyal services. See the document in Dormer, Discursos varios, p. 354.

[33] Carbajal, Anales, MS., años 1470, 1498.—Florez, Reynas Cathólicas, tom. ii. pp. 846, 847.—Faria y Sousa, Europa Portuguesa, tom. ii. p. 504.

gradually sunk under this accumulated load of sorrow, which threw a deep shade of melancholy over the evening of her life.

The infant, whose birth had cost so dear, proved a male, and received the name of Miguel, in honor of the saint on whose day he first saw the light. In order to dissipate in some degree the general gloom occasioned by the late catastrophe, it was thought best to exhibit the young prince before the eyes of his future subjects; and he was accordingly borne in the arms of his nurse, in a magnificent litter, through the streets of the city, escorted by the principal nobility. Measures were then taken for obtaining the sanction of his legitimate claims to the crown. Whatever doubts had been entertained of the validity of the mother's title, there could be none whatever of the child's; since those who denied the right of females to inherit for themselves admitted their power of conveying such a right to male issue. As a preliminary step to the public recognition of the prince, it was necessary to name a guardian, who should be empowered to make the requisite engagements and to act in his behalf. The Justice of Aragon, in his official capacity, after due examination, appointed the grandparents, Ferdinand and Isabella, to the office of guardians during his minority, which would expire by law at the age of fourteen.[34]

[34] Blancas, Commentarii, pp. 510, 511.—Idem, Coronaciones, lib. 3, cap. 19.—Gerónimo Martel, Forma de celebrar Cortes en Aragon (Zaragoza, 1641), cap. 44.—Alvaro Gomez, De Rebus gestis a Francisco Ximenio Cisnerio (Compluti, 1569), fol. 28.—Lanuza, Historias, lib. 1, cap. 9.

On Saturday, the 22d of September, when the queen had sufficiently recovered from a severe illness brought on by her late sufferings, the four *arms* of the cortes of Aragon assembled in the house of deputation at Saragossa; and Ferdinand and Isabella made oath as guardians of the heir apparent, before the Justice, not to exercise any jurisdiction whatever in the name of the young prince during his minority; engaging, moreover, so far as lay in their power, that, on his coming of age, he should swear to respect the laws and liberties of the realm, before entering on any of the rights of sovereignty. The four estates then took the oath of fealty to Prince Miguel, as lawful heir and successor to the crown of Aragon; with the protestation that it should not be construed into a precedent for exacting such an oath hereafter during the minority of the heir apparent. With such watchful attention to constitutional forms of procedure did the people of Aragon endeavor to secure their liberties; forms which continued to be observed in later times, long after those liberties had been swept away.[35]

In the month of January of the ensuing year,

[35] Blancas, Coronaciones, ubi supra.—Idem., Commentarii, pp. 510, 511. The reverence of the Aragonese for their institutions is shown in their observance of the most insignificant ceremonies. A remarkable instance of this occurred in the year 1481, at Saragossa, when, the queen having been constituted *lieutenant-general* of the kingdom, and duly qualified to hold a cortes in the absence of the king her husband, who by the ancient laws of the land was required to preside over it in person, it was deemed necessary to obtain a formal act of the legislature for opening the door for her admission. See Blancas, Modo de proceder en Cortes de Aragon (Zaragoza, 1641), fol. 82, 83.

the young prince's succession was duly confirmed by the cortes of Castile, and in the following March, by that of Portugal. Thus, for once, the crowns of the three monarchies of Castile, Aragon, and Portugal were suspended over one head. The Portuguese, retaining the bitterness of ancient rivalry, looked with distrust at the prospect of a union, fearing, with some reason, that the importance of the lesser state would be wholly merged in that of the greater. But the untimely death of the destined heir of these honors, which took place before he had completed his second year, removed the causes of jealousy, and defeated the only chance which had ever occurred of bringing under the same rule three independent nations, which, from their common origin, their geographical position, and, above all, their resemblance in manners, sentiments, and language, would seem to have originally been intended to form but one.[36]

[36] Faria y Sousa, Europa Portuguesa, tom. ii. pp. 504, 507.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 154.—Carbajal, Anales, MS., año 1499.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. v. lib. 3, cap. 33.—Sandoval, Hist. del Emp. Carlos V., tom. i. p. 4.

CHAPTER V

DEATH OF CARDINAL MENDOZA—RISE OF XIMENES —ECCLESIASTICAL REFORM

Death of Mendoza—His Early Life, and Character—The Queen his Executor—Origin of Ximenes—He enters the Franciscan Order —His Ascetic Life—Confessor to the Queen—Made Archbishop of Toledo—Austerity of his Life—Reform of the Monastic Orders—Insults offered to the Queen—She consents to the Reform

IN the beginning of 1495, the sovereigns lost their old and faithful minister, the grand cardinal of Spain, Don Pedro Gonzalez de Mendoza. He was the fourth son of the celebrated marquis of Santillana, and was placed by his talents at the head of a family every member of which must be allowed to have exhibited a rare union of public and private virtue. The cardinal had reached the age of sixty-six, when his days were terminated, after a long and painful illness, on the 11th of January, at his palace of Guadalaxara.[1]

In the unhappy feuds between Henry the Fourth and his younger brother Alfonso, the cardinal had remained faithful to the former. But on the death of that monarch he threw his whole

[1] Carbajal, Anales, MS., año 1495.—Salazar de Mendoza, Crón. del Gran Cardenal, lib. 2, cap. 45, 46.—Zurita, Anales, tom. v. fol. 61.—Pulgar, Claros Varones, tit. 4.—His disorder was an abscess on the kidneys, which confined him to the house nearly a year before his death. When this event happened, a white cross of extraordinary magnitude and splendor, shaped precisely like that on his arms, was seen in the heavens directly over his house, by a crowd of spectators, for more than two hours; a full account of which was duly transmitted to Rome by the Spanish court, and has obtained easy credit with the principal Spanish historians.

weight, with that of his powerful family, into the scale of Isabella, whether influenced by a conviction of her superior claims or her capacity for government. This was a most important acquisition to the royal cause; and Mendoza's consummate talents for business, recommended by the most agreeable address, secured him the confidence of both Ferdinand and Isabella, who had long been disgusted with the rash and arrogant bearing of their old minister, Carillo.

On the death of that turbulent prelate, Mendoza succeeded to the archiepiscopal see of Toledo. His new situation naturally led to still more intimate relations with the sovereigns, who uniformly deferred to his experience, consulting him on all important matters, not merely of a public but of a private nature. In short, he gained such ascendency in the cabinet, during a long ministry of more than twenty years, that he was pleasantly called by the courtiers the "third king of Spain."[2]

The minister did not abuse the confidence so generously reposed in him. He called the attention of his royal mistress to objects most deserving it. His views were naturally grand and lofty; and, if he sometimes yielded to the fanatical im-

[2] Alvaro Gomez says of him, "Nam præter clarissimum tum natalium, tum fortunæ, tum dignitatis splendorem, quæ in illo ornamenta summa erant, incredibilem animi sublimitatem cum pari morum facilitate, elegantiâque conjunxerat; ut merito locum in republicâ summo proximum ad supremum usque diem tenuerit." (De Rebus gestis, fol. 9.) Martyr, noticing the cardinal's death, bestows the following brief but comprehensive panegyric on him: "Periit Gonsalus Mendotiæ, domûs splendor et lucida fax; periit quem universa colebat Hispania, quem exteri etiam principes venerabantur, quem ordo cardineus collegam sibi esse gloriabatur." Opus Epist., epist. 158.

pulse of the age, he never failed to support her heartily in every generous enterprise for the advancement of her people. When raised to the rank of primate of Spain, he indulged his natural inclination for pomp and magnificence. He filled his palace with pages, selected from the noblest families in the kingdom, whom he carefully educated. He maintained a numerous body of armed retainers, which, far from being a mere empty pageant, formed a most effective corps for public service on all requisite occasions. He dispensed the immense revenues of his bishopric with the same munificent hand which has so frequently distinguished the Spanish prelacy, encouraging learned men and endowing public institutions. The most remarkable of these were the college of Santa Cruz at Valladolid, and the hospital of the same name for foundlings at Toledo, the erection of which, completed at his sole charge, consumed more than ten years each.[3]

The cardinal, in his younger days, was occasionally seduced by those amorous propensities in which the Spanish clergy freely indulged, contaminated, perhaps, by the example of their Mahometan neighbors. He left several children by his amours with two ladies of rank, from whom some of the best houses in the kingdom are descended.[4] A characteristic anecdote is recorded

[3] Salazar de Mendoza, Crón. del Gran Cardenal, pp. 263–273, 381–410.

[4] "Gran varon, y muy experimentado y prudente en negocios," says Oviedo of the cardinal, "*pero á vueltas de las negociaciones desta vida* tuvo trés hijos varones," etc. Then follows a full notice of this graceless progeny. Quincuagenas, MS., bat. 1, quinc. 1, dial. 8.

of him in relation to this matter. An ecclesiastic, who one day delivered a discourse in his presence, took occasion to advert to the laxity of the age, in general terms, indeed, but bearing too pertinent an application to the cardinal to be mistaken. The attendants of the latter boiled with indignation at the freedom of the preacher, whom they determined to chastise for his presumption. They prudently, however, postponed this until they should see what effect the discourse had on their master. The cardinal, far from betraying any resentment, took no other notice of the preacher than to send him a dish of choice game, which had been served up at his own table, where he was entertaining a party of friends that day, accompanying it at the same time, by way of sauce, with a substantial donative of gold doblas; an act of Christian charity not at all to the taste of his own servants. It wrought its effects on the worthy divine, who at once saw the error of his ways, and, the next time he mounted the pulpit, took care to frame his discourse in such a manner as to counteract the former unfavorable impressions, to the entire satisfaction, if not edification, of his audience. "Nowadays," says the honest biographer who reports the incident, himself a lineal descendant of the cardinal, "the preacher would not have escaped so easily. And with good reason; for the holy gospel should be discreetly preached, 'cum grano salis,' that is to say, with the decorum and deference due to majesty and men of high estate." [5]

[5] Salazar de Mendoza, Crón. del Gran Cardenal, lib. 2, cap. 66.—The doctor Pedro Salazar de Mendoza's biography of his illustrious

When Cardinal Mendoza's illness assumed an alarming aspect, the court removed to the neighborhood of Guadalaxara, where he was confined. The king and queen, especially the latter, with the affectionate concern which she manifested for more than one of her faithful subjects, used to visit him in person, testifying her sympathy for his sufferings, and benefiting by the lights of the sagacious mind which had so long helped to guide her. She still further showed her regard for her old minister by condescending to accept the office of his executor, which she punctually discharged, superintending the disposition of his effects according to his testament,[6] and particularly the erection of the stately hospital of Santa Cruz before mentioned, not a stone of which was laid before his death.[7]

relative is a very fair specimen of the Spanish style of book-making in ancient times. One event seems to suggest another with about as much cohesion as the rhymes of "The House that Jack built." There is scarcely a place or personage of note, that the grand cardinal was brought in contact with in the course of his life, whose history is not made the theme of profuse dissertation. Nearly fifty chapters are taken up, for example, with the distinguished men who graduated at the college of Santa Cruz.

[6] "Non hoc," says Tacitus with truth, "præcipuum amicorum munus est, prosequi defunctum ignavo questu: sed quæ voluerit meminisse, quæ mandaverit exsequi." Annales, lib. 2, sect. 71.

[7] Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 143.—Carbajal, Anales, MS., año 1494.—Salazar de Mendoza, Crón. del Gran Cardenal, lib. 2, cap. 45.—A foundling-hospital does not seem to have come amiss in Spain, where, according to Salazar, the wretched parents frequently destroyed their offspring by casting them into wells and pits, or exposing them in desert places to die of famine. "*The more compassionate*," he observes, "laid them at the doors of churches, where they were too often worried to death by dogs and other animals." The grand cardinal's nephew, who founded a similar institution, is said to have furnished an asylum in the course of his life to no less than 13,000 of these little victims! Ibid., cap. 61.

In one of her interviews with the dying minister, the queen requested his advice respecting the nomination of his successor. The cardinal, in reply, earnestly cautioned her against raising any one of the principal nobility to this dignity, almost too exalted for any subject, and which, when combined with powerful family connections, would enable a man of factious disposition to defy the royal authority itself, as they had once had bitter experience in the case of Archbishop Carillo. On being pressed to name the individual whom he thought best qualified, in every point of view, for the office, he is said to have recommended Fray Francisco Ximenez de Cisneros, a friar of the Franciscan order, and confessor of the queen. As this extraordinary personage exercised a more important control over the destinies of his country than any other subject, during the remainder of the present reign, it will be necessary to put the reader in possession of his history.[8]

Ximenez de Cisneros, or Ximenes, as he is usually called, was born at the little town of Tordelaguna, in the year 1436,[9] of an ancient but

[8] Salazar de Mendoza, Crón. del Gran Cardenal, lib. 2, cap. 46.—Gomez, De Rebus gestis, fol. 8.—The dying cardinal is said to have recommended, among other things, that the queen should repair any wrong done to Joanna Beltraneja, by marrying her to the young prince of Asturias; which suggestion was so little to Isabella's taste that she broke off the conversation, saying, "the good man wandered and talked nonsense."

[9] It is singular that Fléchier should have blundered some twenty years in the date of Ximenes's birth, which he makes 1457. (Hist. de Ximenés, liv. 1, p. 3.) It is not singular that Marsollier should. Histoire du Ministère du Cardinal Ximenez (Toulouse, 1694), liv. 1, p. 3.

decayed family.[10] He was early destined by his parents for the church, and, after studying grammar at Alcalá, was removed at fourteen to the university of Salamanca. Here he went through the regular course of instruction then pursued, devoting himself assiduously to the civil and canon law, and at the end of six years received the degree of bachelor in each of them, a circumstance at that time of rare occurrence.[11]

Three years after quitting the university, the young bachelor removed by the advice of his parents to Rome, as affording a better field for ecclesiastical preferment than he could find at home. Here he seems to have attracted some notice by the diligence with which he devoted himself to his professional studies and employments. But still he was far from reaping the golden fruits presaged by his kindred; and at the expiration of six years he was suddenly recalled to his native country by the death of his father, who left his affairs in so embarrassed a condition as to require his immediate presence.[12]

[10] The honorable extraction of Ximenes is intimated in Juan Vergara's verses at the end of the Complutensian Polyglot:

> "Nomine Cisnerius clarâ de stirpe parentum,
> Et meritis factus clarior ipse suis."

Fray Pedro de Quintanilla y Mendoza makes a goodly genealogical tree for his hero, of which King Pelayo, King Pepin, Charlemagne, and other royal worthies are the respectable roots. (Proœmia Dedicatoria, pp. 5–35.) According to Gonzalo de Oviedo, his father was a poor hidalgo, who, having spent his little substance on the education of his children, was obliged to take up the profession of an advocate. Quincuagenas, MS.

[11] Quintanilla, Archetypo, p. 6.—Gomez, De Rebus gestis, Ximen., fol. 2.—Idem, Miscellanear., MS., ex Bibliothecâ Regiâ Matritensi, tom. ii. fol. 189.

[12] Gomez, De Rebus gestis, fol. 2.—Idem, Miscellanear, MS., ubi

Before his return, Ximenes obtained a papal bull, or *expectative,* preferring him to the first benefice of a specified value which should become vacant in the see of Toledo. Several years elapsed before such a vacancy offered itself by the death of the archpriest of Uzeda (1473); and Ximenes took possession of that living by virtue of the apostolic grant.

This assumption of the papal court to dispose of the church livings at its own pleasure had been long regarded by the Spaniards as a flagrant imposition; and Carillo, the archbishop of Toledo, in whose diocese the vacancy occurred, was not likely to submit to it tamely. He had, moreover, promised this very place to one of his own followers. He determined, accordingly, to compel Ximenes to surrender his pretensions in favor of the latter, and, finding argument ineffectual, resorted to force, confining him in the fortress of Uzeda, whence he was subsequently removed to the strong tower of Santorcaz, then used as a prison for contumacious ecclesiastics. But Carillo understood little of the temper of Ximenes, which was too inflexible to be broken by persecution. The archbishop in time became convinced of this, and was persuaded to release him, but not till after an imprisonment of more than six years.[13]

supra.—Eugenio de Robles, Compendio de la Vida y Hazañas del Cardenal Don Fray Francisco Ximenez de Cisneros (Toledo, 1604), cap. 11.

[13] Quintanilla, Archetypo, pp. 8, 10.—Gomez, De Rebus gestis, fol. 2.—Fléchier, Hist. de Ximenés, pp. 8–10.—Suma de la Vida del R. S. Cardenal Don Fr. Francisco Ximenez de Cisneros, sacada de los Memoriales de Juan de Vallejo, Paje de Cámara, è de algunas Per-

Ximenes, thus restored to freedom, and placed in undisturbed possession of his benefice, was desirous of withdrawing from the jurisdiction of his vindictive superior, and not long after effected an exchange for the chaplainship of Siguenza (1480). In this new situation he devoted himself with renewed ardor to his theological studies, occupying himself diligently, moreover, with Hebrew and Chaldee, his knowledge of which proved of no little use in the concoction of his famous Polyglot.

Mendoza was at that time bishop of Siguenza. It was impossible that a man of his penetration should come in contact with a character like that of Ximenes without discerning its extraordinary qualities. It was not long before he appointed him his vicar, with the administration of his diocese; in which situation he displayed such capacity for business that the count of Cifuentes, on falling into the hands of the Moors, after the unfortunate affair of the Axarquia, confided to him the sole management of his vast estates during his captivity.[14]

But these secular concerns grew more and more distasteful to Ximenes, whose naturally austere and contemplative disposition had been deepened, probably, by the melancholy incidents of his life, into stern religious enthusiasm. He determined,

sonas que en su Tiempo lo vieron: para la Ilustrisima Señora Doña Catalina de la Zerda, Condesa de Coruña, a quien Dios guarde, y de su Gracia, por un Criado de su Casa, MS.

[14] Suma de la Vida de Cisneros, MS.—Gomez, De Rebus gestis, fol. 3.—Robles, Vida de Ximenez, cap. 11.—Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS., dial. de Ximeni.

therefore, to break at once from the shackles which bound him to the world, and seek an asylum in some religious establishment, where he might devote himself unreservedly to the service of Heaven. He selected for this purpose the Observantines of the Franciscan order, the most rigid of the monastic societies. He resigned his various employments and benefices, with annual rents to the amount of two thousand ducats, and, in defiance of the arguments and entreaties of his friends, entered on his noviciate in the convent of San Juan de los Reyes, at Toledo; a superb pile then erecting by the Spanish sovereigns, in pursuance of a vow made during the war of Granada.[15]

He distinguished his noviciate by practising every ingenious variety of mortification with which superstition has contrived to swell the inevitable catalogue of human sufferings. He slept on the ground, or on the hard floor, with a billet of wood for his pillow. He wore hair cloth next his skin, and exercised himself with fasts, vigils, and stripes to a degree scarcely surpassed by the fanatical founder of his order. At the end of the year, he regularly professed, adopting

[15] Quintanilla, Archetypo, p. 11.—Gomez, Miscellanear., MS., ubi supra.—Idem, De Rebus gestis, fol. 4.—This edifice, says Salazar de Mendoza, in respect to its sacristy, choir, cloisters, library, etc., was the most sumptuous and noted of its time. It was originally destined by the Catholic sovereigns for their place of sepulture; an honor afterwards reserved for Granada, on its recovery from the infidels. The great chapel was garnished with the fetters * taken from the dungeons of Malaga, in which the Moors confined their Christian captives. Monarquía, tom. i. p. 410.

* [Many of these fetters now hang upon the outside walls.—M.]

then for the first time the name of Francisco, in compliment to his patron saint, instead of that of Gonzalo, by which he had been baptized.

No sooner had this taken place, than his reputation for sanctity, which his late course of life had diffused far and wide, attracted multitudes of all ages and conditions to his confessional; and he soon found himself absorbed in the same vortex of worldly passions and interests from which he had been so anxious to escape. At his solicitation, therefore, he was permitted to transfer his abode to the convent of Our Lady of Castañar, so called from a deep forest of chestnuts in which it was embosomed. In the midst of these dark mountain solitudes, he built with his own hands a little hermitage or cabin, of dimensions barely sufficient to admit his entrance. Here he passed his days and nights in prayer, and in meditations on the sacred volume, sustaining life, like the ancient anchorites, on the green herbs and running waters. In this state of self-mortification, with a frame wasted by abstinence, and a mind exalted by spiritual contemplation, it is no wonder that he should have indulged in ecstasies and visions, until he fancied himself raised into communication with celestial intelligences. It is more wonderful that his understanding was not permanently impaired by these distempered fancies. This period of his life, however, seems to have been always regarded by him with peculiar satisfaction; for long after, as his biographer assures us, when reposing in lordly palaces, and surrounded by all the appliances of luxury, he looked back with fond regret on the

hours which had glided so peacefully in the hermitage of Castañar.[16]

Fortunately, his superiors, choosing to change his place of residence according to custom, transferred him at the end of three years to the convent of Salzeda. Here he practised, indeed, similar austerities, but it was not long before his high reputation raised him to the post of guardian of the convent. This situation necessarily imposed on him the management of the institution; and thus the powers of his mind, so long wasted in unprofitable reverie, were again called into exercise for the benefit of others. An event which occurred some years later, in 1492, opened to him a still wider sphere of action.

By the elevation of Talavera to the metropolitan see of Granada, the office of queen's confessor became vacant. Cardinal Mendoza, who was consulted on the choice of a successor, well knew the importance of selecting a man of the highest integrity and talent; since the queen's tenderness of conscience led her to take counsel of her confessor not merely in regard to her own spiritual concerns, but all the great measures of her administration. He at once fixed his eye on Ximenes, of whom he had never lost sight, indeed, since his first acquaintance with him at Siguenza. He was far from approving his adoption of the monastic life, and had been heard to say that "parts so extraordinary would not long be buried in the shades of a

[16] Fléchier, Hist. de Ximenés, p. 14.—Quintanilla, Archetypo, pp. 13, 14.—Gomez, De Rebus gestis, fol. 4.—Suma de la Vida de Cisneros, MS.—Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS.

convent." He is said, also, to have predicted that Ximenes would one day succeed him in the chair of Toledo; a prediction which its author contributed more than any other to verify.[17]

He recommended Ximenes in such emphatic terms to the queen as raised a strong desire in her to see and converse with him herself. An invitation was accordingly sent him from the cardinal to repair to the court at Valladolid, without intimating the real purpose of it. Ximenes obeyed the summons, and, after a short interview with his early patron, was conducted, as if without any previous arrangement, to the queen's apartment. On finding himself so unexpectedly in the royal presence, he betrayed none of the agitation or embarrassment to have been expected from the secluded inmate of a cloister, but exhibited a natural dignity of manner, with such discretion and fervent piety, in his replies to Isabella's various interrogatories, as confirmed the favorable prepossessions she had derived from the cardinal.

Not many days after, Ximenes was invited to take charge of the queen's conscience (1492). Far from appearing elated by this mark of royal favor, and the prospects of advancement which it opened, he seemed to view it with disquietude, as likely to interrupt the peaceful tenor of his religious duties; and he accepted it only with the understanding that he should be allowed to conform in every respect to the obligations of his

[17] Salazar de Mendoza, Crón. del Gran Cardenal, lib. 2, cap. 63.—Gomez, De Rebus gestis, fol. 4.—Suma de la Vida de Cisneros, MS.—Robles, Vida de Ximenez, cap. 12.

order, and to remain in his own monastery when his official functions did not require attendance at court.[18]

Martyr, in more than one of his letters dated at this time, notices the impression made on the courtiers by the remarkable appearance of the new confessor, in whose wasted frame and pallid careworn countenance they seemed to behold one of the primitive anchorites from the deserts of Syria or Egypt.[19] The austerities and the blameless purity of Ximenes's life had given him a reputation for sanctity throughout Spain;[20] and Martyr indulges the regret that a virtue which had stood so many trials should be exposed to the worst of all, in the seductive blandishments of a court. But Ximenes's heart had been steeled by too stern a discipline to be moved by the fascinations of pleasure, however it might be by those of ambition.

Two years after this event he was elected pro-

[18] Fléchier, Hist. de Ximenés, pp. 18, 19.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 108.—Robles, Vida de Ximenez, ubi supra.—Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS.

[19] Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 108.—"Præterea," says Martyr, in a letter to Don Fernando Alvarez, one of the royal secretaries, "nonne tu sanctissimum quendam virum a solitudine abstrusisque silvis, macie ob abstinentiam confectum, relicti Granatensis loco fuisse suffectum, scriptitasti? In istius facie obductâ, nonne Hilarionis te imaginem aut primi Pauli vultum conspexisse fateris?" Opus Epist., epist. 105.

[20] "Todos hablaban," says Oviedo, "de la sanctimonia é vida de este religioso." The same writer says that he saw him at Medina del Campo, in 1494, in a solemn procession, on the day of Corpus Christi, his body much emaciated, and walking barefooted in his coarse friar's dress. In the same procession was the magnificent cardinal of Spain, little dreaming how soon his proud honors were to descend on the head of his more humble companion. Quincuagenas, MS.

vincial of his order in Castile, which placed him at the head of its numerous religious establishments. In his frequent journeys for their inspection he travelled on foot, supporting himself by begging alms, conformably to the rules of his order. On his return he made a very unfavorable report to the queen of the condition of the various institutions, most of which he represented to have grievously relaxed in discipline and virtue. Contemporary accounts corroborate this unfavorable picture, and accuse the religious communities of both sexes throughout Spain, at this period, of wasting their hours not merely in unprofitable sloth, but in luxury and licentiousness. The Franciscans, in particular, had so far swerved from the obligations of their institute, which interdicted the possession of property of any description, that they owned large estates in town and country, living in stately edifices, and in a style of prodigal expense not surpassed by any of the monastic orders. Those who indulged in this latitude were called *conventuals,* while the comparatively small number who put the strictest construction on the rule of their founder were denominated *observantines,* or brethren of the observance. Ximenes, it will be remembered, was one of the latter.[21]

The Spanish sovereigns had long witnessed with deep regret the scandalous abuses which had

[21] Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 201.—Suma de la Vida de Cisneros, MS.—Mosheim, Ecclesiastical History, vol. iii. cent. 14, p. 2.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 163.—L. Marineo, Cosas memorables, fol. 165.—Oviedo, Epilogo real, imperial y pontifical, MS., apud Mem. de la Acad. de Hist., tom. vi. Ilust. 8.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 3, cap. 15.

crept into these ancient institutions, and had employed commissioners for investigating and reforming them, but ineffectually. Isabella now gladly availed herself of the assistance of her confessor in bringing them into a better state of discipline. In the course of the same year, 1494, she obtained a bull with full authority for this purpose from Alexander the Sixth, the execution of which she intrusted to Ximenes. The work of reform required all the energies of his powerful mind, backed by the royal authority. For, in addition to the obvious difficulty of persuading men to resign the good things of this world for a life of penance and mortification, there were other impediments, arising from the circumstance that the conventuals had been countenanced in their lax interpretation of the rules of their order by many of their own superiors, and even the popes themselves. They were, besides, sustained in their opposition by many of the great lords, who were apprehensive that the rich chapels and masses which they or their ancestors had founded in the various monasteries would be neglected by the observantines, whose scrupulous adherence to the vow of poverty excluded them from what, in church as well as state, is too often found the most cogent incentive to the performance of duty.[22]

From these various causes, the work of reform went on slowly; but the untiring exertions of

[22] Fléchier, Hist. de Ximenés, pp. 25, 26.—Quintanilla, Archetypo, pp. 21, 22.—Gomez, De Rebus gestis, fol. 6, 7.—Robles, Vida de Ximenez, cap. 12.

Ximenes gradually effected its adoption in many establishments; and, where fair means could not prevail, he sometimes resorted to force. The monks of one of the convents in Toledo, being ejected from their dwelling in consequence of their pertinacious resistance, marched out in solemn procession, with the crucifix before them, chanting, at the same time, the psalm *In exitu Israël,* in token of their persecution. Isabella resorted to milder methods. She visited many of the nunneries in person, taking her needle or distaff with her, and endeavoring by her conversation and example to withdraw their inmates from the low and frivolous pleasures to which they were addicted.[23]

While the reformation was thus silently going forward, the vacancy in the archbishropic of Toledo already noticed occurred by the death of the grand cardinal (1495). Isabella deeply felt the responsibility of providing a suitable person for this dignity, the most considerable not merely in Spain, but probably in Christendom, after the papacy; one which, moreover, raised its possessor to eminent political rank, as high chancellor of Castile.[24] The right of nomination to benefices

[23] Fléchier, Hist. de Ximenés, p. 25.—Quintanilla, Archetypo, lib. 1, cap. 11.—Mem. de la Acad. de Hist., tom. vi. Ilust. 8.—Robles, Vida de Ximenez, ubi supra.

[24] Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS., bat. 1, quinc. 2, dial. 1.—Ferdinand and Isabella annexed the dignity of high chancellor in perpetuity to that of archbishop of Toledo. It seems, however, at least in later times, to have been a mere honorary title. (Mendoza, Dignidades, lib. 2, cap. 8.) The revenues of the archbishopric at the beginning of the sixteenth century amounted to 80,000 ducats (Navagiero, Viaggio, fol. 9.—L. Marineo, Cosas memorables, fol. 23), equivalent to about 702,200 dollars at the present day.

was vested in the queen by the original settlement of the crown. She had uniformly discharged this trust with the most conscientious impartiality, conferring the honors of the church on none but persons of approved piety and learning.[25] In the present instance she was strongly solicited by Ferdinand in favor of his natural son Alfonso, archbishop of Saragossa. But this prelate, although not devoid of talent, had neither the age nor experience, and still less the exemplary morals, demanded for this important station; and the queen mildly but unhesitatingly resisted all entreaty and expostulation of her husband on his behalf.[26]

The post had always been filled by men of high family. The queen, loath to depart from this usage, notwithstanding the dying admonition of Mendoza, turned her eyes on various candidates

[25] "De mas desto," says Lucio Marineo, "tenia por costumbre, que quando avia de dar alguna dignidad, o obispado, mas mirava en virtud, honestidad, y sciencia de las personas, que las riquezas, y generosidad, aun que fuessen sus deudos. Lo qual fue causa que muchos de los que hablavan poco, y tenian los cabellos mas cortos que las cejas, començaron a traer los ojos baxos mirando la tierra, y andar con mas gravedad, y hazer mejor vida, *simulando por ventura algunos mas la virtud, que exercitandola.*" (Cosas memorables, fol. 182.) "L'hpyocrisie est l'hommage que le vice rend à la vertu." The maxim is now somewhat stale, like most others of its profound author.

[26] Quintanilla, Archetypo, lib. 1, cap. 16.—Salazar de Mendoza, Crón. del Gran Cardenal, lib. 2, cap. 65.—This prelate was at this time only twenty-four years of age. He had been raised to the see of Saragossa when only six. This strange abuse of preferring infants to the highest dignities of the church seems to have prevailed in Castile as well as Aragon; for the tombs of five archdeacons might be seen in the church of Madre de Dios at Toledo, in Salazar's time, whose united ages amounted to only thirty years. See Crón. del Gran Cardenal, ubi supra.

before she determined in favor of her own confessor, whose character presented so rare a combination of talent and virtue as amply compensated any deficiency of birth.

As soon as the papal bull reached Castile, confirming the royal nomination, Isabella summoned Ximenes to her presence, and, delivering to him the parcel, requested him to open it before her. The confessor, who had no suspicion of their real purport, took the letters and devoutly pressed them to his lips; when, his eye falling on the superscription, "To our venerable brother Francisco Ximenez de Cisneros, archbishop elect of Toledo," he changed color, and involuntarily dropped the packet from his hands, exclaiming, "There is some mistake in this: it cannot be intended for me;" and abruptly quitted the apartment.

The queen, far from taking umbrage at this unceremonious proceeding, waited awhile, until the first emotions of surprise should have subsided. Finding that he did not return, however, she despatched two of the grandees, who she thought would have the most influence with him, to seek him out and persuade him to accept the office. The nobles instantly repaired to his convent in Madrid, in which city the queen then kept the court. They found, however, that he had already left the place. Having ascertained his route, they mounted their horses, and, following as fast as possible, succeeded in overtaking him at three leagues' distance from the city, as he was travelling on foot at a rapid rate, though in the noon-

tide heat, on his way to the Franciscan monastery at Ocaña.

After a brief expostulation with Ximenes on his abrupt departure, they prevailed on him to retrace his steps to Madrid; but, upon his arrival there, neither the arguments nor entreaties of his friends, backed as they were by the avowed wishes of his sovereign, could overcome his scruples, or induce him to accept an office of which he professed himself unworthy. "He had hoped," he said, "to pass the remainder of his days in the quiet practice of his monastic duties; and it was too late now to call him into public life, and impose a charge of such heavy responsibility on him, for which he had neither capacity nor inclination." In this resolution he pertinaciously persisted for more than six months, until a second bull was obtained from the pope, commanding him no longer to decline an appointment which the church had seen fit to sanction. This left no further room for opposition, and Ximenes acquiesced, though with evident reluctance, in his advancement to the first dignity in the kingdom.[27]

There seems to be no good ground for charging Xiemenes with hypocrisy in this singular display of humility. The *nolo episcopari,* indeed, has passed into a proverb; but his refusal was too long and sturdily maintained to be reconciled with affectation or insincerity. He was, moreover, at

[27] Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 4.—Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 26, cap. 7.—Suma de la Vida de Cisneros, MS.—Quintanilla, Archetypo, lib. 1, cap. 16.—Gomez, De Rebus gestis, fol. 11.—Carbajal, Anales, MS., año 1495.—Robles, Vida de Ximenez, cap. 13.—Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS.

this time in the sixtieth year of his age, when ambition, though not extinguished, is usually chilled in the human heart. His habits had been long accommodated to the ascetic duties of the cloister, and his thoughts turned from the business of this world to that beyond the grave. However gratifying the distinguished honor conferred on him might be to his personal feelings, he might naturally hesitate to exchange the calm, sequestered way of life, to which he had voluntarily devoted himself, for the turmoil and vexations of the world.

But, although Ximenes showed no craving for power, it must be confessed he was by no means diffident in the use of it. One of the very first acts of his administration is too characteristic to be omitted. The government of Cazorla, the most considerable place in the gift of the archbishop of Toledo, had been intrusted by the grand cardinal to his younger brother, Don Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza. The friends of this nobleman applied to Ximenes to confirm the appointment, reminding him at the same time of his own obligations to the cardinal, and enforcing their petition by the recommendation which they had obtained from the queen. This was not the way to approach Ximenes, who was jealous of any improper influence over his own judgment, and, above all, of the too easy abuse of the royal favor. He was determined, in the outset, effectually to discourage all such applications; and he declared that "the sovereigns might send him back to the cloister again, but that no personal considerations should

ever operate with him in distributing the honors of the church." The applicants, nettled at this response, returned to the queen, complaining in the bitterest terms of the arrogance and ingratitude of the new primate. Isabella, however, evinced no symptoms of disapprobation, not altogether displeased, perhaps, with the honest independence of her minister; at any rate, she took no further notice of the affair.[28]

Some time after, the archbishop encountered Mendoza in one of the avenues of the palace, and, as the latter was turning off to avoid the meeting, he saluted him with the title of *adelantado* of Cazorla. Mendoza stared with astonishment at the prelate, who repeated the salutation, assuring him "that, now he was at full liberty to consult his own judgment, without the suspicion of any sinister influence, he was happy to restore him to a station for which he had shown himself well qualified." It is scarcely necessary to say that Ximenes was not importuned after this with solicitations for office. Indeed, any personal application he affected to regard as of itself sufficient ground for a denial, since it indicated "the want either of merit or of humility in the applicant." [29]

After his elevation to the primacy, he retained the same simple and austere manners as before, dispensing his large revenues in public and private charities, but regulating his domestic expenditure

[28] Gomez, De Rebus gestis. fol. 11.

[29] Gomez, De Rebus gestis, fol. 11.—Robles, Vida de Ximenez, cap. 13, 14.

with the severest economy,[30] until he was admonished by the Holy See to adopt a state more consonant with the dignity of his office, if he would not disparage it in popular estimation. In obedience to this, he so far changed his habits as to display the usual magnificence of his predecessors in all that met the public eye,—his general style of living, equipage, and the number and pomp of his retainers; but he relaxed nothing of his personal mortifications. He maintained the same abstemious diet amidst all the luxuries of his table. Under his robes of silk or costly furs he wore the coarse frock of St. Francis, which he used to mend with his own hands. He used no linen about his person or bed; and he slept on a miserable pallet like that used by the monks of his fraternity, and so contrived as to be concealed from observation under the luxurious couch in which he affected to repose.[31]

As soon as Ximenes entered on the duties of his office, he bent all the energies of his mind to the consummation of the schemes of reform which his

[30] "He kept five or six friars of his order," says Gonzalo de Oviedo, "in his palace with him, and as many asses in his stables; but the latter all grew sleek and fat, for the archbishop would not ride himself nor allow his brethren to ride either." Quincuagenas, MS.

[31] Suma de la Vida de Cisneros, MS.—Quintanilla, Archetypo, lib. 2, cap. 8, 9.—Gomez, De Rebus gestis, fol. 12.—Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS.—Robles, Vida de Ximenez, cap. 13.—He commonly slept in his Franciscan habit. Of course his toilet took no long time. On one occasion, as he was travelling, and up as usual long before dawn, he urged his muleteer to dress himself quickly; at which the latter irreverently exclaimed, "Cuerpo de Dios! does your holiness think I have nothing more to do than to shake myself like a wet spaniel and tighten my cord a little?" Quintanilla, Archetypo, ubi supra.

royal mistress, as well as himself, had so much at heart. His attention was particularly directed to the clergy of his diocese, who had widely departed from the rule of St. Augustine, by which they were bound. His attempts at reform, however, excited such a lively dissatisfaction in this reverend body that they determined to send one of their own number to Rome, to prefer their complaints against the archbishop at the papal court.[32]

The person selected for this delicate mission was a shrewd and intelligent canon by the name of Albornoz. It could not be conducted so privately as to escape the knowledge of Ximenes. He was no sooner acquainted with it than he despatched an officer to the coast, with orders to arrest the emissary. In case he had already embarked, the officer was authorized to fit out a fast-sailing vessel, so as to reach Italy, if possible, before him. He was at the same time fortified with despatches from the sovereigns to the Spanish minister, Garcilasso de la Vega, to be delivered immediately on his arrival.

The affair turned out as had been foreseen. On arriving at the port, the officer found the bird had flown. He followed, however, without delay, and had the good fortune to reach Ostia several days before him. He forwarded his instructions at

[32] Gomez, De Rebus gestis, fol. 16.—The Venetian minister Navagiero, noticing the condition of the canons of Toledo some few years later, celebrates them as "lording it above all others in their own city, being especial favorites with the ladies, dwelling in stately mansions, passing, in short, the most agreeable lives in the world, without any one to trouble them." Viaggio, fol. 9.

once to the Spanish minister, who in pursuance of them caused Albornoz to be arrested the moment he set foot on shore, and sent him back as a prisoner of state to Spain; where a close confinement for two-and-twenty months admonished the worthy canon of the inexpediency of thwarting the plans of Ximenes.[33]

His attempts at innovation among the regular clergy of his own order were encountered with more serious opposition. The reform fell most heavily on the Franciscans, who were interdicted by their rules from holding property, whether as a community or as individuals; while the members of other fraternities found some compensation for the surrender of their private fortunes, in the consequent augmentation of those of their fraternity. There was no one of the religious orders, therefore, in which the archbishop experienced such a dogged resistance to his plans as in his own. More than a thousand friars, according to some accounts, quitted the country and passed over to Barbary, preferring rather to live with the infidel than conform to the strict letter of the founder's rules.[34]

The difficulties of the reform were perhaps augmented by the mode in which it was conducted. Isabella, indeed, used all gentleness and persua-

[33] Gomez, De Rebus gestis, fol. 17.

[34] Quintanilla, Archetypo, pp. 22, 23.—Mem. de la Acad. de Hist., tom. vi. p. 201.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 3, cap. 15.—One account represents the migration as being to Italy and other Christian countries, where the conventual order was protected; which would seem the more probable, though not the better authenticated, statement of the two.

sion;[35] but Ximenes carried measures with a high and inexorable hand. He was naturally of an austere and arbitrary temper, and the severe training which he had undergone made him less charitable for the lapses of others, especially of those who, like himself, had voluntarily incurred the obligations of monastic rule. He was conscious of the rectitude of his intentions; and, as he identified his own interests with those of the church, he regarded all opposition to himself as an offence against religion, warranting the most peremptory exertion of power.

The clamor raised against his proceedings became at length so alarming that the general of the Franciscans, who resided at Rome, determined to anticipate the regular period of his visit to Castile for inspecting the affairs of the order (1496). As he was himself a conventual, his prejudices were of course all enlisted against the measures of reform; and he came over fully resolved to compel Ximenes to abandon it altogether, or to undermine, if possible, his credit and influence at court. But this functionary had neither the talent nor temper requisite for so arduous an undertaking.

He had not been long in Castile before he was convinced that all his own power, as head of the order, would be incompetent to protect it against

[35] "Trataba las monjas," says Riol, "con un agrado y amor tan cariñoso, que las robaba los corazones, y hecha dueña de ellas, las persuadia con suavidad y eficacia á que votasen clausura. Y es cosa admirable, que raro fue el convento donde entró esta celebre heroina, donde no lograse en el propio dia el efecto de su santo deseo." Informe, apud Semanario erudito, tom. iii. p. 110.

the bold innovations of his provincial, while supported by royal authority. He demanded, therefore, an audience of the queen, in which he declared his sentiments with very little reserve. He expressed his astonishment that she should have selected an individual for the highest dignity in the church, who was destitute of nearly every qualification, even that of birth; whose sanctity was a mere cloak to cover his ambition; whose morose and melancholy temper made him an enemy not only of the elegances but the common courtesies of life; and whose rude manners were not compensated by any tincture of liberal learning. He deplored the magnitude of the evil which his intemperate measures had brought on the church, but which it was, perhaps, not yet too late to rectify; and he concluded by admonishing her that, if she valued her own fame or the interests of her soul, she would compel this man of yesterday to abdicate the office for which he had proved himself so incompetent, and return to his original obscurity!

The queen, who listened to this violent harangue with an indignation that prompted her more than once to order the speaker from her presence, put a restraint on her feelings, and patiently waited to the end. When he had finished, she calmly asked him, "If he was in his senses, and knew whom he was thus addressing?" "Yes," replied the enraged friar, "I am in my senses, and know very well whom I am speaking to;—the queen of Castile, a mere handful of dust, like myself!" With these words, he rushed out of the apartment,

shutting the door after him with furious violence.[36]

Such impotent bursts of passion could, of course, have no power to turn the queen from her purpose. The general, however, on his return to Italy, had sufficient address to obtain authority from His Holiness to send a commission of conventuals to Castile, who should be associated with Ximenes in the management of the reform. These individuals soon found themselves mere ciphers; and, highly offended at the little account which the archbishop made of their authority, they preferred such complaints of his proceedings to the pontifical court that Alexander the Sixth was induced, with the advice of the college of cardinals, to issue a brief, November 9th, 1496, peremptorily inhibiting the sovereigns from proceeding further in the affair until it had been regularly submitted for examination to the head of the church.[37]

Isabella, on receiving this unwelcome mandate, instantly sent it to Ximenes. The spirit of the latter, however, rose in proportion to the obstacles it had to encounter. He sought only to rally the queen's courage, beseeching her not to faint in the good work, now that it was so far advanced, and assuring her that it was already attended with such beneficent fruits as could not fail to secure the protection of Heaven. Isabella, every act of

[36] Fléchier, Hist. de Ximenés, pp. 56, 58.—Gomez, De Rebus gestis, fol. 14.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 3, cap. 15.—Robles, Vida de Ximenez, cap. 13.

[37] Gomez, De Rebus gestis, fol. 23.—Quintanilla, Archetypo, lib. 1, cap. 11.

whose administration may be said to have had reference, more or less remote, to the interests of religion, was as little likely as himself to falter in a matter which proposed these interests as its direct and only object. She assured her minister that she would support him in all that was practicable; and she lost no time in presenting the affair, through her agents, in such a light to the court of Rome as might work a more favorable disposition in it. In this she succeeded, though not till after multiplied delays and embarrassments; and such ample powers were conceded to Ximenes (1497), in conjunction with the apostolic nuncio, as enabled him to consummate his grand scheme of reform, in defiance of all the efforts of his enemies.[38]

The reformation thus introduced extended to the religious institutions of every order equally with his own. It was most searching in its operation, reaching eventually to the moral conduct of the subjects of it, no less than to mere points of monastic discipline. As regards the latter, it may be thought of doubtful benefit to have enforced the rigid interpretation of a rule founded on the melancholy principle that the amount of happiness in the next world is to be regulated by that of self-inflicted suffering in this. But it should be remembered that, however objectionable such a rule may be in itself, yet where it is voluntarily assumed as an imperative moral obligation

[38] Quintanilla, Archetypo, lib. 1, cap. 11–14.—Riol discusses the various monastic reforms effected by Ximenes, in his Memorial to Philip V., apud Semanario erudito, tom. iii. pp. 102–110.

it cannot be disregarded without throwing down the barrier to unbounded license; and that the reassertion of it, under these circumstances, must be a necessary preliminary to any effectual reform of morals.

The beneficial changes wrought in this latter particular, which Isabella had far more at heart than any exterior forms of discipline, are the theme of unqualified panegyric with her contemporaries.[39] The Spanish clergy, as I have before had occasion to remark, were early noted for their dissolute way of life, which, to a certain extent, seemed to be countenanced by the law itself.[40] This laxity of morals had been carried to a most lamentable extent under the last reign, when all orders of ecclesiastics, whether regular or secular, infected probably by the corrupt example of the court, are represented (we may hope it is an exaggeration) as wallowing in all the excesses of sloth and sensuality. So deplorable a pollution of the very sanctuaries of religion could not fail to occasion sincere regret to a pure and virtuous mind like Isabella's. The stain had sunk too deep, how-

[39] L. Marineo, Cosas memorables, fol. 165.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 201.—et al.

[40] The practice of concubinage by the clergy was fully recognized, and the ancient *fueros* of Castile permitted their issue to inherit the estates of such parents as died intestate. (See Marina, Ensayo histórico-crítico sobre la antigua Legislacion de Castilla (Madrid, 1808), p. 184.) The effrontery of these legalized strumpets, *barraganas,* as they were called, was at length so intolerable as to call for repeated laws, regulating their apparel, and prescribing a badge for distinguishing them from honest women. (Sempere, Hist. del Luxo, tom. i. pp. 165–169.)—Spain is probably the only country in Christendom where concubinage was ever sanctioned by law; a circumstance doubtless imputable in some measure to the influence of the Mahometans.

ever, to be readily purged away. Her personal example, indeed, and the scrupulous integrity with which she reserved all ecclesiastical preferment for persons of unblemished piety, contributed greatly to bring about an amelioration in the morals of the secular clergy. But the secluded inmates of the cloister were less open to these influences; and the work of reform could only be accomplished there by bringing them back to a reverence for their own institutions, and by the slow operation of public opinion.

Notwithstanding the queen's most earnest wishes, it may be doubted whether this would have ever been achieved without the co-operation of a man like Ximenes, whose character combined in itself all the essential elements of a reformer. Happily, Isabella was permitted to see before her death, if not the completion, at least the commencement, of a decided amendment in the morals of the religious orders; an amendment which, far from being transitory in its character, calls forth the most emphatic eulogium from a Castilian writer far in the following century; who while he laments their ancient laxity, boldly challenges comparison for the religious communities of his own country with those of any other, in temperance, chastity, and exemplary purity of life and conversation.[41]

The authority on whom the life of Cardinal Ximenes mainly rests is Alvaro Gomez de Castro. He was born in the village of St. Eulalia, near Toledo, in 1515, and received his education at Alcalá, where he obtained great repute for his critical acquaintance

[41] Gomez, De Rebus gestis, fol. 23.

with the ancient classics. He was afterwards made professor of the humanities in the university; a situation which he filled with credit, but subsequently exchanged for the rhetorical chair in a school recently founded at Toledo. While thus occupied, he was chosen by the university of Alcalá to pay the most distinguished honor which could be rendered to the memory of its illustrious founder, by a faithful record of his extraordinary life. The most authentic sources of information were thrown open to him. He obtained an intimate acquaintance with the private life of the cardinal from three of his principal domestics, who furnished abundance of reminiscences from personal observation, while the archives of the university supplied a mass of documents relating to the public services of its patron. From these and similar materials, Gomez prepared his biography, after many years of patient labor. The work fully answered public expectation; and its merits are such as to lead the learned Nic. Antonio to express a doubt whether any thing more excellent or perfect in its way could be achieved: "quo opere in eo genere an præstantius quidquam aut perfectius, esse possit, non immerito sæpe dubitavi." (Bibliotheca Nova, tom. i. p. 59.) The encomium may be thought somewhat excessive; but it cannot be denied that the narrative is written in an easy and natural manner, with fidelity and accuracy, with commendable liberality of opinion, though with a judgment sometimes warped into an undue estimate of the qualities of his hero. It is distinguished, moreover, by such beauty and correctness of Latinity as have made it a text-book in many of the schools and colleges of the Peninsula. The first edition, being that used in the present work, was published at Alcalá, in 1569. It has since been reprinted twice in Germany, and perhaps elsewhere. Gomez was busily occupied with other literary lucubrations during the remainder of his life, and published several works in Latin prose and verse, both of which he wrote with ease and elegance. He died of a catarrh, in 1580, in the sixty-sixth year of his age, leaving behind him a reputation for disinterestedness and virtue which is sufficiently commemorated in two lines of his epitaph:

> "Nemini unquam sciens nocui,
> Prodesse quam pluribus curavi."

The work of Gomez has furnished the basis for all those biographies of Ximenes which have since appeared in Spain. The most important of these, probably, is Quintanilla's; which, with little merit of selection or arrangement, presents a copious mass of details, drawn from every quarter whence his patient industry could glean them. Its author was a Franciscan, and employed in procuring the beatification of Cardinal Ximenes by the court of Rome; a circumstance which probably disposed him to easier faith in the *marvellous* of his story than most of his readers will be ready to give. The work was published at Palermo in 1653.

In addition to these authorities, I have availed myself of a curious old manuscript, presented to me by Mr. O. Rich, entitled "Suma de la Vida del R. S. Cardenal Don Fr. Francisco Ximenez de Cisneros." It was written within half a century after the cardinal's death, by "un criado de la casa de Coruña." The original, in "very ancient letter," was extant in the archives of that noble house in Quintanilla's time, and is often cited by him. (Archetypo, apend., p. 77.) Its author evidently had access to those contemporary notices some of which furnished the basis of Castro's narrative, from which, indeed, it exhibits no material discrepancy.

The extraordinary character of Ximenes has naturally attracted the attention of foreign writers, and especially the French, who have produced repeated biographies of him. The most eminent of these is by Fléchier, the eloquent bishop of Nismes. It is written with the simple elegance and perspicuity which characterize his other compositions, and in the general tone of its sentiments, on all matters both of church and state, is quite as orthodox as the most bigoted admirer of the cardinal could desire. Another life, by Marsollier, has obtained a very undeserved repute. The author, not content with the extraordinary qualities really appertaining to his hero, makes him out a sort of universal genius, rivalling Molière's Dr. Pancrace himself. One may form some idea of the historian's accuracy from the fact that he refers the commencement and conduct of the war of Granada chiefly to the counsels of Ximenes, who, as we have seen, was not even introduced at court till after the close of the war. Marsollier reckoned largely on the ignorance and *gullibility* of his readers. The event proved he was not mistaken.

CHAPTER VI

XIMENES IN GRANADA—PERSECUTION, INSURRECTION, AND CONVERSION OF THE MOORS

1499–1500

Tranquil State of Granada—Mild Policy of Talavera—Clergy dissatisfied with it—Violent Measures of Ximenes—His Fanaticism—Its mischievous Effects—Insurrection in Granada—Tranquillity restored—Baptism of the Inhabitants

MORAL energy, or constancy of purpose, seems to be less properly an independent power of the mind than a mode of action by which its various powers operate with effect. But, however this may be, it enters more largely, perhaps, than mere talent, as commonly understood, into the formation of what is called character, and is often confounded by the vulgar with talent of the highest order. In the ordinary concerns of life, indeed, it is more serviceable than brilliant parts; while in the more important these latter are of little weight without it, evaporating only in brief and barren flashes, which may dazzle the eye by their splendor, but pass away and are forgotten.

The importance of moral energy is felt not only, where it would be expected, in the concerns of active life, but in those more exclusively of an intellectual character,—in deliberative assemblies, for example, where talent, as usually understood, might be supposed to assert an absolute supre-

macy, but where it is invariably made to bend to the controlling influence of this principle. No man destitute of it can be the leader of a party; while there are few leaders, probably, who do not number in their ranks minds from which they would be compelled to shrink in a contest for purely intellectual pre-eminence.

This energy of purpose presents itself in a yet more imposing form when stimulated by some intense passion, as ambition, or the nobler principle of patriotism or religion; when the soul, spurning vulgar considerations of interest, is ready to do and to dare all for conscience' sake; when, insensible alike to all that this world can give or take away, it loosens itself from the gross ties which bind it to earth, and, however humble its powers in every other point of view, attains a grandeur and elevation which genius alone, however gifted, can never reach.

But it is when associated with exalted genius, and under the action of the potent principles above mentioned, that this moral energy conveys an image of power which approaches nearer than any thing else on earth to that of a divine intelligence. It is, indeed, such agents that Providence selects for the accomplishment of those great revolutions by which the world is shaken to its foundations, new and more beautiful systems created, and the human mind carried forward at a single stride, in the career of improvement, further than it had advanced for centuries. It must, indeed, be confessed that this powerful agency is sometimes for evil, as well as for good. It is this same impulse

which spurs guilty Ambition along his bloody track, and which arms the hand of the patriot sternly to resist him; which glows with holy fervor in the bosom of the martyr, and which lights up the fires of persecution, by which he is to win his crown of glory. The direction of the impulse, differing in the same individual under different circumstances, can alone determine whether he shall be the scourge or the benefactor of his species.

These reflections have been suggested by the character of the extraordinary person brought forward in the preceding chapter, Ximenes de Cisneros, and the new and less advantageous aspect in which he must now appear to the reader. Inflexible constancy of purpose formed, perhaps, the most prominent trait of his remarkable character. What direction it might have received under other circumstances it is impossible to say. It would be no great stretch of fancy to imagine that the unyielding spirit, which in its early days could voluntarily endure years of imprisonment rather than submit to an act of ecclesiastical oppression, might under similar influences have been aroused, like Luther's, to shake down the ancient pillars of Catholicism, instead of lending all its strength to uphold them. The latter position, however, would seem better assimilated to the constitution of his mind, whose sombre enthusiasm naturally prepared him for the vague and mysterious in the Romish faith, as his inflexible temper did for its bold and arrogant dogmas. At any rate, it was to this cause he devoted the

whole strength of his talents and commanding energies.

We have seen in the preceding chapter with what promptness he entered on the reform of religious discipline as soon as he came into office, and with what pertinacity he pursued it in contempt of all personal interest and popularity. We are now to see him devoting himself with similar zeal to the extirpation of heresy, with contempt not merely of personal consequences, but also of the most obvious principles of good faith and national honor.

Nearly eight years had elapsed since the conquest of Granada, and the subjugated kingdom continued to repose in peaceful security under the shadow of the treaty which guaranteed the unmolested enjoyment of its ancient laws and religion. This unbroken continuance of public tranquillity, especially difficult to be maintained among the jarring elements of the capital, whose motley population of Moors, renegades, and Christians suggested perpetual points of collision, must be chiefly referred to the discreet and temperate conduct of the two individuals whom Isabella had charged with the civil and ecclesiastical government. These were Mendoza, count of Tendilla, and Talavera, archbishop of Granada.

The former, the brightest ornament of his illustrious house, has been before made known to the reader by his various important services, both military and diplomatic. Immediately after the conquest of Granada he was made alcayde and captain-general of the kingdom; a post for which he

was every way qualified by his prudence, firmness, enlightened views, and long experience.[1]

The latter personage, of more humble extraction,[2] was Fray Fernando de Talavera, a Hieronymite monk, who, having been twenty years prior of the monastery of Santa Maria del Prado, near Valladolid, was made confessor of Queen Isabella, and afterwards of the king. This situation necessarily gave him considerable influence in all public measures. If the keeping of the royal conscience could be safely intrusted to any one, it might certainly be to this estimable prelate, equally distinguished for his learning, amiable manners, and unblemished piety; and, if his character was somewhat tainted with bigotry, it was in so mild a form, so far tempered by the natural benevolence of his disposition, as to make a favorable contrast to the dominant spirit of the time.[3]

[1] "Hombre," his son, the historian, says of him, "de prudencia en negocios graves, de animo firme, asegurado con luenga experiencia de rencuentros i battallas ganadas." (Guerra de Granada, lib. 1, p. 9.) Oviedo dwells with sufficient amplification on the personal history and merits of this distinguished individual, in his garrulous reminiscences. Quincuagenas, MS., bat. 1, quinc. 1, dial. 28.

[2] Oviedo, at least, can find no better pedigree for him than that of Adam: "Quanto á su linage él fué del linage de todos los humanos ó de aquel barro y subcesion de Adan." (Quincuagenas, MS., dial. de Talavera.) It is a very hard case, when a Castilian can make out no better genealogy for his hero.

[3] Pedraza, Antigüedad de Granada, lib. 3, cap. 10.—Marmol, Rebelion de los Moriscos, lib. 1, cap. 21.—Talavera's correspondence with the queen, published in various works, but most correctly, probably, in the sixth volume of the Mem. de la Acad. de Hist. (Ilust. 13), is not calculated to raise his reputation. His letters are little else than homilies on the love of company, dancing, and the like heinous offences. The whole savors more of the sharp twang of Puritanism than of the Roman Catholic school. But

After the conquest, he exchanged the bishopric of Avila for the archiepiscopal see of Granada. Notwithstanding the wishes of the sovereigns, he refused to accept any increase of emolument in this new and more exalted station. His revenues, indeed, which amounted to two millions of maravedis annually, were somewhat less than he before enjoyed.[4] The greater part of this sum he liberally expended on public improvements and works of charity; objects which, to their credit be it spoken, have rarely failed to engage a large share of the attention and resources of the higher Spanish clergy.[5]

The subject which pressed most seriously on the mind of the good archbishop was the conversion of the Moors, whose spiritual blindness he regarded with feelings of tenderness and charity very different from those entertained by most of his reverend brethren. He proposed to accomplish this by the most rational method possible. Though late in life, he set about learning Arabic, that he might communicate with the Moors in their own language, and commanded his clergy to do

bigotry is neutral ground, on which the most opposite sects may meet.

[4] Pedraza, Antigüedad de Granada, lib. 3, cap. 10.—Marmol, lib. 1, cap. 21.—Equivalent to 56,000 dollars of the present day; a sum which Pedraza makes do quite as hard duty, according to its magnitude, as the 500 pounds of Pope's Man of Ross.

[5] Pedraza, ubi supra.—Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS., dial. de Talavera.—The worthy archbishop's benefactions on some occasions were of rather an extraordinary character. "Pidiendole limosna," says Pedraza, "una muger que no tenia camisa, se entró en una casa, y se desnudó, la suya y se la dio; diziendo con san Pedro, No tengo oro ni plata que darte, doyte lo que tengo." Antigüedad de Granada, lib. 3, cap. 10.

the same.[6] He caused an Arabic vocabulary, grammar, and catechism to be compiled, and a version in the same tongue to be made of the liturgy, comprehending the selections from the Gospels, and proposed to extend this at some future time to the whole body of the Scriptures.[7] Thus unsealing the sacred oracles which had been hitherto shut out from their sight, he opened to them the only true sources of Christian knowledge, and, by endeavoring to effect their conversion through the medium of their understandings, instead of seducing their imaginations with a vain show of ostentatious ceremonies, proposed the only method by which conversion could be sincere and permanent.

These wise and benevolent measures of the good prelate, recommended as they were by the most exemplary purity of life, acquired him great authority among the Moors, who, estimating the value of the doctrine by its fruits, were well inclined to listen to it, and numbers were daily added to the church.[8]

[6] Marmol, Rebelion de los Moriscos, lib. 1, cap. 21.—Pedraza, Antigüedad de Granada, ubi supra.

[7] Fléchier, Hist. de Ximenés, p. 17.—Quintanilla, Archetypo, lib. 2, cap. 2.—Gomez, De Rebus gestis, fol. 32.—Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS.—These tracts were published at Granada, in 1505, in Roman characters being the first books ever printed in the Arabic language, according to Dr. M'Crie (Reformation in Spain, p. 70), who cites Schnurrer, Bibl. Arabica, pp. 16–18.

[8] Bleda, Corónica, lib. 5, cap. 23.—Pedraza, Antigüedad de Granada, lib. 3, cap. 10.—Marmol, Rebelion de los Moriscos, lib. 1, cap. 21.—Gomez, De Rebus gestis, fol. 29.—"Hacia lo que predicaba, é predicó lo que hizo," says Oviedo of the archbishop, briefly, "é así fué mucho provechoso é util en aquella ciudad para la conversion de los Moros." Quincuagenas, MS.

The progress of proselytism, however, was necessarily slow and painful among a people reared from the cradle not merely in antipathy to, but abhorrence of, Christianity; who were severed from the Christian community by strong dissimilarity of language, habits, and institutions, and now indissolubly knit together by a common sense of national misfortune. Many of the more zealous clergy and religious persons, conceiving, indeed, this barrier altogether insurmountable, were desirous of seeing it swept away at once by the strong arm of power. They represented to the sovereigns that it seemed like insensibility to the goodness of Providence, which had delivered the infidels into their hands, to allow them any longer to usurp the fair inheritance of the Christians, and that the whole of the stiff-necked race of Mahomet might justly be required to submit without exception to instant baptism, or to sell their estates and remove to Africa. This, they maintained, could be scarcely regarded as an infringement of the treaty, since the Moors would be so great gainers on the score of their eternal salvation; to say nothing of the indispensableness of such a measure to the permanent tranquillity and security of the kingdom![9]

But these considerations, "just and holy as they were," to borrow the words of a devout Spaniard,[10] failed to convince the sovereigns, who resolved to abide by their royal word, and to trust to the conciliatory measures now in progress, and

[9] Marmol, Rebelion de los Moriscos, lib. 1, cap. 23.
[10] Ibid, ubi supra.

a longer and more intimate intercourse with the Christians, as the only legitimate means for accomplishing their object. Accordingly, we find the various public ordinances, as low down as 1499, recognizing this principle, by the respect which they show for the most trivial usages of the Moors,[11] and by their sanctioning no other stimulant to conversion than the amelioration of their condition.[12]

Among those in favor of more active measures was Ximenes, archbishop of Toledo. Having followed the court to Granada in the autumn of 1499, he took the occasion to communicate his views to Talavera, the archbishop, requesting leave at the same time to participate with him in his labor of love; to which the latter, willing to strengthen himself by so efficient an ally, modestly assented. Ferdinand and Isabella soon after removed to Seville (Nov. 1499), but, before their departure, enjoined on the prelates to observe the temperate policy hitherto pursued, and to beware of giving any occasion for discontent to the Moors.[13]

[11] In the *pragmática* dated Granada, October 30th, 1499, prohibiting silk apparel of any description, an exception was made in favor of the Moors, whose robes were usually of that material, among the wealthier classes. Pragmáticas del Reyno, fol. 120.

[12] Another law, October 31st, 1499, provided against the disinheritance of Moorish children who had embraced Christianity, and secured, moreover, to the female converts a portion of the property which had fallen to the state on the conquest of Granada. (Pragmáticas del Reyno, fol. 5.) Llorente has reported this pragmatic with some inaccuracy. Hist. de l'Inquisition, tom. i. p. 334.

[13] Bleda, Corónica, lib. 5, cap. 23.—Gomez, De Rebus gestis, fol. 29.—Quintanilla, Archetypo, lib. 2, p. 54.—Suma de la Vida de Cisneros, MS.—Ferdinand and Isabella, according to Ferreras, took counsel of sundry learned theologians and jurists, whether they could

No sooner had the sovereigns left the city, than Ximenes invited some of the leading *alfaquis*, or Mussulman doctors, to a conference, in which he expounded, with all the eloquence at his command, the true foundations of the Christian faith, and the errors of their own; and, that his teaching might be the more palatable, enforced it by liberal presents, consisting mostly of rich and costly articles of dress, of which the Moors were at all times exceedingly fond. This policy he pursued for some time, till the effect became visible. Whether the preaching or presents of the archbishop had most weight, does not appear.[14] It is probable, however, that the Moorish doctors found conversion a much more pleasant and profitable business than they had anticipated; for they one after another declared their conviction of their errors, and their willingness to receive baptism. The example of these learned persons was soon followed by great numbers of their illiterate disciples, insomuch that no less than four thousand are said to have presented themselves in one day for baptism; and Ximenes, unable to administer the rite to each individually, was obliged to adopt

lawfully compel the Mahometans to become Christians, notwithstanding the treaty, which guaranteed to them the exercise of their religion. After repeated conferences of this erudite body, "il fut décidé," says the historian, "qu'on solliciteroit la conversion des Mahométans de la Ville et du Royaume de Grenade, en ordonnant à ceux qui ne voudroient pas embrasser la religion Chrétienne, de vendre leurs biens et de sortir du royaume." (Hist. d'Espagne, tom. viii. p. 194.) Such was the idea of *solicitation* entertained by these reverend casuists! The story, however, wants a better voucher than Ferreras.

[14] The honest Robles appears to be of the latter opinion. "Alfin," says he, with *naïveté*, "con halagos, dadivas, y caricias, los truxo a conocimiento del verdadero Dios." Vida de Ximenez, p. 100.

the expedient familiar to the Christian missionaries, of christening them *en masse* by aspersion; scattering the consecrated drops from a mop, or hyssop, as it was called, which he twirled over the heads of the multitude.[15]

So far all went on prosperously; and the eloquence and largesses of the archbishop, which latter he lavished so freely as to encumber his revenues for several years to come, brought crowds of proselytes to the Christian fold.[16] There were some, indeed, among the Mahometans, who regarded these proceedings as repugnant, if not to the letter, at least to the spirit of the original treaty of capitulation; which seemed intended to provide not only against the employment of force, but of any undue incentive to conversion.[17]

[15] Robles, Vida de Ximenez, cap. 14.—Marmol, Rebelion de los Moriscos, lib. 1, cap. 24.—Gomez, De Rebus gestis, fol. 29.—Suma de la Vida de Cisneros, MS.—Some ecclesiastical writers find no trace of christening by *aspersion* earlier than the fourteenth century. (Fleury, Histoire ecclésiastique, liv. 98.) But Father Torquemada, in discussing the validity of this mode of baptism, finds, or imagnes he finds, warrant for it as far back as the age of the Apostles. "Lo ha avido," he says of the *bautizando con hisopo*, "y huvo en la primitiva Iglesia, en tiempo de los Apóstolos de Christo, y en otros despues. Esto dice Tertuliano averse usado, y en su tiempo se debia de usar tambien, nombrando el bautismo con el nombre de aspersion de agua. Yo lo mismo lo dice San Cypriano en la Epistola 76, Ad Magnum, y dice ser Verdadero Bautismo."—Monarquia Indiana (Madrid, 1723), tom. iii. lib. 16, cap. 1.

[16] Robles, Vida de Ximenez, cap. 14.—Quintanilla, Archetypo, fol. 55.—The sound of bells, so unusual to Mahometan ears, pealing day and night from the newly-consecrated mosques, gained Ximenes the appellation of *alfaqui campañero* from the Granadines. Suma de la Vida de Cisneros, MS.

[17] Marmol, Rebelion de los Moricos, lib. 1, cap. 25.—Take for example the following provisions in the treaty: "Que si algun Moro tuviere alguna renegada por muger, no será apremiada á ser Christiana contra su voluntad, sino que será interrogada, en

Several of the more sturdy, including some of the principal citizens, exerted their efforts to stay the tide of defection, which threatened soon to swallow up the whole population of the city. But Ximenes, whose zeal had mounted up to fever heat in the excitement of success, was not to be cooled by any opposition, however formidable; and, if he had hitherto respected the letter of the treaty, he now showed himself prepared to trample on letter and spirit indifferently, when they crossed his designs.

Among those most active in the opposition was a noble Moor named Zegri, well skilled in the learning of his countrymen, with whom he had great consideration. Ximenes, having exhausted all his usual artillery of arguments and presents on this obdurate infidel, had him taken into custody by one of his officers named Leon, "a lion," says a punning historian, "by nature as well as by name," [18] and commanded the latter to take such measures with his prisoner as would clear the film from his eyes. This faithful functionary executed his orders so effectually that, after a few days of fasting, fetters, and imprisonment, he was able to present his charge to his employer, penitent to all outward appearance, and with an humble mien strongly contrasting with his former

presencia de Christianos y de Moros, y se siguirá su voluntad; y lo mesmo se entenderá con los niños y niñas nacidos de Christiana y Moro. Que ningun Moro ni Mora serán apremiados á ser Christianos contra su voluntad; y que si alguna doncella, ó casada, ó viuda, por razon de algunos amores se quisiere tornar Christiana, tampoco será recebida, hasta ser interrogada." The whole treaty is given *in extenso* by Marmol, and by no other author that I have seen.

[18] Gomez, De Rebus gestis, lib. 2, fol. 29.

proud and lofty bearing. After the most respectful obeisance to the archbishop, Zegri informed him that "on the preceding night he had had a revelation from Allah, who had condescended to show him the error of his ways, and commanded him to receive instant baptism;" at the same time, pointing to his gaoler, he "jocularly" remarked, "Your reverence has only to turn this *lion* of yours loose among the people, and, my word for it, there will not be a Mussulman left many days within the walls of Granada."[19] "Thus," exclaims the devout Ferreras, "did Providence avail itself of the darkness of the dungeon to pour on the benighted minds of the infidel the light of the true faith!"

The work of proselytism now went on apace; for terror was added to the other stimulants. The zealous propagandist, in the mean while, flushed with success, resolved not only to exterminate infidelity, but the very characters in which its teachings were recorded. He accordingly caused all the Arabic manuscripts which he could procure to be heaped together in a common pile in one of the great squares of the city. The largest part were copies of the Koran or works in some way or other connected with theology; with many others, however, on various scientific subjects. They

[19] Robles, Vida de Ximenez, cap. 14.—Suma de la Vida de Cisneros, MS.—Gomez, de Rebus gestis, fol. 30.—Marmol, Rebelion de los Moriscos, lib. 1, cap. 25.—Zegri assumed the baptismal name of the Great Captain, Gonzalo Hernandez, whose prowess he had experienced in a personal rencontre in the vega of Granada. Marmol, Rebelion de los Moriscos, ubi supra.—Suma de la Vida de Cisneros, MS.

[20] Hist. d'Espagne, tom. viii. p. 195

were beautifully executed, for the most part, as to their chirography, and sumptuously bound and decorated; for in all relating to the mechanical finishing of books the Spanish Arabs excelled every people in Europe. But neither splendor of outward garniture, nor intrinsic merit of composition, could atone for the taint of heresy in the eye of the stern inquisitor; he reserved for his university of Alcalá three hundred works, indeed, relating to medical science, in which the Moors were as pre-eminent in that day as the Europeans were deficient; but all the rest, amounting to many thousands,[21] he consigned to indiscriminate conflagration.[22]

This melancholy *auto da fe,* it will be recollected, was celebrated, not by an unlettered barbarian, but by a cultivated prelate, who was at that very time actively employing his large revenues in the publication of the most stupendous literary

[21] According to Robles (Vida de Ximenez, p. 104, and the Suma de la Vida de Cisneros, 1,005,000; to Conde (El Nubiense, Descripcion de España, p. 4, note), 80,000; to Gomez and others, 5000. There are scarcely any data for arriving at probability in this monstrous discrepancy. The famous library of the Ommeyades at Cordova was said to contain 600,000 volumes. It had long since been dissipated; and no similar collection had been attempted in Granada, where learning was never in that palmy state which it reached under the Cordovan dynasty. Still, however, learned men were to be found there, and the Moorish metropolis would naturally be the depository of such literary treasures as had escaped the general shipwreck of time and accident. On the whole, the estimate of Gomez would appear much too small, and that of Robles as disproportionately exaggerated. Conde, better instructed in Arabic lore than any of his predecessors, may be found, perhaps, here, as elsewhere, the best authority.

[22] Gomez, De Rebus gestis, lib 2, fol. 30.—Marmol, Rebelion de los Moriscos, lib. 1, cap. 25.—Robles, Vida de Ximenez, cap. 14.—Suma de la Vida de Cisneros, MS.—Quintanilla, Archetypo, p. 58.

work of the age, and in the endowment of the most learned university in Spain.[23] It took place, not in the darkness of the Middle Ages, but in the dawn of the sixteenth century, and in the midst of an enlightened nation, deeply indebted for its own progress to these very stores of Arabian wisdom. It forms a counterpart to the imputed sacrilege of Omar,[24] eight centuries before, and shows that bigotry is the same in every faith and every age.

The mischief occasioned by this act, far from being limited to the immediate loss, continued to be felt still more severely in its consequences. Such as could, secreted the manuscripts in their possession till an opportunity occurred for conveying them out of the country; and many thousands in this way were privately shipped over to Barbary.[25] Thus Arabian literature became rare in the libraries of the very country to which it was indigenous; and Arabic scholarship, once so flourishing in Spain, and that too in far less pol-

[23] Yet the archbishop might find some countenance for his fanaticism in the most polite capital of Europe. The faculty of Theology in Paris, some few years later, declared, "que c'en était fait de la religion, si on permettait l'étude du Grec et de l'Hébreu!" Villers, Essai sur l'Esprit et l'Influence de la Réformation de Luther (Paris, 1820), p. 64, note.

[24] Gibbon's argument, if it does not shake the foundations of the whole story of the Alexandrian conflagration, may at least raise a natural skepticism as to the pretended amount and value of the works destroyed.

[25] The learned Granadine, Leo Africanus, who emigrated to Fez after the fall of the capital, notices a single collection of 3000 manuscripts belonging to an individual, which he saw in Algiers, whither they had been secretly brought by the Moriscos from Spain. Conde, Dominacion de los Arabes, prólogo.—Casiri, Bibliotheca Escurialensis, tom. i. p. 172.

ished ages, gradually fell into decay from want of aliment to sustain it. Such were the melancholy results of this literary persecution; more mischievous, in one view, than even that directed against life; for the loss of an individual will scarcely be felt beyond his own generation, while the annihilation of a valuable work, or, in other words, of mind itself embodied in a permanent form, is a loss to all future time.

The high hand with which Ximenes now carried measures excited serious alarm in many of the more discreet and temperate Castilians in the city. They besought him to use greater forbearance, remonstrating against his obvious violations of the treaty, as well as against the expediency of forced conversions, which could not, in the nature of things, be lasting. But the pertinacious prelate only replied that "a tamer policy might, indeed, suit temporal matters, but not those in which the interests of the soul were at stake; that the unbeliever, if he could not be drawn, should be driven, into the way of salvation; and that it was no time to stay the hand, when the ruins of Mahometanism were tottering to their foundations." He accordingly went on with unflinching resolution.[26]

But the patience of the Moors themselves, which had held out so marvellously under this system of oppression, began now to be exhausted. Many signs of this might be discerned by much less acute optics than those of the archbishop; but his were blinded by the arrogance of success. At length,

[26] Gomez, De Rebus gestis, fol. 30.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, rey 30, cap. 10.

in this inflammable state of public feeling, an incident occurred which led to a general explosion.

Three of Ximenes's servants were sent on some business to the Albaycin, a quarter inhabited exclusively by Moors, and encompassed by walls, which separated it from the rest of the city.[27] These men had made themselves peculiarly odious to the people by their activity in their master's service. A dispute, having arisen between them and some inhabitants of the quarter, came at last to blows, when two of the servants were massacred on the spot, and their comrade escaped with difficulty from the infuriated mob.[28] The affair operated as a signal for insurrection. The inhabitants of the district ran to arms, got possession of the gates, barricaded the streets, and in a few hours the whole Albaycin was in rebellion.[29]

In the course of the following night, a large number of the enraged populace made their way into the city to the quarters of Ximenes, with the purpose of taking summary vengeance on his head for all his persecutions. Fortunately, his palace was strong, and defended by numerous resolute and well-armed attendants. The latter, at the approach of the rioters, implored their master to make his escape, if possible, to the fortress of the Alhambra, where the count of Tendilla

[27] Casiri, Bibliotheca Escurialensis, tom. ii. p. 281.—Pedraza, Antigüedad de Granada, lib. 3, cap. 10.

[28] Gomez, De Rebus gestis, fol. 31.—There are some discrepancies —not important, however—between the narrative of Gomez and the other authorities. Gomez, considering his uncommon opportunities of information, is worth them all.

[29] Suma de la Vida de Cisneros, MS.—Gomez, De Rebus gestis, lib. 2, fol. 31.—Marmol, Rebelion de los Moriscos, lib. 1, cap. 26.

was established. But the intrepid prelate, who held life too cheap to be a coward, exclaimed, "God forbid I should think of my own safety, when so many of the faithful are perilling theirs! No, I will stand to my post, and await there, if Heaven wills it, the crown of martyrdom."[30] It must be confessed he well deserved it.

The building, however, proved too strong for the utmost efforts of the mob; and at length, after some hours of awful suspense and agitation to the beleaguered inmates, the count of Tendilla arrived in person at the head of his guards, and succeeded in dispersing the insurgents and driving them back to their own quarters. But no exertions could restore order to the tumultuous populace, or induce them to listen to terms; and they even stoned the messenger charged with pacific proposals from the count of Tendilla. They organized themselves under leaders, provided arms, and took every possible means for maintaining their defence. It seemed as if, smitten with the recollections of ancient liberty, they were resolved to recover it again at all hazards.[31]

At length, after this disorderly state of things had lasted for several days, Talavera, the archbishop of Granada, resolved to try the effect of his personal influence, hitherto so great with the Moors, by visiting himself the disaffected quarter. This noble purpose he put in execution, in spite

[30] Robles, Vida de Ximenez, cap. 14.—Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 27, cap. 5.—Quintanilla, Archetypo, p. 56.—Peter Martyr. Opus Epist., epist. 212.

[31] Mariana, Hist. de España, ubi sup.—Bleda, Corónica, lib. 5, cap. 23.—Mendoza, Guerra de Granada, p. 11.

of the most earnest remonstrances of his friends. He was attended only by his chaplain, bearing the crucifix before him, and a few of his domestics, on foot and unarmed like himself. At the sight of their venerable pastor, with his countenance beaming with the same serene and benign expression with which they were familiar when listening to his exhortations from the pulpit, the passions of the multitude were stilled. Every one seemed willing to abandon himself to the tender recollections of the past; and the simple people crowded around the good man, kneeling down and kissing the hem of his robe, as if to implore his benediction. The count of Tendilla no sooner learned the issue, than he followed into the Albaycin, attended by a handful of soldiers. When he had reached the place where the mob was gathered, he threw his bonnet into the midst of them, in token of his pacific intentions. The action was received with acclamations, and the people, whose feelings had now taken another direction, recalled by his presence to the recollection of his uniformly mild and equitable rule, treated him with similar respect to that shown the archbishop of Granada.[32]

These two individuals took advantage of this favorable change of feeling to expostulate with the Moors on the folly and desperation of their conduct, which must involve them in a struggle with such overwhelming odds as that of the whole

[32] Marmol, Rebelion de los Moriscos, lib. 1, cap. 26.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 212.—Quintanilla, Archetypo, p. 56.—Bleda, Corónica, ubi supra.

Spanish monarchy. They implored them to lay down their arms and return to their duty, in which event they pledged themselves, as far as in their power, to allow no further repetition of the grievances complained of, and to intercede for their pardon with the sovereigns. The count testified his sincerity, by leaving his wife and two children as hostages in the heart of the Albaycin; an act which must be admitted to imply unbounded confidence in the integrity of the Moors.[33] These various measures, backed, moreover, by the counsels and authority of some of the chief alfaquis, had the effect to restore tranquillity among the people, who, laying aside their hostile preparations, returned once more to their regular employments.[34]

The rumor of the insurrection, in the mean while, with the usual exaggeration, reached Seville, where the court was then residing. In one respect rumor did justice, by imputing the whole blame of the affair to the intemperate zeal of Ximenes. That personage, with his usual promptness, had sent early notice of the affair to the queen by a negro slave uncommonly fleet of foot. But the fellow had become intoxicated by the way, and the court were several days without any more authentic tidings than general report. The king,

[33] Marmol, Rebelion de los Moriscos, loc. cit.—Mendoza, Guerra de Granada, lib. 1, p. 11.—That such confidence was justified, may be inferred from a common saying of Archbishop Talavera, "That Moorish works and Spanish faith were all that were wanting to make a good Christian." A bitter sarcasm this on his own countrymen! Pedraza, Antigüedad de Granada, lib. 3, cap. 10.

[34] Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 212.—Bleda, Corónica, loc. cit.—Marmol, Rebelion de los Moriscos, ubi supra.

who had always regarded Ximenes's elevation to the primacy, to the prejudice, as the reader may remember, of his own son, with dissatisfaction, could not now restrain his indignation, but was heard to exclaim tauntingly to the queen, "So we are like to pay dear for your archbishop, whose rashness has lost us in a few hours what we have been years in acquiring." [35]

The queen, confounded at the tidings, and unable to comprehend the silence of Ximenes, instantly wrote to him in the severest terms, demanding an explanation of the whole proceeding. The archbishop saw his error in committing affairs of moment to such hands as those of his sable messenger; and the lesson stood him in good stead, according to his moralizing biographer, for the remainder of his life.[36] He hastened to repair his fault by proceeding to Seville in person and presenting himself before the sovereigns. He detailed to them the history of all the past transactions; recapitulated his manifold services, the arguments and exhortations he had used, the large sums he had expended, and his various expedients, in short, for effecting conversion, before resorting to severity. He boldly assumed the responsibility of the whole proceeding, acknowledging that he had purposely avoided communicating his plans to the sovereigns for fear of opposition. If he had erred, he said, it could be imputed to no other motive, at worst, than too great zeal for the in-

[35] Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 27, cap. 5.—Robles, Vida de Ximenez, cap. 14.—Suma de la Vida de Cisneros, MS.

[36] Gomez, De Rebus gestis, fol. 32.—Robles, Vida de Ximenez, cap. 14.

terests of religion; but he concluded with assuring them that the present position of affairs was the best possible for their purposes, since the late conduct of the Moors involved them in the guilt, and consequently all the penalties, of treason, and that it would be an act of clemency to offer pardon on the alternatives of conversion or exile![37]

The archbishop's discourse, if we are to credit his enthusiastic biographer, not only dispelled the clouds of royal indignation, but drew forth the most emphatic expressions of approbation.[38] How far Ferdinand and Isabella were moved to this by his final recommendation, or what, in clerical language, may be called the "improvement of his discourse," does not appear. They did not, at any rate, adopt it to its literal extent. In due time, however, commissioners were sent to Granada, fully authorized to inquire into the late disturbances and punish their guilty authors. In the course of the investigation, many, including some of the principal citizens, were imprisoned on suspicion. The greater part made their peace by embracing Christianity. Many others sold their estates and migrated to Barbary; and the remainder of the population, whether from fear of punishment or contagion of example, abjured their ancient superstition and consented to receive baptism. The whole number of converts was estimated at about fifty thousand, whose future relapses promised an almost inexhaustible supply for the fiery labors of the Inquisition. From this

[37] Gomez, De Rebus gestis, ubi supra.

[38] Ibid., fol. 33.—Suma de la Vida de Cisneros, MS.

period the name of Moors, which had gradually superseded the primitive one of Spanish Arabs, gave way to the title of Moriscos, by which this unfortunate people continued to be known through the remainder of their protracted existence in the Peninsula.[39]

The circumstances under which this important revolution in religion was effected in the whole population of this great city will excite only feelings of disgust at the present day, mingled, indeed, with compassion for the unhappy beings who so heedlessly incurred the heavy liabilities attached to their new faith. Every Spaniard, doubtless, anticipated the political advantages likely to result from a measure which divested the Moors of the peculiar immunities secured by the treaty of capitulation and subjected them at once to the law of the land. It is equally certain, however, that they attached great value in a spiritual view to the mere show of conversion, placing implicit confidence in the purifying influence of the waters of baptism, to whomever and under whatever circumstances administered. Even the philosophic Martyr, as little tinctured with bigotry as any of the time, testifies his joy at the conversion, on the ground that, although it might not penetrate beneath the crust of infidelity which had

[39] Bleda, Corónica, lib. 5, cap. 23.—Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 27, cap. 5.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 215.—Marmol, Rebelion de los Moriscos, lib. 1, cap. 27.—Gomez, De Rebus gestis, lib. 2, fol. 32.—Lanuza, Historias, tom. i. lib. 1, cap. 11.—Carbajal, Anales, MS., año 1500.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 159.—The last author carries the number of converts in Granada and its *environs* to 70,000.

formed over the mind of the older and of course inveterate Mussulman, yet it would have full effect on his posterity, subjected from the cradle to the searching operation of Christian discipline.[40]

With regard to Ximenes, the real author of the work, whatever doubts were entertained of his discretion in the outset, they were completely dispelled by the results. All concurred in admiring the invincible energy of the man who, in the face of such mighty obstacles, had so speedily effected this momentous revolution in the faith of a people bred from childhood in the deadliest hostility to Christianity;[41] and the good archbishop Talavera was heard in the fulness of his heart to exclaim that "Ximenes had achieved greater triumphs than Ferdinand and Isabella; since they had con-

[40] "Tu vero inquies," he says, in a letter to the cardinal of Santa Cruz, "iisdem in suum Mahometem vivent animis, atque id jure merito suspicandum est. Durum namque majorum instituta relinquere; attamen ego existimo, consultum optime fuisse ipsorum admittere postulata: paulatim namque nova superveniente disciplinâ, juvenum saltem et infantum atque eo tutius nepotum, inanibus illis superstitionibus abrasis, novis imbuentur ritibus. De senescentibus, qui callosis animis induruerunt, haud ego quidem id futurum inficior." Opus Epist., epist. 215.—Gonsalvo de Cordova expresses himself in a similar tone of satisfaction in a letter to the secretary Almazan, Carta fecha en Caragoça (Siracusa?), April 16th, 1501, MS.

[41] "Magnæ deinceps," says Gomez, "apud omnes venerationi Ximenius esse cœpit.—Porrò plus mentis acie videre quàm solent homines credebatur, quòd re ancipiti, neque plane confirmatâ, barbarâ civitate adhuc suum Mahumetum spirante, tantâ animi contentione, ut Christi doctrinam amplecterentur, laboraverat et effecerat." (De Rebus gestis, fol. 33.) The panegyric of the Spaniard is endorsed by Fléchier (Histoire de Ximenés, p. 119), who, in the age of Louis XIV., displays all the bigotry of that of Ferdinand and Isabella.

quered only the soil, while he had gained the souls, of Granada!" [42]

[42] Talavera, as I have already noticed, had caused the offices, catechisms, and other religious exercises to be translated into Arabic for the use of the converts; proposing to extend the translation at some future time to the great body of the Scriptures. That time had now arrived; but Ximenes vehemently remonstrated against the measure. "It would be throwing pearls before swine," said he, "to open the Scriptures to persons in their low state of ignorance, who could not fail, as St. Paul says, to wrest them to their own destruction. The word of God should be wrapped in discreet mystery from the vulgar, who feel little reverence for what is plain and obvious. It was for this reason that our Saviour himself clothed his doctrines in parables, when he addressed the people. The Scriptures should be confined to the three ancient languages, which God with mystic import permitted to be inscribed over the head of his crucified Son; and the vernacular should be reserved for such devotional and moral treatises as holy men indite, in order to quicken the soul, and turn it from the pursuit of worldly vanities to heavenly contemplation." De Rebus gestis, fol. 32, 33. The narrowest opinion, as usual, prevailed, and Talavera abandoned his wise and benevolent purpose. The sagacious arguments of the primate lead his biographer, Gomez, to conclude that he had a prophetic knowledge of the coming heresy of Luther, which owed so much of its success to the vernacular versions of the Scriptures; in which probable opinion he is faithfully echoed, as usual, by the good bishop of Nismes. Fléchier, Hist. de Ximenés, pp. 117–119.

CHAPTER VII

RISING IN THE ALPUJARRAS—DEATH OF ALONSO DE AGUILAR—EDICT AGAINST THE MOORS

1500–1502

Rising in the Alpujarras—Expedition to the Sierra Vermeja—Alonso de Aguilar—His noble Character, and Death—Bloody Rout of the Spaniards—Final Submission to Ferdinand—Cruel Policy of the Victors—Commemorative Ballads—Edict against the Moors—Causes of Intolerance—Last Notice of the Moors under the present Reign

WHILE affairs went forward so triumphantly in the capital of Granada, they excited general discontent in other parts of that kingdom, especially the wild regions of the Alpujarras. This range of maritime Alps, which stretches to the distance of seventeen leagues in a southeasterly direction from the Moorish capital, sending out its sierras like so many broad arms towards the Mediterranean, was thickly sprinkled with Moorish villages; cresting the bald summits of the mountains, or checkering the green slopes and valleys which lay between them. Its simple inhabitants, locked up within the lonely recesses of their hills, and accustomed to a life of penury and toil, had escaped the corruptions, as well as refinements, of civilization. In ancient times they had afforded a hardy militia for the princes of Granada; and they now exhibited an unshaken

attachment to their ancient institutions and religion, which had been somewhat effaced in the great cities by more intimate intercourse with the Europeans.[1]

These warlike mountaineers beheld with gathering resentment the faithless conduct pursued towards their countrymen, which they had good reason to fear would soon be extended to themselves; and their fiery passions were inflamed to an ungovernable height by the public apostasy of Granada. They at length resolved to anticipate any similar attempt on themselves by a general insurrection. They accordingly seized on the fortresses and strong passes throughout the country, and began as usual with forays into the lands of the Christians.

These bold acts excited much alarm in the capital, and the count of Tendilla took vigorous measures for quenching the rebellion in its birth. Gonsalvo de Cordova, his early pupil, but who might now well be his master in the art of war, was at that time residing in Granada; and Tendilla availed himself of his assistance to enforce a hasty muster of levies and march at once against the enemy.

[1] Alpujarras,—an Arabic word, signifying "land of warriors," according to Salazar de Mendoza. (Monarquía, tom. ii. p. 138.) According to the more accurate and learned Conde, it is derived from an Arabic term for "pasturage." (El Nubiense, Descripcion de España, p. 187.)

"La Alpuxarra, aquessa sierra
que al Sol la cerviz levanta
y que poblada de Villas,
es Mar de peñas, y plantas,
adonde sus poblaciones
ondas navegan de plata."

Calderon (Comedias (Madrid, 1760), tom. i. p. 353), whose gorgeous muse sheds a blaze of glory over the rudest scenes.

His first movement was against Huejar, a fortified town situated in one of the eastern ranges of the Alpujarras, whose inhabitants had taken the lead in the insurrection. The enterprise was attended with more difficulty than was expected. "God's enemies," to borrow the charitable epithet of the Castilian chroniclers, had ploughed up the lands in the neighborhood; and, as the light cavalry of the Spaniards was working its way through the deep furrows, the Moors opened the canals which intersected the fields, and in a moment the horses were floundering up to their girths in the mire and water. Thus embarrassed in their progress, the Spaniards presented a fatal mark to the Moorish missiles, which rained on them with pitiless fury; and it was not without great efforts and considerable loss that they gained a firm landing on the opposite side. Undismayed, however, they then charged the enemy with such vivacity as compelled him to give way and take refuge within the defences of the town.

No impediment could now check the ardor of the assailants. They threw themselves from their horses, and bringing forward the scaling-ladders, planted them against the walls. Gonsalvo was the first to gain the summit; and, as a powerful Moor endeavored to thrust him from the topmost round of the ladder, he grasped the battlements firmly with his left hand and dealt the infidel such a blow with the sword in his right as brought him headlong to the ground. He then leapt into the place, and was speedily followed by his troops. The enemy made a brief and ineffectual resistance.

The greater part were put to the sword; the remainder, including the women and children, were made slaves, and the town was delivered up to pillage.[2]

The severity of this military execution had not the effect of intimidating the insurgents; and the revolt wore so serious an aspect that King Ferdinand found it necessary to take the field in person, which he did at the head of as complete and beautiful a body of Castilian chivalry as ever graced the campaigns of Granada.[3] Quitting Alhendin, the place of rendezvous, in the latter end of February, 1500, he directed his march on Lanjaron, one of the towns most active in the revolt, and perched high among the inaccessible fastnesses of the sierra, southeast of Granada.

The inhabitants, trusting to the natural strength of a situation which had once baffled the arms of the bold Moorish chief El Zagal, took no precautions to secure the passes. Ferdinand, relying on this, avoided the more direct avenue to the place, and, bringing his men by a circuitous route over dangerous ravines and dark and dizzy precipices, where the foot of the hunter had seldom ventured, succeeded at length, after incredible toil

[2] Marmol, Rebelion de los Moriscos, tom. i. lib. 1, cap. 28.—Quintana, Españoles célebres, tom. i. p. 239.—Bleda, Corónica, lib. 5, cap. 23.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 159.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. fol. 338.—Mendoza, Guerra de Granada, p. 12.

[3] If we are to believe Martyr, the royal force amounted to 80,000 foot and 15,000 horse. So large an army, so promptly brought into the field, would suggest high ideas of the resources of the nation; too high, indeed, to gain credit, even from Martyr, without confirmation.

and hazard, in reaching an elevated point which entirely commanded the Moorish fortress.

Great was the dismay of the insurgents at the apparition of the Christian banners, streaming in triumph in the upper air from the very pinnacles of the sierra. They stoutly persisted, however, in the refusal to surrender. But their works were too feeble to stand the assault of men who had vanquished the more formidable obstacles of nature; and, after a short struggle, the place was carried by storm, and its wretched inmates experienced the same dreadful fate with those of Huejar. (March 8th, 1500.)[4]

At nearly the same time, the count of Lerin took several other fortified places in the Alpujarras, in one of which he blew up a mosque filled with women and children. Hostilities were carried on with all the ferocity of a civil, or rather servile, war; and the Spaniards, repudiating all the feelings of courtesy and generosity which they had once shown to the same men, when dealing with them as honorable enemies, now regarded them only as rebellious vassals, or indeed slaves, whom the public safety required to be not merely chastised, but exterminated.

These severities, added to the conviction of their own impotence, at length broke the spirit of the Moors, who were reduced to the most humble concessions; and the Catholic king, "unwilling out of his great clemency," says Abarca, "to stain his

[4] Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 215.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. fol. 338.—Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 3, cap. 45.—Carbajal, Anales, MS., año 1500.

sword with the blood of all these wild beasts of the Alpujarras," consented to terms which may be deemed reasonable, at least in comparison with his previous policy. These were, the surrender of their arms and fortresses, and the payment of the round sum of fifty thousand ducats.[5]

As soon as tranquillity was re-established, measures were taken for securing it permanently, by introducing Christianity among the natives, without which they never could remain well affected to their present government. Holy men were, therefore, sent as missionaries, to admonish them, calmly and without violence, of their errors, and to instruct them in the great truths of revelation.[6] Various immunities were also proposed as an additional incentive to conversion, including an entire exemption to the convert from the payment of his share of the heavy mulct lately imposed.[7] The wisdom of these temperate measures became every day more visible, in the conversion not merely of the simple mountaineers, but of nearly all the population of the great cities of Baza, Guadix, and Almeria, who consented before the end of the year to abjure their ancient religion and receive baptism.[8]

[5] Marmol, Rebelion de los Moriscos, lib. 1, cap. 28.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. fol. 338.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 159.—Bleda, Corónica, lib. 5, cap. 24.

[6] Bleda, Corónica, lib. 5, cap. 24.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 165.

[7] Privilegios á los Moros de Valdelecrin y las Alpuxarras que se convirtieren, á 30 de Julio de 1500. Archivo de Simancas, apud Mem. de la Acad. de Hist., tom. vi. apend. 14.

[8] Carbajal, Anales, MS., año 1500.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 10.

This defection, however, caused great scandal among the more sturdy of their countrymen, and a new insurrection broke out on the eastern confines of the Alpujarras (Dec., 1500), which was suppressed with similar circumstances of stern severity, and a similar exaction of a heavy sum of money,—money, whose doubtful efficacy may be discerned, sometimes in staying, but more frequently in stimulating, the arm of persecution.[9]

But while the murmurs of rebellion died away in the east, they were heard in thunders from the distant hills on the western borders of Granada. This district, comprehending the sierras Vermeja and Villa Luenga, in the neighborhood of Ronda, was peopled by a warlike race, among whom was the African tribe of Gandules, whose blood boiled with the same tropical fervor as that which glowed in the veins of their ancestors. They had early shown symptoms of discontent at the late proceeding in the capital. The duchess of Arcos, widow of the great marquis duke of Cadiz, whose estates lay in that quarter,[10] used her personal exertions to appease them; and the government made the most earnest assurances of its intention to respect whatever had been guaranteed by the treaty of capitulation.[11] But they had learned to place little

[9] Carbajal, Anales, MS., año 1501.—Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 4, cap. 27, 31.

[10] The great marquis of Cadiz was third count of Arcos, from which his descendants took their title on the resumption of Cadiz by the crown after his death. Mendoza, Dignidades, lib. 3, cap. 8, 17.

[11] See two letters, dated Seville, January and February, 1500, addressed by Ferdinand and Isabella to the inhabitants of the Serrania de Ronda, preserved in the Archives of Simancas, apud Mem. de la Acad. de Hist., tom. vi. Ilust. 15.

trust in princes; and the rapidly extending apostasy of their countrymen exasperated them to such a degree that they at length broke out in the most atrocious acts of violence; murdering the Christian missionaries, and kidnapping, if report be true, many Spaniards of both sexes, whom they sold as slaves in Africa. They were accused, with far more probability, of entering into a secret correspondence with their brethren on the opposite shore, in order to secure their support in the meditated revolt.[12]

[12] Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 165.—Bleda, Corónica, lib. 5, cap. 25.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 221.—The complaints of the Spanish and African Moors to the Sultan of Egypt, or of Babylon, as he was then usually styled, had drawn from that prince sharp remonstrances to the Catholic sovereigns against their persecutions of the Moslems, accompanied by menaces of strict retaliation on the Christians in his dominions. In order to avert such calamitous consequences, Peter Martyr was sent as ambassador to Egypt. He left Granada in August, 1501, proceeded to Venice, and embarked there for Alexandria, which place he reached in December. Though cautioned, on his arrival, that his mission, in the present exasperated state of feeling at the court, might cost him his head, the dauntless envoy sailed up the Nile under a Mameluke guard to Grand Cairo. Far from experiencing any outrage, however, he was courteously received by the Sultan; although the ambassador declined compromising the dignity of the court he represented, by paying the usual humiliating mark of obeisance, in prostrating himself on the ground in the royal presence; an independent bearing highly satisfactory to the Castilian historians. (See Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 12.) He had three audiences, in which he succeeded so completely in effacing the unfavorable impressions of the Moslem prince that the latter not only dismissed him with liberal presents, but granted, at his request, several important privileges to the Christian residents, and the pilgrims to the Holy Land, which lay within his dominions. Martyr's account of this interesting visit, which gave him ample opportunity for studying the manners of a nation, and seeing the stupendous monuments of ancient art, then little familiar to Europeans, was published in Latin, under the title of "De Legatione Babylonicâ," in three books, appended to his more celebrated "Decades de Rebus Oceanicis et Novo Orbe."

The government displayed its usual promptness and energy on this occasion. Orders were issued to the principal chiefs and cities of Andalusia to muster their forces with all possible despatch and concentrate them on Ronda. The summons was obeyed with such alacrity that in the course of a very few weeks the streets of that busy city were thronged with a shining array of warriors drawn from all the principal towns of Andalusia. Seville sent three hundred horse and two thousand foot. The principal leaders of the expedition were the count of Cifuentes, who, as assistant of Seville, commanded the troops of that city; the count of Ureña, and Alonso de Aguilar, elder brother of the Great Captain, and distinguished like him for the highest qualities of mind and person.

It was determined by the chiefs to strike at once into the heart of the Sierra Vermeja, or Red Sierra, as it was called from the color of its rocks, rising to the east of Ronda, and the principal theatre of insurrection. On the 18th of March, 1501, the little army encamped before Monarda, on the skirts of a mountain, where the Moors were understood to have assembled in considerable force. They had not been long in these quarters before parties of the enemy were seen hovering along the slopes of the mountain, from which the Christian camp was divided by a narrow river,—the Rio Verde, probably, which has gained such

Mazzuchelli (Scrittori d'Italia, *voce* Anghiera) notices an edition which he had seen published separately, without date or name of the printer.

mournful celebrity in Spanish song.[13] Aguilar's troops, who occupied the van, were so much roused by the sight of the enemy that a small party, seizing a banner, rushed across the stream without orders, in pursuit. The odds, however, were so great that they would have been severely handled, had not Aguilar, while he bitterly condemned their temerity, advanced promptly to their support with the remainder of his corps. The count of Ureña followed with the central division, leaving the count of Cifuentes with the troops of Seville to protect the camp.[14]

The Moors fell back as the Christians advanced, and, retreating nimbly from point to point, led them up the rugged steeps far into the recesses of the mountains. At length they reached an open level, encompassed on all sides by a natural rampart of rocks, where they had deposited their valuable effects, together with their wives and children. The latter, at sight of the invaders, uttered dismal cries, and fled into the remoter depth of the sierra.

[13] "Rio Verde, Rio Verde,
Tinto va en sangre viva."

Percy, in his well-known version of one of these agreeable *romances*, adopts the tame epithet of "gentle river," from the awkwardness, he says, of the literal translation of "verdant river." He was not aware, it appears, that the Spanish is a proper name. (See Reliques of Ancient English Poetry (London, 1812), vol. i. p. 357.) The more faithful version of "green river," however, would have nothing very unpoetical in it; though our gifted countryman Bryant seems to intimate, by his omission, somewhat of a similar difficulty, in his agreeable stanzas on the beautful stream of that name in New England.

[14] Zuñiga, Annales de Sevilla, año 1501.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. p. 340.—Bleda, Corónica, lib. 5, cap. 26.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 165.—"Fue muy gentil capitan," says Oviedo, speaking of this latter nobleman, "y valiente lanza; y muchas vezes dio testimino grande de su animoso esfuerzo." Quincuagenas, MS., bat. 1, quinc. 1, dial. 36.

The Christians were too much attracted by the rich spoil before them to think of following, and dispersed in every direction in quest of plunder, with all the heedlessness and insubordination of raw, inexperienced levies. It was in vain that Alonso de Aguilar reminded them that their wily enemy was still unconquered, or that he endeavored to force them into the ranks again, and restore order. No one heeded his call, or thought of anything beyond the present moment and of securing as much booty to himself as he could carry.

The Moors, in the mean while, finding themselves no longer pursued, were aware of the occupation of the Christians, whom they not improbably had purposely decoyed into the snare. They resolved to return to the scene of action and surprise their incautious enemy. Stealthily advancing, therefore, under the shadows of night, now falling thick around, they poured through the rocky defiles of the enclosure upon the astonished Spaniards. An unlucky explosion, at this crisis, of a cask of powder, into which a spark had accidentally fallen, threw a broad glare over the scene and revealed for a moment the situation of the hostile parties;—the Spaniards in the utmost disorder, many of them without arms, and staggering under the weight of their fatal booty; while their enemies were seen gliding like so many demons of darkness through every crevice and avenue of the enclosure, in the act of springing on their devoted victims. This appalling spectacle, vanishing almost as soon as seen, and followed by

the hideous yells and war-cries of the assailants, struck a panic into the hearts of the soldiers, who fled, scarcely offering any resistance. The darkness of the night was as favorable to the Moors, familiar with all the intricacies of the ground, as it was fatal to the Christians, who, bewildered in the mazes of the sierra, and losing their footing at every step, fell under the swords of their pursuers, or went down the dark gulfs and precipices which yawned all around.[15]

Amidst this dreadful confusion, the count of Ureña succeeded in gaining a lower level of the sierra, where he halted and endeavored to rally his panic-struck followers. His noble comrade, Alonso de Aguilar, still maintained his position on the heights above, refusing all entreaties of his followers to attempt a retreat. "When," said he, proudly, "was the banner of Aguilar ever known to fly from the field?" His eldest son, the heir of his house and honors, Don Pedro de Cordova, a youth of great promise, fought at his side. He had received a severe wound on the head from a stone, and a javelin had pierced quite through his leg. With one knee resting on the ground, however, he still made a brave defence with his sword. The sight was too much for the father, and he implored him to suffer himself to be removed from the field. "Let not the hopes of our house be crushed at a single blow," said he; "go, my son, live as becomes a Christian knight,—live, and

[15] Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. fol. 340.—Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 4, cap. 33.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 10.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 165. Marmol, Rebelion de los Moriscos, lib. 1, cap. 28.

cherish your desolate mother." * All his entreaties were fruitless, however; and the gallant boy refused to leave his father's side, till he was forcibly borne away by the attendants, who fortunately succeeded in bringing him in safety to the station occupied by the count of Ureña.[16]

Meantime the brave little band of cavaliers, who remained true to Aguilar, had fallen one after another; and the chief, left almost alone, retreated to a huge rock which rose in the middle of the plain, and, placing his back against it, still made fight, though weakened by loss of blood, like a lion at bay, against his enemies.[17] In this situation he was pressed so hard by a Moor of uncommon size and strength that he was compelled to turn and close with him in single combat. The strife was long and desperate, till Don Alonzo, whose corselet had become unlaced in the previous struggle, having received a severe wound in the breast, followed by another on the head, grappled closely with his adversary, and they came rolling on the ground together. The Moor remained upper-

[16] Mendoza, Guerra de Granada, p. 13.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. fol. 340.—Marmol, Rebelion de los Moriscos, lib. 1, cap. 28.—Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS., bat. 1, quinc. 1, dial. 36.—The boy, who lived to man's estate, was afterwards created marquis of Priego by the Catholic sovereigns. Salazar de Mendoza, Dignidades, lib. 2, cap. 13.

[17] It is the simile of the fine old ballad:

"Solo queda Don Alonso
Su campana es acabada
Pelea como un Leon
Pero poco aprovechaba."

* [Bernardino de Escalanti's rendering of the story is not quite like Prescott's. "Diziendo quo no fuesse toda la Carne en un assador." *Dialogos Militares*.—M.]

most; but the spirit of the Spanish cavalier had not sunk with his strength, and he proudly exclaimed, as if to intimidate his enemy, "I am Don Alonzo de Aguilar;" to which the other rejoined, "And I am the Feri de Ben Estepar," a well-known name of terror to the Christians. The sound of this detested name roused all the vengeance of the dying hero; and, grasping his foe in mortal agony, he rallied his strength for a final blow; but it was too late,—his hand failed, and he was soon despatched by the dagger of his more vigorous rival. (March 18th, 1501.)[18]

Thus fell Alonso Hernandez de Cordova, or Alonso de Aguilar, as he is commonly called from the land where his family estates lay.[19] "He was

[18] Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., ubi supra.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. ubi supra.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 10.—Mendoza, Guerra de Granada, p. 13.—Sandoval, Hist. del Emp. Carlos V., tom. i. p. 5.—According to Hita's prose, Aguilar had first despatched more than thirty Moors with his own hand. (Guerras de Granada, part i. p. 568.) The ballad, with more discretion, does not vouch for any particular number.

"Don Alonso en este tiempo
Muy gran batalla hacia,
El cavallo le havian muerto,
Por muralla le tenia
Y arrimado á un gran peñon
Con valor se defendia:
Muchos Moros tiene muertos,
Pero poco le valia.
Porque sobre el cargan muchos,
Y le dan grandes heridas,
Tantas que cayó alli muerto
Entre la gente enemiga."

The warrior's death is summed up with an artless brevity, that would be affectation in more studied composition:

"Muerto queda Don Alonso,
Y eterna fama ganada."

[19] Paolo Giovio finds an etymology for the name in the eagle (*aguila*), assumed as the device of the warlike ancestors of Don Alonso. St. Ferdinand of Castile, in consideration of the services

of the greatest authority among the grandees of his time," says Father Abarca, "for his lineage; personal character, large domains, and the high posts which he filled, both in peace and war. More than forty years of his life he served against the infidel, under the banner of his house in boyhood, and as leader of that same banner in later life, or as viceroy of Andalusia and commander of the royal armies. He was the fifth lord of his warlike and pious house who had fallen fighting for their country and religion against the accursed sect of Mahomet. And there is good reason to believe," continues the same orthodox authority, "that his soul has received the glorious reward of the Christian soldier; since he was armed on that very morning with the blessed sacraments of confession and communion." [20]

The victorious Moors, all this time, were driving the unresisting Spaniards, like so many terrified deer, down the dark steeps of the sierra. The count of Ureña, who had seen his son stretched by his side, and received a severe wound himself, made the most desperate efforts to rally the fugitives,

of this illustrious house at the taking of Cordova, in 1236, allowed it to bear as a cognomen the name of that city. This branch, however, still continued to be distinguished by their territorial epithet of Aguilar; although Don Alonso's brother, the Great Captain, as we have seen, was more generally known by that of Cordova. Vita Magni Gonsalvi, fol. 204.

[20] Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. fol. 340, 341.—The hero's body, left on the field of battle, was treated with decent respect by the Moors, who restored it to King Ferdinand; and the sovereigns caused it to be interred with all suitable pomp in the church of St. Hypolito at Cordova. Many years afterwards the marchioness of Priego, his descendant, had the tomb opened; and, on examining the mouldering remains, the iron head of a lance, received in his last mortal struggle, was found buried in the bones. Bleda, Corónica, lib. 5, cap. 26.

but was at length swept away by the torrent. Trusting himself to a faithful adalid, who knew the passes, he succeeded with much difficulty in reaching the foot of the mountain, with such a small remnant of his followers as could keep in his track.[21] Fortunately, he there found the count of Cifuentes, who had crossed the river with the rear-guard and encamped on a rising ground in the neighborhood. Under favor of this strong position, the latter commander and his brave Sevillians, all fresh for action, were enabled to cover the shattered remains of the Spaniards, and beat off the assaults of their enemies till the break of morn, when they vanished, like so many foul birds of night, into the recesses of the mountains.

The rising day, which dispersed their foes, now revealed to the Christians the dreadful extent of their own losses. Few were to be seen of all that proud array which had marched up the heights so confidently under the banners of their ill-fated chiefs the preceding evening. The bloody roll of slaughter, besides the common file, was graced with the names of the best and bravest of the Christian knighthood. Among the number was

[21] "Tambien el Conde de Ureña,
Mal herido en demasia,
Se sale de la batalla
Llevado por una guia.
"Que sabia bien la senda
Que de la Sierra salia:
Muchos Moros dexaba muertos
Por su grande valentia.

"Tambien algunos se escapan,
Que al buen Conde le seguian."

Oviedo, speaking of this retreat of the good count and his followers, says, "Volvieron las riendas a sus caballos, y se retiraron a mas que galope por la multitud de los Infieles." Quincuagenas, MS., bat. 1, quinc. 1, dial. 36.

Francisco Ramirez de Madrid, the distinguished engineer, who had contributed so essentially to the success of the Granadine war.[22]

The sad tidings of the defeat soon spread throughout the country, occasioning a sensation such as had not been felt since the tragic affair of the Axarquia. Men could scarcely credit that so much mischief could be inflicted by an outcast race, who, whatever terror they once inspired, had long been regarded with indifference or contempt. Every Spaniard seemed to consider himself in some way or other involved in the disgrace; and the most spirited exertions were made on all sides to retrieve it. By the beginning of April, King Ferdinand found himself at Ronda, at the head of a strong body of troops, which he determined to lead in person, notwithstanding the remonstrances of his courtiers, into the heart of the Sierra, and take bloody vengeance on the rebels.

These latter, however, far from being encouraged, were appalled by the extent of their own success; and, as the note of warlike preparation reached them in their fastnesses, they felt their temerity in thus bringing the whole weight of the Castilian monarchy on their heads. They accordingly abandoned all thoughts of further resistance, and lost no time in sending deputies to the king's camp, to deprecate his anger and sue in the most submissive terms for pardon.

[22] Zuñiga, Annales de Sevilla, año 1501.—Carbajal, Anales, MS., año 1501.—Bleda, Corónica, lib. 5, cap. 26.—Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS., bat. 1, quinc. 1, dial. 36.—For a more particular notice of Ramirez, see Part I. chapter 13, of this History.

Ferdinand, though far from vindictive, was less open to pity than the queen; and in the present instance he indulged in a full measure of the indignation with which sovereigns, naturally identifying themselves with the state, are wont to regard rebellion, by viewing it in the aggravated light of a personal offence. After some hesitation, however, his prudence got the better of his passions, as he reflected that he was in a situation to dictate the terms of victory without paying the usual price for it. His past experience seems to have convinced him of the hopelessness of infusing sentiments of loyalty in a Mussulman towards a Christian prince; for, while he granted a general amnesty to those concerned in the insurrection, it was only on the alternative of baptism or exile, engaging at the same time to provide conveyance for such as chose to leave the country, on the payment of ten doblas of gold a head.[23]

These engagements were punctually fulfilled. The Moorish emigrants were transported in public galleys from Estepona to the Barbary coast. The number, however, was probably small; by far the greater part being obliged, however reluctantly, from want of funds, to remain and be baptized. "They would never have stayed," says Bleda, "if they could have mustered the ten doblas of gold; a circumstance," continues that charitable writer, "which shows with what levity they received

[23] Bleda, Corónica, lib. 5, cap. 26, 27.—Robles, Vida de Ximenez, cap. 16.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 165.—Mariana, Hist. de España, lib. 27, cap. 5.—Marmol, Rebelion de los Moriscos, lib. 1, cap. 28.

baptism, and for what paltry considerations they could be guilty of such sacrilegious hypocrisy!"[24]

But, although every spark of insurrection was thus effectually extinguished, it was long, very long, before the Spanish nation could recover from the blow, or forget the sad story of its disaster in the Red Sierra. It became the theme not only of chronicle, but of song; the note of sorrow was prolonged in many a plaintive *romance,* and the names of Aguilar and his unfortunate companions were embalmed in that beautiful minstrelsy, scarcely less imperishable, and far more touching, than the stately and elaborate records of history.[25]

[24] Corónica, lib. 5, cap. 27.—The Curate of Los Palacios disposes of the Moors rather summarily: "The Christians stripped them, gave them a free passage, and sent them to the devil!" Reyes Católicos, cap. 165.

[25] According to one of the *romances*, cited by Hita, the expedition of Aguilar was a piece of romantic Quixotism, occasioned by King Ferdinand's challenging the bravest of his knights to plant his banner on the summits of the Alpujarras:

"Qual de vosotros, amigos,
Ira á la Sierra mañana,
A poner mi Real pendon
Encima de la Alpuxarra?"

All shrunk from the perilous emprise, till Alonso de Aguilar stepped forward and boldly assumed it for himself:

"A todos tiembla la barba,
Sino fuera don Alonso,
Que de Aguilar se llamaba.
Levantóse en pie ante el Rey
De esta manera le habla.
"Aquesa empresa, Señor,
Para mi estaba guardada,
Que mi señora la reyna
Ya me la tiene mandada.
"Alegróse mucho el Rey
Por la oferta que le daba,
Aun no era amanecido
Don Alonso ya cavalga."

These popular ditties, it cannot be denied, are slippery authorities for any important fact, unless supported by more direct historic testimony. When composed, however, by contemporaries, or those

The popular feeling was displayed after another fashion in regard to the count of Ureña and his followers, who were accused of deserting their posts in the hour of peril; and more than one ballad of the time reproachfully demanded an account from him of the brave companions-in-arms whom he had left in the Sierra.[26]

The imputation on this gallant nobleman appears wholly undeserved; for certainly he was not called on to throw away his own life and those of his brave followers, in a cause perfectly desperate, for a chimerical point of honor. And, so far from forfeiting the favor of his sovereigns by his conduct on this occasion, he was maintained by them in the same high stations which he before held, and which he continued to fill with dignity to a good old age.[27]

who lived near the time, they may very naturally record many true details, too insignificant in their consequences to attract the notice of history. The ballad translated with so much elaborate simplicity by Percy is chiefly taken up, as the English reader may remember, with the exploits of a Sevillian hero named Saavedra. No such personage is noticed, as far as I am aware, by the Spanish Chroniclers. The name of Saavedra, however, appears to have been a familiar one in Seville, and occurs two or three times in the muster-roll of nobles and cavaliers of that city who joined King Ferdinand's army in the preceding year, 1500. Zuñiga, Annales de Sevilla, eodem anno.

[26] Mendoza notices these splenetic effusions (Guerra de Granada, p. 13); and Bleda (Corónica, p. 636) cites the following couplet from one of them:

> "Decid, conde de Ureña,
> Don Alonso donde queda."

[27] The Venetian ambassador, Navagiero, saw the count of Ureña at Ossuna in 1526. He was enjoying a green old age, or, as the minister expresses it, "molto vecchio e gentil corteggiano però." "Diseases," said the veteran, good-humoredly, "sometimes visit me, but seldom tarry long; for my body is like a crazy old inn, where

It was about seventy years after this event, in 1570, that the duke of Arcos, descended from the great marquis of Cadiz and from this same count of Ureña, led an expedition into the Sierra Vermeja, in order to suppress a similar insurrection of the Moriscos. Among the party were many of the descendants and kinsmen of those who had fought under Aguilar. It was the first time since, that these rude passes had been trodden by Christian feet; but the traditions of early childhood had made every inch of ground familiar to the soldiers. Some way up the eminence, they recognized the point at which the count of Ureña had made his stand; and farther still, the fatal plain, belted round with its dark rampart of rocks, where the strife had been hottest. Scattered fragments of arms and harness still lay rusting on the ground, which was covered with the bones of the warriors, that had lain for more than half a century unburied and bleaching in the sun.[28] Here was the spot on which the brave son of Aguilar had fought so sturdily by his father's side; and there the huge rock at whose foot the chieftain had fallen, throwing its dark shadow over the remains of the noble

travellers find such poor fare that they merely touch and go." Viaggio, fol. 17.

[28] Guerra de Granada, p. 301.—Compare the similar painting of Tacitus, in the scene where Germanicus pays the last sad offices to the remains of Varus and his legions: "Dein semiruto vallo, humili fossâ, accisæ jam reliquiæ consedisse intelligebantur: medio campi albentia ossa, ut fugerant, ut restiterant, disjecta vel aggerata; adjacebant fragmina telorum, equorumque artus, simul truncis arborum antefixa ora." (Annales, lib. 1, sect. 61.) Mendoza falls nothing short of this celebrated description of the Roman historian:

"Pan etiam Arcadiâ dicat se judice victum."

dead who lay sleeping around. The strongly-marked features of the ground called up all the circumstances, which the soldiers had gathered from tradition; their hearts beat high, as they recapitulated them one to another; and the tears, says the eloquent historian who tells the story, fell fast down their iron cheeks, as they gazed on the sad relics and offered up a soldier's prayer for the heroic souls which once animated them.[29]

Tranquillity was now restored throughout the wide borders of Granada. The banner of the Cross floated triumphantly over the whole extent of its wild sierras, its broad valleys, and populous cities. Every Moor, in exterior at least, had become a Christian. Every mosque had been converted into a Christian church. Still the country was not entirely purified from the stain of Islamism, since many professing their ancient faith were scattered over different parts of the kingdom of Castile, where they had been long resident before the surrender of their capital. The late events seemed to have no other effect than to harden them in error; and the Spanish government saw with alarm the pernicious influence of their example and persuasion, in shaking the infirm faith of the new converts.

[29] Mendoza, Guerra de Granada, pp. 300–302.—The Moorish insurrection of 1570 was attended with at least one good result, in calling forth this historic masterpiece, the work of the accomplished Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, accomplished alike as a statesman, warrior, and historian. His "Guerra de Granada," confined as it is to a barren fragment of Moorish history, displays such liberal sentiments (too liberal, indeed, to permit its publication till long after its author's death), profound reflection, and classic elegance of style, as well entitle him to the appellation of the Spanish Sallust.

To obviate this, an ordinance was published, in the summer of 1501, prohibiting all intercourse between these Moors and the orthodox kingdom of Granada.[30] At length, however, convinced that there was no other way to save the precious seed from being choked by the thorns of infidelity than to eradicate them altogether, the sovereigns came to the extraordinary resolution of offering them the alternative of baptism or exile. They issued a *pragmática* to that effect from Seville, February 12th, 1502. After a preamble, duly setting forth the obligations of gratitude on the Castilians to drive God's enemies from the land which he in his good time had delivered into their hands, and the numerous backslidings occasioned among the new converts by their intercourse with their unbaptized brethren, the act goes on to state, in much the same terms with the famous ordinance against the Jews, that all the unbaptized Moors in the kingdoms of Castile and Leon, above fourteen years of age if males, and twelve if females, must leave the country by the end of April following; that they might sell their property in the mean time, and take the proceeds in anything save gold and silver and merchandise regularly prohibited; and, finally, that they might emigrate to any foreign country, except the dominions of the Grand Turk, and such parts of Africa as Spain was then at war with. Obedience to these severe provisions was enforced by the penalties of death and confiscation of property.[31]

[30] Pragmáticas del Reyno, fol. 6.
[31] Ibid., fol. 7.

This stern edict, so closely modelled on that against the Jews, must have been even more grievous in its application.[32] For the Jews may be said to have been denizens almost equally of every country; while the Moors, excluded from a retreat among their countrymen on the African shore, were sent into the lands of enemies or strangers. The former, moreover, were far better qualified by their natural shrewdness and commercial habits for disposing of their property advantageously, than the simple, inexperienced Moors, skilled in little else than husbandry or rude mechanic arts. We have nowhere met with any estimate of the number who migrated on this occasion. The Castilian writers pass over the whole affair in a very few words; not, indeed, as is too evident, from any feelings of disapprobation, but from its insignificance in a political view. Their silence implies a very inconsiderable number of emigrants; a circumstance not to be wondered at, as there were very few, probably, who would not sooner imitate their Granadine brethren in assuming the mask of Christianity, than encounter exile under all the aggravated miseries with which it was accompanied.[33]

[32] Bleda anxiously claims the credit of the act of expulsion for Fray Thomas de Torquemada, of inquisitorial memory. (Corónica, p. 640.) That eminent personage had, indeed, been dead some years; but this edict was so obviously suggested by that against the Jews, that it may be considered as the result of his principles if not directly taught by him. Thus it is, "the evil that men do lives after them."

[33] The Castilian writers, especially the dramatic, have not been insensible to the poetical situations afforded by the distresses of the banished Moriscos. Their sympathy for the exiles, however, is

Castile might now boast, for the first time in eight centuries, that every outward stain, at least, of infidelity was purified from her bosom. But how had this been accomplished? By the most detestable expedients which sophistry could devise and oppression execute; and that, too, under an enlightened government, proposing to be guided solely by a conscientious regard for duty. To comprehend this more fully, it will be necessary to take a brief view of public sentiment in matters of religion at that time.

It is a singular paradox, that Christianity, whose doctrines inculcate unbounded charity, should have been made so often an engine of persecution; while Mahometanism, whose principles are those of avowed intolerance, should have exhibited, at least till later times, a truly philosophical spirit of toleration.[34] Even the first victorious disciples of the prophet, glowing with all the fiery zeal of proselytism, were content with the exaction of tribute from the vanquished; at least, more vindictive feelings were reserved only for idolaters, who did not, like the Jews and Christians, acknowledge with themselves the unity of God. With these latter denominations they had obvious sympathy, since it was their creed which formed

whimsically enough contrasted by an orthodox anxiety to justify the conduct of their own government. The reader may recollect a pertinent example in the story of Sancho's Moorish friend, Ricote. Don Quixote, part. 2, cap. 54.

[34] The *spirit of toleration* professed by the Moors, indeed, was made a principal argument against them in the archbishop of Valencia's memorial to Philip III. The Mahometans would seem the better Christians of the two. See Geddes, Miscellaneous Tracts (London, 1702–6), vol. i. p. 94.

the basis of their own.[35] In Spain, where the fiery temperament of the Arab was gradually softened under the influence of a temperate climate and higher mental culture, the toleration of the Jews and Christians, as we have already had occasion to notice, was so remarkable that within a few years after the conquest we find them not only protected in the enjoyment of civil and religious freedom, but mingling on terms almost of equality with their conquerors.

It is not necessary to inquire here how far the different policy of the Christians was owing to the peculiar constitution of their hierarchy, which, composed of a spiritual militia drawn from every country in Europe, was cut off by its position from all human sympathies, and attached to no interests but its own; which availed itself of the superior science and reputed sanctity that were supposed to have given it the key to the dread mysteries of a future life, not to enlighten but to enslave the minds of a credulous world; and which, making its own tenets the only standard of faith, its own rites and ceremonial the only

[35] Heeren seems willing to countenance the learned Pluquet in regarding Islamism, in its ancient form, as one of the modifications of Christianity; placing the principal difference between that and Socinianism, for example, in the mere rites of circumcision and baptism. (Essai sur l'Influence des Croisades, traduit par Villers (Paris, 1808), p. 175, not.) "The Mussulmans," says Sir William Jones, "are a sort of heterodox Christians, if Locke reasons justly, because they firmly believe the immaculate conception, divine character, and miracles of the Messiah; heterodox in denying vehemently his character of Son. and his equality, as God, with the Father, of whose unity and attributes they entertain and express the most awful ideas." See his Dissertation on the Gods of Greece, Italy, and India; Works (London, 1799), vol. i. p. 279.

evidence of virtue, obliterated the great laws of morality written by the divine hand on every heart, and gradually built up a system of exclusiveness and intolerance most repugnant to the mild and charitable religion of Jesus Christ.

Before the close of the fifteenth century, several circumstances operated to sharpen the edge of intolerance, especially against the Arabs. The Turks, whose political consideration of late years had made them the peculiar representatives and champions of Mahometanism, had shown a ferocity and cruelty in their treatment of the Christians which brought general odium on all the professors of their faith, and on the Moors, of course, though most undeservedly, in common with the rest. The bold, heterodox doctrines, also, which had occasionally broken forth in different parts of Europe in the fifteenth century, like so many faint streaks of light ushering in the glorious morn of the Reformation, had roused the alarm of the champions of the church, and kindled on more than one occasion the fires of persecution; and before the close of the period the Inquisition was introduced into Spain.

From that disastrous hour, religion wore a new aspect in this unhappy country. The spirit of intolerance, no longer hooded in the darkness of the cloister, now stalked abroad in all his terrors. Zeal was exalted into fanaticism, and a rational spirit of proselytism into one of fiendish persecution. It was not enough now, as formerly, to conform passively to the doctrines of the church, but it was enjoined to make war on all who refused them.

The natural feelings of compunction in the discharge of this sad duty was a crime; and the tear of sympathy, wrung out by the sight of mortal agonies, was an offence to be expiated by humiliating penance. The most frightful maxims were deliberately engrafted into the code of morals. Any one, it was said, might conscientiously kill an apostate wherever he could meet him. There was some doubt whether a man might slay his own father, if a heretic or infidel, but none whatever as to his right, in that event, to take away the life of his son or of his brother.[36] These maxims were not a dead letter, but of most active operation, as the sad records of the dread tribunal too well prove. The character of the nation underwent a melancholy change. The milk of charity, nay, of human feeling, was soured in every bosom. The liberality of the old Spanish cavalier gave way to the fiery fanaticism of the monk. The taste for blood, once gratified, begat a cannibal appetite in the people, who, cheered on by the frantic clergy, seemed to vie with one another in the eagerness with which they ran down the miserable game of the Inquisition.

It was at this very time, when the infernal monster, gorged but not sated with human sacrifice, was crying aloud for fresh victims, that Granada

[36] See the bishop of Orihuela's treatise, "De Bello Sacro," etc., cited by the industrious Clemencin. (Mem. de la Acad. de Hist., tom. vi. Ilust. 15.) The Moors and Jews, of course, stood no chance in this code; the reverened father expresses an opinion, with which Bleda heartily coincides, that the government would be perfectly justified in taking away the life of every Moor in the kingdom, for their shameless infidelity. Ubi supra;—and Bleda, Corónica, p. 995.

surrendered to the Spaniards, under the solemn guarantee of the full enjoyment of civil and religious liberty. The treaty of capitulation granted too much, or too little,—too little for an independent state, too much for one whose existence was now merged in that of a greater; for it secured to the Moors privileges in some respects superior to those of the Castilians, and to the prejudice of the latter. Such, for example, was the permission to trade with the Barbary coast, and with the various places in Castile and Andalusia, without paying the duties imposed on the Spaniards themselves;[37] and that article, again, by such runaway Moorish slaves from other parts of the kingdom were made free and incapable of being reclaimed by their masters, if they could reach Granada.[38] The former of these provisions struck at the commercial profits of the Spaniards, the latter directly at their property.

It is not too much to say that such a treaty, depending for its observance on the good faith and forbearance of the stronger party, would not hold together a year in any country of Christendom, even at the present day, before some flaw or pretext would be devised to evade it. How much greater was the probability of this in the present case, where the weaker party was viewed with all the accumulated odium of long hereditary hostility and religious rancor!

The work of conversion, on which the Chris-

[37] The articles of the treaty are detailed at length by Marmol, Rebelion de los Moriscos, lib. 1, cap. 19.

[38] Marmol, Rebelion de los Moriscos, lib. 1, cap. 19.

tians, no doubt, much relied, was attended with greater difficulties than had been anticipated by the conquerors. It was now found that, while the Moors retained their present faith, they would be much better affected towards their countrymen in Africa than to the nation with which they were incorporated. In short, Spain still had enemies in her bosom; and reports were rife, in every quarter, of their secret intelligence with the Barbary states, and of Christians kidnapped to be sold as slaves to Algerine corsairs. Such tales, greedily circulated and swallowed, soon begat general alarm; and men are not apt to be over-scrupulous as to measures which they deem essential to their personal safety.

The zealous attempt to bring about conversion by preaching and expostulation was fair and commendable. The intervention of bribes and promises, if it violated the spirit, did not, at least, the letter of the treaty. The application of force to a few of the most refractory, who by their blind obstinacy were excluding a whole nation from the benefits of redemption, was to be defended on other grounds; and these were not wanting to cunning theologians, who considered that the sanctity of the end justified extraordinary means, and that where the eternal interests of the soul were at stake the force of promises and the faith of treaties were equally nugatory.[39]

[39] See the arguments of Ximenes, or of his enthusiastic biographer Fléchier, for it is not always easy to discriminate between them. Hist. de Ximenés, pp. 108, 109.—Montesquieu, in those admirable Letters which disguise so much deep philosophy under the pleasant veil of raillery, makes a stricture on this compulsory

But the *chef-d'œuvre* of monkish casuistry was the argument imputed to Ximenes for depriving the Moors of the benefits of the treaty, as a legitimate consequence of the rebellion into which they had been driven by his own malpractices. This proposition, however, far from outraging the feelings of the nation, well drilled by this time in the metaphysics of the cloister, fell short of them, if we are to judge from recommendations of a still more questionable import, urged, though ineffectually, on the sovereigns at this very time, from the highest quarter.[40]

proselytism worth all the arguments of its advocates: "Celui qui veut me faire changer de religion ne le fait sans doute que parce qu'il ne changeroit la sienne, quand on voudroit l'y forcer; il trouve donc étrange que je ne fasse pas une chose qu'il ne feroit pas lui-même, peut-être, pour l'empire du monde." Lettres Persanes, let. 85.

[40] The duke of Medina Sidonia proposed to Ferdinand and Isabella to be avenged on the Moors, in some way not explained, after their disembarkation in Africa, on the ground that, the term of the royal safe-conduct having elapsed, they might lawfully be treated as enemies. To this proposal, which would have done honor to a college of Jesuits in the sixteenth century, the sovereigns made a reply too creditable not to be transcribed. "El Rei é la Réina. Fernando de Zafra, nuestro secretário. Vimos vuestra letra, en que nos fecistes saber lo que el duque de Medinasidónia tenia pensado que se podia facer contra los Moros de Villaluenga después de desembarcados allende. Decidle que le agradecemos y tenemos en servício el buen deseo que tiene de nos servir: *pero porqué nuestra palabra y seguro real así se debe guardar á los infieles como á los Cristianos*, y faciéndose lo que él dice pareceria cautela y engaño armado sobre nuestro seguro para no le guardar, que en ninguna manera se haga eso, ni otra cosa de que pueda parecer que se quebranta nuestro seguro. De Granada véinte y nueve de mayo de quiniéntos y un años.—Yo el Rei.—Yo la Réina.—Por mandado del Rei é del Réina, Miguel Perez Almazan." (Mem. de la Acad. de Hist., tom. vi. Ilust. 15, from the original in the archives of the family of Medina Sidonia.) Would that the suggestions of Isabella's own heart, instead of the clergy, had always been the guide of her conduct in these matters!

Such are the frightful results to which the fairest mind may be led, when it introduces the refinements of logic into the discussions of duty; when, proposing to achieve some great good, whether in politics or religion, it conceives that the importance of the object authorizes a departure from the plain principles of morality which regulate the ordinary affairs of life; and when, blending these higher interests with those of a personal nature, it becomes incapable of discriminating between them, and is led insensibly to act from selfish motives, while it fondly imagines itself obeying only the conscientious dictates of duty.[41]

With these events may be said to terminate the history of the Moors, or the Moriscos, as henceforth called, under the present reign. Eight centuries had elapsed since their first occupation of the country; during which period they had exhibited all the various phases of civilization, from

[41] A memorial of the archbishop of Valencia to Philip III. affords an example of this moral obliquity, that may make one laugh, or weep, according to the temper of his philosophy. In this precious document he says, "Your Majesty may, without any scruple of conscience, make slaves of all the Moriscos, and may put them into your own galleys or mines, or sell them to strangers. And as to their children, they may be all sold at good rates here in Spain; which will be so far from being a punishment, that it will be a mercy to them; since by that means they will all become Christians; which they would never have been, had they continued with their parents. By the holy execution of which piece of justice, *a great sum of money will flow into your Majesty's treasury.*" (Geddes, Miscellaneous Tracts, vol. i. p. 71.) "Il n'est point d'hostilité excellente comme la Chrestienne," says old Montaigne; "nostre zele faict merveilles, quand il va secondant nostre pente vers la haine, la cruauté, l'ambition, l'avarice, la detraction, la rebellion. Nostre religion est faicte pour extirper les vices; elle les couvre, les nourrit, les incite." Essais, liv. 2, chap. 12.

its dawn to its decline. Ten years had sufficed to overturn the splendid remains of this powerful empire; and ten more, for its nominal conversion to Christianity. A long century of persecution, of unmitigated and unmerited suffering, was to follow, before the whole was consummated by the expulsion of this unhappy race from the Peninsula. Their story, in this latter period, furnishes one of the most memorable examples in history, of the impotence of persecution, even in support of a good cause against a bad one. It is a lesson that cannot be too deeply pondered through every succeeding age. The fires of the Inquisition are, indeed, extinguished, probably to be lighted no more. But where is the land which can boast that the spirit of intolerance, which forms the very breath of persecution, is altogether extinct in its bosom?

CHAPTER VIII

COLUMBUS—PROSECUTION OF DISCOVERY—HIS TREATMENT BY THE COURT

1494–1503

Progress of Discovery—Reaction of Public Feeling—The Queen's Confidence in Columbus—He discovers Terra Firma—Isabella sends back the Indian Slaves—Complaints against Columbus—Superseded in the Government—Vindication of the Sovereigns—His fourth and last Voyage

THE reader will turn with satisfaction from the melancholy and mortifying details of superstition to the generous efforts which the Spanish government was making to enlarge the limits of science and dominion in the west. "Amidst the storms and troubles of Italy, Spain was every day stretching her wings over a wider sweep of empire, and extending the glory of her name to the far Antipodes." Such is the swell of exultation with which the enthusiastic Italian, Martyr, notices the brilliant progress of discovery under his illustrious countryman Columbus.[1] The Spanish sovereigns had never lost sight of the new domain, so unexpectedly opened to them, as it were, from the depths of the ocean. The first accounts transmitted by the great navigator and his companions, on his second voyage, while their imaginations

[1] "Inter has Italiæ procellas magis indies ac magis alas protendit Hispania, imperium auget, gloriam nomenque suum ad Antipodes porriget." Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 146.

were warm with the beauty and novelty of the scenes which met their eyes in the New World, served to keep alive the tone of excitement which their unexpected successes had kindled in the nation.[2] The various specimens sent home in the return ships, of the products of these unknown regions, confirmed the agreeable belief that they formed part of the great Asiatic continent, which had so long excited the cupidity of Europeans. The Spanish court, sharing in the general enthusiasm, endeavored to promote the spirit of discovery and colonization, by forwarding the requisite supplies, and complying promptly with the most minute suggestions of Columbus. But in less than two years from the commencement of his second voyage the face of things experienced a melancholy change. Accounts were received at home of the most alarming discontent and disaffection in the colony; while the actual returns from these vaunted regions were so scanty as to bear no proportion to the expenses of the expedition.

This unfortunate result was in a great measure imputable to the misconduct of the colonists themselves. Most of them were adventurers, who had

[2] See, among others, a letter of Dr. Chanca, who accompanied Columbus on his second voyage. It is addressed to the authorities of Seville. After noticing the evidences of gold in Hispaniola, he says, "Ansi que de cierto los Reyes nuestros Señores desde agora se pueden tener por los mas prosperos e mas ricos Principes del mundo, porque tal cosa hasta agora no se ha visto ni leido de ninguno en el mundo, porque verdaderamente a otro camino que los navios vuelvan puedan llevar tanta cantidad de oro que se pueden maravillar cualesquiera que lo supieren." In another part of the letter, the Doctor is equally sanguine in regard to the fruitfulness of the soil and climate. Letra de Dr. Chanca, apud Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. i. pp. 198–224.

embarked with no other expectation than that of getting together a fortune as speedily as possible in the golden Indies. They were without subordination, patience, industry, or any of the regular habits demanded for success in such an enterprise. As soon as they had launched from their native shore, they seemed to feel themselves released from the constraints of all law. They harbored jealousy and distrust of the admiral as a foreigner. The cavaliers and hidalgos, of whom there were too many in the expedition, contemned him as an upstart, whom it was derogatory to obey. From the first moment of their landing in Hispaniola, they indulged the most wanton license in regard to the unoffending natives, who, in the simplicity of their hearts, had received the white men as messengers from Heaven. Their outrages, however, soon provoked a general resistance, which led to such a war of extermination that, in less than four years after the Spaniards had set foot on the island, one-third of its population, amounting, probably, to several hundred thousands, were sacrificed! Such were the melancholy auspices under which the intercourse was opened between the civilized white man and the simple natives of the western world.[3]

These excesses, and a total neglect of agriculture,—for none would condescend to turn up the earth for any other object than the gold they could find in it,—at length occasioned an alarming

[3] Fernando Colon, Hist. del Almirante, cap. 60, 62.—Muñoz, Hist. del Nuevo-Mundo, lib. 5, sec. 25.—Herrera, Indias occidentales, dec. 1, lib. 2, cap. 9.—Benzoni, Novi Orbis Hist., lib. 1, cap. 9.

scarcity of provisions; while the poor Indians neglected their usual husbandry, being willing to starve themselves, so that they could starve out their oppressors.[4] In order to avoid the famine which menaced his little colony, Columbus was obliged to resort to coercive measures, shortening the allowance of food, and compelling all to work, without distinction of rank. These unpalatable regulations soon bred general discontent. The high-mettled hidalgos, especially, complained loudly of the indignity of such mechanical drudgery, while Father Boil and his brethren were equally outraged by the diminution of their regular rations.[5]

The Spanish sovereigns were now daily assailed with complaints of the mal-administration of Columbus, and of his impolitic and unjust severities to both Spaniards and natives.* They lent, however, an unwilling ear to these vague accusations; they fully appreciated the difficulties of his situation; and, although they sent out an agent to inquire into the nature of the troubles which threatened the existence of the colony (August, 1495), they were careful to select an individual who

[4] The Indians had some grounds for relying on the efficacy of starvation, if, as Las Casas gravely asserts, "one Spaniard consumed in a single day as much as would suffice three families!" Llorente, Œuvres de Don Barthélemi de las Casas, précédées de sa Vie (Paris, 1822), tom. i. p. 11.

[5] Martyr, De Rebus Oceanicis, dec. 1, lib. 4.—Gomara, Hist. de las Indias, cap. 20, tom. ii.—Herrera, Indias occidentales, dec. 1, lib. 2, cap. 12.

* [Even the most ardent admirers of Columbus must admit that he was singularly lacking in tact. It was he who originated American slavery.—M.]

they thought would be most grateful to the admiral; and when the latter, in the following year, 1496, returned to Spain, they received him with the most ample acknowledgments of regard. "Come to us," they said, in a kind letter of congratulation, addressed to him soon after his arrival, "when you can do it without inconvenience to yourself, for you have endured too many vexations already." [6]

The admiral brought with him, as before, such samples of the productions of the western hemisphere as would strike the public eye and keep alive the feeling of curiosity. On his journey through Andalusia, he passed some days under the hospitable roof of the good curate Bernaldez, who dwells with much satisfaction on the remarkable appearance of the Indian chiefs following in the admiral's train, gorgeously decorated with golden collars and coronets and various barbaric ornaments. Among these he particularly notices certain "belts and masks of cotton and of wood, with figures of the Devil embroidered and carved thereon, sometimes in his own proper likeness, and at others in *that of a cat or an owl.* There is much reason," he infers, "to believe that he appears to the islanders in this guise, and that they are all idolaters, having Satan for their lord!" [7]

[6] Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. ii., Doc. dipl., no. 101.—Fernando Colon, Hist. del Almirante, cap. 64.—Muñoz, Hist. del Nuevo-Mundo, lib. 5, sec. 31.

[7] Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 131.—Herrera expresses the same charitable opinion: "Muy claramente se conocio que el demonio estava apoderado de aquella gente, y la traia ciega y engañada, hablandoles, y mostrandoles en diversas figuras." Indias occidentales, lib. 3, cap. 4.

But neither the attractions of the spectacle, nor the glowing representations of Columbus, who fancied he had discovered in the mines of Hispaniola the golden quarries of Ophir,* from which King Solomon had enriched the temple of Jerusalem, could rekindle the dormant enthusiasm of the nation. The novelty of the thing had passed. They heard a different tale, moreover, from the other voyagers, whose wan and sallow visages provoked the bitter jest that they had returned with more gold in their faces than in their pockets. In short, the skepticism of the public seemed now quite in proportion to its former overweening confidence; and the returns were so meagre, says Bernaldez, "that it was very generally believed there was little or no gold in the island." [8]

Isabella was far from participating in this unreasonable distrust. She had espoused the theory of Columbus when others looked coldly or contemptuously on it.[9] She firmly relied on his re-

[8] Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 131.—Muñoz, Hist. del Nuevo-Mundo, lib. 6, sec. 1.

[9] Columbus, in his letter to Prince John's nurse, dated 1500, makes the following ample acknowledgment of the queen's early protection

* [All the world but himself saw that his "India" was a myth. He had brought back but little gold from the islands he discovered, and that gold was mostly in the form of personal adornments. Moreover, his crude imagination led him into such extravagance of statement that not a few writers accuse him of habitual deceit. He no longer stands upon the pedestal where Washington Irving placed him for the admiration of the world. The graceful American writer saw only the stronger and better features of his character. He saw only what he wished to see. When Prescott wrote this, his first book, he was more inclined to the lenient judgment his own sweetness of character suggested than was afterwards the case, and yet even Prescott is forced at times to admit a "suspicion of a temporary inalienation of mind." Harrisse's antiquarian researches are of immense value in this connection.—M.]

CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS RECEIVED BY FERDINAND AND ISABELLA

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Goupil & Cie. Paris.

peated assurances that the track of discovery would lead to other and more important regions. She formed a higher estimate, moreover, of the value of the new acquisitions than any founded on the actual proceeds in gold and silver; keeping ever in view, as her letters and instructions abundantly show, the glorious purpose of introducing the blessings of Christian civilization among the heathen.[10] She entertained a deep sense of the merits of Columbus, to whose serious and elevated character her own bore much resemblance; although the enthusiasm which distinguished each was naturally tempered in hers with somewhat more of benignity and discretion.

But, although the queen was willing to give the most effectual support to his great enterprise, the situation of the country was such as made delay in its immediate prosecution unavoidable. Large expense was necessarily incurred for the actual maintenance of the colony;[11] the exchequer was liberally drained, moreover, by the Italian war, as well as by the profuse magnificence with which the nuptials of the royal family were now celebrating. It was, indeed, in the midst of the courtly revelries attending the marriage of Prince

of him: "En todos hobo incredulidad, y a la Reina mi Señora dio Nuestro Señor el espiritu de inteligencia y esfuerzo grande, y la hizo de todo heredera como a cara y muy amada hija." "Su Alteza lo aprobaba al contrario, y lo sostuvo fasta que pudo." Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. i. p. 266.

[10] See the letters to Columbus, dated May 14th, 1493, August, 1494, apud Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. ii. pp. 66, 154, et mult. al.

[11] The salaries alone, annually disbursed by the crown to persons resident in the colony, amounted to six millions of maravedis. Muñoz, Hist. del Nuevo-Mundo, lib. 5, sec. 33.

John that the admiral presented himself before the sovereigns at Burgos, after his second voyage. Such was the low condition of the treasury from these causes that Isabella was obliged to defray the cost of an outfit to the colony, at this time, from funds originally destined for the marriage of her daughter Isabella with the king of Portugal.[12]

This unwelcome delay, however, was softened to Columbus by the distinguished marks which he daily received of the royal favor; and various ordinances were passed, confirming and enlarging his great powers and privileges in the most ample manner, to a greater extent, indeed, than his modesty, or his prudence, would allow him to accept.[13] The language in which these princely gratuities were conferred rendered them doubly grateful to his noble heart, containing, as they did, the most emphatic acknowledgments of his "many, good, loyal, distinguished, and continual services," and thus testifying the unabated confidence of his sovereigns in his integrity and prudence.[14]

Among the impediments to the immediate com-

[12] Hist. del Nuevo-Mundo, lib. 6, sec. 2.—Fernando Colon, Hist. del Almirante, cap. 64.—Herrera, Indias occidentales, lib. 3, cap. 1.

[13] Such, for example, was the grant of an immense tract of land in Hispaniola, with the title of count or duke, as the admiral might prefer. Muñoz, Hist. del Nuevo-Mundo, lib. 6, sec. 17.

[14] The instrument establishing the *mayorazgo,* or perpetual entail of Columbus's estates, contains an injunction that "his heirs shall never use any other signature than that of 'the Admiral,' *el Almirante,* whatever other titles and honors may belong to them." That title indicated his peculiar achievements, and it was an honest pride which led him by this simple expedient to perpetuate the remembrance of them in his posterity. See the original document, apud Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. ii. pp. 221–235.

pletion of the arrangements for the admiral's departure on his third voyage may be also noticed the hostility of Bishop Fonseca,* who at this period had the control of the Indian department; a man of an irritable and, as it would seem, most unforgiving temper, who, from some causes of disgust which he had conceived with Columbus previous to his second voyage, lost no opportunity of annoying and thwarting him, for which his official station unfortunately afforded him too many facilities.[15]

From these various circumstances the admiral's fleet was not ready before the beginning of 1498. Even then further embarrassment occurred in manning it, as few were found willing to embark in a service which had fallen into such general discredit. This led to the ruinous expedient of substituting convicts, whose regular punishments were commuted into transportation, for a limited period, to the Indies. No measure could possibly have been devised more effectual for the ruin of the infant settlement. The seeds of corruption, which had been so long festering in the Old World, soon shot up into a plentiful harvest in the New, and Columbus, who suggested the measure, was the first to reap the fruits of it.

[15] Muñoz, Hist. del Nuevo-Mundo, lib. 6, sec. 20.—Fernando Colon, Hist. del Almirante, cap. 64.—Zuñiga, Annales de Sevilla, año 1496.

* [Sir Arthur Helps happily calls Fonseca "the ungodly bishop." He says "the student of American history will have a bad opinion of many Spanish bishops if he does not discover that it is Bishop Fonseca who reappears under various designations." Besides acting as chaplain to both Isabella and Ferdinand, he also held, one after another, the bishoprics of Badajoz, Cordova, Palencia, Conde, and Burgos, as well as the archbishopric of Rosano in Italy.—M.]

At length, all being in readiness, the admiral embarked on board his little squadron, consisting of six vessels, whose complement of men, notwithstanding every exertion, was still deficient, and took his departure from the port of St. Lucar, May 30th, 1498. He steered in a more southerly direction than on his preceding voyages, and on the 1st of August succeeded in reaching *terra firma;* * thus entitling himself to the glory of being the first to set foot on the great southern continent, to which he had before opened the way.

It is not necessary to pursue the track of the illustrious voyager, whose career, forming the most brilliant episode to the history of the present reign, has been so recently traced by a hand which few will care to follow. It will suffice briefly to notice his personal relations with the Spanish government, and the principles on which the colonial administration was conducted.

On his arrival at Hispaniola, Columbus found the affairs of the colony in the most deplorable confusion An insurrection had been raised by the arts of a few factious individuals against his brother Bartholomew, to whom he had intrusted

[16] Peter Martyr, De Rebus Oceanicis, dec. 1, lib. 6.—Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. ii., Doc. dipl., nos. 116, 120.—Tercer Viage de Colon, apud Navarrete, tom. i. p. 245.—Benzoni, Novi Orbis Hist., lib. 1, cap. 10, 11.—Herrera, Indias occidentales, dec. 1, lib. 3, cap. 10, 11.—Muñoz, Hist. del Nuevo-Mundo, lib. 6, sec. 19.

* [Columbus landed on the southern side of the island of Trinidad. As he sailed over those seas he must have seen the shores to the southward. Whether he was the first European to set foot upon them is another question.—M.]

the government during his absence. In this desperate rebellion, all the interests of the community were neglected. The mines, which were just beginning to yield a golden harvest, remained unwrought. The unfortunate natives were subjected to the most inhuman oppression. There was no law but that of the strongest. Columbus, on his arrival, in vain endeavored to restore order. The very crews he brought with him, who had been unfortunately reprieved from the gibbet in their own country, served to swell the mass of mutiny. The admiral exhausted art, negotiation, entreaty, force, and succeeded at length in patching up a specious reconciliation by such concessions as essentially impaired his own authority. Among these was the grant of large tracts of land to the rebels, with permission to the proprietor to employ an allotted number of the natives in its cultivation. This was the origin of the celebrated system of *repartimientos,* which subsequently led to the foulest abuses that ever disgraced humanity.[17]

Nearly a year elapsed after the admiral's return to Hispaniola, before he succeeded in allaying these intestine feuds. In the mean while, rumors were every day reaching Spain of the distractions of the colony, accompanied with most injurious imputations on the conduct of Columbus and his brother, who were loudly accused of oppressing

[17] Gomara, Hist. de las Indias, cap. 20.—Benzoni, Novi Orbis Hist., lib. 1, cap. 10, 11.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 7.—Fernando Colon, Hist. del Almirante, cap. 73–82.—Peter Martyr, De Rebus Oceanicis, dec. 1, lib. 5.—Herrera, Indias occidentales, dec. 1, lib. 3, cap. 16.—Muñoz, Hist. del Nuevo-Mundo, lib. 6, sec. 40–42.

both Spaniards and Indians, and of sacrificing the public interests, in the most unscrupulous manner, to their own. These complaints were rung in the very ears of the sovereigns by numbers of the disaffected colonists, who had returned to Spain, and who surrounded the king, as he rode out on horseback, clamoring loudly for the discharge of the arrears of which they said the admiral had defrauded them.[18]

There were not wanting, even, persons of high consideration at the court, to give credence and circulation to these calumnies. The recent discovery of the pearl-fisheries of Paria, as well as of more prolific veins of the precious metals in Hispaniola, and the prospect of an indefinite extent of unexplored country, opened by the late voyage of Columbus, made the viceroyalty of the New World a tempting bait for the avarice and ambition of the most potent grandee. They artfully endeavored, therefore, to undermine the admiral's credit with the sovereigns, by raising in their minds suspicions of his integrity, founded not merely on vague reports, but on letters received from the colony, charging him with disloyalty, with appropriating to his own use the revenues of

[18] Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 7.—Peter Martyr, De Rebus Oceanicis, dec. 1, lib. 7.—Gomara, Hist. de las Indias, cap. 23. —Benzoni, Novi Orbis Hist., cap. 11.—Ferdinand Columbus mentions that he and his brother, who were then pages to the queen, could not stir out into the courtyard of the Alhambra without being followed by fifty of these vagabonds, who insulted them in the grossest manner, "as the sons of the adventurer who had led so many brave Spanish hidalgos to seek their graves in the land of vanity and delusion which he had found out." Hist. del Almirante, cap. 85.

the island, and with the design of erecting an independent government for himself.[19]

Whatever weight these absurd charges may have had with Ferdinand, they had no power to shake the queen's confidence in Columbus or lead her to suspect his loyalty for a moment. But the long-continued distractions of the colony made her feel a natural distrust of his capacity to govern it, whether from the jealousy entertained of him as a foreigner, or from some inherent deficiency in his own character. These doubts were mingled, it is true, with sterner feelings towards the admiral, on the arrival, at this juncture, of several of the rebels with the Indian slaves assigned to them by his orders.[20]

It was the received opinion among good Catholics of that period, that heathen and barbarous nations were placed by the circumstance of their infidelity without the pale both of spiritual and civil rights. Their souls were doomed to eternal perdition. Their bodies were the property of the Christian nation who should occupy their soil.[21]

[19] Benzoni, Novi Orbis Hist., lib. 1, cap. 12.—National feeling operated, no doubt, as well as avarice to sharpen the tooth of slander against the admiral. "Ægre multi patiuntur," says Columbus's countryman, with honest warmth, "peregrinum hominem, et quidem e nostrâ Italiâ ortum, tantum honoris ac gloriæ consequutum, ut non tantum Hispanicæ gentis, sed et cujusvis alterius homines superaverit." Benzoni, lib. 1, cap. 5.

[20] Herrera, Indias occidentales, lib. 4, cap. 7, 10, and more especially lib. 6, cap. 13.—Las Casas, Œuvres, éd. de Llorente, tom. i. p. 306.

[21] "La qualité de Catholique Romain," says the philosophic Villers, "avait tout-à-fait remplacé celle d'homme, et même de Chrétien. Qui n'était pas Catholique Romain, n'était pas homme, était moins qu'homme; et eût-il été un souverain, c'était une bonne action que de lui ôter la vie." (Essai sur la Réformation, p. 56, éd. 1820.) Las

Such, in brief, were the profession and the practice of the most enlightened Europeans of the fifteenth century; and such the deplorable maxims which regulated the intercouse of the Spanish and Portuguese navigators with the uncivilized natives of the western world.[22] Columbus, agreeably to these views, had, very soon after the occupation of Hispaniola, recommended a regular exchange of slaves for the commodities required for the support of the colony; representing, moreover, that in this way their conversion would be more surely effected,—an object, it must be admitted, which he seems to have ever had most earnestly at heart.

Isabella, however, entertained views on this matter far more liberal than those of her age.

Casas rests the title of the Spanish crown to its American possessions on the original papal grant, made on condition of converting the natives to Christianity. The pope, as vicar of Jesus Christ, possesses plenary authority over all men for the safety of their souls. He might, therefore, in furtherance of this, confer on the Spanish sovereigns *imperial supremacy* over all lands discovered by them,—not, however, to the prejudice of authorities already existing there, and over such nations only as voluntarily embraced Christianity. Such is the sum of his thirty propositions submitted to the council of the Indies for the inspection of Charles V. (Œuvres, éd. de Llorente, tom. i. pp. 286–311.) One may see in these arbitrary and whimsical limitations the good bishop's desire to reconcile what reason told him were the natural rights of man, with what faith prescribed as the legitimate prerogative of the pope. Few Roman Catholics at the present day will be found sturdy enough to maintain this lofty prerogative, however carefully limited. Still fewer in the sixteenth century would have challenged it. Indeed, it is but just to Las Casas to admit that the general scope of his arguments, here and elsewhere, is very far in advance of his age.

[22] A Spanish casuist founds the right of his nation to enslave the Indians, among other things on their smoking tobacco and not trimming their beards *à l'Espagnole.* At least this is Montesquieu's interpretation of it. (Esprit des Lois, lib. 15, chap. 3.) The doctors of the Inquisition could hardly have found a better reason.

She had been deeply interested by the accounts she had received from the admiral himself of the gentle, unoffending character of the islanders; and she revolted at the idea of consigning them to the horrors of slavery, without even an effort for their conversion. She hesitated, therefore, to sanction his proposal; and, when a number of Indian captives were advertised to be sold in the markets of Andalusia, she commanded the sale to be suspended, till the opinion of a council of theologians and doctors, learned in such matters, could be obtained as to its conscientious lawfulness. She yielded still further to the benevolent impulses of her nature, causing holy men to be instructed as far as possible in the Indian languages and sent out as missionaries for the conversion of the natives.[23] Some of them, as Father Boil and his brethren, seem, indeed, to have been more concerned for the welfare of their own bodies than for the souls of their benighted flock. But others, imbued with a better spirit, wrought in the good work with disinterested zeal, and, if we may credit their accounts, with some efficacy.[24]

In the same beneficent spirit, the royal letters and ordinances urged over and over again the

[23] Muñoz, Hist. del Nuevo-Mundo, lib. 5, sec. 34.—Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. ii., Doc. dipl., no. 92.—Herrera, Indias occidentales, lib. 3, cap. 4.

[24] "Among other things that the holy fathers carried out," says Robles, "was a little organ and several bells, which greatly delighted the simple people, so that from one to two thousand persons were baptized every day." (Vida de Ximenez, p. 120.) Ferdinand Columbus remarks, with some *naïveté,* that "the Indians were so obedient from their fear of the admiral, and at the same time so desirous to oblige him, that they *voluntarily* became Christians." Hist. del Almirante, cap. 84.

paramount obligation of the religious instruction of the natives, and of observing the utmost gentleness and humanity in all dealings with them. When, therefore, the queen learned the arrival of two vessels from the Indies, with three hundred slaves on board, which the admiral had granted to the mutineers, she could not repress her indignation, but impatiently asked, "By what authority does Columbus venture thus to dispose of my subjects?" (June 20th, 1500.) She instantly caused proclamation to be made in the southern provinces, that all who had Indian slaves in their possession, granted by the admiral, should forthwith provide for their return to their own country; while the few still held by the crown were to be restored to freedom in like manner.[25]

After a long and visible reluctance, the queen acquiesced in sending out a commissioner to investigate the affairs of the colony. The person appointed to this delicate trust was Don Francisco de Bobadilla, a poor knight of Calatrava. He was invested with supreme powers of civil and criminal jurisprudence. He was to bring to trial and pass sentence on all such as had conspired against the authority of Columbus. He was authorized to take possession of the fortress, vessels, public stores, and property of every description, to dispose of all officers, and to command whatever

[25] Herrera, Indias occidentales, lib. 4, cap. 7.—Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. ii., Doc. dipl., no. 134.—Las Casas observes that "so great was the queen's indignation at the admiral's misconduct in this particular, that nothing but the consideration of his great public services saved him from immediate disgrace." Œuvres, éd. de Llorente, tom. i. p. 306.

persons he might deem expedient for the tranquillity of the island, without distinction of rank, to return to Spain and present themselves before the sovereigns. Such, in brief, was the sum of the extraordinary powers intrusted to Bobadilla.[26]

It is impossible now to determine what motives could have led to the selection of so incompetent an agent for an office of such high responsibility. He seems to have been a weak and arrogant man, swelled with unmeasurable insolence by the brief authority thus undeservedly bestowed on him. From the very first, he regarded Columbus in the light of a convicted criminal, on whom it was his business to execute the sentence of the law. Accordingly, on his arrival at the island, after an ostentatious parade of his credentials, he commanded the admiral to appear before him, and, without affecting the forms of a legal inquiry, at once caused him to be manacled and thrown into prison. (August 23, 1500.) Columbus submitted without the least show of resistance, displaying in this sad reverse a magnanimity of soul which would have touched the heart of a generous adversary. Bobadilla, however, discovered no such sensibility; and, after raking together all the foul or frivolous calumnies which hatred or the hope of favor could extort, he caused the whole loathsome

[26] Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. ii., Doc. dipl., nos. 127–130. The original commission to Bobadilla was dated March 21st, and May 21st, 1499; the execution of it, however, was delayed until July, 1500, in the hope, doubtless, of obtaining such tidings from Hispaniola as should obviate the necessity of a measure so prejudicial to the admiral.

mass of accusation to be sent back to Spain with the admiral, whom he commanded to be kept in irons during the passage; "afraid," says Ferdinand Columbus, bitterly, "lest he might by any chance swim back again to the island." [27]

This excess of malice served, as usual, however, to defeat itself. So enormous an outrage shocked the minds of those most prejudiced against Columbus. All seemed to feel it as a national dishonor that such indignities should be heaped on the man who, whatever might be his indiscretions, had done so much for Spain, and for the whole civilized world; a man who, in the honest language of an old writer, "had he lived in the days of ancient Greece or Rome, would have had statues raised and temples and divine honors dedicated to him, as to a divinity!" [28]

None partook of the general indignation more strongly than Ferdinand and Isabella, who, in addition to their personal feelings of disgust at so gross an act, readily comprehended the whole weight of obloquy which its perpetration must necessarily attach to them. They sent to Cadiz without an instant's delay, and commanded the

[27] Fernando Colon, Hist. del Almirante, cap. 86.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 7.—Peter Martyr, de Rebus Oceanicis, dec. 1, lib. 7.—Gomara, Hist. de las Indias, cap. 23.—Herrera, Indias occidentales, lib. 4, cap. 10.—Benzoni, Novi Orbis Hist., lib. 1, cap. 12.

[28] Benzoni, Novi Orbis Hist., lib. 1, cap. 12.—Herrera, Indias occidentales, lib. 6, cap. 15.—Ferdinand Columbus tells us that his father kept the fetters in which he was brought home, hanging up in an apartment of his house, as a perpetual memorial of national ingratitude, and, when he died, ordered them to be buried in the same grave with himself. Hist. del Almirante, cap. 86.

admiral to be released from his ignominious fetters. They wrote to him in the most benignant terms, expressing their sincere regret for the unworthy usage which he had experienced, and requesting him to appear before them as speedily as possible, at Granada, where the court was then staying. At the same time, they furnished him a thousand ducats for his expenses, and a handsome retinue to escort him on his journey.

Columbus, revived by these assurances of the kind dispositions of his sovereigns, proceeded without delay to Granada, which he reached on the 17th of December, 1500. Immediately on his arrival he obtained an audience. The queen could not repress her tears at the sight of the man whose illustrious services had met with such ungenerous requital, as it were, at her own hands. She endeavored to cheer his wounded spirit with the most earnest assurances of her sympathy and sorrow for his misfortunes. Columbus from the first moment of his disgrace, had relied on the good faith and kindness of Isabella; for, as an ancient Castilian writer remarks, "she had ever favored him beyond the king her husband, protecting his interests and showing him especial kindness and good will." When he beheld the emotion of his royal mistress, and listened to her consolatory language, it was too much for his loyal and generous heart; and, throwing himself on his knees, he gave vent to his feelings, and sobbed aloud. The sovereigns endeavored to soothe and tranquillize his mind, and, after testifying their deep sense of his injuries, promised him that impartial justice

should be done his enemies, and that he should be reinstated in his emoluments and honors.[29]

Much censure has attached to the Spanish government for its share in this unfortunate transaction; both in the appointment of so unsuitable an agent as Bobadilla, and the delegation of such broad and indefinite powers. With regard to the first, it is now too late, as has already been remarked, to ascertain on what grounds such a selection could have been made. There is no evidence of his being indebted for his promotion to intrigue or any undue influence. Indeed, according to the testimony of one of his contemporaries, he was reputed "an extremely honest and religious man;" and the good bishop of Las Casas expressly declares that "no imputation of dishonesty or avarice had ever rested on his character."[30] It was an error of judgment; a grave one, indeed, and must pass for as much as it is worth.

But in regard to the second charge, of delegating unwarrantable powers, it should be remembered that the grievances of the colony were represented as of a most pressing nature, demanding a prompt and peremptory remedy; that a more limited and partial authority, dependent for its exercise on instructions from the government at home, might be attended with ruinous delays; that

[29] Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 7.—Peter Martyr, De Rebus Oceanicis, dec. 1, lib. 7.—Fernando Colon, Hist. del Almirante, cap. 86, 87.—Herrera, Indias occidentales, dec. 1, lib. 4, cap. 8–10.—Benzoni, Novi Orbis Hist., lib. 1, cap. 12.

[30] Oviedo, Hist. gen. de las Ind., P. 1, lib. 3, cap. 6.—Las Casas, lib. 2, cap. 6, apud Navarrete, tom. i. introd., p. 99.

this authority must necessarily be paramount to that of Columbus, who was a party implicated; and that, although unlimited jurisdiction was given over all offences committed against him, yet neither he nor his friends were to be molested in any other way than by temporary suspension from office, and a return to their own country, where the merits of their case might be submitted to the sovereigns themselves.

This view of the matter, indeed, is perfectly conformable to that of Ferdinand Columbus, whose solicitude, so apparent in every page, for his father's reputation, must have effectually counterbalanced any repugnance he may have felt at impugning the conduct of his sovereigns. "The only ground of complaint," he remarks, in summing up his narrative of the transaction, "which I can bring against their Catholic Highnesses is, the unfitness of the agent whom they employed, equally malicious and ignorant. Had they sent out a suitable person, the admiral would have been highly gratified; since he had more than once requested the apponitment of some one with full powers of jurisdiction in an affair where he felt some natural delicacy in moving, in consequence of his own brother having been originally involved in it." And, as to the vast magnitude of the powers intrusted to Bobadilla, he adds, "It can scarcely be wondered at, considering the manifold complaints against the admiral made to their Highnesses." [31]

Although the king and queen determined with-

[31] Fernando Colon, Hist. del Almirante, cap. 86.

out hesitation on the complete restoration of the admiral's honor, they thought it better to defer his reappointment to the government of the colony until the present disturbances should be settled and he might return there with personal safety and advantage. In the mean time, they resolved to send out a competent individual, and to support him with such a force as should overawe faction and enable him to place the tranquillity of the island on a permanent basis.

The person selected was Don Nicolas de Ovando, comendador of Lares, of the military order of Alcantara. He was a man of acknowledged prudence and sagacity, temperate in his habits, and plausible and politic in his address. It is sufficient evidence of his standing at court that he had been one of the ten youths selected to be educated in the palace as companions for the prince of Asturias. He was furnished with a fleet of two-and-thirty sail, carrying twenty-five hundred persons, many of them of the best families in the kingdom, with every variety of article for the nourishment and permanent prosperity of the colony; and the general equipment was in a style of expense and magnificence such as had never before been lavished on any armada destined for the western waters.[32]

The new governor was instructed immediately on his arrival to send Boabdilla home for trial. (September, 1501.) Under his lax administration, abuses of every kind had multiplied to an

[32] Herrera, Indias occidentales, dec. 1, lib. 4, cap. 11.—Fernando Colon, Hist. del Almirante, cap. 87.—Benzoni, Novi Orbis Hist., lib. 1, cap. 12.—Mem. de la Acad. de Hist., tom. vi. p. 385.

alarming extent, and the poor natives, in particular, were rapidly wasting away under the new and most inhuman arrangement of the *repartimientos*, which he had established. Isabella now declared the Indians free, and emphatically enjoined on the authorities of Hispaniola to respect them as true and faithful vassals of the crown. Ovando was especially to ascertain the amount of losses sustained by Columbus and his brothers, to provide for their full indemnification, and to secure the unmolested enjoyment in future of all their lawful rights and pecuniary perquisites.[33]

Fortified with the most ample instructions in regard to these and other details of his administration, the governor embarked on board his magnificent flotilla, and crossed the bar of St. Lucar, February 15th, 1502. A furious tempest dispersed the fleet before it had been out a week, and a report reached Spain that it had entirely perished. The sovereigns, overwhelmed with sorrow at this fresh disaster, which consigned so many of their best and bravest to a watery grave, shut themselves up in their palace for several days. Fortunately, the report proved ill founded. The fleet rode out the storm in safety, one vessel only having perished, and the remainder reached in due time the place of destination.[34]

The Spanish government has been roundly taxed with injustice and ingratitude for its delay in restoring Columbus to the full possession of his

[33] Herrera, Indias occidentales, lib. 4, cap. 11–13.—Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. ii., Doc. dipl., nos. 138, 144.—Fernando Colon, Hist. del Almirante, cap. 87.

[34] Herrera, Indias occidentales, lib. 5, cap. 1.

colonial authority; and that too by writers generally distinguished for candor and impartiality. No such animadversion, however, so far as I am aware, is countenanced by contemporary historians; and it appears to be wholly undeserved. Independent of the obvious inexpediency of returning him immediately to the theatre of disaffection, before the embers of ancient animosity had had time to cool, there were several features in his character which make it doubtful whether he were the most competent person, in any event, for an emergency demanding at once the greatest coolness, consummate address, and acknowledged personal authority. His sublime enthusiasm, which carried him victorious over every obstacle, involved him also in numerous embarrassments, which men of more phlegmatic temperament would have escaped. It led him to count too readily on a similar spirit in others,—and to be disappointed. It gave an exaggerated coloring to his views and descriptions, that inevitably led to a reaction in the minds of such as embarked their all on the splendid dreams of a fairy-land which they were never to realize.[35] Hence a fruitful source of discontent

[35] The high devotional feeling of Columbus led him to trace out allusions in Scripture to the various circumstances and scenes of his adventurous life. Thus, he believed his great discovery announced in the Apocalypse, and in Isaiah; he identified, as I have before stated, the mines of Hispaniola with those which furnished Solomon with materials for his temple; he fancied that he had determined the actual locality of the garden of Eden in the newly-discovered region of Paria. But his greatest extravagance was his project of a crusade for the recovery of the Holy Sepulchre. This he cherished from the first hour of his discovery, pressing it in the most urgent manner on the sovereigns, and making provision for it in his testament. This was a flight, however, beyond the spirit even of this

and disaffection in his followers. It led him, in his eagerness for the achievement of his great enterprises, to be less scrupulous and politic as to the means than a less ardent spirit would have been. His pertinacious adherence to the scheme of Indian slavery, and his impolitic regulation compelling the labor of the hidalgos, are pertinent examples of this.[36] He was, moreover, a foreigner, without rank, fortune, or powerful friends; and his high and sudden elevation naturally raised him up a thousand enemies among a proud, punctilious, and intensely national people. Under these multiplied embarrassments, resulting from peculiarities of character and situation, the sovereigns might well be excused for not intrusting Columbus, at this delicate crisis, with disentangling the meshes of intrigue and faction, in which the affairs of the colony were so unhappily involved.

I trust these remarks will not be construed into an insensibility to the merits and exalted services of Columbus. "A world," to borrow the words, though not the application, of the Greek historian,

romantic age, and probably received as little serious attention from the queen as from her more cool and calculating husband. Peter Martyr, De Rebus Oceanicis, dec. 1, lib. 6.—Tercer Viage de Colon, apud Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. i. p. 259,—tom. ii., Doc. dipl., no. 140.—Herera, Indias occidentales, lib. 6, cap. 15.

[36] Another example was the injudicious punishment of delinquents by diminishing their regular allowance of food, a measure so obnoxious as to call for the interference of the sovereigns, who prohibited it altogether. (Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. ii., Doc. dipl., no. 97.) Herrera, who must be admitted to have been in no degree insensible to the merits of Columbus, closes his account of the various accusations urged against him and his brothers, with the remark that, "with every allowance for calumny, they must be confessed not to have governed the Castilians with the moderation that they ought to have shown." Indias occidentales, lib. 4, cap. 9.

"is his monument." His virtues shine with too bright a lustre to be dimmed by a few natural blemishes; but it becomes necessary to notice these, to vindicate the Spanish government from the imputation of perfidy and ingratitude, where it has been most freely urged, and apparently with the least foundation.

It is more difficult to excuse the paltry equipment with which the admiral was suffered to undertake his fourth and last voyage. The object proposed by this expedition was the discovery of a passage to the great Indian Ocean, which he inferred, sagaciously enough from his premises, though, as it turned out,—to the great inconvenience of the commercial world,—most erroneously, must open somewhere between Cuba and the coast of Paria. Four caravels only were furnished for the expedition, the largest of which did not exceed seventy tons' burden; a force forming a striking contrast to the magnificent armada lately intrusted to Ovando, and altogether too insignificant to be vindicated on the ground of the different objects proposed by the two expeditions.[37]

Columbus, oppressed with growing infirmities and a consciousness, perhaps, of the decline of popular favor, manifested unusual despondency previously to his embarkation. He talked, even, of resigning the task of further discovery to his brother Bartholomew. "I have established," said he, "all that I proposed,—the existence of land in

[37] Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 14.—Fernando Colon, Hist. del Almirante, cap. 88.—Herrera, Indias occidentales, lib. 5, cap. 1.—Benzoni, Novi Orbis Hist., cap. 14.

the west. I have opened the gate, and others may enter at their pleasure; as indeed they do, arrogating to themselves the title of discoverers, to which they can have little claim, following as they do in my track." He little thought the ingratitude of mankind would sanction the claims of these adventurers so far as to confer the name of one of them on that world which his genius had revealed.[38]

The great inclination, however, which the admiral had to serve the Catholic sovereigns, and especially the most serene queen, says Ferdinand Columbus, induced him to lay aside his scruples

[38] It would be going out of our way to investigate the pretensions of Amerigo Vespucci to the honor of first discovering the South American continent. The reader will find them displayed with perspicuity and candor by Mr. Irving, in his "Life of Columbus." (Appendix, No. 9.) Few will be disposed to contest the author's conclusion respecting their fallacy, though all may not have the same charity as he, in tracing its possible origin to an editorial blunder instead of wilful fabrication on the part of Vespucci; in which light, indeed, it seems to have been regarded by the most ancient and honest historians of the event, Las Casas and Herrera. There is no reason to suspect him, however, of pretending to anything beyond the discovery of Paria, or of anticipating in any degree the important consequence destined to result from such pretensions. Mr. Irving's conclusions have since been confirmed, in the fullest manner, by M. de Humboldt, in his "Géographie du nouveau Continent," published in 1839; in which he has assembled a mass of testimony suggesting the most favorable impressions of Vespucci's innocence of the various charges brought against him.—Since the appearance of Mr. Irving's work, Señor Navarrete has published the third volume of his "Coleccion de iages y Descubrimientos," etc., containing, among other things, the original letters recording Vespucci's American voyages, illustrated by all the authorities and facts that could come within the scope of his indefatigable researches. The whole weight of evidence leads irresistibly to the conviction that Columbus is entitled to the glory of being the original discoverer of the southern continent, as well as islands, of the western hemisphere. Coleccion de Viages, tom. iii. pp. 183–334.

and encounter the perils and fatigues of another voyage. A few weeks before his departure, he received a gracious letter from Ferdinand and Isabella, the last ever addressed to him by his royal mistress, assuring him of their purpose to maintain inviolate all their engagements with him, and to perpetuate the inheritance of his honors in his family.[39] Comforted and cheered by these assurances, the veteran navigator, quitting the port of Cadiz on the 9th of March, 1502, once more spread his sails for those golden regions which he had approached so near, but was destined never to reach.

It will not be necessary to pursue his course further than to notice a single occurrence of most extraordinary nature. The admiral had received instructions not to touch at Hispaniola on his outward voyage. The leaky condition of one of his ships, however, and the signs of an approaching storm, induced him to seek a temporary refuge there; at the same time, he counselled Ovando to delay for a few days the departure of the fleet, then riding in the harbor, which was destined to carry Bobadilla and the rebels with their ill-gotten treasures back to Spain. The churlish governor,

[39] Fernando Colon, Hist. del Almirante, cap. 87. Herrera notices this letter, written, he says, "con tanta humanidad, que parecia extraordinaria de lo que usavan con otros, y no sin razon, pues jamas nadie les hizo tal servicio." (Indias occidentales, lib. 5, cap. 1.)—Among other instances of the queen's personal regard for Columbus, may be noticed her receiving his two sons, Diego and Fernando, as her own pages, on the death of Prince John, in whose service they had formerly been. (Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. ii., Doc. dipl., no. 125.)—By an ordinance of 1503, we find Diego Colon made *contino* of the royal household, with an annual salary of 50,000 maravedis. Ibid., Doc. dipl., no. 150.

however, not only refused Columbus admittance, but gave orders for the instant departure of the vessels. The apprehensions of the experienced mariner were fully justified by the event. Scarcely had the Spanish fleet quitted its moorings, before one of those tremendous hurricanes came on, which so often desolate these tropical regions, sweeping down everything before it, and fell with such violence on the little navy that out of eighteen ships, of which it was composed, not more than three or four escaped. The rest all foundered, including those which contained Bobadilla and the late enemies of Columbus. Two hundred thousand *castellanos* of gold, half of which belonged to the government, went to the bottom with them. The only one of the fleet which made its way back to Spain was a crazy, weather-beaten bark, which contained the admiral's property, amounting to four thousand ounces of gold. To complete these curious coincidences, Columbus with his little squadron rode out the storm in safety under the lee of the island, where he had prudently taken shelter on being so rudely repulsed from the port. This even-handed retribution of justice, so uncommon in human affairs, led many to discern the immediate interposition of Providence. Others, in a less Christian temper, referred it all to the necromancy of the admiral.[40]

[40] Peter Martyr, De Rebus Oceanicis, dec. 1, lib. 10.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 14.—Fernando Colon, Hist. del Almirante, cap. 88.—Benzoni, Novi Orbis Hist., cap. 12.—Herrera, Indias occidentales, lib. 5, cap. 2.

CHAPTER IX

SPANISH COLONIAL POLICY

Careful Provision for the Colonies—License for Private Voyages—Important Papal Concessions—The Queen's Zeal for Conversion—Immediate Profits from the Discoveries—Their moral Consequences—Their geographical Extent

A CONSIDERATION of the colonial policy pursued during Isabella's lifetime has been hitherto deferred to avoid breaking the narrative of Columbus's personal adventures. I shall now endeavor to present the reader with a brief outline of it, so far as can be collected from imperfect and scanty materials; for, however incomplete in itself, it becomes important as containing the germ of the gigantic system developed in later ages.

Ferdinand and Isabella manifested from the first an eager and enlightened curiosity in reference to their new acquisitions, constantly interrogating the admiral minutely as to their soil and climate, their various vegetable and mineral products, and especially the character of the uncivilized races who inhabited them. They paid the greatest deference to his suggestions, as before remarked, and liberally supplied the infant settlement with whatever could contribute to its nourishment and permanent prosperity.[1] Through

[1] See, in particular, a letter to Columbus, dated August, 1494 (apud Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. ii., Doc. dipl., no. 79);

their provident attention, in a very few years after its discovery the island of Hispaniola was in possession of the most important domestic animals, as well as fruits and vegetables, of the Old World, some of which have since continued to furnish the staple of a far more lucrative commerce than was ever anticipated from its gold-mines.[2]

Emigration to the new countries was encouraged by the liberal tenor of the royal ordinances passed from time to time. The settlers in Hispaniola were to have their passage free; to be excused from taxes; to have the absolute property of such plantations on the island as they should engage to cultivate for four years; and they were furnished with a gratuitous supply of grain and stock for their farms. All exports and imports were exempted from duty; a striking contrast to the narrow policy of later ages. Five hundred persons, including scientific men and aritsans of every description, were sent out and maintained at the expense of the government. To provide for the greater security and quiet of the island, Ovando was authorized to gather the residents into towns, which were endowed with the privileges appertaining to similar corporations in

also an elaborate memorial presented by the admiral in the same year, setting forth the various necessities of the colony, every item of which is particularly answered by the sovereigns, in a manner showing how attentively they considered his suggestions.—Ibid., tom. i. pp. 226–241.

[2] Abundant evidence of this is furnished by the long enumeration of articles subjected to tithes, contained in an ordinance dated October 5th, 1501, showing with what indiscriminate severity this heavy burden was imposed from the first on the most important products of human industry. Recopilacion de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias (Madrid, 1774), tom. i. lib. 1, tit. 16, ley 2.

the mother country; and a number of married men, with their families, were encouraged to establish themselves in them, with the view of giving greater solidity and permanence to the settlement.[3]

With these wise provisions were mingled others savoring too strongly of the illiberal spirit of the age. Such were those prohibiting Jews, Moors, or indeed any but Castilians, for whom the discovery was considered exclusively to have been made, from inhabiting, or even visiting, the New World. The government kept a most jealous eye upon what it regarded as its own peculiar perquisites, reserving to itself the exclusive possession of all minerals, dyewoods, and precious stones that should be discovered; and, although private persons were allowed to search for gold, they were subjected to the exorbitant tax of two-thirds, subsequently reduced to one-fifth, of all they should obtain, for the crown.[4]

The measure which contributed more effectually than any other, at this period, to the progress of discovery and colonization, was the license granted, under certain regulations, in 1495, for voyages undertaken by private individuals. No use was made of this permission until some years

[3] Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. ii. Doc. dipl., no. 86, April 10th, 1495.—Nos. 103, 105–108, April 23d, 1497.—No. 110, May 6th, 1497.—No. 121, July 22d, 1497.—Herrera, Indias occidentales, dec. 1, lib. 4, cap. 12.

[4] Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. ii., Doc. dipl., nos. 86, 121. —Herrera, Indias occidentales, lib. 3, cap. 2.—Muñoz, Hist. del Nuevo-Mundo, lib. 5, sec. 34.—The exclusion of foreigners, at least all but "Catholic Christians," is particularly recommended by Columbus in his first communication to the crown. Primer Viage de Colon.

later, in 1499. The spirit of enterprise had flagged, and the nation had experienced something like disappointment on contrasting the meagre results of their own discoveries with the dazzling successes of the Portuguese, who had struck at once into the very heart of the jewelled East. The reports of the admiral's third voyage, however, and the beautiful specimens of pearls which he sent home from the coast of Paria, revived the cupidity of the nation. Private adventurers now proposed to avail themselves of the license already granted, and to follow up the track of discovery on their own account. The government, drained by its late heavy expenditures, and jealous of the spirit of maritime adventure beginning to show itself in the other nations of Europe,[5] willingly acquiesced in a measure which, while it opened a wide field of enterprise for its subjects, secured to itself all the substantial benefits of discovery, without any of the burdens.

The ships fitted out under the general license were required to reserve one-tenth of their tonnage for the crown, as well as two-thirds of all the gold,* and ten per cent. of all other commodi-

[5] Among the foreign adventurers were the two Cabots, who sailed in the service of the English monarch, Henry VII., in 1497, and ran down the whole coast of North America, from Newfoundland to within a few degrees of Florida, thus encroaching, as it were, on the very field of discovery preoccupied by the Spaniards.

* [This is an error. From discoverers and traders only one-tenth was demanded. *Settlers* were required to pay two-thirds (if they had received aid from the sovereigns *four-fifths*) of all the gold they secured, to the officers of the crown. Muñoz, Hist. del Nuevo-Mundo, lib. 5, sect. 33, states that, of all gold acquired in rivers and mines, *colonists* had only one-third left them, and if they

ties which they should procure. The government promoted these expeditions by a bounty on all vessels of six hundred tons and upwards engaged in them.[6]

With this encouragement the more wealthy merchants of Seville, Cadiz, and Palos, the old theatre of nautical enterprise, freighted and sent out little squadrons of three or four vessels each, which they intrusted to the experienced mariners who had accompanied Columbus in his first voyage, or since followed in his footsteps. They held in general the same course pursued by the admiral on his last expedition, exploring the coasts of the great southern continent. Some of the adventurers returned with such rich freights of gold, pearls, and other precious commodities as well compensated the fatigues and perils of the voyage. But the greater number were obliged to content themselves with the more enduring, but barren, honors of discovery.[7]

[6] Muñoz, Hist. del Nuevo-Mundo, lib. 5, sect. 32.—Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, Doc. dipl., no. 86.

[7] Columbus seems to have taken exceptions at the license for private voyages, as an infringement of his own prerogatives. It is difficult, however, to understand on what ground. There is nothing in his original capitulations with the government having reference to the matter (see Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, Doc. dipl., no. 5); while, in the letters patent made out previously to his second voyage, the right of granting licenses is expressly reserved to the crown, and to the superintendent, Fonseca, equally with the admiral. (Doc. dipl., no. 35.) The only legal claim which he could make in all such expeditions as were not conducted under him was to one-eighth of the tonnage, and this was regularly provided for in the general license. (Doc. dipl., no. 86.) The sovereigns, indeed, in

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worked for pay, no more than one-fifth. This distinction between discoverers and settlers was made because the mines were supposed to be so rich.—M.]

The active spirit of enterprise now awakened, and the more enlarged commercial relations with the new colonies, required a more perfect organization of the department for Indian affairs, the earliest vestiges of which have been already noticed in a preceding chapter.[8] By an ordinance dated at Alcalá, January 20th, 1503, it was provided that a board should be established, consisting of three functionaries, with the titles of treasurer, factor, and comptroller. Their permanent residence was assigned in the old alcazar of Seville, where they were to meet every day for the despatch of business. The board was expected to make itself thoroughly acquainted with whatever concerned the colonies, and to afford the government all information that could be obtained affecting their interests and commercial prosperity. It was empowered to grant licenses under the regular conditions, to provide for the equipment of fleets, to determine their destination, and to furnish them with instructions on sailing. All merchandise for exportation was to be deposited in the alcazar, where the return cargoes were to be received and contracts made for their sale. Similar authority was given to it over the trade with

consequence of his remonstrances, published an ordinance, June 2d, 1497, in which, after expressing their unabated respect for all the rights and privileges of the admiral, they declare that whatever shall be found in their previous license repugnant to these shall be null and void. (Doc. dipl., no. 113.) The hypothetical form in which this is stated shows that the sovereigns, with an honest desire of keeping their engagements with Columbus, had not a very clear perception in what manner they had been violated. Peter Martyr, De Rebus Oceanicis, dec. 1, lib. 9.—Herrera, Indias occidentales, lib. 4, cap. 11.—Benzoni, Novi Orbis Hist., cap. 13.

[8] Part I. chap. 18, of this History.

the Barbary coast and the Canary Islands. Its supervision was to extend in like manner over all vessels which might take their departure from the port of Cadiz, as well as from Seville. With these powers were combined others of a purely judicial character, authorizing it to take cognizance of questions arising out of particular voyages, and of the colonial trade in general. In this latter capacity it was to be assisted by the advice of two jurists, maintained by a regular salary from the government.[9]

Such were the extensive powers intrusted to the famous *Casa de Contratacion,* or House of Trade, on this its first definite organization; and, although its authority was subsequently somewhat circumscribed by the appellate jurisdiction of the Council of the Indies, it has always continued the great organ by which the commercial transactions with the colonies have been conducted and controlled.

The Spanish government, while thus securing to itself the more easy and exclusive management of the colonial trade, by confining it within one narrow channel, discovered the most admirable foresight in providing for its absolute supremacy in ecclesiastical affairs, where alone it could be contested. By a bull of Alexander the Sixth, dated November 16th, 1501, the sovereigns were

[9] Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. ii., Doc. dipl., no. 148.—Solorzano y Pereyra, Política Indiana (Madrid, 1776), lib. 6, cap. 17.—Linage de Veitia, Norte de la Contratacion de las Indias occidentales (Sevilla, 1672), lib. 1, cap. 1.—Zuñiga, Annales de Sevilla, año 1503.—Herrera, Indias occidentales, lib. 5, cap. 12.—Navagiero, Viaggio, fol. 15.

empowered to receive all the tithes in the colonial dominions.[10] Another bull, of Pope Julius the Second, July 28th, 1508, granted them the right of collating to all benefices, of whatever description, in the colonies, subject only to the approbation of the Holy See. By these two concessions, the Spanish crown was placed at once at the head of the church in its transatlantic dominions, with the absolute disposal of all its dignities and emoluments.[11]

It has excited the admiration of more than one historian, that Ferdinand and Isabella, with their reverence for the Catholic church, should have the courage to assume an attitude of such entire independence of its spiritual chief.[12] But whoever has studied their reign will regard this measure as perfectly conformable to their habitual policy, which never suffered a zeal for religion, or a blind deference to the church, to compromise in any degree the independence of the crown. It is much more astonishing that pontiffs could be found content to divest themselves of such important prerogatives. It was deviating widely from the subtle and tenacious spirit of their predecessors, and, as the consequences came to be more fully disclosed, furnished ample subject of regret to those who succeeded them.

[10] See the original bull, apud Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. ii. apend. 14, and a Spanish version of it, in Solorzano, Política Indiana, lib. 4, cap. 1, sec. 7.

[11] Solorzano, Política Indiana, tom. ii. lib. 4, cap. 2, sec. 9.—Riol. Informe, apud Semanario erudito, tom. iii. pp. 160, 161.

[12] Among others, see Raynal, History of the East and West Indies, translated by Justamond (London, 1788), vol. iv. p. 277.—Robertson, History of America (London, 1796), vol. iii. p. 283.

Such is a brief summary of the principal regulations adopted by Ferdinand and Isabella for the administration of the colonies. Many of their peculiarities, including most of their defects, are to be referred to the peculiar circumstances under which the discovery of the New World was effected. Unlike the settlements on the comparatively sterile shores of North America, which were permitted to devise laws accommodated to their necessities, and to gather strength in the habitual exercise of political functions, the Spanish colonies were from the very first checked and controlled by the over-legislation of the parent country. The original project of discovery had been entered into with indefinite expectations of gain. The verification of Columbus's theory of the existence of land in the west gave popular credit to his conjecture that that land was the far-famed Indies. The specimens of gold and other precious commodities found there served to maintain the delusion. The Spanish government regarded the expedition as its own private adventure, to whose benefits it had exclusive pretensions. Hence those jealous regulations for securing to itself a monopoly of the most obvious sources of profit, the dyewoods and the precious metals.

These impolitic provisions were relieved by others better suited to the permanent interests of the colony. Such was the bounty offered in various ways on the occupation and culture of land, the erection of municipalities, the right of intercolonial traffic, and of exporting and importing

merchandise of every description free of duty.[13] These and similar laws show that the government, far from regarding the colonies merely as a foreign acquisition to be sacrificed to the interests of the mother country, as at a later period, was disposed to legislate for them on more generous principles, as an integral portion of the monarchy.

Some of the measures even of a less liberal tenor may be excused, as sufficiently accommodated to existing circumstances. No regulation, for example, was found eventually more mischievous in its operation than that which confined the colonial trade to the single port of Seville, instead of permitting it to find a free vent in the thousand avenues naturally opened in every part of the kingdom; to say nothing of the grievous monopolies and exactions for which this concentration of a mighty traffic on so small a point was found, in later times, to afford unbounded facility. But the colonial trade was too limited in its extent under Ferdinand and Isabella, to involve such consequences. It was confined chiefly to a few wealthy seaports of Andalusia, from the vicinity of which the first adventurers had sallied forth on their career of discovery. It was no inconvenience to them to have a common port of entry, so central and accessible as Seville, which, moreover, by this arrangement became a great mart for European trade, thus affording a convenient market to the country for effecting its commercial exchanges

[13] Muñoz, Hist. del Nuevo-Mundo, lib. 5, sec. 32, 33.—Herrera, Indias occidentales, lib. 4, cap. 11, 12.—Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. ii., Doc. dipl., no. 86.

with every quarter of Christendom.[14] It was only when laws adapted to the incipient stages of commerce were perpetuated to a period when that commerce had swelled to such gigantic dimensions as to embrace every quarter of the empire, that their gross impolicy became manifest.

It would not be giving a fair view of the great objects proposed by the Spanish sovereigns in their schemes of discovery, to omit one which was paramount to all the rest, with the queen at least,—the propagation of Christianity among the heathen. The conversion and civilization of this simple people form, as has already been said, the burden of most of her official communications from the earliest periods.[15] She neglected no means for the furtherance of this good work, through the agency of missionaries exclusively devoted to it, who were to establish their residence among the natives and win them to the true faith by their instructions and the edifying example of their own lives. It was with the design of ameliorating the condition of the natives that she sanctioned the introduction of negro slaves born in Spain. (1501.) This she did on the representation that the physical constitution of the African was much better fitted than that of the Indian to

[14] The historian of Seville mentions that it was the resort especially of the merchants of Flanders, with whom a more intimate intercourse had been opened by the intermarriages of the royal family with the house of Burgundy. See Zuñiga, Annales de Sevilla, p. 415.

[15] Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. ii., Doc. dipl., no. 45, et loc. al.—Las Casas, amidst his unsparing condemnation of the guilty, does ample justice to the pure and generous, though, alas! unavailing efforts of the queen. See Œuvres, éd. de Llorente, tom. i. pp. 21, 307, 395, et alibi.

endure severe toil under a tropical climate. To this false principle of economizing human suffering we are indebted for that foul stain on the New World, which has grown deeper and darker with the lapse of years.[16]

Isabella, however, was destined to have her benevolent designs in regard to the natives defeated by her own subjects. The popular doctrine of the absolute rights of the Christian over the heathen seemed to warrant the exaction of labor from these unhappy beings to any degree which avarice on the one hand could demand, or human endurance concede on the other. The device of the *repartimientos* systematized and completed the whole scheme of oppression. The queen, it is true, abolished them under Ovando's administration, and declared the Indians "as free as her own subjects."[17] But his representation that the Indians, when no longer compelled to work, withdrew from all intercourse with the Christians, thus annihilating at once all hopes of their conversion, subsequently induced her to consent that they should be required to labor moderately and for a reasonable compen-

[16] Herrera, Indias occidentales, lib. 4, cap. 12.—A good account of the introduction of negro slavery into the New World, comprehending the material facts, and some little known, may be found in the fifth chapter of Bancroft's "History of the United States;" a work in which the author has shown singular address in creating a unity of interest out of a subject which, in its early stages, would seem to want every other unity. It is the deficiency of this, probably, which has prevented Mr. Grahame's valuable History from attaining the popularity to which its solid merits justly entitle it. Should the remaining volumes of Mr. Bancroft's work be conducted with the same spirit, scholarship, and impartiality as the volume before us, it cannot fail to take a permanent rank in American literature.

[17] Herrera, Indias occidentales, lib. 4, cap. 11.

sation.[18] This was construed with their usual latitude by the Spaniards. They soon revived the old system of distribution on so terrific a scale that a letter of Columbus, written shortly after Isabella's death, represents more than six-sevenths of the whole population of Hispaniola to have melted away under it![19] The queen was too far removed to enforce the execution of her own beneficent measures; nor is it probable that she ever imagined the extent of their violation, for there was no intrepid philanthropist, in that day, like Las Casas, to proclaim to the world the wrongs and sorrows of the Indian.[20] A conviction, however, of the unworthy treatment of the natives seems to have pressed heavily on her heart; for in a codicil to her testament, dated a few days only before her death, she invokes the kind offices of her suc-

[18] Dec. 20th, 1503.—Ibid., lib. 5, cap. 11.—See the instructions to Ovando in Navarrete (Coleccion de Viages, tom. ii., Doc. dipl., no. 153). "Pay them regular wages," says the ordinance, "for their labor," "como personas libres como lo son, y no como siervos." Las Casas, who analyzes these instructions, which Llorente, by-the-by, has misdated, exposes the atrocious manner in which they were violated, in every particular, by Ovando and his successors. Œuvres, éd. de Llorente, tom. i. p. 309 et seq.

[19] Ibid., ubi supra.—Las Casas, Hist. Ind., lib. 2, cap. 36, MS., apud Irving, vol. iii. p. 412.—The venerable bishop confirms this frightful picture of desolation, in its full extent, in his various memorials prepared for the Council of the Indies. Œuvres, éd. de Llorente, tom. i., passim.

[20] Las Casas made his first voyage to the Indies, it is true, in 1498, or at latest 1502; but there is no trace of his taking an active part in denouncing the oppressions of the Spaniards earlier than 1510, when he combined his efforts with those of the Dominican missionaries lately arrived in St. Domingo, in the same good work. It was not until some years later, 1515, that he returned to Spain and pleaded the cause of the injured natives before the throne. Llorente, Œuvres de Las Casas, tom. i. pp. 1–23.—Nic. Antonio, Bibliotheca Nova, tom. i. pp. 191, 192.

cessor in their behalf in such strong and affectionate language as plainly indicates how intently her thoughts were occupied with their condition down to the last hour of her existence.[31]

The moral grandeur of the maritime discoveries under this reign must not so far dazzle us as to lead to a very high estimate of their immediate results in an economical view. Most of those articles which have since formed the great staples of South American commerce, as cocoa, indigo, cochineal, tobacco, etc., were either not known in Isabella's time, or not cultivated for exportation. Small quantities of cotton had been brought to Spain, but it was doubted whether the profit would compensate the expense of raising it. The sugar-cane had been transplanted into Hispaniola, and thrived luxuriantly in its genial soil. But it required time to grow it to any considerable amount as an article of commerce; and this was still further delayed by the distractions as well as avarice of the colony, which grasped at nothing less substantial than gold itself. The only vegetable product extensively used in trade was the brazil-wood, whose beautiful dye and application to various ornamental purposes made it, from the first, one of the most important monopolies of the crown.

The accounts are too vague to afford any probable estimate of the precious metals obtained from the new territories previous to Ovando's mission. Before the discovery of the mines of Hayna it was certainly very inconsiderable. The size of

[31] See the will, apud Dormer, Discursos varios, p. 381.

some of the specimens of ore found there would suggest magnificent ideas of their opulence. One piece of gold is reported by the contemporary historians to have weighed three thousand two hundred castellanos, and to have been so large that the Spaniards served up a roasted pig on it, boasting that no potentate in Europe could dine off so costly a dish.[22] The admiral's own statement, that the miners obtained from six gold castellanos to one hundred or even two hundred and fifty in a day, allows a latitude too great to lead to any definite conclusion.[23] More tangible evidence of the riches of the island is afforded by the fact that two hundred thousand castellanos of gold went down in the ships with Bobadilla. But this, it must be remembered, was the fruit of gigantic efforts, continued, under a system of unexampled oppression, for more than two years. To this testimony might be added that of the well-informed historian of Seville, who infers from several royal ordinances that the influx of the precious metals had been such, before the close of the fifteenth century, as to affect the value of the currency and the regular prices of commodities.[24] These large

[22] Herrera, Indias occidentales, lib. 5, cap. 1.—Fernando Colon, Hist. del Almirante, cap. 84.—Oviedo, Relacion sumaria de la Historia natural de las Indias, cap. 84, apud Barcia, Historiadores primitivos, tom. i.

[23] Tercer Viage de Colon, apud Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. i. p. 274.

[24] Zuñiga, Annales de Sevilla, p. 415.—The alteration was in the gold currency; which continued to rise in value till 1497, when it gradually sunk, in consequence of the importation from the mines of Hispaniola. Clemencin has given its relative value as compared with silver, for several different years; and the year he assigns for the commencement of its depreciation is precisely the same with

estimates, however, are scarcely reconcilable with the popular discontent at the meagreness of the returns obtained from the New World, or with the assertion of Bernaldez, of the same date with Zuñiga's reference, that "so little gold had been brought home as to raise a general belief that there was scarcely any in the island."[25] This is still further confirmed by the frequent representations of contemporary writers, that the expenses of the colonies considerably exceeded the profits, and may account for the very limited scale on which the Spanish government, at no time blind to its own interests, pursued its schemes of discovery, as compared with its Portuguese neighbors, who followed up theirs with a magnificent apparatus of fleets and armies, that could have been supported only by the teeming treasures of the Indies.[26]

that indicated by Zuñiga. (Mem. de la Acad. de Hist., tom. vi. Ilust. 20.) The value of silver was not materially affected till the discovery of the great mines of Potosí and Zacatecas.

[25] Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 131.

[26] The estimates in the text, it will be noticed, apply only to the period antecedent to Ovando's administration, in 1502. The operations under him were conducted on a far more extensive and efficient plan. The system of *repartimientos* being revived, the whole physical force of the island, aided by the best mechanical apparatus, was employed in extorting from the soil all its hidden stores of wealth. The success was such that in 1506, within two years after Isabella's death, the four founderies established in the island yielded an annual amount, according to Herrera, of 450,000 ounces of gold. It must be remarked, however, that one-fifth only of the gross sum obtained from the mines was at that time paid to the crown. It is a proof how far these returns exceeded the expectations at the time of Ovando's appointment, that the person then sent out as marker of the gold was to receive, as a reasonable compensation, one per cent. of all the gold assayed. The perquisite, however, was found to be so excessive that the functionary was recalled and a new arrangement made with his successor. (See Herrera, Indias occidentales, dec. 1, lib. 6, cap. 18.) When Navagiero visited

While the colonial commerce failed to produce immediately the splendid returns which were expected, it was generally believed to have introduced a physical evil into Europe, which, in the language of an eminent writer, "more than counterbalanced all the benefits that resulted from the discovery of the New World." I allude to the loathsome disease which Heaven has sent as the severest scourge of licentious intercourse between the sexes; and which broke out with all the virulence of an epidemic in almost every quarter of Europe, in a very short time after the discovery of America. The coincidence of these two events led to the popular belief of their connection with each other, though it derived little support from any other circumstance. The expedition of Charles the Eighth against Naples, which brought the Spaniards, soon after, in immediate contact with the various nations of Christendom, suggested a plausible medium for the rapid communication of the disorder; and this theory of its origin and transmission, gaining credit with time, which made it more difficult to be refuted, has passed with little examination from the mouth of one historian to another to the present day.

The extremely brief interval which elapsed between the return of Columbus and the simultaneous appearance of the disorder at the most distant points of Europe long since suggested a reasonable distrust of the correctness of the

Seville, in 1520, the royal fifth of the gold which passed through the mints amounted to about 100,000 ducats annually. Viaggio, fol. 15.

hypothesis; and an American, naturally desirous of relieving his own country from so melancholy a reproach, may feel satisfaction that the more searching and judicious criticism of our own day has at length established beyond a doubt that the disease, far from originating in the New World, was never known there till introduced by Europeans.[27]

[27] The curious reader is particularly referred to a late work, entitled *Lettere sulla Storia de' Mali Venerei, di Domenico Thiene, Venezia,* 1823; for the knowledge and loan of which I am indebted to my friend, Dr. Walter Channing. In this work the author has assembled all the early notices of the disease of any authority, and discussed their import with great integrity and judgment. The following positions may be considered as established by his researches. 1. That neither Columbus nor his son, in their copious narratives and correspondence, alludes in any way to the existence of such a disease in the New World. I must add that an examination of the original documents published by Navarrete since the date of Dr. Thiene's work fully confirms this statement. 2. That among the frequent notices of the disease, during the twenty-five years immediately following the discovery of America, there is not a single intimation of its having been brought from that country; but, on the contrary, a uniform derivation of it from some other source, generally France. 3. That the disorder was known and circumstantially described previous to the expedition of Charles VIII., and of course could not have been introduced by the Spaniards in that way, as vulgarly supposed. 4. That various contemporary authors trace its existence in a variety of countries, as far back as 1493, and the beginning of 1904, showing a rapidity and extent of diffusion perfectly irreconcilable with its importation by Columbus in 1493. 5. Lastly, that it was not till after the close of Ferdinand and Isabella's reigns that the first work appeared affecting to trace the origin of the disease to America; and this, published 1517, was the production not of a Spaniard, but a foreigner. A letter of Peter Martyr to the learned Portuguese Arias Barbosa, professor of Greek at Salamanca, noticing the symptoms of the disease in the most unequivocal manner, will settle at once this much-vexed question, if we can rely on the genuineness of the date, the 5th of April, 1488, about five years before the return of Columbus. Dr. Thiene, however, rejects the date as apocryphal, on the ground: 1. That the name of "morbus Gallicus," given to the disease by Martyr, was not in use till after the French invasion, in 1494. 2. That the superscription of Greek professor at Sala-

Whatever be the amount of physical good or evil immediately resulting to Spain from her new

manca was premature, as no such professorship existed there till 1508. As to the first of these objections, it may be remarked that there is but one author prior to the French invasion who notices the disease at all. He derives it from Gaul, though not giving it the technical appellation of *morbus Gallicus;* and Martyr, it may be observed, far from confining himself to this, alludes to one or two other names, showing that its title was then quite undetermined. In regard to the second objection, Dr. Thiene does not cite his authority for limiting the introduction of Greek at Salamanca to 1508. He may have found a plausible one in the account of that university compiled by one of its officers, Pedro Chacon, in 1569, inserted in the eighteenth volume of the Semanario erudito (Madrid, 1789). The accuracy of the writer's chronology, however, may well be doubted from a gross anachronism on the same page with the date referred to, where he speaks of Queen Joanna as inheriting the crown in 1512. (Hist. de la Universidad de Salamanca, p. 55.) Waiving this, however, the fact of Barbosa being Greek professor at Salamanca in 1488 is directly intimated by his pupil the celebrated Andrew Resendi. "Arias Lusitanus," says he, "quadraginta, et eo plus annos Salamanticæ tum Latinas litteras, tum Græcas, magnâ cum laude professus est." (Responsio ad Quevedum, apud Barbosa, Bibliotheca Lusitana, tom. i. p. 77.) Now, as Barbosa, by general consent, passed several years in his native country, Portugal, before his death in 1530, this assertion of Resendi necessarily places him at Salamanca in the situation of Greek instructor some time before the date of Martyr's letter. It may be added, indeed, that Nic. Antonio, than whom a more competent critic could not be found, so far from suspecting the date of the letter, cites it as settling the period when Barbosa filled the Greek chair at Salamanca. (See Bibliotheca Nova, tom. i. p. 170.) Martyr's epistle, if we admit the genuineness of the date, must dispose at once of the whole question of the American origin of the venereal disease. But as this question is determined quite as conclusively, though not so summarily, by the accumulated evidence from other sources, the reader will probably think the matter not worth so much discussion.*

* [The reader will find this subject treated with great learning in the third volume of Häser's Geschichte der Medicin und der Epidemische Krankheiten. A perusal of the volume will convince him that this disease did not originate in the New World, and that it probably prevailed at different periods in many parts of the ancient world. Its greatest development came in the latter part of the fifteenth century in Italy, France, and Spain. The times

discoveries, their moral consequences were inestimable. The ancient limits of human thought and action were overleaped; the veil which had covered the secrets of the deep for so many centuries was removed; another hemisphere was thrown open; and a boundless expansion promised to science, from the infinite varieties in which nature was exhibited in these unexplored regions. The success of the Spaniards kindled a generous emulation in their Portuguese rivals, who soon after accomplished their long-sought passage into the Indian seas, and thus completed the great circle of maritime discovery.[28] It would seem as if Providence had postponed this grand event until the possession of America, with its stores of precious metals, might supply such materials for a commerce with the East as should bind together the most distant quarters of the globe. The impression made on the enlightened minds of that day is evinced by the tone of gratitude and exultation in which they indulge at being permitted to witness the consummation of these glorious events, which their fathers had so long, but in vain, desired to see.[29]

The discoveries of Columbus occurred most opportunely for the Spanish nation, at the moment when it was released from the tumultuous strug-

[28] This event occurred in 1497, Vasco da Gama doubling the Cape of Good Hope, November 20th, in that year, and reaching Calicut in the following May, 1498. La Clède, Hist. de Portugal, tom. iii. pp. 104–109.

[29] See, among others, Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist, 181.

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were enormously licentious, libertinism was most glaring in those countries, and the Italian wars contributed immensely to the spreading of the disease.—M.]

gle in which it had been engaged for so many years with the Moslems. The severe schooling of these wars had prepared it for entering on a bolder theatre of action, whose stirring and romantic perils raised still higher the chivalrous spirit of the people. The operation of this spirit was shown in the alacrity with which private adventurers embarked in expeditions to the New World, under cover of the general license, during the last two years of this century. Their efforts, combined with those of Columbus, extended the range of discovery from its original limits, twenty-four degrees of north latitude, to probably more than fifteen south, comprehending some of the most important territories in the western hemisphere. Before the end of 1500, the principal groups of the West Indian islands had been visited, and the whole extent of the southern continent coasted, from the Bay of Honduras to Cape St. Augustine. One adventurous mariner, indeed, named Lepe, penetrated several degrees south of this, to a point not reached by any other voyager for ten or twelve years after. A great part of Brazil was embraced in this extent, and two successive Castilian navigators landed and took formal possession of it for the crown of Castile, previous to its reputed discovery by the Portuguese Cabral;[30] although the claims to it were subsequently relinquished by the Spanish government, conformably

[30] Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. iii. pp. 18–26.—Cabral's pretensions to the discovery of Brazil appear not to have been doubted until recently. They are sanctioned both by Robertson and Raynal.

to the famous line of demarcation established by the treaty of Tordesillas.[31]

While the colonial empire of Spain was thus every day enlarging, the man to whom it was all due was never permitted to know the extent or the value of it. He died in the conviction in which he lived, that the land he had reached was the long-sought Indies. But it was a country far richer than the Indies; and, had he on quitting Cuba struck into a westerly instead of southerly direction, it would have carried him into the very depths of the golden regions whose existence he had so long and vainly asserted. As it was, he "only

[31] The Portuguese court formed, probably, no very accurate idea of the geographical position of Brazil. King Emanuel, in a letter to the Spanish sovereigns acquainting them with Cabral's voyage, speaks of the newly-discovered region as not convenient, but *necessary,* for the navigation to India. (See the letter, apud Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. iii. no. 13.) The oldest maps of this country, whether from ignorance or design, bring it twenty-two degrees east of its proper longitude, so that the whole of the vast tract now comprehended under the name of Brazil would fall on the Portuguese side of the partition-line agreed on by the two governments, which, it will be remembered, was removed to three hundred and seventy leagues west of the Cape de Verd Islands. The Spanish court made some show at first of resisting the pretensions of the Portuguese, by preparations for establishing a colony on the northern extremity of the Brazilian territory. (Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. iii. p. 39.) It is not easy to understand how it came finally to admit these pretensions. Any correct admeasurement with the Castilian league would only have included the fringe, as it were, of the northeastern promontory of Brazil. The Portuguese league, allowing seventeen to a degree, may have been adopted, which would embrace nearly the whole territory which passed under the name of Brazil in the best ancient maps, extending from Para on the north to the great river of San Pedro on the south. (See Malte-Brun, Universal Geography (Boston, 1824–9), book 91.) Mariana seems willing to help the Portuguese, by running the partition-line one hundred leagues farther west than they claimed themselves. Hist. de España, tom. ii. p. 607.

opened the gates," to use his own language, for others more fortunate than himself; and, before he quitted Hispaniola for the last time, the young adventurer arrived there who was destined, by the conquest of Mexico, to realize all the magnificent visions, which had been derided as only visions, in the lifetime of Columbus.

The discovery of the New World was fortunately reserved for a period when the human race was sufficiently enlightened to form some conception of its importance. Public attention was promptly and eagerly directed to this momentous event, so that few facts worthy of note, during the whole progress of discovery from its earliest epoch, escaped contemporary record. Many of these notices have, indeed, perished through neglect, in the various repositories in which they were scattered. The researches of Navarrete have rescued many, and will, it is to be hoped, rescue many more, from their progress to oblivion. The first two volumes of his compilation, containing the journals and letters of Columbus, the correspondence of the sovereigns with him, and a vast quantity of public and private documents, form, as I have elsewhere remarked, the most authentic basis for a history of that great man. Next to these in importance is the "History of the Admiral," by his son Ferdinand, whose own experience and opportunities, combined with uncommon literary attainments, eminently qualified him for recording his father's extraordinary life. It must be allowed that he has done this with a candor and good faith seldom warped by any overweening, though natural, partiality for his subject. His work met with a whimsical fate. The original was early lost, but happily not before it had been translated into the Italian, from which a Spanish version was afterwards made; and from this latter, thus reproduced in the same tongue in which it originally appeared, are derived the various translations of it into the other languages of Europe. The Spanish version, which is incorporated into Barcia's collection, is executed in a slovenly manner, and is replete with chronological inaccuracies; a circumstance not very wonderful, considering the curious transmigration it has undergone.

Another contemporary author of great value is Peter Martyr, who took so deep an interest in the nautical enterprise of his day as to make it, independently of the abundant notices scattered through his correspondence, the subject of a separate work. His history, "De Rebus Oceanicis et Novo Orbe," has all the value which extensive learning, a reflecting, philosophical mind, and inti-

mate familiarity with the principal actors in the scenes he describes, can give. Indeed, that no source of information might be wanting to him, the sovereigns authorized him to be present at the Council of the Indies whenever any communication was made to that body respecting the progress of discovery. The principal defects of his work arise from the precipitate manner in which the greater part of it was put together, and the consequently imperfect and occasionally contradictory statements which appear in it. But the honest intentions of the author, who seems to have been fully sensible of his own imperfections, and his liberal spirit, are so apparent as to disarm criticism in respect to comparatively venial errors.

But the writer who has furnished the greatest supply of materials for the modern historian is Antonio de Herrera. He did not flourish, indeed, until near a century after the discovery of America; but the post which he occupied of historiographer of the Indies gave him free access to the most authentic and reserved sources of information. He has availed himself of these with great freedom; transcribing whole chapters from the unpublished narratives of his predecessors, especially of the good bishop Las Casas, whose great work, "Crónica de las Indias occidentales," contained too much that was offensive to national feeling to be allowed the honors of the press. The Apostle of the Indians, however, lives in the pages of Herrera, who, while he has omitted the tumid and overheated declamation of the original, is allowed by the Castilian critics to have retained whatever is of most value, and exhibited it in a dress far superior to that of his predecessor. It must not be omitted, however, that he is also accused of occasional inadvertence in stating as fact what Las Casas only adduced as tradition or conjecture. His "Historia general de las Indias occidentales," bringing down the narrative to 1554, was published in four volumes, at Madrid, in 1601. Herrera left several other histories of the different states of Europe, and closed his learned labors in 1625, at the age of seventy-five.

No Spanish historian had since arisen to contest the palm with Herrera on his own ground, until, at the close of the last century, Don Juan Bautista Muñoz was commissioned by the government to prepare a history of the New World. The talents and liberal acquisitions of this scholar, the free admission opened to him in every place of public and private deposit, and the immense mass of materials collected by his indefatigable researches, authorized the most favorable auguries of his success. These were justified by the character of the first volume, which brought the narrative of early discovery to the period of Bobadilla's mission, written in a perspicuous and agreeable style, with such a discriminating selection of incident and skilful arrangement as convey the most distinct impression to the mind of the reader. Unfortunately, the untimely death of the author crushed his labors in the

bud. Their fruits were not wholly lost, however. Señor Navarrete,* availing himself of them, in connection with those derived from his own extensive investigations, is pursuing in part the plan of Muñoz, by the publication of original documents; and Mr. Irving has completed this design in regard to the early history of Spanish discovery, by the use which he has made of these materials in constructing out of them the noblest monument to the memory of Columbus.

* [" Coleccion de Documentos inéditos para la Historia de España por Martin Fernandez Navarrete, Miguel Salva y Pedro Sainz de Baranda."—M.]

CHAPTER X

ITALIAN WARS—PARTITION OF NAPLES—GONSALVO OVERRUNS CALABRIA

1498–1502

Louis XII.'s Designs on Italy—Alarm of the Spanish Court—Bold Conduct of its Minister at Rome—Celebrated Partition of Naples—Gonsalvo sails against the Turks—Success and Cruelties of the French—Gonsalvo invades Calabria—He punishes a Mutiny—His munificent Spirit—He captures Tarento—Seizes the Duke of Calabria

DURING the last four years of our narrative, in which the unsettled state of the kingdom and the progress of foreign discovery appeared to demand the whole attention of the sovereigns, a most important revolution was going forward in the affairs of Italy. The death of Charles the Eighth would seem to have dissolved the relations recently arisen between that country and the rest of Europe, and to have restored it to its ancient independence. It might naturally have been expected that France, under her new monarch, who had reached a mature age, rendered still more mature by the lessons he had received in the school of adversity, would feel the folly of reviving ambitious schemes, which had cost so dear and ended so disastrously. Italy, too, it might have been presumed, lacerated and still bleeding at every pore, would have learned the fatal consequence of invoking foreign aid in her domestic quarrels, and

of throwing open the gates to a torrent sure to sweep down friend and foe indiscriminately in its progress. But experience, alas! did not bring wisdom, and passion triumphed as usual.

Louis the Twelfth, on ascending the throne, assumed the titles of Duke of Milan and King of Naples, thus unequivocally announcing his intention of asserting his claims, derived through the Visconti family, to the former, and, through the Angevin dynasty, to the latter state. His aspiring temper was stimulated rather than satisfied by the martial renown he had acquired in the Italian wars; and he was urged on by the great body of the French chivalry, who, disgusted with a life of inaction, longed for a field where they might win new laurels and indulge in the joyous license of military adventure.

Unhappily, the court of France found ready instruments for its purpose in the profligate politicians of Italy. The Roman pontiff, in particular, Alexander the Sixth, whose criminal ambition assumes something respectable by contrast with the low vices in which he was habitually steeped, willingly lent himself to a monarch who could so effectually serve his selfish schemes of building up the fortunes of his family. The ancient republic of Venice, departing from her usual sagacious policy, and yielding to her hatred of Lodovico Sforza, and to the lust of territorial acquisition, consented to unite her arms with those of France against Milan, in consideration of a share (not the lion's share) of the spoils of victory. Florence, and many other inferior powers,

whether from fear or weakness, or the short-sighted hope of assistance in their petty international feuds, consented either to throw their weight into the same scale or to remain neutral.[1]

Having thus secured himself from molestation in Italy, Louis the Twelfth entered into negotiations with such other European powers as were most likely to interfere with his designs. The emperor Maximilian, whose relations with Milan would most naturally have demanded his interposition, was deeply entangled in a war with the Swiss. The neutrality of Spain was secured by the treaty of Marcoussis, August 5th, 1498, which settled all the existing differences with that country. And a treaty with Savoy in the following year guaranteed to the French army a free passage through her mountain-passes into Italy.[2]

Having completed these arrangements, Louis lost no time in mustering his forces, which, descending like a torrent on the fair plains of Lombardy, effected the conquest of the entire duchy in little more than a fortnight; and although the prize was snatched for a moment from his grasp, yet French valor and Swiss perfidy soon restored it. The miserable Sforza, the dupe of arts which he had so long practised, was transported into France, where he lingered out the remainder of his days in doleful captivity. He had first called

[1] Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. lib. 4, p. 214, ed. 1645.—Flassan Diplomatie Française, tom. i. pp. 275, 277.

[2] Dumont, Corps diplomatique, tom. iii. pp. 397–400.—Flassan Diplomatie Française, tom. i. p. 279.

the *barbarians* into Italy, and it was a righteous retribution which made him their earliest victim.[3]

By the conquest of Milan, France now took her place among the Italian powers. A preponderating weight was thus thrown into the scale, which disturbed the ancient political balance, and which, if the projects on Naples should be realized, would wholly annihilate it. These consequences, to which the Italian states seemed strangely insensible, had long been foreseen by the sagacious eye of Ferdinand the Catholic, who watched the movements of his powerful neighbor with the deepest anxiety. He had endeavored, before the invasion of Milan, to awaken the different governments in Italy to a sense of their danger, and to stir them up to some efficient combination against it.[4] Both he and the queen had beheld with disquietude the increasing corruptions of the papal court, and that shameless

[3] Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 4, pp. 250–252.—Mémoires de la Trémoille, chap. 19, apud Petitot, Collection de Mémoires, tom. xiv. —Buonaccorsi, Diario de' Successi più importanti (Fiorenza, 1568), pp. 26–29.

[4] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 3, cap. 31.—Martyr, in a letter written soon after Sforza's recovery of his capital, says that the Spanish sovereigns "could not conceal their joy at the event, such was their jealousy of France." (Opus Epist., epist. 213.) The same sagacious writer, the distance of whose residence from Italy removed him from those political rancors and prejudices which clouded the optics of his countrymen, saw with deep regret their coalition with France, the fatal consequences of which he predicted in a letter to a friend in Venice, the former minister at the Spanish court. "The king of France," says he, "after he has dined with the duke of Milan, will come and sup with you." (Epist. 207.) Daru, on the authority of Burchard, refers this remarkable prediction, which time so fully verified, to Sforza, on his quitting his capital. (Hist. de Venise, tom. iii. p. 326, 2d ed.) Martyr's letter, however, is dated some months previously to that event.

cupidity and lust of power which made it the convenient tool of the French monarch.

By their orders, Garcilasso de la Vega, the Spanish ambassador, read a letter from his sovereigns in the presence of his Holiness, commenting on his scandalous immorality, his invasion of ecclesiastical rights appertaining to the Spanish crown, his schemes of selfish aggrandizement, and especially his avowed purpose of transferring his son, Cæsar Borgia, from a sacred to a secular dignity; a circumstance that must necessarily make him, from the manner in which it was to be conducted, the instrument of Louis the Twelfth.[5]

This unsavory rebuke, which probably lost nothing of its pungency from the tone in which it was delivered, so incensed the pope that he attempted to seize the paper and tear it in pieces, giving vent at the same time to the most indecent reproaches against the minister and his sovereigns. Garcilasso coolly waited till the storm had subsided, and then replied, undauntedly, "that he had uttered no more than became a loyal subject of Castile; that he should never shrink from declaring freely what his sovereigns commanded, or what he conceived to be for the good of Chris-

[5] Louis XII., for the good offices of the pope in the affair of his divorce from the unfortunate Jeanne of France, promised the uncardinalled Cæsar Borgia the duchy of Valence in Dauphiny, with a rent of 20,000 livres, and a considerable force to support him in his flagitious enterprises against the princes of Romagna. (Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. lib. 4, p. 207.—Sismondi, Hist. des Français, tom. xv. p. 275.) In a letter written not long after by the Spanish minister to his sovereigns, he freely comments on the selfish and fickle character of the pope, veiling himself "como suela en las yprocrisias. Yo no lo puedo sufrir." Carta de Garcilasso de la Vega, Roma, 8 de Nov. 1499, MS.

tendom; and, if his Holiness were displeased with it, he could dismiss him from his court, where he was convinced, indeed, his residence could be no longer useful." [6]

Ferdinand had no better fortune at Venice, where his negotiations were conducted by Lorenzo Suarez de la Vega, an adroit diplomatist, brother of Garcilasso.[7] These negotiations were resumed after the occupation of Milan by the French, when the minister availed himself of the jealousy occasioned by that event to excite a determined resistance to the proposed aggression on Naples. But the republic was too sorely pressed by the Turkish war—which Sforza, in the hope of creating a diversion in his own favor, had brought on his country—to have leisure for other operations. Nor did the Spanish court succeed any better at this crisis with the emperor Maximilian, whose magnificent pretensions were ridiculously contrasted with his limited authority, and still more limited revenues, so scanty, indeed, as to gain him the contemptuous epithet among the Italians of *pochi denari,* or "the Moneyless." He

[6] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 3, cap. 33.—Garcilasso de la Vega seems to have possessed little of the courtly and politic address of a diplomatist. In a subsequent audience, which the pope gave him together with a special embassy from Castile, his blunt expostulation so much exasperated his Holiness that the latter hinted it would not cost him much to have him thrown into the Tiber. The bold bearing of the Castilian, however, appears to have had its effect; since we find the pope soon after revoking an offensive ecclesiastical provision he had made in Spain, taking occasion at the same time to eulogize the character of the Catholic sovereigns in full consistory. Ibid., lib. 3, cap. 33, 35.

[7] Oviedo has made this cavalier the subject of one of his dialogues. Quincuagenas, MS., bat. 1, quinc. 3, dial. 44.

had conceived himself, indeed, greatly injured, both on the score of his imperial rights and his connections with Sforza, by the conquest of Milan; but, with the levity and cupidity essential to his character, he suffered himself, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the Spanish court, to be bribed into a truce with King Louis, which gave the latter full scope for his meditated enterprise on Naples.[8]

Thus disembarrassed of the most formidable means of annoyance, the French monarch went briskly forward with his preparations, the object of which he did not affect to conceal. Frederick, the unfortunate king of Naples, saw himself with dismay now menaced with the loss of empire, before he had time to taste the sweets of it. He knew not where to turn for refuge, in his desolate condition, from the impending storm. His treasury was drained, and his kingdom wasted, by the late war. His subjects, although attached to his person, were too familiar with revolutions to stake their lives or fortunes on the cast. His countrymen, the Italians, were in the interest of his enemy; and his nearest neighbor, the pope, had drawn from personal pique motives for the most deadly hostility.[9] He had as little reliance

[8] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 3, cap. 38, 39.—Daru, Hist. de Venise, tom. iii. pp. 336, 339, 347.—Muratori, Annali d'Italia (Milano, 1820), tom. xiv. pp. 9, 10.—Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. lib. 5, p. 260.

[9] Alexander VI. had requested the hand of Carlotta, daughter of King Frederick, for his son, Cæsar Borgia; but this was a sacrifice at which pride and parental affection alike revolted. The slight was not to be forgiven by the implacable Borgias. Comp. Giannone, Istoria di Napoli, lib. 29, cap. 3.—Guicciardini, Istoria,

on the king of Spain, his natural ally and kinsman, who, he well knew, had always regarded the crown of Naples as his own rightful inheritance. He resolved, therefore, to apply at once to the French monarch; and he endeavored to propitiate him by the most humiliating concessions, —the offer of an annual tribute, and the surrender into his hands of some of the principal fortresses in the kingdom. Finding these advances coldly received, he invoked, in the extremity of his distress, the aid of the Turkish sultan, Bajazet, the terror of Christendom, requesting such supplies of troops as should enable him to make head against their common foe.* This desperate step produced no other result than that of furnishing the enemies of the unhappy prince with a plausible ground of accusation against him, of which they did not fail to make good use.[10]

The Spanish government, in the mean time, made the most vivid remonstrances, through its resident minister, or agents expressly accredited for the purpose, against the proposed expedition

tom. i. lib. 4, p. 233.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 3, cap. 22.

[10] Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. lib. 5, pp. 265, 266.—Giannone, Istoria di Napoli, lib. 29, cap. 3.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 3, cap. 40.—Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, lib. 1, p. 229.—Daru, Hist. de Venise, tom. iii. p. 338.

* [This was not the first time that Mohammedan aid had been invoked against Christian enemies by the sovereign of the kingdom of Naples. It was through the assistance of his Mohammedan allies that Frederick II., Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, and King of the Sicilies, was able so long to defy the power of the pope in the first half of the thirteenth century. Southern Italy was ever more tolerant in matters of faith than was the rest of the peninsula.—M.]

of Louis the Twelfth. It even went so far as to guarantee the faithful discharge of the tribute proffered by the king of Naples.[11] But the reckless ambition of the French monarch, overleaping the barriers of prudence, and indeed of common sense, disdained the fruits of conquest without the name.

Ferdinand now found himself apparently reduced to the alternative of abandoning the prize at once to the French king, or of making battle with him in defence of his royal kinsman. The first of these measures, which would bring a restless and powerful rival on the borders of his Sicilian dominions, was not to be thought of for a moment. The latter, which pledged him a second time to the support of pretentions hostile to his own, was scarcely more palatable. A third expedient suggested itself; the partition of the kingdom, as hinted in the negotiations with Charles the Eighth, by which means the Spanish government, if it could not rescue the whole prize from the grasp of Louis, would at least divide it with him.[12]

[11] Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., lib. 14, epist. 218.

[12] See Part II., chapter 3, of this History.—Ferdinand, it seems, entertained the thought of visiting Italy in person. This appears from a letter, or rather an elaborate memorial, of Garcilasso de la Vega, urging various considerations to dissuade his master from this step. In the course of it he lays open the policy and relative strength of the Italian states, half of whom, at least, he regards as in the interests of France. At the same time he advises the king to carry the war across his own borders into the French territory, and thus, by compelling Louis to withdraw his forces, in part, from Italy, cripple his operations in that country. The letter is full of the suggestions of a shrewd policy, but shows that the writer knew much more of Italian politics than of what was

Instructions were accordingly given to Gralla, the minister at the court of Paris, to sound the government on this head, bringing it forward as his own private suggestion. Care was taken at the same time to secure a party in the French councils to the interests of Ferdinand.[13] The suggestions of the Spanish envoy received additional weight from the report of a considerable armament then equipping in the port of Malaga. Its ostensible purpose was to co-operate with the Venetians in the defence of their possessions in the Levant. Its main object, however, was to cover the coasts of Sicily in any event from the French, and to afford means for prompt action on any point where circumstances might require it. The fleet consisted of about sixty sail, large and small, and carried forces amounting to six hundred horse and four thousand foot, picked men, many of them drawn from the hardy regions of the north, which had been taxed least severely in the Moorish wars.[14]

The command of the whole was intrusted to the

then passing in the cabinets of Paris and Madrid. Carta de Garcilasso de la Vega, Toledo, 25 de Agosto, 1500, MS.

[13] According to Zurita, Ferdinand secured the services of Guillaume de Poictiers, lord of Clérieux and governor of Paris, by the promise of the city of Cotron, mortgaged to him in Italy. (Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 3, cap. 40.) Comines calls the same nobleman a good sort of a man, "qui aisément croit, et pour espécial *tels personnages*," meaning King Ferdinand. Comines, Mémoires, liv. 8, chap. 23.

[14] Bembo, Istoria Viniziana, tom. iii. lib. 5, p. 324.—Ulloa, Vita et Fatti dell' invitissimo Imperatore Carlo V. (Venetia, 1606), fol. 2.—Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 27, cap. 7.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, tom. i. p. 226.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 11.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 10, sec. 13.

Great Captain, Gonsalvo de Cordova, who since his return home had fully sustained the high reputation which his brilliant military talents had acquired for him abroad. Numerous volunteers, comprehending the noblest of the young chivalry of Spain, pressed forward to serve under the banner of this accomplished and popular chieftain. Among them may be particularly noticed Diego de Mendoza, son of the grand cardinal, Pedro de la Paz,[15] Gonzalo Pizarro, father of the celebrated adventurer of Peru, and Diego de Paredes, whose personal prowess and feats of extravagant daring furnished many an incredible legend for chronicle and romance. With this gallant armament the Great Captain weighed anchor in the port of Malaga, in May, 1500, designing to touch at Sicily before proceeding against the Turks.[16]

Meanwhile, the negotiations between France and Spain, respecting Naples, were brought to a close, by a treaty for the equal partition of that kingdom between the two powers, ratified at Granada, November 11th, 1500. This extraordi-

[15] This cavalier, one of the most valiant captains in the army, was so diminutive in size that, when mounted, he seemed almost lost in the high demipeak war-saddle then in vogue; which led a wag, according to Brantôme, when asked if he had seen Don Pedro de Paz pass that way, to answer that "he had seen his horse and saddle, but no rider." Œuvres, tom. i. disc. 9.*

[16] Ferreras, Hist. d'Espagne, tom. viii. p. 217.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 161.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 9.

* [Immense strength and skill at arms often comes to men of small stature. George Monk, duke of Albemarle, to whom Charles II. owed his crown, was a mighty man of valor. And yet if we are to trust to his effigy in the Effigy Chamber in Westminster Abbey, he was a dwarf in size.—M.]

nary document, after enlarging on the unmixed evils flowing from war, and the obligation on all Christians to preserve inviolate the blessed peace bequeathed them by the Saviour, proceeds to state that no other prince, save the kings of France and Aragon, can pretend to a title to the throne of Naples; and as King Frederick, its present occupant, has seen fit to endanger the safety of all Christendom by bringing on it its bitterest enemy, the Turks, the contracting parties, in order to rescue it from this imminent peril and preserve inviolate the bond of peace, agree to take possession of his kingdom and divide it between them. It is then provided that the northern portion, comprehending the Terra di Lavoro and Abruzzo, be assigned to France, with the title of King of Naples and Jerusalem, and the southern, consisting of Apulia and Calabria, with the title of Duke of those provinces, to Spain. The *dogana,* an important duty levied on the flocks of the Capitanate, was to be collected by the officers of the Spanish government, and divided equally with France. Lastly, any inequality between the respective territories was to be so adjusted that the revenues accruing to each of the parties should be precisely equal. The treaty was to be kept profoundly secret until preparations were completed for the simultaneous occupation of the devoted territory by the combined powers.[17]

Such were the terms of this celebrated compact, by which two European potentates coolly carved

[17] See the original treaty, apud Dumont, Corps diplomatique, tom. iii. pp. 445, 446.

out and divided between them the entire dominions of a third, who had given no cause for umbrage, and with whom they were both at that time in perfect peace and amity. Similar instances of political robbery (to call it by the coarse name it merits) have occurred in later times; but never one founded on more flimsy pretexts, or veiled under a more detestable mask of hypocrisy. The principal odium of the transaction has attached to Ferdinand, as the kinsman of the unfortunate king of Naples. His conduct, however, admits of some palliatory considerations that cannot be claimed for Louis.

The Aragonese nation always regarded the bequest of Ferdinand's uncle Alfonso the Fifth in favor of his natural offspring as an unwarrantable and illegal act. The kingdom of Naples had been won by their own good swords, and, as such, was the rightful inheritance of their own princes. Nothing but the domestic troubles of his dominions had prevented John the Second of Aragon, on the decease of his brother, from asserting his claim by arms. His son, Ferdinand the Catholic, had hitherto acquiesced in the usurpation of the bastard branch of his house only from similar causes. On the accession of the present monarch, he had made some demonstrations of vindicating his pretensions to Naples, which, however, the intelligence he received from that kingdom induced him to defer to a more convenient season.[18] But it was deferring, not relinquishing, his purpose. In the mean time, he carefully avoided entering

[18] See Part II. chapter 3, of this History.

into such engagements as should compel him to a different policy by connecting his own interests with those of Frederick; and with this view, no doubt, rejected the alliance, strongly solicited by the latter, of the duke of Calabria, heir apparent to the Neapolitan crown, with his third daughter, the infanta Maria. Indeed, this disposition of Ferdinand, so far from being dissembled, was well understood by the court of Naples, as is acknowledged by its own historians.[19]

It may be thought that the undisturbed succession to the throne of Naples of four princes, each of whom had received the solemn recognition of the people, might have healed any defects in their original title, however glaring. But it may be remarked, in extenuation of both the French and Spanish claims, that the principles of monarchical succession were but imperfectly settled in that day; that oaths of allegiance were tendered too lightly by the Neapolitans, to carry the same weight as in other nations; and that the prescriptive right derived from possession, necessarily indeterminate, was greatly weakened in this case by the comparatively few years, not more than forty, during which the bastard line of Aragon had occupied the throne,—a period much shorter than that after which the house of York had in England, a few years before, successfully contested the validity of the Lancastrian title. It should be added that Ferdinand's views appear to have perfectly corresponded with those of the

[19] Giannone, Istoria di Napoli, lib. 29, cap. 3.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 3, cap. 32.

Spanish nation at large; not one writer of the time, whom I have met with, intimating the slightest doubt of his title to Naples, while not a few insist on it with unnecessary emphasis.[20] It is but fair to state, however, that foreigners, who contemplated the transaction with a more impartial eye, condemned it as inflicting a deep stain on the characters of both potentates. Indeed, something like an apprehension of this, in the parties themselves, may be inferred from their solicitude to deprecate public censure by masking their designs under a pretended zeal for religion.

Before the conferences respecting the treaty were brought to a close, the Spanish armada under Gonsalvo, after a detention of two months in Sicily, where it was reinforced by two thousand recruits, who had been serving as mercenaries in Italy, held its course for the Morea. (September 21st, 1500.) The Turkish squadron lying before Napoli di Romania, without awaiting Gonsalvo's approach, raised the siege, and retreated precipitately to Constantinople. The Spanish general, then uniting his forces with the Venetians, stationed at Corfu, proceeded at once against the fortified place of St. George, in Cephalonia, which the Turks had lately wrested from the republic.[21] *

[20] See, in particular, the Doctor Salazar de Mendoza, who exhausts the subject—and the reader's patience—in discussing the multifarous grounds of the incontrovertible title of the house of Aragon to Naples. Monarquía, tom. i. lib. 3, cap. 12–15.

[21] Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, tom. i. p. 226.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 9.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 4,

* [St. George, in Cephalonia, commanded the entrance to the Adriatic. Its possession was therefore most necessary to Venice

The town stood high on a rock, in an impregnable position, and was garrisoned by four hundred Turks, all veteran soldiers, prepared to die in its defence. We have not room for the details of this siege, in which both parties displayed unbounded courage and resources, and which was protracted nearly two months under all the privations of famine and the inclemencies of a cold and stormy winter.[22]

At length, weary with this fatal procrastination, Gonsalvo and the Venetian admiral, Pesaro, resolved on a simultaneous attack on separate quarters of the town. The ramparts had been already shaken by the mining operations of Pedro Navarro, who in the Italian wars acquired such terrible celebrity in this department, till then little understood. The Venetian cannon, larger and better served than that of the Spaniards, had opened a practicable breach in the works, which the

cap. 19.—Gonsalvo was detained most unexpectedly in Messina, which he had reached July 19, by various embarrassments, enumerated in his correspondence with the sovereigns. The difficulty of obtaining supplies for the troops was among the most prominent. The people of the island showed no good will to the cause. Obstacles multiplied until it seemed as if they came from the devil himself; *parecen ostaculos del diablo.* Among others, he indicates the coldness of the viceroy. Part of these letters, as usual, is in cipher. Cartas á los Reyes Católicos, fhâs en Messina á 15 y 21 de Setiembre de 1501, MS.

[22] Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, ubi supra.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 14.

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if the republic would preserve its maritime supremacy. The Turkish defence of the town was as marvellous as was that of Malta by the Knights of St. John. Prescott's description of the defence of Malta by the Knights is one of the most thrilling chapters of historical writing. See his History of the Reign of Philip II.—M.]

besieged repaired with such temporary defences as they could. The signal being given at the appointed hour, the two armies made a desperate assault on different quarters of the town, under cover of a murderous fire of artillery. The Turks sustained the attack with dauntless resolution, stopping up the breach with the bodies of their dead and dying comrades, and pouring down volleys of shot, arrows, burning oil and sulphur, and missiles of every kind, on the heads of the assailants. But the desperate energy, as well as numbers, of the latter, proved too strong for them. Some forced the breach, others scaled the ramparts; and, after a short and deadly struggle within the walls, the brave garrison, four-fifths of whom, with their commander, had fallen, were overpowered, and the victorious banners of St. Jago and St. Mark were planted side by side triumphantly on the towers.[23]

The capture of this place, although accomplished at considerable loss, and after a most gallant resistance by a mere handful of men, was of great service to the Venetian cause; since it was the first check given to the arms of Bajazet, who had filched one place after another from the republic, menacing its whole colonial territory in the Levant. The promptness and efficiency of King Ferdinand's succor to the Venetians gained him high reputation throughout Europe, and precisely of the kind which he most coveted, that of being

[23] Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, ubi supra.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 10.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 25.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 167.

the zealous defender of the faith; while it formed a favorable contrast to the cold supineness of the other powers of Christendom.

The capture of St. George restored to Venice the possession of Cephalonia; and the Great Captain, having accomplished this important object, returned in the beginning of the following year, 1501, to Sicily. Soon after his arrival there, an embassy waited on him from the Venetian senate, to express their grateful sense of his services; which they testified by enrolling his name on the golden book, as a nobleman of Venice, and by a magnificent present of plate, curious silks and velvets, and a stud of beautiful Turkish horses. Gonsalvo courteously accepted the proffered honors, but distributed the whole of the costly largess, with the exception of a few pieces of plate, among his friends and soldiers.[24]

In the mean while, Louis the Twelfth having completed his preparations for the invasion of Naples, an army, consisting of one thousand lances and ten thousand Swiss and Gascon foot, crossed the Alps, and directed its march towards the south. (June 1st, 1500.) At the same time a powerful armament, under Philip de Ravenstein, with six thousand five hundred additional troops on board, quitted Genoa for the Neapolitan capital. The command of the land-forces was given to the Sire d'Aubigny, the same brave and experienced officer

[24] Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 167.—Quintana, Españoles célebres, tom. i. p. 246.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, p. 228.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 4.

who had formerly coped with Gonsalvo in the campaigns of Calabria.[25]

No sooner had D'Aubigny crossed the papal borders than the French and Spanish ambassadors announced to Alexander the Sixth and the college of cardinals the existence of the treaty for the partition of the kingdom between the sovereigns, their masters, requesting his Holiness to confirm it and grant them the investiture of their respective shares. In this very reasonable petition his Holiness, well drilled in the part he was to play, acquiesced without difficulty; declaring himself moved thereto solely by his consideration of the pious intentions of the parties, and the unworthiness of King Frederick, whose treachery to the Christian commonwealth had forfeited all right (if he ever possessed any) to the crown of Naples.[26]

From the moment that the French forces had descended into Lombardy, the eyes of all Italy were turned with breathless expectation on Gonsalvo and his army in Sicily. The bustling preparations of the French monarch had diffused the knowledge of his designs throughout Europe. Those of the king of Spain, on the contrary, remained enveloped in profound secrecy. Few doubted that Ferdinand would step forward to shield his kinsman from the invasion which men-

[25] Jean d'Auton, Histoire de Louys XII. (Paris, 1622), part. 1, chap. 44, 45, 48.—Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. p. 265.—Sainct-Gelais, Histoire de Louys XII. (Paris, 1622), p. 163.—Buonaccorsi, Diario, p. 46.

[26] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 43.—Lanuza, Historias, tom. i. lib. 1, cap. 14.

aced him, and, it might be, his own dominions in Sicily; and they looked to the immediate junction of Gonsalvo with King Frederick, in order that their combined strength might overpower the enemy before he had gained a footing in the kingdom. Great was their astonishment when the scales dropped from their eyes, and they beheld the movements of Spain in perfect accordance with those of France, and directed to crush their common victim between them. They could scarcely credit, says Guicciardini, that Louis the Twelfth could be so blind as to reject the proffered vassalage and substantial sovereignty of Naples, in order to share it with so artful and dangerous a rival as Ferdinand.[27]

The unfortunate Frederick, who had been advised for some time past of the unfriendly dispositions of the Spanish government,[28] saw no refuge from the dark tempest mustering against him on the opposite quarters of his kingdom. He collected such troops as he could, however, in order to make battle with the nearest enemy, before he should cross the threshold. On the 28th of June, the French army resumed its march. Before quitting Rome, a brawl rose between some French soldiers and Spaniards resident in the

[27] Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. lib. 5, p. 266.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 8.

[28] In the month of April the king of Naples received letters from his envoys in Spain, written by command of King Ferdinand, informing him that he had nothing to expect from that monarch in case of an invasion of his territories by France. Frederick bitterly complained of the late hour at which this intelligence was given, which effectually prevented an accommodation he might otherwise have made with King Louis. Lanuza, Historias, lib. 1, cap. 14.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 37.

capital; each party asserting the paramount right of its own sovereign to the crown of Naples. From words they soon came to blows, and many lives were lost before the fray could be quelled; a melancholy augury for the permanence of the concord so unrighteously established between the two governments.[29]

On the 8th of July, the French crossed the Neapolitan frontier. Frederick, who had taken post at St. Germano, found himself so weak that he was compelled to give way on its approach, and retreat on his capital. The invaders went forward, occupying one place after another with little resistance, till they came before Capua, where they received a temporary check. During a parley for the surrender of that place, they burst into the town, and, giving free scope to their fiendish passions, butchered seven thousand citizens in the streets, and perpetrated outrages worse than death on their defenceless wives and daughters. It was on this occasion that Alexander the Sixth's son, the infamous Cæsar Borgia, selected forty of the most beautiful from the principal ladies of the place and sent them back to Rome to swell the complement of his seraglio. The dreadful doom of Capua intimidated further resistance, but inspired such detestation of the French throughout the country, as proved of infinite prejudice to their cause in their subsequent struggle with the Spaniards.[30]

[29] D'Auton, Hist. de Louys XII., part. 1, chap. 48.

[30] Summonte, Hist. di Napoli, tom. iii. lib. 6, cap. 4.—D'Auton, Hist. de Louys XII., part. 1, chap. 51–54.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V.,

King Frederick, shocked at bringing such calamities on his subjects, resigned his capital without a blow in its defence, and, retreating to the isle of Ischia, soon after embraced the counsel of the French admiral Ravenstein, to accept a safe-conduct into France and throw himself on the generosity of Louis. (Oct. 1501) The latter received him courteously, and assigned him the duchy of Anjou, with an ample revenue for his maintenance, which, to the credit of the French king, was continued after he had lost all hope of recovering the crown of Naples.[31] With this show of magnanimity, however, he kept a jealous eye on his royal guest; under pretence of paying him the greatest respect, he placed a guard over his person, and thus detained him in a sort of honorable captivity to the day of his death, which occurred in 1504.

Frederick was the last of the illegitimate branch of Aragon who held the Neapolitan sceptre; a line of princes who, whatever might be their characters in other respects, accorded that munificent patronage to letters which sheds a ray of glory over the roughest and most turbulent reign. It might have been expected that an amiable and accomplished prince, like Frederick, would have done still more towards the moral development of his people, by healing the animosities which had so

fol. 8.—Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 5, pp. 268, 269.—Zurita, Hist. del. Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 41.—Giannone, Istoria di Napoli, lib. 29, cap. 3.

[31] St. Gelais, Hist. de Louys XII., p. 163.—D'Auton, Hist. de Louys XII., part. 1, ch. 56.—Summonte, Hist. di Napoli, tom. iii. p. 541.

long festered in their bosoms. His gentle character, however, was ill suited to the evil times on which he had fallen; and it is not improbable that he found greater contentment in the calm and cultivated retirement of his latter years, sweetened by the sympathies of friendship which adversity had proved,[32] than when placed on the dazzling heights which attract the admiration and envy of mankind.[33]

Early in March, Gonsalvo de Cordovo had received his first official intelligence of the partition treaty, and of his own appointment to the post of lieutenant-general of Calabria and Apulia. He felt natural regret at being called to act against a prince whose character he esteemed, and with whom he had once been placed in the most intimate and friendly relations. In the true spirit of chivalry, he returned to Frederick, before taking up arms against him, the duchy of St. Angel and the other large domains with which that monarch had requited his services in the late war, requesting at the same time to be released from his obligations of homage and fealty. The generous

[32] The reader will readily call to mind the Neapolitan poet Sannazaro, whose fidelity to his royal master forms so beautiful a contrast with the conduct of Pontano, and indeed of too many of his tribe, whose gratitude is of that sort that will only rise above zero in the sunshine of a court. His various poetical effusions afford a noble testimony to the virtues of his unfortunate sovereign, the more unsuspicious as many of them were produced in the days of his adversity.

[33] "Neque mala vel bona," says the philosophic Roman, "quæ vulgus putet; multos, qui conflictari adversis videantur, beatos; ac plerosque, quamquam magnas per opes, miserrimos; si illi gravem fortunam constanter tolerent, hi prosperâ inconsultè utantur." Tacitus, Annales, lib. 6, sect. 22.

monarch readily complied with the latter part of his request, but insisted on his retaining the grant, which he declared an inadequate compensation, after all, for the benefits the Great Captain had once rendered him.[34]

The levies assembled at Messina amounted to three hundred heavy-armed, three hundred light horse, and three thousand eight hundred infantry, together with a small body of Spanish veterans, which the Castilian ambassador had collected in Italy. The number of the forces was inconsiderable, but they were in excellent condition, well disciplined, and seasoned to all the toils and difficulties of war. On the 5th of July, the Great Captain landed at Tropea, and commenced the conquest of Calabria, ordering the fleet to keep along the coast, in order to furnish whatever supplies he might need. The ground was familiar to him, and his progress was facilitated by the old relations he had formed there, as well as by the important posts which the Spanish government had retained in its hands as an indemnification for the expenses of the late war. Notwithstanding the opposition or coldness of the great Angevin lords who resided in this quarter, the entire occupation of the two Calabrias, with the exception of Tarento, was effected in less than a month.[35]

This city, remarkable in ancient times for its

[34] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 35.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, p. 230.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 21.—Lanuza, Historias, tom. i. lib. 1, cap. 14.

[35] Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 11, sec. 8.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 44.—Mariana, Hist de España, tom. ii. lib. 27, cap. 9.

defence against Hannibal, was of the last importance. King Frederick had sent thither his eldest son, the duke of Calabria, a youth about fourteen years of age, under the care of Juan de Guevara, count of Potenza, with a strong body of troops, considering it the place of greatest security in his dominions. Independently of the strength of its works, it was rendered nearly inaccessible by its natural position; having no communication with the mainland except by two bridges, at opposite quarters of the town, commanded by strong towers, while its exposure to the sea made it easily open to supplies from abroad.

Gonsalvo saw that the only method of reducing the place must be by blockade. Disagreeable as the delay was, he prepared to lay regular siege to it, ordering the fleet to sail round the southern point of Calabria and blockade the port of Tarento, while he threw up works on the land side, which commanded the passes to the town and cut off its communications with the neighboring country. The place, however, was well victualled, and the garrison prepared to maintain it to the last.[36]

Nothing tries more severely the patience and discipline of the soldier than a life of sluggish inaction, unenlivened, as in the present instance, by any of the rencontres or feats of arms which keep up military excitement and gratify the cupidity or ambition of the warrior. The Spanish troops, cooped up within their intrenchments,

[36] Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, p. 231.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 9.—Giannone, Istoria di Napoli, lib. 29, cap. 3.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 31.

and disgusted with the languid monotony of their life, cast many a wistful glance at the stirring scenes of war in the centre of Italy, where Cæsar Borgia held out magnificent promises of pay and plunder to all who embarked in his adventurous enterprises. He courted the aid, in particular, of the Spanish veterans, whose worth he well understood, for they had often served under his banner, in his feuds with the Italian princes. In consequence of these inducements, some of Gonsalvo's men were found to desert every day; while those who remained were becoming hourly more discontented, from the large arrears due from the government; for Ferdinand, as already remarked, conducted his operations with a stinted economy very different from the prompt and liberal expenditure of the queen, always competent to its object.[37]

A trivial incident, at this time, swelled the popular discontent into mutiny. The French fleet, after the capture of Naples, was ordered to the Levant to assist the Venetians against the Turks. Ravenstein, ambitious of eclipsing the exploits of the Great Captain, turned his arms against Mitilene, with the design of recovering it for the republic. He totally failed in the attack, and his fleet was soon after scattered by a tempest, and his own ship wrecked on the isle of Cerigo. He

[37] Carta de Gonzalo á los Reyes, Tarento, 10 de Mayo, 1522, MS.—Don Juan Manuel, the Spanish minister at Vienna, seems to have been fully sensible of this trait of his master. He told the emperor Maximilian, who had requested the loan of 300,000 ducats from Spain, that it was as much money as would suffice King Ferdinand for the conquest, not merely of Italy, but Africa into the bargain. Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 3, cap. 42.

subsequently found his way, with several of his principal officers, to the shores of Calabria, where he landed in the most forlorn and desperate plight. Gonsalvo, touched with his misfortunes, no sooner learned his necessities than he sent him abundant supplies of provisions, adding a service of plate, and a variety of elegant apparel for himself and followers; consulting his own munificent spirit in this, much more than the limited state of his finances.[38]

This excessive liberality was very inopportune. The soldiers loudly complained that their general found treasures to squander on foreigners, while his own troops were defrauded of their pay. The Biscayans, a people of whom Gonsalvo used to say "he had rather be a lion-keeper than undertake to govern them," took the lead in the tumult. It soon swelled into open insurrection; and the men, forming themselves into regular companies, marched to the general's quarters and demanded payment of their arrears. One fellow, more insolent than the rest, levelled a pike at his breast with the most angry and menacing looks. Gonsalvo, however, retaining his self-possession, gently put it aside, saying, with a good-natured smile, "Higher, you careless knave, lift your lance higher, or you will run me through in your jesting." As he was reiterating his assurances of the want of funds, and his confident expectation of speedily obtaining them, a Biscayan captain called out, "Send your daughter to the brothel, and that

[38] Bembo, Istoria Viniziana, tom. iii. lib. 6, p. 368.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, p. 232.—D'Auton, part. 1, chap. 71, 72.

will soon put you in funds!" This was a favorite daughter named Elvira, whom Gonsalvo loved so tenderly that he would not part with her even in his campaigns. Although stung to the heart by this audacious taunt, he made no reply, but, without changing a muscle of his countenance, continued, in the same tone as before, to expostulate with the insurgents, who at length were prevailed on to draw off, and disperse to their quarters. The next morning, the appalling spectacle of the lifeless body of the Biscayan, hanging by the neck from a window of the house in which he had been quartered, admonished the army that there were limits to the general's forbearance it was not prudent to overstep.[39]

An unexpected event, which took place at this juncture, contributed even more than this monitory lesson to restore subordination to the army. This was the capture of a Genoese galleon with a valuable freight, chiefly iron, bound to some Turkish port, as it was said, in the Levant, which Gonsalvo, moved no doubt by his zeal for the Christian cause, ordered to be seized by the Spanish cruisers, and the cargo to be disposed of for the satisfaction of his troops. Giovio charitably excuses this act of hostility against a friendly power with the remark that "when the Great Captain did any thing contrary to law he was wont to say, 'A general must secure the victory at all hazards, right or

[39] Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 34.—Quintana, Españoles célebres, tom. i. pp. 252, 253.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, p. 232.—The turbulent character of the Biscayans is noticed by the Great Captain in a letter, of somewhat earlier date, to the secretary Almazan. Carta, 16 de Abril, 1501, MS.

wrong; and, when he has done this, he can compensate those whom he has injured with tenfold benefits.' "[40]

The unexpected length of the siege of Tarento determined Gonsalvo, at length, to adopt bolder measures for quickening its termination. The city, whose insulated position has been noticed, was bounded on the north by a lake, or rather arm of the sea, forming an excellent interior harbor, about eighteen miles in circumference. The inhabitants, trusting to the natural defences of this quarter, had omitted to protect it by fortifications, and the houses rose abruptly from the margin of the basin. Into this reservoir the Spanish commander resolved to transport such of his vessels then riding in the outer bay as from their size could be conveyed across the narrow isthmus which divided it from the inner.

After incredible toil, twenty of the smallest craft were moved on huge cars and rollers across the intervening land and safely launched on the bosom of the lake. The whole operation was performed amid the exciting accompaniments of discharges of ordnance, strains of martial music, and loud acclamations of the soldiery. The inhabitants of Tarento saw with consternation the fleet so lately floating in the open ocean under their impregnable walls, now quitting its native element, and moving, as it were by magic, across the land, to assault them on the quarter where they were the least defended.[41]

[40] Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, lib. 1, p. 233.

[41] Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, ubi supra.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 33.—Gonsalvo took the hint for this, doubtless, from

The Neapolitan commander perceived it would be impossible to hold out longer, without compromising the personal safety of the young prince under his care. He accordingly entered into negotiations for a truce with the Great Captain, during which articles of capitulation were arranged, guaranteeing to the duke of Calabria and his followers the right of evacuating the place and going wherever they listed. The Spanish general, in order to give greater solemnity to these engagements, bound himself to observe them by an oath on the sacrament.[42]

On the 1st of March, 1502, the Spanish army took possession, according to agreement, of the city of Tarento; and the duke of Calabria, with his suite, was permitted to leave it, in order to rejoin his father in France. In the meantime, advices were received from Ferdinand the Catholic, instructing Gonsalvo on no account to suffer the young prince to escape from his hand, as he was a pledge of too great importance for the Spanish government to relinquish. The general in consequence sent after the duke, who had pro-

Hannibal's similar expedient. (See Polybius, lib. 8.) Cæsar notices a similar manœuvre, executed by him in his wars in Spain. The vessels which he caused to be transported, however, across twenty miles of land, were much inferior in size to those of Gonsalvo. De Bello Civili, lib. i. cap. 54.

[42] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 52, 53.—Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. lib. 5, p. 270.—Giannone, Istoria di Napoli, lib. 29, cap. 3.—Muratori, Annali d'Italia, tom. xiv. p. 14.—The various authorities differ more irreconcilably than usual in the details of the siege. I have followed Paolo Giovio, a contemporary, and personally acquainted with the principal actors. All agree in the only fact in which one would willingly see some discrepancy, Gonsalvo's breach of faith to the young duke of Calabria.

ceeded in company with the count of Potenza as far as Bitonto, on his way to the north, and commanded him to be arrested and brought back to Tarento. Not long after, he caused him to be conveyed on board one of the men-of-war in the harbor, and, in contempt of his solemn engagements, sent a prisoner to Spain.[43]

The national writers have made many awkward attempts to varnish over this atrocious act of perfidy in their favorite hero. Zurita vindicates it by a letter from the Neapolitan prince to Gonsalvo, requesting the latter to take this step, since he preferred a residence in Spain to one in France, but could not with decency appear to act in opposition to his father's wishes on the subject. If such a letter, however, were really obtained from the prince, his tender years would entitle it to little weight, and of course it would afford no substantial ground for justification. Another explanation is offered by Paolo Giovio, who states that the Great Captain, undetermined what course to adopt, took the opinion of certain learned jurists. This sage body decided "that Gonsalvo was not bound by his oath, since it was repugnant to his

[43] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 56.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 11, sec. 10–12.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 9.—Lanuza, Historias, lib. 1, cap. 14.—Martyr, who was present on the young prince's arrival at court, where he experienced the most honorable reception, speaks of him in the highest terms: "Adolescens namque est et regno et regio sanguine dignus, miræ indolis, formâ egregius." (See Opus Epist., epist. 252.) He survived to the year 1550, but without ever quitting Spain, contrary to the fond prediction of his friend Sannazaro:

> "Nam mihi, nam tempus veniet, cum reddita sceptra
> Parthenopes, fractosque tua sub cuspide reges
> Ipse canam."
>
> Opera Latina, Ecloga 4.

paramount obligations to his master; and that the latter was not bound by it, since it was made without his privity!" [44] The man who trusts his honor to the tampering of casuists has parted with it already.[45]

[44] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 4, cap. 58.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, lib. 1, p. 234.—Mariana coolly disposes of Gonsalvo's treachery with the remark, "No parece se le guardo lo que tenian asentado. En la guerra quien hay que de todo punto lo guarde?" (Hist. de España, tom. ii. p. 675.)

——"Dolus an virtus, quis in hoste requirat?"

[45] In Gonsalvo's correspondence is a letter to the sovereigns, written soon after the occupation of Tarento, in which he mentions his efforts to secure the duke of Calabria in the Spanish interests. He speaks with confidence of his own ascendency over the young man's mind, and assures the sovereigns that the latter will be content to continue with him till he shall receive instructions from Spain how to dispose of him. At the same time the Great Captain took care to maintain a surveillance over the duke, by means of the attendants on his person. We find no allusion to any promises under oath. The communication is too brief to clear up the difficulties in this dark transaction. As coming from Gonsalvo himself, the document has great interest, and I will give it to the reader in the original: "A vuestras altezas he dado aviso de la entrada de las vanderas e gente de vuestras altezas por la gracia de nuestro Señor en Tarento el primero dia de Marzo, e asi en la platica que estava con el duque don fernando de ponerse al servicio y amparo de vuestras alteças syn otro partido ny ofrecimiento demas de certificarle que en todo tiempo seria libre para yr donde quisiese sy vuestras altezas bien no le tratasen y que vuestras alteças le tenian el respeto que a tal persona como el se deve. El conde de potença e algunos de los que estan ceerca del han trabajado por apartarle de este proposito e levarle a Iscla asi yo por muchos modos he procurado de reducirle al servicio de vuestras alteças y tengole en tal termino que puedo certificar a vuestras alteças que este mozo no les saldra de la mano con consenso suyo del servicio de vuestras alteças asta tanto que vuestras alteças me embien a mandar como del he de disponer e de lo que con el se ha de facer y por las contrastes que en esto han entrevenido no ha salido de taranto porque asi ha convenido. El viernes que sera once de marzo saldra a castellaneta que es quince millas de aqui con algunos destos suyos que le quieren seguir con alguna buena parte de compañia destos criados de vuestras alteças para acompañarle y este mismo dia viernes entraran las vanderas e gente de vuestras

The only palliation of the act must be sought in the prevalent laxity and corruption of the period, which is rife with examples of the most flagrant violation of both public and private faith. Had this been the act of a Sforza, indeed, or a Borgia, it could not reasonably have excited surprise.* But coming from one of a noble, magnanimous nature, like Gonsalvo, exemplary in his private life, and unstained with any of the grosser vices of the age, it excited general astonishment and reprobation, even among his contemporaries. It has left a reproach on his name which the historian may regret, but cannot wipe away.

alteças en el castillo de tarento con ayuda de nuestro Señor." De Tarento, 10 de Marzo, 1502, MS.

* [The reader must endeavor to transport himself to the age in which Gonsalvo lived, and to imbue himself with the ideas of that period before he ventures to pass judgment upon the Great Captain. Machiavelli voiced the sentiment of those times in his "Prince," and Machiavelli's ideal prince was Cæsar Borgia, a man who was absolutely without conscience, and who regarded no laws, human or divine, if they hindered him from accomplishing his ends.—M.]

CHAPTER XI

ITALIAN WARS—RUPTURE WITH FRANCE—GONSALVO BESIEGED IN BARLETA

1502, 1503

Rupture between the French and Spaniards—Gonsalvo retires to Barleta—Chivalrous Character of the War—Tourney near Trani—Duel between Bayard and Sotomayor—Distress of Barleta—Constancy of the Spaniards—Gonsalvo storms and takes Ruvo—Prepares to leave Barleta

IT was hardly to be expected that the partition treaty between France and Spain, made so manifestly in contempt of all good faith, would be maintained any longer than suited the convenience of the respective parties. The French monarch, indeed, seems to have prepared, from the first, to dispense with it so soon as he had secured his own moiety of the kingdom;[1] and sagacious men at the Spanish court inferred that King Ferdinand would do as much, when he should be in a situation to assert his claims with success.[2]

[1] Peter Martyr, in a letter written from Venice while detained there on his way to Alexandria, speaks of the efforts made by the French emissaries to induce the republic to break with Spain and support their master in his designs on Naples: "Adsunt namque a Ludovico rege Gallorum oratores, qui omni nixu conantur a vobis Venetorum animos avertere. Fremere dentibus aiunt oratorem primarium Gallum, quia nequeat per Venetorum suffragi consequi, ut aperte vobis hostilitatem edicant, utque velint Gallis regno Parthenopeo contra vestra præsidia ferre suppetias." The letter is dated October 1, 1501. Opus Epist., epist. 231.

[2] Martyr, after noticing the grounds of the partition treaty, comments with his usual shrewdness on the politic views of the Spanish

It was altogether improbable, whatever might be the good faith of the parties, that an arrangement could long subsist which so rudely rent asunder the members of this ancient monarchy; or that a thousand points of collision should not arise between rival hosts, lying as it were on their arms within bowshot of each other and in view of the rich spoil which each regarded as its own. Such grounds for rupture did occur, sooner probably than either party had foreseen, and certainly before the king of Aragon was prepared to meet it.

The immediate cause was the extremely loose language of the partition treaty, which assumed such a geographical division of the kingdom into four provinces as did not correspond with any ancient division, and still less with the modern, by which the number was multiplied to twelve.[3] The central portion, comprehending the Capitanate, the Basilicate, and the Principality, became debatable ground between the parties, each of whom insisted on these as forming an integral part of its

sovereigns: "Facilius namque se sperant, eam partem, quam sibi Galli sortiti sunt, habituros aliquando, quam si universum regnum occuparint." Opus Epist., epist. 218.

[3] The Italian historians, who have investigated the subject with some parade of erudition, treat it so vaguely as to leave it, after all, nearly as perplexed as they found it. Giovio includes the Capitanate in Apulia, according to the ancient division; Guicciardini, according to the modern; and the Spanish historian Mariana, according to both. The last writer, it may be observed, discusses the matter with equal learning and candor, and more perspicuity than either of the preceding. He admits reasonable grounds for doubt to which moiety of the kingdom the Basilicate and Principalities should be assigned. Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. p. 670.—Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. lib. 5, pp. 274, 275.—Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, lib. 1, pp. 234, 235.

own moiety. The French had no ground whatever for contesting the possession of the Capitanate, the first of these provinces, and by far the most important, on account of the tolls paid by the numerous flocks which descended every winter into its sheltered valleys from the snow-covered mountains of Abruzzo.[4] There was more uncertainty to which of the parties the two other provinces were meant to be assigned. It is scarcely possible that language so loose, in a matter requiring mathematical precision, should have been unintentional.

Before Gonsalvo de Cordova had completed the conquest of the southern moiety of the kingdom, and while lying before Tarento, he received intelligence of the occupation by the French of several places, both in the Capitanate and Basilicate. He detached a body of troops for the protection of these countries, and, after the surrender of Tarento, marched towards the north to cover them with his whole army. As he was not in a condition for immediate hostilities, however, he entered into negotiations, which, if attended with no other advantage, would at least gain him time.[5]

[4] The provision of the partition treaty, that the Spaniards should collect the tolls paid by the flocks on their descent from the French district of Abruzzo into the Capitanate, is conclusive evidence of the intention of the contracting parties to assign the latter to Spain. See the treaty apud Dumont, Corps diplomatique, tom. iii. pp. 445, 446.

[5] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 52.—Mariana, Hist. de Españo, tom. ii. lib. 27, cap. 12.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 10.—Gonsalvo, in his account of these transactions to the sovereigns, notices "the intemperate language and bearing" both of the viceroy and Alègre. This part of the letter is in cipher. Carta de Tarento, 10 de Marzo, 1502, MS.

The pretensions of the two parties, as might have been expected, were too irreconcilable to admit of compromise; and a personal conference between the respective commanders-in-chief (April 1, 1502) led to no better arrangement than that each should retain his present acquisitions till explicit instructions could be received from their respective courts.

But neither of the two monarchs had further instructions to give; and the Catholic king contented himself with admonishing his general to postpone an open rupture as long as possible, that the government might have time to provide more effectually for his support and strengthen itself by alliance with other European powers. But, however pacific may have been the disposition of the generals, they had no power to control the passions of their soldiers, who, thus brought into immediate contact, glared on each other with the ferocity of bloodhounds ready to slip the leash which held them in temporary check. Hostilities soon broke out along the lines of the two armies, the blame of which each nation charged on its opponent. There seems good ground, however, for imputing it to the French; since they were altogether better prepared for war than the Spaniards, and entered into it so heartily as not only to assail places in the debatable ground, but in Apulia, which had been unequivocally assigned to their rivals.[6]

[6] D'Auton, Hist. de Louys XII., part. 2, chap. 3–7.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 60, 62, 64, 65.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, tom. i. p. 236.—Giannone, Istoria di Napoli, lib. 29, cap. 4.—Bernaldez states that the Great Captain, finding his con-

In the meanwhile, the Spanish court fruitlessly endeavored to interest the other powers of Europe in its cause. The emperor Maximilian, although dissatisfied with the occupation of Milan by the French, appeared wholly engrossed with the frivolous ambition of a Roman coronation. The pontiff and his son, Cæsar Borgia, were closely bound to King Louis by the assistance which he had rendered them in their maurauding enterprises against the neighboring chiefs of Romagna. The other Italian princes, although deeply incensed and disgusted by this infamous alliance, stood too much in awe of the colossal power which had planted its foot so firmly on their territory to offer any resistance. Venice alone, surveying from her distant watch-tower, to borrow the words of Peter Martyr, the whole extent of the political horizon, appeared to hesitate. The French ambassadors loudly called on her to fulfil the terms of her late treaty with their master, and support him in his approaching quarrel; but the wily republic saw with distrust the encroaching ambition of her powerful neighbor, and secretly wished that a counterpoise might be found in the success of Aragon. Martyr, who stopped at Venice on his return from Egypt, appeared before the Senate (October, 1501) and employed all his eloquence in supporting his master's cause in opposition to the

ference with the French general ineffectual, proposed to the latter to decide the quarrel between their respective nations by single combat. (Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 167.) We should require some other authority, however, than that of the good Curate to vouch for this romantic fight, so entirely out of keeping with the Spanish general's character, in which prudence was probably the most conspicuous attribute.

French envoys; but his pressing entreaties to the Spanish sovereigns to send thither some competent person, as a resident minister, show his own conviction of the critical position in which their affairs stood.[7]

The letters of the same intelligent individual during his journey through the Milanese[8] are filled with the most gloomy forebodings of the termination of a contest for which the Spaniards were so indifferently provided; while the whole north of Italy was alive with the bustling preparations of the French, who loudly vaunted their intention of driving their enemy not merely out of Naples, but Sicily itself.[9]

[7] Daru, Hist. de Venise, tom. iii. p. 345.—Bembo, Istoria Viniziana, tom. i. lib. 6.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 238, 240, 252.—This may appear strange, considering that Lorenzo Suarez de la Vega was there, a person of whom Gonzalo de Oviedo writes, "Fué gentil caballero, é sabio, é de gran prudencia; * * * * * muy entendido é de mucho reposo é honesto é afable é de linda conversacion;" and again, more explicitly, "Embaxador á Venecia, en el qual oficio sirvio muy bien, é como prudente varon." (Quincuagenas, MS., bat. 1, quinc. 3, dial. 44.) Martyr admits his prudence, but objects his ignorance of Latin, a deficiency, however heinous in the worthy tutor's eyes, probably of no rare occurrence among the elder Castilian nobles.

[8] Many of Martyr's letters were addressed to both Ferdinand and Isabella. The former, however, was ignorant of the Latin language, in which they were written. Martyr playfully alludes to this in one of his epistles, reminding the queen of her promise to interpret them faithfully to her husband. The unconstrained and familiar tone of his correspondence affords a pleasing example of the personal intimacy to which the sovereigns, in defiance of the usual stiffness of Spanish etiquette, admitted men of learning and probity at their court, without distinction of rank. Opus Epist., epist. 230.

[9] "Galli," says Martyr, in a letter more remarkable for strength of expression than elegance of Latinity, "furunt, sæviunt, internecionem nostris minantur, putantque id sibi fore facillimum. Regem eorum esse in itinere, inquiunt, ut ipse cum duplicato exercitu Alpes trajiciat in Italiam. Vestro nomini insurgunt. Cristas erigunt in vos superbissimè. Provinciam hanc, veluti rem humilem,

Louis the Twelfth superintended these preparations in person, and, to be near the theatre of operations, crossed the Alps, and took up his quarters at Asti. (July, 1502.) At length, all being in readiness, he brought things to an immediate issue, by commanding his general to proclaim war at once against the Spaniards, unless they abandoned the Capitanate in four-and-twenty hours.[10]

The French force in Naples amounted, according to their own statements, to one thousand men-at-arms, three thousand five hundred French and Lombard and three thousand Swiss infantry, in addition to the Neapolitan levies raised by the Angevin lords throughout the kingdom. The command was intrusted to the duke of Nemours, a brave and chivalrous young nobleman, of the ancient house of Armagnac, whom family connections, more than talents, had raised to the perilous post of viceroy over the head of the veteran D'Aubigny. The latter would have thrown up his commission in disgust, but for the remonstrances of his sovereign, who prevailed on him to remain where his counsels were more than ever necessary to supply the inexperience of the young commander. The jealousy and wilfulness of the latter, however, defeated these intentions; and the misunderstanding of the chiefs, extending to their

parvique momenti, se aggressuros præconantur. Nihil esse negotii eradicare exterminareque vestra præsidia ex utrâque Siciliâ blacterant. Insolenter nimis exspuendo insultant." Opus Epist., epist. 241.

[10] D'Auton, Hist. de Louys XII., part. 2, chap. 8.—Giannone, Istoria di Napoli, lib. 29, cap. 4.—Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 5, pp. 274, 275.—Buonaccorsi, Diario, p. 61

followers, led to a fatal want of concert in their movements.

With these officers were united some of the best and bravest of the French chivalry; among whom may be noticed Jacques de Chabannes, more commonly known as the Sire de la Palice, a favorite of Louis the Twelfth, and well entitled to be so by his deserts; Louis d'Ars; Ives d'Alègre, brother of the Précy who gained so much renown in the wars of Charles the Eighth; and Pierre de Bayard, the knight "sans peur et sans reproche," who was then entering on the honorable career in which he seemed to realize all the imaginary perfections of chivalry.[11] *

Notwithstanding the small numbers of the French force, the Great Captain was in no condition to cope with them. He had received no reinforcements from home since he first landed in Calabria. His little corps of veterans was destitute of proper clothing and equipments, and the large arrears due them made the tenure of their

[11] Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 5, p. 265.—D'Auton, Hist. de Louys XII., part. 1, chap. 57.—Gaillard, Rivalité, tom. iv. pp. 221–233.—St. Gelais, Hist. de Louys XII., p. 169.—Brantôme has introduced sketches of most of the French captains mentioned in the text into his admirable gallery of national portraits. See Vies des Hommes illustres, Œuvres, tom. ii. and iii.

* [Bayard was already well advanced upon his honorable career. In 1494 he accompanied Charles VIII., when that monarch made his expedition into Italy, and was knighted by the French king after the battle of Fornova. In 1499, serving under Louis XII., he pursued some fugitives into the city of Milan, and was there captured. So great was the esteem in which he was held by his opponents that Ludovico Sforza on this occasion released him, without ransom.—M.]

obedience extremely precarious.[12] Since affairs began to assume their present menacing aspect, he had been busily occupied with drawing together the detachments posted in various parts of Calabria, and concentrating them on the town of Atella in the Basilicate, where he had established his own quarters. He had also opened a correspondence with the barons of the Aragonese faction, who were most numerous as well as most powerful in the northern section of the kingdom, which had been assigned to the French. He was particularly fortunate in gaining over the two Colonnas, whose authority, powerful connections, and large military experience proved of inestimable value to him.[13]

With all the resources he could command, however, Gonsalvo found himself, as before noticed, unequal to the contest, though it was impossible to defer it, after the peremptory summons of the French viceroy to surrender the Capitanate. To this he unhesitatingly answered that "the Capi-

[12] Martyr's epistles at this crisis are filled with expostulations, argument, and entreaties to the sovereigns, begging them to rouse from their apathy and take measures to secure the wavering affections of Venice, as well as to send more effectual aid to their Italian troops. Ferdinand listened to the first of these suggestions, but showed a strange insensibility to the last.

[13] Carta de Gonzalo á los Reyes, Tarento, 10 de Marzo 1502, MS. —Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 4, cap. 62, 65.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, p. 230.—Prospero Colonna, in particular, was distinguished not only for his military science, but his fondness for letters and the arts, of which he is commemorated by Tiraboschi as a munificent patron. (Letteratura Italiana, tom. viii. p. 77.) Paolo Giovio has introduced his portrait among the effigies of illustrious men, who, it must be confessed, are more indebted in his work to the hand of the historian than of the artist. Elogia Virorum Bellicâ Virtute Illustrium (Basiliæ, 1578), lib. 5.

tanate belonged of right to his own master; and that, with the blessing of God, he would make good its defence against the French king, or any other who should invade it.

Notwithstanding the bold front put on his affairs, however, he did not choose to abide the assault of the French in his present position. He instantly drew off with the greater part of his force to Barleta, a fortified seaport on the confines of Apulia, on the Adriatic, the situation of which would enable him either to receive supplies from abroad, or to effect a retreat, if necessary, on board the Spanish fleet, which still kept the coast of Calabria. The remainder of his army he distributed in Bari, Andria, Canosa, and other adjacent towns; where he confidently hoped to maintain himself till the arrival of reinforcements, which he solicited in the most pressing manner from Spain and Sicily, should enable him to take the field on more equal terms against his adversary.[14]

The French officers, in the meantime, were divided in opinion as to the best mode of conducting the war. Some were for besieging Bari, held by the illustrious and unfortunate Isabella of Aragon;[15] others, in a more chivalrous spirit, opposed

[14] D'Auton, Hist. de Louys XII., part. 2, chap. 8.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 10.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 42.—Summonte, Hist. di Napoli, tom. iii. p. 541.

[15] This beautiful and high-spirited lady, whose fate has led Boccalini, in his whimsical satire of the "Ragguagli di Parnasso," to call her the most unfortunate female on record, had seen her father, Alfonso II., and her husband, Galeazzo Sforza, driven from their thrones by the French, while her son still remained in captivity in their hands. No wonder they revolted from accumulating new woes on her devoted head.

the attack of a place defended by a female, and advised an immediate assault on Barleta itself, whose old and dilapidated works might easily be forced, if it did not at once surrender. The duke of Nemours, deciding on a middle course, determined to invest the last-mentioned town, and, cutting off all communication with the surrounding country, to reduce it by regular blockade. This plan was unquestionably the least eligible of all, as it would allow time for the enthusiasm of the French, the *furia Francese,* as it was called in Italy, which carried them victorious over so many obstacles, to evaporate, while it brought into play the stern resolve, the calm, unflinching endurance, which distinguished the Spanish soldier.[16]

One of the first operations of the French viceroy was the siege of Canosa (July 2, 1502), a strongly fortified place west of Barleta, garrisoned by six hundred picked men under the engineer Pedro Navarro. The defence of the place justified the reputation of this gallant soldier. He beat off two successive assaults of the enemy, led on by Bayard, La Palice, and the flower of their chivalry. He had prepared to sustain a third, resolved to bury himself under the ruins of the town rather than surrender. But Gonsalvo, unable to relieve it, commanded him to make the best terms he could, saying "the place was of far less value than the lives of the brave men who defended it." Navarro found no diffi-

[16] Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, p. 237.—Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 5, pp. 282, 283.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 14.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 249.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 168.

culty in obtaining an honorable capitulation; and the little garrison, dwindled to one-third of its original number, marched out through the enemy's camp, with colors flying and music playing, as if in derision of the powerful force it had so nobly kept at bay."

After the capture of Canosa, D'Aubigny, whose misunderstanding with Nemours still continued, was dispatched with a small force into the south, to overrun the two Calabrias. The viceroy, in the meanwhile, having fruitlessly attempted the reduction of several strong places held by the Spaniards in the neighborhood of Barleta, endeavored to straiten the garrison there by desolating the surrounding country and sweeping off the flocks and herds which grazed in its fertile pastures. The Spaniards, however, did not remain idle within their defences, but, sallying out in small detachments, occasionally retrieved the spoil from the hands of the enemy, or annoyed him with desultory attacks, ambuscades, and other irregular movements of guerilla warfare, in which the French were comparatively unpractised.[18]

The war now began to assume many of the

[17] Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 47.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 69.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, tom. i. p. 241.—D'Auton, part. 2, chap. 11.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 247.—Martyr says that the Spaniards marched through the enemy's camp, shouting, "España, España, vivi España!" (ubi supra.) Their gallantry in the defence of Canosa elicits a hearty eulogium from Jean d'Auton, the loyal historiographer of Louis XII.: "Je ne veux donc par ma Chronique mettre les biensfaicts des Espaignols en oubly, mais dire que pour vertueuse defence, doibuent auoir louange honorable." Hist. de Louys XII., chap. 11.

[18] Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 169.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 10.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 66.

romantic features of that of Granada. The knights on both sides, not content with the usual military rencontres, defied one another to jousts and tourneys, eager to establish their prowess in the noble exercises of chivalry. One of the most remarkable of these meetings took place between eleven Spanish and as many French knights, in consequence of some disparaging remarks of the latter on the cavalry of their enemies, which they affirmed inferior to their own. The Venetians gave the parties a fair field of combat in the neutral territory under their own walls of Trani. A gallant array of well-armed knights of both nations guarded the lists and maintained the order of the fight. On the appointed day (Sept. 20, 1502) the champions appeared in the field, armed at all points, with horses richly caparisoned, and barbed or covered with steel panoply like their masters. The roofs and battlements of Trani were covered with spectators, while the lists were thronged with the French and Spanish chivalry, each staking in some degree the national honor on the issue of the contest. Among the Castilians were Diego de Paredes and Diego de Vera, while the good knight Bayard was most conspicuous on the other side.

As the trumpets sounded the appointed signal, the hostile parties rushed to the encounter. Three Spaniards were borne from their saddles by the rudeness of the shock, and four of their antagonists' horses slain. The fight, which began at ten in the morning, was not to be protracted beyond sunset. Long before that hour, all the French

save two, one of them the chevalier Bayard, had been dismounted, and their horses, at which the Spaniards had aimed more than at the riders, disabled or slain. The Spaniards, seven of whom were still on horseback, pressed hard on their adversaries, leaving little doubt of the fortune of the day. The latter, however, intrenching themselves behind the carcases of their dead horses, made good their defence against the Spaniards, who in vain tried to spur their terrified steeds over the barrier. In this way the fight was protracted till sunset; and, as both parties continued to keep possession of the field, the palm of victory was adjudged to neither, while both were pronounced to have demeaned themselves like good and valiant knights.[19]

The tourney being ended, the combatants met in the centre of the lists, and embraced each other in the true companionship of chivalry, "making good cheer together," says an old chronicler, before they separated. The Great Captain was not satisfied with the issue of the fight. "We have, at least," said one of his champions, "disproved the taunt of the Frenchmen, and shown

[19] Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 53.—D'Auton, Hist. de Louys XII., part. 2, chap. 26.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, pp. 238, 239.—Mémoires de Bayard par le Loyal Serviteur, chap. 23, apud Petitot, Collection des Mémoirs, tom. xv.—Brantôme, Œuvres, tom. iii. disc. 77.—This celebrated tourney, its causes, and all the details of the action, are told in as many different ways as there are narrators; and this, notwithstanding it was fought in the presence of a crowd of witnesses, who had nothing to do but look on and note what passed before their eyes. The only facts in which all agree are, that there was such a tournament, and that neither party gained the advantage. So much for history!

ourselves as good horsemen as they." "I sent you for better," coldly retorted Gonsalvo.[20]

A more tragic termination befell a combat *á l'outrance* between the chevalier Bayard and a Spanish cavalier, named Alonso de Sotomayor, who had accused the former of uncourteous treatment of him while his prisoner. Bayard denied the charge, and defied the Spaniard to prove it in single fight, on horse or on foot, as he best liked. Sotomayor, aware of his antagonist's uncommon horsemanship, preferred the latter alternative.

At the day and hour appointed (Feb. 2, 1503) the two knights entered the lists, armed with sword and dagger, and sheathed in complete harness; although, with a degree of temerity unusual in these combats, they wore their visors up. Both combatants knelt down in silent prayer for a few moments, and then, rising and crossing themselves, advanced straight against each other; "the good knight Bayard," says Brantôme, "moving as light of step as if he were going to lead some fair lady down the dance."

The Spaniard was of a large and powerful frame, and endeavored to crush his enemy by weight of blows, or to close with him and bring him to the ground. The latter, naturally inferior in strength, was rendered still weaker by a fever from which he had not entirely recovered. He was more light and agile than his adversary, however, and superior dexterity enabled him not only to parry his enemy's strokes, but to deal him

[20] D'Auton, Hist. de Louys XII., ubi supra.—Quintana, Españoles célebres, tom. ii. p. 263.

occasionally one of his own, while he sorely distressed him by the rapidity of his movements. At length, as the Spaniard was somewhat thrown off his balance by an ill-directed blow, Bayard struck him so sharply on the gorget that it gave way, and the sword entered his throat. Furious with the agony of the wound, Sotomayor collected all his strength for a last struggle, and, grasping his antagonist in his arms, they both rolled in the dust together. Before either could extricate himself, the quick-eyed Bayard, who had retained his poniard in his left hand during the whole combat, while the Spaniard's had remained in his belt, drove the steel with such convulsive strength under his enemy's eye that it pierced quite through the brain. After the judges had awarded the honors of the day to Bayard, the minstrels as usual began to pour forth triumphant strains in praise of the victor; but the good knight commanded them to desist, and, having first prostrated himself on his knees in gratitude for his victory, walked slowly out of the lists, expressing a wish that the combat had a different termination, so that his honor had been saved.[21]

In these jousts and tourneys, described with sufficient prolixity, but in a truly heart-stirring tone, by the chroniclers of the day, we may discern the last gleams of the light of chivalry, which illumined the darkness of the Middle Ages; and, although rough in comparison with the pastimes of

[21] Brantôme, Œuvres, tom. vi., Discours sur les Duels.—D'Auton, Hist. de Louys XII., part. 2, chap. 27.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 11.—Mémoires de Bayard, chap. 22, apud Petitot, Collection des Mémoires.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, p. 240.

more polished times, they called forth such displays of magnificence, courtesy, and knightly honor as throw something like the grace of civilization over the ferocious features of the age.

While the Spaniards, cooped up within the old town of Barleta, sought to vary the monotony of their existence by these chivalrous exercises or an occasional foray into the neighboring country, they suffered greatly from the want of military stores, food, clothing, and the most common necessaries of life. It seemed as if their master had abandoned them to their fate on this forlorn outpost, without a struggle in their behalf.[22] How different from the parental care with which Isabella watched over the welfare of her soldiers in the long war of Granada! The queen appears to have taken no part in the management of these wars, which, notwithstanding the number of her own immediate subjects embarked in them, she probably regarded, from the first, as appertaining to Aragon as exclusively as the conquests in the New World did to Castile. Indeed, whatever degree of interest she may have felt in their success, the declining state of her health at this period would not have allowed her to take any part in the conduct of them.

[22] According to Martyr, the besieged had been so severely pressed by famine for some time before this that Gonsalvo entertained serious thoughts of embarking the whole of his little garrison on board the fleet and abandoning the place to the enemy: "Barlettæ inclusos fame pesteque urgeri graviter aiunt. Vicina ipsorum omnia Galli occupant, et nostros quotidie magis ac magis premunt. Ita obsessi undique, de relinquendâ etiam Barlettâ sæpius iniere consilium. Ut mari terga dent hostibus, ne fame pesteque pereant, sæpe cadit in deliberationem." Opus Epist., epist. 249.

Gonsalvo was not wanting to himself in this trying emergency, and his noble spirit seemed to rise as all outward and visible resources failed. He cheered his troops with promises of speedy relief, talking confidently of the supplies of grain he expected from Sicily and the men and money he was to receive from Spain and Venice. He contrived, too, says Giovio, that a report should get abroad that a ponderous coffer lying in his apartment was filled with gold, which he could draw upon in the last extremity. The old campaigners, indeed, according to the same authority, shook their heads at these and other agreeable fictions of their general, with a very skeptical air. They derived some confirmation, however, from the arrival soon after of a Sicilian bark laden with corn, and another from Venice with various serviceable stores and wearing-apparel, which Gonsalvo bought on his own credit and that of his principal officers and distributed gratuitously among his destitute soldiers.[23]

At this time he received the unwelcome tidings that a small force which had been sent from Spain to his assistance, under Don Manuel de Benavides, and which had effected a junction with one much larger from Sicily under Hugo de Cardona, had been surprised by D'Aubigny near Terranova and totally defeated. (Dec. 25, 1502.) This disaster was followed by the reduction of all Calabria, which the latter general, at the head of his French

[23] Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, p. 242.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 4.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 167.—Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 5, p. 283.

and Scottish gendarmerie, rode over from one extremity to the other without opposition.[24]

The prospect now grew darker and darker around the little garrison of Barleta. The discomfiture of Benavides excluded hopes of relief in that direction. The gradual occupation of most of the strong places in Apulia by the duke of Nemours cut off all communication with the neighboring country; and a French fleet cruising in the Adriatic rendered the arrival of further stores and reinforcements extremely precarious. Gonsalvo, however, maintained the same unruffled cheerfulness as before, and endeavored to infuse it into the hearts of others. He perfectly understood the character of his countrymen, knew all their resources, and tried to rouse every latent principle of honor, loyalty, pride, and national feeling; and such was the authority which he acquired over their minds, and so deep the affection which he inspired, by the amenity of his manners and the generosity of his disposition, that not a murmur or symptom of insubordination escaped them during the whole of this long and painful siege. But neither the excellence of his troops, nor the resources of his own genius, would have been sufficient to extricate Gonsalvo from the difficulties of his situation, without the most flagrant errors on the part of his opponent. The Spanish general, who understood the character of the French commander perfectly well, lay patiently awaiting his opportunity, like a skilful fencer,

[24] Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 5, p. 294.—D'Auton, Hist. de Louys XII., part. 2, chap. 22.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 63.

ready to make a decisive thrust at the first vulnerable point that should be presented. Such an occasion at length offered itself early in the following year.[25] (January, 1503.)

The French, no less weary than their adversaries of their long inaction, sallied out from Canosa, where the viceroy had established his headquarters, and, crossing the Ofanto, marched up directly under the walls of Barleta, with the intention of drawing out the garrison from the "old den," as they called it, and deciding the quarrel in a pitched battle. The duke of Nemours, accordingly, having taken up his position, sent a trumpet into the place to defy the Great Captain to the encounter; but the latter returned for answer that "he was accustomed to choose his own place and time for fighting, and would thank the French general to wait till his men found time to shoe their horses and burnish up their arms." At length, Nemours, after remaining some days and finding there was no chance of decoying his wily foe from his defences, broke up his camp and retired, satisfied with the empty honors of his gasconade.

No sooner had he fairly turned his back than Gonsalvo, whose soldiers had been restrained with difficulty from sallying out on their insolent foe, ordered the whole strength of his cavalry, under the command of Diego de Mendoza, flanked by two corps of infantry, to issue forth and pursue the French. Mendoza executed these orders so promptly that he brought up his horse, which were

[25] Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 11.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, tom. i. p. 247.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 9.

somewhat in advance of the foot, on the rear-guard of the French, before it had got many miles from Barleta. The latter instantly halted to receive the charge of the Spaniards, and, after a lively skirmish of no great duration, Mendoza retreated, followed by the incautious enemy, who, in consequence of their irregular and straggling march, were detached from the main body of their army. In the meantime, the advancing columns of the Spanish infantry, which had now come up with the retreating horse, unexpectedly closing on the enemy's flanks, threw them into some disorder, which became complete when the flying cavalry of the Spaniards, suddenly wheeling round in the rapid style of the Moorish tactics, charged them boldly in front. All was now confusion. Some made resistance, but most sought only to escape; a few effected it, but the greater part of those who did not fall on the field were carried prisoners to Barleta; where Mendoza found the Great Captain with his whole army drawn up under the walls in order of battle, ready to support him in person, if necessary. The whole affair passed so expeditiously that the viceroy, who, as has been said, conducted his retreat in a most disorderly manner, and in fact had already dispersed several battalions of his infantry to the different towns from which he had drawn them, knew nothing of the rencontre till his men were securely lodged within the walls of Barleta.[26]

[26] Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, pp. 243, 244.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 11, 12.—A dispute arose, soon after this affair, between a French officer and some Italian gentlemen at Gonsalvo's table, in

The arrival of a Venetian trader at this time, with a cargo of grain, brought temporary relief to the pressing necessities of the garrison.[27] This was followed by the welcome intelligence of the total discomfiture of the French fleet under M. de Préjan by the Spanish admiral Lezcano, in an action off Otranto, which consequently left the seas open for the supplies daily expected from Sicily. Fortune seemed now in the giving vein; for in a few days a convoy of seven transports from that island, laden with grain, meat, and other stores, came safe into Barleta, and supplied abundant means for recruiting the health and spirits of its famished inmates.[28]

Thus restored, the Spaniards began to look forward with eager confidence to the achievement of some new enterprise. The temerity of the viceroy soon afforded an opportunity. The people of Castellaneta, a town near Tarento, were driven by

consequence of certain injurious reflections made by the former on the bravery of the Italian nation. The quarrel was settled by a combat *à l'outrance* between thirteen knights on each side, fought under the protection of the Great Captain, who took a lively interest in the success of his allies. It terminated in the discomfiture of all the French. The tourney covers more pages in the Italian historians than the longest battle, and is told with pride and a swell of exultation which show that this insult of the French cut more deeply than all the injuries inflicted by them. Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, pp. 244–247.—Guicciardini, Istoria, pp. 296–298.—Giannone, Istoria di Napoli, lib. 29, cap. 4.—Summonte, Hist. di Napoli, tom. iii. pp. 542–552.

[27] This supply was owing to the avarice of the French general Alègre, who, having got possession of a magazine of corn in Foggia, sold it to the Venetian merchant, instead of reserving it, where it was most needed, for his own army.

[28] D'Auton, Hist. de Louys XII., part. 1, chap. 72.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 254.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, p. 242.

the insolent and licentious behavior of the French garrison to betray the place into the hands of the Spaniards. The duke of Nemours, enraged at this defection, prepared to march at once with his whole force and take signal vengeance on the devoted little town; and this, notwithstanding the remonstrances of his officers against a step which must inevitably expose the unprotected garrisons in the neighborhood to the assault of their vigilant enemy in Barleta. The event justified these apprehensions.[29]

No sooner had Gonsalvo learned the departure of Nemours on a distant expedition than he resolved at once to make an attack on the town of Ruvo, about twelve miles distant, and defended by the brave La Palice with a corps of three hundred French lances and as many foot. With his usual promptness, the Spanish general quitted the walls of Barleta the same night on which he received the news (Feb. 22, 1503), taking with him his whole effective force amounting to about three thousand infantry and one thousand light and heavy armed horse. So few, indeed, remained to guard the city that he thought it prudent to take some of the principal inhabitants as hostages to insure its fidelity in his absence.

At break of day the little army arrived before Ruvo. Gonsalvo immediately opened a lively cannonade on the old ramparts, which in less than four hours effected a considerable breach. He

[29] Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 5, p. 296.—D'Auton, Hist. de Louys XII., part. 2, chap. 31.

then led his men to the assault, taking charge himself of those who were to storm the breach, while another division, armed with ladders for scaling the walls, was intrusted to the adventurous cavalier Diego de Paredes.

The assailants experienced more resolute resistance than they had anticipated from the inconsiderable number of the garrison. La Palice, throwing himself into the breach with his iron band of dismounted gendarmes, drove back the Spaniards as often as they attempted to set foot on the broken ramparts; while the Gascon archery showered down volleys of arrows thick as hail, from the battlements, on the exposed persons of the assailants. The latter, however, soon rallied under the eye of their general, and returned with fresh fury to the charge, until the overwhelming tide of numbers bore down all opposition, and they poured in through the breach and over the walls with irresistible fury. The brave little garrison were driven before them; still, however, occasionally making fight in the streets and houses. Their intrepid young commander, La Palice, retreated facing the enemy, who pressed thick and close upon him, till, his further progress being arrested by a wall, he placed his back against it, and kept them at bay, making a wide circle around him with the deadly sweep of his battle-axe. But the odds were too much for him; and, at length, after repeated wounds, having been brought to the ground by a deep cut in the head, he was made prisoner; not, however, before he had flung his sword far over the heads of the assailants, disdain-

ing, in the true spirit of a knight-errant, to yield it to the rabble around him.[30]

All resistance was now at an end. The women of the place had fled, like so many frightened deer, to one of the principal churches; and Gonsalvo, with more humanity than was usual in these barbarous wars, placed a guard over their persons, which effectually secured them from the insults of the soldiery. After a short time spent in gathering up the booty and securing his prisoners, the Spanish general, having achieved the object of his expedition, set out on his homeward march, and arrived without interruption at Barleta.

The duke of Nemours had scarcely appeared before Castellaneta before he received tidings of the attack on Ruvo. He put himself, without losing a moment, at the head of his gendarmes, supported by the Swiss pikemen, hoping to reach the beleaguered town in time to raise the siege. Great was his astonishment, therefore, on arriving before it, to find no trace of an enemy, except the ensigns of Spain unfurled from the deserted battlements. Mortified and dejected, he made no further attempt to recover Castellaneta, but

[30] Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, pp. 248, 249.—Guicciardini, Istoria, p. 296.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 175.—D'Auton, Hist. de Louys XII., part. 2, chap. 31.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 72.—The gallant behavior of La Palice, and indeed the whole siege of Ruvo, is told by Jean d'Auton in a truly heart-stirring tone, quite worthy of the chivalrous pen of old Froissart. There is an inexpressible charm imparted to the French memoirs and chronicles of this ancient date, not only from the picturesque character of the details, but from a gentle tinge of romance shed over them, which calls to mind the doughty feats of

"prowest knights,
Both Paynim and the peers of Charlemagne."

silently drew off to hide his chagrin within the walls of Canosa.[31]

Among the prisoners were several persons of distinguished rank. Gonsalvo treated them with his usual courtesy, and especially La Palice, whom he provided with his own surgeon and all the appliances for rendering his situation as comfortable as possible. For the common file, however, he showed no such sympathy, but condemned them all to serve in the Spanish admiral's galleys, where they continued to the close of the campaign.* An unfortunate misunderstanding had long subsisted between the French and Spanish commanders respecting the ransom and exchange of prisoners; and Gonsalvo was probably led to this severe measure, so different from his usual clemency, by an unwillingness to encumber himself with a superfluous population in the besieged city.[32] But, in truth, such a proceeding, however offensive to humanity, was not at all repugnant to the haughty spirit of chivalry, which, reserving its courtesies exclusively for those of gentle blood and high degree, cared little for the inferior orders, whether soldier or peasant, whom it abandoned

[31] Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., ubi supra.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 16.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 72.

[32] D'Auton, Hist. de Louys XII., ubi supra.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, p. 249.—Quintana, Españoles célebres, tom. ii. p. 270.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 14.

* [This contempt for the foot-soldier was one of the relics of feudalism, which tarried longer in the Spanish peninsula than elsewhere. Strangely enough, however, it was the Spanish infantry, developed first by Gonsalvo, which destroyed the supremacy of the cavalry in Europe. When the age of chivalry passed away the age of humanity came.—M.]

without remorse to all the caprices and cruelties of military license.

The capture of Ruvo was attended with important consequences to the Spaniards. Besides a valuable booty of clothes, jewels, and money, they brought back with them nearly a thousand horses, which furnished Gonsalvo with the means of augmenting his cavalry, the small number of which had hitherto materially crippled his operations. He accordingly selected seven hundred of his best troops and mounted them on the French horses; thus providing himself with a corps burning with zeal to approve itself worthy of the distinguished honor conferred on it.[33]

A few weeks after, the general received an important accession of strength by the arrival of two thousand German mercenaries, which Don Juan Manuel, the Spanish minister at the Austrian court, had been permitted to raise in the emperor's dominions. This event determined the Great Captain on a step which he had been some time meditating. The new levies placed him in a condition for assuming the offensive. His stock of provisions, moreover, already much reduced, would be obviously insufficient long to maintain his increased numbers. He resolved, therefore, to sally out of the old walls of Barleta, and, availing himself of the high spirits in which the late successes had put his troops, to bring the enemy at once to battle.[34]

[33] Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Vitorum, p. 249.

[34] Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 15.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 16.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 17.

CHAPTER XII

ITALIAN WARS—NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRANCE—VICTORY OF CERIGNOLA—SURRENDER OF NAPLES

1503

Birth of Charles V.—Philip and Joanna visit Spain—Treaty of Lyons—The Great Captain refuses to comply with it—Encamps before Cerignola—Battle, and Rout of the French—Triumphant Entry of Gonsalvo into Naples

BEFORE accompanying the Great Captain further in his warlike operations, it will be necessary to take a rapid glance at what was passing in the French and Spanish courts, where negotiations were in train for putting a stop to them altogether.

The reader has been made acquainted in a preceding chapter with the marriage of the infanta Joanna, second daughter of the Catholic sovereigns, with the archduke Philip, son of the emperor Maximilian, and sovereign, in right of his mother, of the Low Countries. The first fruit of this marriage was the celebrated Charles the Fifth, born at Ghent, February 24, 1500, whose birth was no sooner announced to Queen Isabella than she predicted that to this infant would one day descend the rich inheritance of the Spanish monarchy.[1] The premature death of the heir appar-

[1] Carbajal, Anales, MS., año 1500.—Sandoval, Hist. del Emp. Carlos V., tom. i. p. 2.—The queen expressed herself in the language of

ent, Prince Miguel, not long after, prepared the way for this event by devolving the succession on Joanna, Charles's mother. From that moment the sovereigns were pressing in their entreaties that the archduke and his wife would visit Spain, that they might receive the customary oaths of allegiance, and that the former might become acquainted with the character and institutions of his future subjects. The giddy young prince, however, thought too much of present pleasure to heed the call of ambition or duty, and suffered more than a year to glide away before he complied with the summons of his royal parents.[2]

In the latter part of 1501, Philip and Joanna, attended by a numerous suite of Flemish courtiers, set out on their journey, proposing to take their way through France. They were entertained with profuse magnificence and hospitality at the French

Scripture, "Sors cecidit super Mathiam," in allusion to the circumstances of Charles being born on that saint's day;* a day which, if we are to believe Garibay, was fortunate to him through the whole course of his life. Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 9.

[2] A letter from Joanna, in the collection of Señor de Gayangos, shows much eagerness to vindicate herself and her husband, as far as may be, from any suspicions of unwillingness to visit Spain, caused by their delay: "Io no se que ninguno de mi casa diga que pueden retardar nuestra yda alla, y si lo dixese seria tambien castigado quanto nunca fue persona, y deseo tanto la yda alla que todos los impydimientos que se ysieren trabajare que quitarlos con todas mis fuerças." Carta al Secretario Almazan, Bruselas, Noviembre 4, 1500, MS.

* [The day of Saint Matthias fell, not on the 24th, but on Tuesday the 25th of February, in the year 1500; and it is possible that the latter date was really that of Charles's birth, the error, if there be one, having arisen from the fact that the event took place within an hour after midnight. See Corónica de Felipe I° llamado el Hermoso, escrita por Don Lorenzo de Padilla y dirigida al Emperador Carlos V., published in the 8th volume of the Col. de Doc. inéd. para la Hist. de España.—K.]

court, where the politic attentions of Louis the Twelfth not only effaced the recollection of ancient injuries to the house of Burgundy,[3] but left impressions of the most agreeable character on the mind of the young prince.[4] After some weeks passed in a succession of splendid *fêtes* and amusements at Blois, where the archduke confirmed the treaty of Trent recently made between his father, the emperor, and the French king, stipulating the marriage of Louis's eldest daughter, the princess Claude, with Philip's son Charles, the royal pair resumed their journey towards Spain, which they entered by the way of Fontarabia, January 29, 1502.[5]

Magnificent preparations had been made for

[3] Charles VIII., Louis's predecessor, had contrived to secure the hand of Anne of Bretagne, notwithstanding she was already married by proxy to Philip's father, the emperor Maximilian; and this, too, in contempt of his own engagements to Margaret, the emperor's daughter, to whom he had been affianced from her infancy. This twofold insult, which sank deep into the heart of Maximilian, seems to have made no impression on the volatile spirits of his son.

[4] Mariana, Hist. de España, lib. 27, cap. 11.—St. Gelais describes the cordial reception of Philip and Joanna by the court at Blois, where he was probably present himself. The historian shows his own opinion of the effect produced on their young minds by these flattering attentions, by remarking, "Le roy leur monstra si très grand semblant d'amour, que par noblesse et honesteté de cœur *il les obligeoit envers luy de leur en souvenir toute leur vie.*" (Hist. de Louys XII., pp. 164, 165.) In passing through Paris, Philip took his seat in the parliament as peer of France, and subsequently did homage to Louis XII., as his suzerain for his estates in Flanders; an acknowledgment of inferiority not at all palatable to the Spanish historians, who insist with much satisfaction on the haughty refusal of his wife, the archduchess, to take part in the ceremony. Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 4, cap. 55.—Carbajal, Anales, MS., año 1502.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 13, sec. 1.—Dumont, Corps diplomatique, tom. iv. part. 1, p. 17.

[5] Carbajal, Anales, MS., año 1502.—Sandoval, Hist. del Emp. Carlos V., tom. i. p. 5.

their reception. The grand constable of Castile, the duke of Najara, and many other of the principal grandees waited on the borders to receive them. Brilliant *fêtes* and illuminations, and all the usual marks of public rejoicing, greeted their progress through the principal cities of the north; and a *pragmática* relaxing the simplicity, or rather severity, of the sumptuary laws of the period, so far as to allow the use of silks and various-colored apparel, shows the attention of the sovereigns to every circumstance, however trifling, which could affect the minds of the young princes agreeably and diffuse an air of cheerfulness over the scene.[6]

Ferdinand and Isabella, who were occupied with the affairs of Andalusia at this period, no sooner heard of the arrival of Philip and Joanna than they hastened to the north. They reached Toledo towards the end of April, and in a few days the queen, who paid the usual penalties of royalty, in seeing her children, one after another, removed far from her into distant lands, had the satisfaction of again folding her beloved daughter in her arms.

On the 22d of the ensuing month the archduke and his wife received the usual oaths of fealty from the cortes, duly convoked for the purpose at Toledo.[7] King Ferdinand, not long after, made

[6] Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 4, cap. 55.—Ferreras, Hist. d'Espagne, tom. viii. p. 220.—This extreme simplicity of attire, in which Zurita discerns "the modesty of the times," was enforced by laws the policy of which, whatever be thought of their moral import, may well be doubted in an economical view. I shall have occasion to draw the reader's attention to them hereafter.

[7] The writ is dated at Llerena, March 8. It was extracted by Marina from the archives of Toledo, Teoría, tom. ii. p. 18.

a journey into Aragon, in which the queen's feeble health would not permit her to accompany him, in order to prepare the way for a similar recognition by the estates of that realm. We are not informed what arguments the sagacious monarch made use of to dispel the scruples formerly entertained by that independent body, on a similar application in behalf of his daughter, the late queen of Portugal.[8] They were completely successful, however; and Philip and Joanna, having ascertained the favorable disposition of cortes, made their entrance in great state into the ancient city of Saragossa, in the month of October. On the 27th, having first made oath before the justice, to observe the laws and liberties of the realm, Joanna as future queen proprietor, and Philip as her husband, were solemnly recognized by the four *arms* of Aragon as successors to the

[8] It is remarkable that the Aragonese writers, generally so inquisitive on all points touching the constitutional history of their country, should have omitted to notice the grounds on which the cortes thought proper to reverse its former decision in the analogous case of the infanta Isabella. There seems to have been even less reason for departing from ancient usage in the present instance, since Joanna had a son, to whom the cortes might lawfully have tendered its oath of recognition; for a female, although excluded from the throne in her own person, was regarded as competent to transmit the title unimpaired to her male heirs. Blancas suggests no explanation of the affair (Coronaciones, lib. 3, cap. 20, and Commentarii, pp. 274, 511), and Zurita quietly dismisses it with the remark that "there was some opposition raised, but *the king had managed it so discreetly beforehand* that there was not the same difficulty as formerly." (Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 5.) It is curious to see with what effrontery the prothonotary of the cortes, in the desire to varnish over the departure from constitutional precedent, declares, in the opening address, "the princess Joanna, true and lawful heir to the crown, to whom, in default of male heirs, the usage and law of the land require the oath of allegiance." Coronaciones, ubi supra.

crown, in default of male issue of King Ferdinand. The circumstance is memorable, as affording the first example of the parliamentary recognition of a female heir apparent in Aragonese history.[9]

Amidst all the honors so liberally lavished on Philip, his bosom secretly swelled with discontent, fomented still further by his followers, who pressed him to hasten his return to Flanders, where the free and social manners of the people were much more congenial to their tastes than the reserve and stately ceremonial of the Spanish court. The young prince shared in these feelings, to which, indeed, the love of pleasure, and an instinctive aversion to anything like serious occupation, naturally disposed him. Ferdinand and Isabella saw with regret the frivolous disposition of their son-in-law, who, in the indulgence of selfish and effeminate ease, was willing to repose on others all the important duties of government. They beheld with mortification his indifference to Joanna, who could boast few personal attractions,[10] and who cooled the affections of her husband by alternations of excessive fondness and

[9] Carbajal, Anales, MS., año 1500.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom ii. rey 30, cap. 12, sec. 6.—Robles, Vida de Ximenez, p. 126.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 14.—Sandoval, Hist. del Emp. Carlos V., tom. i. p. 5.—Petronilla, the only female who ever sat, in her own right, on the throne of Aragon, never received the homage of cortes as heir apparent; the custom not having been established at that time, the middle of the twelfth century. (Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 5.) Blancas has described the ceremony of Joanna's recognition with quite as much circumstantiality as the novelty of the case could warrant. Coronaciones, lib. 3, cap. 20.

[10] "Simplex est fœmina," says Martyr, speaking of Joanna, "licet a tantâ muliere progenita." Opus Epist., epist. 250.

irritable jealousy, for which last the levity of his conduct gave her too much occasion.

Shortly after the ceremony at Saragossa, the archduke announced his intention of an immediate return to the Netherlands, by the way of France. The sovereigns, astonished at this abrupt determination, used every argument to dissuade him from it. They represented the ill effects it might occasion the princess Joanna, then too far advanced in a state of pregnancy to accompany him. They pointed out the impropriety, as well as danger, of committing himself to the hands of the French king, with whom they were now at open war; and they finally insisted on the importance of Philip's remaining long enough in the kingdom to become familiar with the usages and establish himself in the affections of the people over whom he would one day be called to reign.

All these arguments were ineffectual; the inflexible prince, turning a deaf ear alike to the entreaties of his unhappy wife and the remonstrances of the Aragonese cortes still in session, set out from Madrid, with the whole of his Flemish suite, in the month of December. He left Ferdinand and Isabella disgusted with the levity of his conduct, and the queen, in particular, filled with mournful solicitude for the welfare of the daughter with whom his destinies were united.[11]

Before his departure for France, Philip, anxious to re-establish harmony between that country

[11] Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., ubi supra.—Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 10.—Gomez, De Rebus gestis, fol. 44.—Carbajal, Anales MS., año 1502.

and Spain, offered his services to his father-in-law in negotiating with Louis the Twelfth, if possible, a settlement of the differences respecting Naples. Ferdinand showed some reluctance at intrusting so delicate a commission to an envoy in whose discretion he placed small reliance, which was not augmented by the known partiality which Philip entertained for the French monarch.[12] Before the archduke had crossed the frontier, however, he was overtaken by a Spanish ecclesiastic named Bernaldo Boyl, abbot of St. Miguel de Cuxa, who brought full powers to Philip from the king for concluding a treaty with France, accompanied at the same time with private instructions of the most strict and limited nature. He was enjoined, moreover, to take no step without the advice of his reverend coadjutor, and to inform the Spanish court at once if different propositions were submitted from those contemplated by his instructions.[13]

Thus fortified, the archduke Philip made his appearance at the French court in Lyons, where he was received by Louis with the same lively expressions of regard as before. With these amiable dispositions, the negotiations were not long in resulting in a definitive treaty, arranged to the mutual satisfaction of the parties, though in viola-

[12] Such manifest partiality for the French court and manners was shown by Philip and his Flemish followers, that the Spaniards very generally believed the latter were in the pay of Louis XII. See Gomez, De Rebus gestis, fol. 44.—Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 23.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 253.—Lanuza, Historias, cap. 16.

[13] Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 10.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 13, sec. 2.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 15.—D'Auton, Hist. de Louys XII., part. 1, chap. 32.

tion of the private instructions of the archduke. In the progress of the discussions, Ferdinand, according to the Spanish historians, received advices from his envoy, the abate Boyl, that Philip was transcending his commission; in consequence of which the king sent an express to France, urging his son-in-law to adhere to the strict letter of his instructions. Before the messenger reached Lyons, however, the treaty was executed. Such is the Spanish account of this blind transaction.[14]

The treaty, which was signed at Lyons, April 5, 1503, was arranged on the basis of the marriage of Charles, the infant son of Philip, and Claude, princess of France; a marriage which, settled by three several treaties, was destined never to take place. The royal infants were immediately to assume the titles of King and Queen of Naples, and Duke and Duchess of Calabria. Until the consummation of the marriage, the French division of the kingdom was to be placed under the administration of some suitable person named by Louis the Twelfth, and the Spanish under that of the archduke Philip, or some other deputy appointed by Ferdinand. All places unlawfully seized by either party were to be restored; and,

[14] Zurtia, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 23.—St. Gelais, Hist. de Louys XII., pp. 170, 171.—Claude de Seyssel, Histoire de Louys XII. (Paris, 1615), p. 108.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 13, sec. 3.—Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. pp. 690, 691.—Lanuza, Historias, tom. i. cap. 16.—Some of the French historians speak of two agents besides Philip employed in the negotiations. Father Boyl is the only one named by the Spanish writers as regularly commissioned for the purpose, although it is not improbable that Gralla, the resident minister at Louis's court, took part in the discussions.

lastly, it was settled, with regard to the disputed province of the Capitanate, that the portion held by the French should be governed by an agent of King Louis, and the Spanish by the archduke Philip on behalf of Ferdinand.[15]

Such in substance was the treaty of Lyons; a treaty which, while it seemed to consult the interests of Ferdinand, by securing the throne of Naples eventually to his posterity, was in fact far more accommodated to those of Louis, by placing the immediate control of the Spanish moiety under a prince over whom that monarch held entire influence. It is impossible that so shrewd a statesman as Ferdinand could, from the mere consideration of advantages so remote and dependent on so precarious a contingency as the marriage of two infants then in their cradles, have seriously contemplated an arrangement which surrendered all the actual power into the hands of his rival; and that, too, at the moment when his large armament, so long preparing for Calabria, had reached that country, and when the Great Captain, on the other quarter, had received such accessions of strength as enabled him to assume the offensive, on at least equal terms with the enemy.

No misgivings on this head, however, appear to have entered the minds of the signers of the treaty, which was celebrated by the court at Lyons with every show of public rejoicing, and particularly with tourneys and tilts of reeds, in imitation of the Spanish chivalry. At the same time, the French

[15] See the treaty, apud Dumont, Corps diplomatique, tom. iv. pp. 27–29.

king countermanded the embarkation of fresh troops on board a fleet equipping at the port of Genoa for Naples, and sent orders to his generals in Italy to desist from further operations. The archduke forwarded similar instructions to Gonsalvo, accompanied with a copy of the powers intrusted to him by Ferdinand. That prudent officer, however, whether in obedience to previous directions from the king, as Spanish writers affirm, or on his own responsibility, from a very natural sense of duty, refused to comply with the ambassador's orders; declaring "he knew no authority but that of his own sovereigns, and that he felt bound to prosecute the war with all his ability, till he received their commands to the contrary." [16]

[16] Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 13, sec. 3.—Giannone, Istoria di Napoli, lib. 29, cap. 4.—St. Gelais, Hist. de Louys XII., p. 171.—Buonaccorsi, Diario, p. 75.—D'Auton, Hist. de Louys XII., part. 2, chap. 32.—According to the Aragonese historians, Ferdinand, on the archduke's departure, informed Gonsalvo of the intended negotiations with France, cautioning the general at the same time not to heed any instructions of the archduke till confirmed by him. This circumstance the French writers regard as unequivocal proof of the king's insincerity in entering into the negotiation. It wears this aspect at first, certainly, but, on a nearer view, admits of a very different construction. Ferdinand had no confidence in the discretion of his envoy, whom, if we are to believe the Spanish writers, he employed in the affair more from accident than choice; and, notwithstanding the full powers intrusted to him, he did not consider himself bound to recognize the validity of any treaty which the other should sign, until first ratified by himself. With these views, founded on principles now universally recognized in European diplomacy, it was natural to caution his general against any unauthorized interference on the part of his envoy, which the rash and presumptuous character of the latter, acting, moreover, under an undue influence of the French monarch, gave him good reason to fear.—As to the Great Captain, who has borne a liberal share of censure on this occasion, it is not easy to see how he could have acted otherwise than he did, even in the event of no

Indeed, the archduke's dispatches arrived at the very time when the Spanish general, having strengthened himself by a reinforcement from the neighboring garrison of Tarento under Pedro Navarro, was prepared to sally forth and try his fortune in battle with the enemy. Without further delay, he put his purpose into execution, and on Friday the 28th of April, 1503, marched out with his whole army from the ancient walls of Barleta; a spot ever memorable in history as the scene of the extraordinary sufferings and indomitable constancy of the Spanish soldier.

The road lay across the field of Cannæ, where, seventeen centuries before, the pride of Rome had been humbled by the victorious arms of Hannibal,[17] in a batttle which, though fought with far greater numbers, was not so decisive in its conse-

special instructions from Ferdinand. For he would scarcely have been justified in abandoning a sure prospect of advantage on the authority of one, the validity of whose powers he could not determine, and which, in fact, do not appear to have warranted such interference. The only authority he knew was that from which he held his commission, and to which he was responsible for the faithful discharge of it.

[17] Neither Polybius (lib. 3, sec. 24, et seq.) nor Livy (Hist., lib. 22, cap. 43–50), who give the most circumstantial narratives of the battle, is precise enough to enable us to ascertain the exact spot in which it was fought. Strabo, in his topographical notices of this part of Italy, briefly alludes to "the affair of Cannæ" (τὰ περὶ Κάννας), without any description of the scene of action. (Geog., lib. 6, p. 285.) Cluverius fixes the site of the ancient Cannæ on the right bank of the Aufidus, the modern Ofanto, between three and four miles below Canusium, and notices the modern hamlet of nearly the same name, Canne, where common tradition recognizes the ruins of the ancient town. (Italia Antiqua, lib. 4, cap. 12, sec. 8.) D'Anville makes no difficulty in identifying these two (Géographie ancienne, abrégée, tom. i. p. 208), having laid down the ancient town in his maps in the direct line, and about midway, between Barleta and Cerignola.

quences as that which the same scenes were to witness in a few hours. The coincidence is certainly singular; and one might almost fancy that the actors in these fearful tragedies, unwilling to deface the fair haunts of civilization, had purposely sought a more fitting theatre in this obscure and sequestered region.

The weather, although only at the latter end of April, was extremely sultry; the troops, notwithstanding Gonsalvo's orders on crossing the river Ofanto, the ancient Aufidus, had failed to supply themselves with sufficient water for the march; parched with heat and dust, they were soon distressed by excessive thirst; and, as the burning rays of the noontide sun beat fiercely on their heads, many of them, especially those cased in heavy armor, sank down on the road, fainting with exhaustion and fatigue. Gonsalvo was seen in every quarter, administering to the necessities of his men, and striving to reanimate their drooping spirits. At length, to relieve them, he commanded that each trooper should take one of the infantry on his crupper, setting the example himself by mounting a German ensign behind him on his own horse.

In this way, the whole army arrived early in the afternoon before Cerignola, a small town on an eminence about sixteen miles from Barleta, where the nature of the ground afforded the Spanish general a favorable position for his camp. The sloping sides of the hill were covered with vineyards, and its base was protected by a ditch of considerable depth. Gonsalvo saw at once the advan-

tages of the ground. His men were jaded by the march; but there was no time to lose, as the French, who, on his departure from Barleta, had been drawn up under the walls of Canosa, were now rapidly advancing. All hands were put in requisition, therefore, for widening the trench, in which they planted sharp-pointed stakes; while the earth which they excavated enabled them to throw up a parapet of considerable height on the side next the town. On this rampart he mounted his little train of artillery, consisting of thirteen guns, and behind it drew up his forces in order of battle.[18]

Before these movements were completed in the Spanish camp, the bright arms and banners of the French were seen glistening in the distance amid the tall fennel and cane-brakes with which the country was thickly covered. As soon as they had come in view of the Spanish encampment, they were brought to a halt, while a council of war was called, to determine the expediency of giving battle that evening. The duke of Nemours would have deferred it till the following morning, as the day was already far spent and allowed no time for reconnoitring the position of his enemy. But Ives

[18] Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum fol. 253–255.—Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 5, p. 303.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 75, 76.—Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 27.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 256. —Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 16, 17.—Giovio says that he had heard Fabrizio Colonna remark more than once, in allusion to the intrenchments at the base of the hill, "that the victory was owing, not to the skill of the commander nor the valor of the troops, but to a mound and a ditch." This ancient mode of securing a position, which had fallen into disuse, was revived after this, according to the same author, and came into general practice among the best captains of the age—Ubi supra.

d'Alègre, Chandieu, the commander of the Swiss, and some other officers, were for immediate action, representing the importance of not balking the impatience of the soldiers, who were all hot for the assault. In the course of the debate, Alègre was so much heated as to throw out some rash taunts on the courage of the viceroy, which the latter would have avenged on the spot, had not his arm been arrested by Louis d'Ars. He had the weakness, however, to suffer them to change his cooler purpose, exclaiming, "We will fight to-night, then; and perhaps those who vaunt the loudest will be found to trust more to their spurs than their swords;" a prediction bitterly justified by the event.[19]

While this dispute was going on, Gonsalvo gained time for making the necessary disposition of his troops. In the centre he placed his German auxiliaries, armed with their long pikes, and on each wing the Spanish infantry under the command of Pedro Navarro, Diego de Paredes, Pizarro, and other illustrious captains. The defence of the artillery was committed to the left wing. A considerable body of men-at-arms, including those recently equipped from the spoils of Ruvo, was drawn up within the intrenchments, in a quarter affording a convenient opening for a sally, and placed under the orders of Mendoza and Fabrizio Colonna, whose brother Prospero and Pedro de la Paz took charge of the light

[19] Brantôme, Œuvres, tom. ii. disc. 8.—Garnier, Histoire de France (Paris, 1783–8), tom. v. pp. 395, 396.—Gaillard, Rivalité, tom. iv. p. 244.—St. Gelais, Hist. de Louys XII., p. 171.

cavalry, which was posted without the lines to annoy the advance of the enemy, and act on any point, as occasion might require. Having completed his preparations, the Spanish general coolly waited the assault of the French.

The duke of Nemours had marshalled his forces in a very different order. He distributed them into three battles or divisions, stationing his heavy horse, composing altogether, as Gonsalvo declared, "the finest body of cavalry seen for many years in Italy," under the command of Louis d'Ars, on the right. The second and centre division, formed somewhat in the rear of the right, was made up of the Swiss and Gascon infantry, headed by the brave Chandieu; and his left, consisting chiefly of his light cavalry, and drawn up, like the last, somewhat in the rear of the preceding, was intrusted to Alègre.[20]

It was within half an hour of sunset when the duke de Nemours gave orders for the attack, and, putting himself at the head of the gendarmerie on the right, spurred at full gallop against the Spanish left. The hostile armies were nearly equal, amounting to between six and seven thousand men each. The French were superior in the number and condition of their cavalry, rising to a third of their whole force; while Gonsalvo's strength lay chiefly in his infantry, which had acquired a lesson of tactics under him that raised it to a level with the best in Europe.

[20] Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 76.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust, Virorum, fol. 253–255.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 17.

As the French advanced, the guns on the Spanish left poured a lively fire into their ranks, when, a spark accidentally communicating with the magazine of powder, the whole blew up with a tremendous explosion. The Spaniards were filled with consternation; but Gonsalvo, converting the misfortune into a lucky omen, called out, "Courage, soldiers! these are the beacon-lights of victory! We have no need of our guns at close quarters."

In the mean time, the French van under Nemours, advancing rapidly under the dark clouds of smoke which rolled heavily over the field, were unexpectedly brought up by the deep trench, of whose existence they were unapprised. Some of the horse were precipitated into it, and all received a sudden check, until Nemours, finding it impossible to force the works in this quarter, rode along their front in search of some practicable passage. In doing this, he necessarily exposed his flank to the fatal aim of the Spanish arquebusiers. A shot from one of them took effect on the unfortunate young nobleman, and he fell, mortally wounded, from his saddle.

At this juncture, the Swiss and Gascon infantry, briskly moving up to second the attack of the now disordered horse, arrived before the intrenchments. Undismayed by this formidable barrier, their commander, Chandieu, made the most desperate attempts to force a passage; but the loose earth freshly turned up afforded no hold to the feet, and his men were compelled to recoil from the dense array of German pikes which bristled

over the summit of the breastwork. Chandieu, their leader, made every effort to rally and bring them back to the charge, but, in the act of doing this, was hit by a ball, which stretched him lifeless in the ditch; his burnished arms, and the snow-white plumes above his helmet, making him a conspicuous mark for the enemy.

All was now confusion. The Spanish arquebusiers, screened by their defences, poured a galling fire into the dense masses of the enemy, who were mingled together indiscriminately, horse and foot, while, the leaders being down, no one seemed capable of bringing them to order. At this critical moment, Gonsalvo, whose eagle eye took in the operations of the whole field, ordered a general charge along the line; and the Spaniards, leaping their intrenchments, descended with the fury of an avalanche on their foes, whose wavering columns, completely broken by the violence of the shock, were seized with a panic, and fled, scarcely offering any resistance. Louis d'Ars, at the head of such of the men-at-arms as could follow him, went off in one direction, and Ives d'Alègre, with his light cavalry, which had hardly come into action, in another; thus fully verifying the ominous prediction of his commander. The slaughter fell most heavily on the Swiss and Gascon foot, whom the cavalry under Mendoza and Pedro de la Paz rode down and cut to pieces without sparing, till the shades of evening shielded them at length from their pitiless pursuers.[21]

[21] Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 75.—Garnier, Hist. de France, tom. v. pp. 396, 397.—Fleurange, Mémoirs, chap. 5, apud Petitot,

Prospero Colonna pushed on to the French encampment, where he found the tables in the duke's tent spread for his evening repast, of which the Italian general and his followers did not fail to make good account,—a trifling incident, that well illustrates the sudden reverses of war.

The Great Captain passed the night on the field of battle, which on the following morning presented a ghastly spectacle of the dying and the dead. More than three thousand French are computed by the best accounts to have fallen. The loss of the Spaniards, covered as they were by their defences, was inconsiderable.[22] All the enemy's artillery, consisting of thirteen pieces, his baggage, and most of his colors fell into their hands. Never was there a more complete victory, achieved too within the space of little more than an hour. The body of the unfortunate Nemours, which was

Collection des Mémoires, tom. xvi.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, ubi sup.—Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. pp. 303, 304.—St. Gelais, Hist. de Louys XII., pp. 171, 172.—Brantôme, Œuvres, tom. ii. disc. 8.

[22] Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, fol. 255.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 15.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 180.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 256.—Fleurange, Mémoires, chap. 5.—No account, that I know of, places the French loss so low as 3000; Garibay raises it to 4500, and the French maréchal de Fleurange rates that of the Swiss alone at 5000; a round exaggeration, not readily accounted for, as he had undoubted access to the best means of information. The Spaniards were too well screened to sustain much injury, and no estimate makes it more than a hundred killed, and some considerably less. The odds are indeed startling, but not impossible; as the Spaniards were not much exposed by personal collision with the enemy, until the latter were thrown into too much disorder to think of anything but escape. The more than usual confusion and discrepancy in the various statements of the particulars of this action may probably be attributed to the lateness of the hour, and consequently imperfect light, in which it was fought.

recognized by one of his pages from the rings on the fingers, was found under a heap of slain, much disfigured. It appeared that he had received three several wounds, disproving, if need were, by his honorable death the injurious taunts of Alègre. Gonsalvo was affected even to tears at beholding the mutilated remains of his young and gallant adversary, who, whatever judgment might be formed of his capacity as a leader, was allowed to have all the qualities which belong to a true knight. With him perished the last scion of the illustrious house of Armagnac. Gonsalvo ordered his remains to be conveyed to Barleta, where they were laid in the cemetery of the convent of St. Francis, with all the honors due to his high station.[23]

The Spanish commander lost no time in following up his blow, well aware that it is quite as difficult to improve a victory as to win one. The French had rushed into battle with too much precipitation to agree on any plan of operations, or any point on which to rally in case of defeat. They accordingly scattered in different directions, and Pedro de la Paz was despatched in pursuit of Louis d'Ars, who threw himself into Venosa,[24] where he kept the enemy at bay for many months longer. Paredes kept close on the scent of Alègre, who, finding the gates shut against him wherever he passed, at length took shelter in Gaeta on the

[23] Quintana, Españoles célebres, tom. i. p. 277.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, fol. 255.—Ferreras, Hist. d'Espagne, tom. viii. pp. 248, 249.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlos V., fol. 17.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 181.

[24] It was to this same city of Venusium that the rash and unfortunate Varro made his retreat, some seventeen centuries before, from the bloody field of Cannæ. Liv. Hist., lib. 22, cap. 49.

extreme point of the Neapolitan territory. There he endeavored to rally the scattered relics of the field of Cerignola, and to establish a strong position, from which the French, when strengthened by fresh supplies from home, might recommence operations for the recovery of the kingdom.

The day after the battle of Cerignola the Spaniards received tidings of another victory, scarcely less important, gained over the French in Calabria, the preceding week.[25] The army sent out under Portocarrero had reached that coast early in March; but soon after its arrival its gallant commander fell ill and died.[26] The dying general named Don Fernando de Andrada as his successor; and this officer, combining his forces with those before in the country under Cardona and Benavides, encountered the French commander D'Aubigny in a pitched battle, not far from Seminara, on Friday, the 21st of April. It was near the same spot on which the latter had twice beaten

[25] Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, fol. 255.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 256.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 80.—Friday, says Guicciardini, alluding no doubt to Columbus's discoveries, as well as these two victories, was observed to be a lucky day to the Spaniards. (Istoria, tom. i. p. 304.) According to Gaillard, it was regarded from the time by the French with more superstitious dread than ever.—Rivalité, tom. vi. p. 348.

[26] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 8, 24.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, fol. 250.—The reader may perhaps recollect the distinguished part played in the Moorish war by Luis Portocarrero, lord of Palma. He was of noble Italian origin, being descended from the ancient Genoese house of Boccanegra. The Great Captain and he had married sisters; and this connection probably recommended him, as much as his military talents, to the Calabrian command, which it was highly important should be intrusted to one who would maintain a good understanding with the commander-in-chief; a thing not easy to secure among the haughty nobility of Castile.

the Spaniards. But the star of France was on the wane; and the gallant old officer had the mortification to see his little corps of veterans completely routed after a sharp engagement of less than an hour, while he himself was retrieved with difficulty from the hands of the enemy by the valor of his Scottish guard.[27]

The Great Captain and his army, highly elated with the news of this fortunate event, which annihilated the French power in Calabria, began their march on Naples; Fabrizio Colonna having been first detached into the Abruzzi to receive the submission of the people in that quarter. The tidings of the victory had spread far and wide; and, as Gonsalvo's army advanced, they beheld the ensigns of Aragon floating from the battlements of the towns upon their route, while the inhabitants came forth to greet the conqueror, eager to testify their devotion to the Spanish cause. The army halted at Benevento; and the general sent his summons to the city of Naples, inviting it in the most courteous terms to resume its ancient allegience to the legitimate branch of Aragon. It was hardly to be expected that the allegiance of a people who had so long seen their country set up as a mere stake for political gamesters should sit very closely upon them, or that they should care to peril their lives on the transfer of a crown which had shifted on the heads of half a dozen proprietors in as

[27] Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, fol. 255.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 256.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 80.—Varillas, Histoire de Louis XII. (Paris, 1688), tom. i. pp. 289–292.—See the account of D'Aubigny's victories at Seminara, in Part II., chapters 2 and 11, of this History.

many successive years.[28] With the same ductile enthusiasm, therefore, with which they had greeted the accession of Charles the Eighth and of Louis the Twelfth, they now welcomed the restoration of the anicent dynasty of Aragon; and deputies from the principal nobility and citizens waited on the Great Captain at Acerra, where they tendered him the keys of the city and requested the confirmation of their rights and privileges.

Gonsalvo, having promised this in the name of his royal master, on the following morning, the 14th of May, 1503, made his entrance in great state into the capital, leaving his army without the walls. He was escorted by the military of the city under a royal canopy borne by the deputies. The streets were strewed with flowers, the edifices decorated with appropriate emblems and devices and wreathed with banners emblazoned with the united arms of Aragon and Naples. As he passed along, the city rang with the acclamations of countless multitudes who thronged the streets; while every window and housetop was filled with spectators, eager to behold the man who, with scarcely any other resources than those of his own genius, had so long defied, and at length completely foiled, the power of France.

[28] Since 1494 the sceptre of Naples had passed into the hands of no less than seven princes, Ferdinand I., Alfonso II., Ferdinand II., Charles VIII., Frederick III., Louis XII., Ferdinand the Catholic. No private estate in the kingdom in the same time had probably changed masters half so often. Gonsalvo notices this revolutionary spirit of the Neapolitans in this emphatic language: "Regno tan tremoloso que la paz que al mundo sosiega á el lo altera."—Carta al Rey Cathólico de Nápoles, á 31 de Octubre, 1505, MS.

On the following day a deputation of the nobility and people waited on the Great Captain at his quarters, and tendered him the usual oaths of allegiance for his master, King Ferdinand, whose accession finally closed the series of revolutions which had so long agitated this unhappy country.[29]

The city of Naples was commanded by two strong fortresses still held by the French, which, being well victualled and supplied with ammunition, showed no disposition to surrender. The Great Captain determined, therefore, to reserve a small corps for their reduction, while he sent forward the main body of his army to besiege Gaeta. But the Spanish infantry refused to march until the heavy arrears, suffered to accumulate through the negligence of the government, were discharged; and Gonsalvo, afraid of awakening the mutinous spirit which he had once found it so difficult to quell, was obliged to content himself with sending forward his cavalry and German levies, and to permit the infantry to take up its quarters in the capital, under strict orders to respect the persons and property of the citizens.

He now lost no time in pressing the siege of the French fortresses, whose impregnable situation might have derided the efforts of the most formidable enemy in the ancient state of military science. But the reduction of these places was intrusted to

[29] Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. p. 304.—Giannone, Istoria di Napoli, lib. 29, cap. 4.—Ferreras, Hist. d'Espagne, tom. viii. p. 250.—Summonte, Hist. di Napoli, tom. iii. pp. 552, 553.—Muratori, Annali d'Italia, tom. xiv. p. 40.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 81.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 18.

Pedro Navarro, the celebrated engineer, whose improvements in the art of mining have gained him the popular reputation of being its inventor, and who displayed such unprecedented skill on this occasion as makes it a memorable epoch in the annals of war.[30]

Under his directions, the small tower of St. Vincenzo having been first reduced by a furious cannonade, a mine was run under the outer defences of the great fortress called Castel Nuovo. On the 21st of May, the mine was sprung; a passage was opened over the prostrate ramparts, and the assailants, rushing in with Gonsalvo and Navarro at their head, before the garrison had time to secure the drawbridge, applied their ladders to the walls of the castle and succeeded in carrying the place by escalade, after a desperate struggle, in which the greater part of the French were slaughtered. An immense booty was found in the castle. The Angevin party had made it a place of deposit for their most valuable effects, gold, jewels, plate, and other treasures, which, together with its well-stored magazines of grain and ammunition, became the indiscriminate spoil of the victors. As some of these, however, complained of not getting their share of the plunder, Gonsalvo, giving full scope in the exultation of the moment to military license,

[30] The Italians, in their admiration of Pedro Navarro, caused medals to be struck on which the invention of mines was ascribed to him. (Marini, apud Daru, Hist. de Venise, tom. iii. p. 351.) Although not actually the inventor, his glory was scarcely less, since he was the first who discovered the extensive and formidable uses to which they might be applied in the science of destruction. See Part I., chapter 13, note 23, of this History.

called out, gayly, "Make amends for it, then, by what you can find in my quarters!" The words were not uttered to deaf ears. The mob of soldiery rushed to the splendid palace of the Angevin prince of Salerno, then occupied by the Great Captain, and in a moment its sumptuous furniture, paintings, and other costly decorations, together with the contents of its generous cellar, were seized and appropriated without ceremony by the invaders, who thus indemnified themselves at their general's expense for the remissness of the government.

After some weeks of protracted operations, the remaining fortress, Castel d'Uovo, as it was called, opened its gates to Navarro; and a French fleet, coming into the harbor, had the mortification to find itself fired on from the walls of the place it was intended to relieve. Before this event, Gonsalvo, having obtained funds from Spain for paying off his men, quitted the capital and directed his march on Gaeta. The important results of his victories were now fully disclosed. D'Aubigny, with the wreck of the forces escaped from Seminara, had surrendered. The two Abruzzi, the Capitanate, all the Basilicate, except Venosa, still held by Louis d'Ars, and indeed every considerable place in the kingdom, had tendered its submission, with the exception of Gaeta. Summoning, therefore, to his aid Andrada, Navarro, and his other officers, the Great Captain resolved to concentrate all his strength on this point, designing to press the siege, and thus exterminate at a blow the feeble remains of the French power in Italy. The enterprise was

attended with more difficulty than he had anticipated.[31]

[31] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 30, 31, 34, 35. —Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, fol. 255–257.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 15.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 183.—Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 6, pp. 307–309.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 18, 19.—Ammirato, Istorie Fiorentine, tom. iii. p. 271.—Summonte, Hist. di Napoli, tom. iii. p. 554.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 84, 86, 87, 93, 95.—Sismondi, Hist. des Français, tom. xv. pp. 407–409.

CHAPTER XIII

NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRANCE—UNSUCCESSFUL INVASION OF SPAIN—TRUCE

1503

Ferdinand's Policy examined—First Symptoms of Joanna's Insanity—Isabella's Distress and Fortitude—Efforts of France—Siege of Salsas—Isabella's Levies—Ferdinand's Successes—Reflections on the Campaign

THE events noticed in the preceding chapter glided away as rapidly as the flitting phantoms of a dream. Scarcely had Louis the Twelfth received the unwelcome intelligence of Gonsalvo de Cordova's refusal to obey the mandate of the archduke Philip, before he was astounded with the tidings of the victory of Cerignola, the march on Naples, and the surrender of that capital, as well as of the greater part of the kingdom, following one another in breathless succession. It seemed as if the very means on which the French king had so confidently relied for calming the tempest had been the signal for awakening all its fury and bringing it on his devoted head. Mortified and incensed at being made the dupe of what he deemed a perfidious policy, he demanded an explanation of the archduke, who was still in France. The latter, vehemently protesting his own innocence, felt, or affected to feel, so sensibly the ridiculous and, as it appeared, dishonorable part played by him in the transaction, that he was thrown into

a severe illness, which confined him to his bed for several days.[1] Without delay, he wrote to the Spanish court in terms of bitter expostulation, urging the immediate ratification of the treaty made pursuant to its orders, and an indemnification to France for its subsequent violation. Such is the account given by the French historians.

The Spanish writers, on the other hand, say that, before the news of Gonsalvo's successes reached Spain, King Ferdinand refused to confirm the treaty sent him by his son-in-law, until it had undergone certain material modifications. If the Spanish monarch hesitated to approve the treaty in the doubtful posture of his affairs, he was little likely to do so when he had the game entirely in his own hands.[2]

He postponed an answer to Philip's application, willing probably to gain time for the Great Captain to strengthen himself firmly in his recent acquisitions. At length, after a considerable interval, he dispatched an embassy to France, announcing his final determination never to ratify a treaty made in contempt of his orders and so clearly detrimental to his interests He endeavored, however, to gain further time by spinning out the negotiation, holding up for this purpose the prospect of an ultimate accommodation, and suggesting the

[1] St. Gelais seems willing to accept Philip's statement, and to consider the whole affair of the negotiation as "one of Ferdinand's old tricks," "l'ancienne cautele de celuy qui en sçavoit bien faire d'autres." Hist. de Louys XII., p. 172.

[2] Idem, ubi supra.—Garnier, Hist. de France, tom. v. p. 410—Gaillard, Rivalité, tom. iv. pp. 238, 239.—Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 23.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 15.—Ferreras, Hist. d'Espagne, tom. viii. p. 233.

re-establishment of his kinsman, the unfortunate Frederick, on the Neapolitan throne, as the best means of effecting it. The artifice, however, was too gross even for the credulous Louis, who peremptorily demanded of the ambassadors the instant and absolute ratification of the treaty, and, on their declaring it was beyond their powers, ordered them at once to leave his court. "I had rather," said he, "suffer the loss of a kingdom, which may perhaps be retrieved, than the loss of honor, which never can." A noble sentiment, but falling with no particular grace from the lips of Louis the Twelfth.[3]

The whole of this blind transaction is stated in so irreconcilable a manner by the historians of the different nations that it is extremely difficult to draw anything like a probable narrative out of them. The Spanish writers assert that the public commission of the archduke was controlled by strict private instructions;[4] while the French, on

[3] Garnier, Hist. de France, tom. v. p. 388.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 13, sec. 3.—Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. p. 300, ed. 1645.—Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 9.—It is amusing to see with what industry certain French writers, as Gaillard and Varillas, are perpetually contrasting the *bonne foi* of Louis XII. with the *méchanceté* of Ferdinand, whose secret intentions, even, are quoted in evidence of his hypocrisy, while the most objectionable acts of his rival seem to be abundantly compensated by some fine sentiment like that in the text.*

[4] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 10.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 13, sec. 2.—Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. pp. 690, 691.—et al.

* [According to Gaillard, Ferdinand took no measures to conceal his deceit, but on the contrary rather gloried in it. Some one told him one day that Louis XII. accused him of having cheated him three times. "The drunkard," said Ferdinand, "he lies. I have cheated him more than ten times." Rivalité, tom. iv. p. 240.—M.]

the other hand, are either silent as to the latter, or represent them to have been as broad and unlimited as his credentials.[5] If this be true, the negotiation must be admitted to exhibit, on the part of Ferdinand, as gross an example of political jugglery and falsehood as ever disgraced the annals of diplomacy.[6]

But it is altogether improbable, as I have before remarked, that a monarch so astute and habitually cautious should have intrusted unlimited authority, in so delicate a business, to a person whose discretion, independently of his known partiality for the French monarch, he held so lightly. It is much more likely that he limited, as is often done, the full powers committed to him in public, by private instructions of the most explicit character; and that the archduke was betrayed by his own vanity, and perhaps ambition (for the treaty threw the immediate power into his own hands), into

[5] Seyssel, Hist. de Louys XII., p. 61.—St. Gelais, Hist. de Louys XII., p. 171.—Gaillard, Rivalité, tom. iv. p. 239.—Garnier, Hist. de France, tom. v. p. 387.—D'Auton, Hist. de Louys XII., part. 2, chap. 32.

[6] Varillas regards Philip's mission to France as a *coup de maître* on the part of Ferdinand, who thereby rid himself of a dangerous rival at home, likely to contest his succession to Castile on Isabella's death, while he employed that rival in outwitting Louis XII. by a treaty which he meant to disavow. (Politique de Ferdinand, liv. 1, pp. 146–150.) The first of these imputations is sufficiently disproved by the fact that Philip quitted Spain in opposition to the pressing remonstrances of the king, queen, and cortes, and to the general disgust of the whole nation, as is repeatedly stated by Gomez, Martyr, and other contemporaries. The second will be difficult to refute and still harder to prove, as it rests on a man's secret intentions, known only to himself. Such are the flimsy cobwebs of which this political dreamer's theories are made,—truly *châteaux en Espagne.*

arrangements unwarranted by the tenor of these instructions.[7]

If this were the case, the propriety of Ferdinand's conduct in refusing the ratification depends on the question how far a sovereign is bound by the acts of a plenipotentiary who departs from his private instructions. Formerly, the question would seem to have been unsettled. Indeed, some of the most respectable writers on public law in the beginning of the seventeenth century maintain that such a departure would not justify the prince in withholding his ratification; deciding thus, no doubt, on principles of natural equity, which appear to require that a principal should be held responsible for the acts of an agent, coming within the scope of his powers, though at variance with his secret orders, with which the other contracting party can have no acquaintance or concern.[8]

The inconvenience, however, arising from adopting a principle in political negotiations which must necessarily place the destinies of a whole

[7] Martyr, whose copious correspondence furnishes the most valuable commentary, unquestionably, on the proceedings of this reign, is provokingly reserved in regard to this interesting matter. He contents himself with remarking, in one of his letters, that "the Spaniards derided Philip's negotiations as of no consequence, and indeed altogether preposterous, considering the attitude assumed by the nation at that very time for maintaining its claims by the sword;" and he dismisses the subject with a reflection that seems to rest the merits of the case more on might than right: "Exitus, qui judex est rerum æternus, loquatur. Nostri regno potiuntur majori ex parte." (Opus Epist., epist. 257.) This reserve of Martyr might be construed unfavorably for Ferdinand, were it not for the freedom with which he usually criticises whatever appears really objectionable to him in the measures of the government.

[8] Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pacis, lib. 2, cap. 11, sec. 12; lib. 3, cap. 22, sec. 4.—Gentilis, De Jure Belli, lib. 3, cap. 14, apud Bynkershoek, Quæst. Juris Publici, lib. 2, cap. 7.

nation in the hands of a single individual, rash or incompetent, it may be, without the power of interference or supervision on the part of the government, has led to a different conclusion in practice; and it is now generally admitted, by European writers, not merely that the exchange of ratifications is essential to the validity of a treaty, but that a government is not bound to ratify the doings of a minister who has transcended his private instructions.[9]

But, whatever be thought of Ferdinand's good faith in the early stages of this business, there is no doubt that at a later period, when his position was changed by the success of his arms in Italy, he sought only to amuse the French court with a show of negotiation, in order, as we have already intimated, to paralyze its operations and gain time for securing his conquests. The French writers inveigh loudly against this crafty and treacherous policy; and Louis the Twelfth gave vent to his own indignation in no very measured terms. But, however we may now regard it, it was in perfect accordance with the trickish spirit of the age; and the French king resigned all right of rebuking his antagonist on this score, when he condescended to become a party with him to the infamous partition treaty, and still more when he so grossly violated it. He had voluntarily engaged with his Spanish rival in the game, and it afforded no good ground

[9] Bynkershoek, Quæst. Juris Publici, lib. 2, cap. 7.—Mably, Droit publique, chap. 1.—Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, chap. 12.—Martens, Law of Nations, trans., book 2, chap. 1.—Bynkershoek, the earliest of these writers, has discussed the question with an amplitude, perspicuity, and fairness unsurpassed by any who have followed him.

of complaint that he was the least adroit of the two.

While Ferdinand was thus triumphant in his schemes of foreign policy and conquest, his domestic life was clouded with the deepest anxiety, in consequence of the declining health of the queen, and the eccentric conduct of his daughter, the infanta Joanna. We have already seen the extravagant fondness with which that princess, notwithstanding her occasional sallies of jealousy, doted on her young and handsome husband.[10] From the hour of his departure she had been plunged in the deepest dejection, sitting day and night with her eyes fixed on the ground, in uninterrupted silence, or broken only by occasional expressions of petulant discontent. She refused all consolations, thinking only of rejoining her absent lord, and "equally regardless," says Martyr, who was then at the court, "of herself, her future subjects, and her afflicted parents."[11]

On the 10th of March, 1503, she was delivered of her second son, who received the baptismal name of Ferdinand, in compliment to his grandfather.[12] No change, however, took place in the

[10] Philip is known in history by the title of "the Handsome," implying that he was, at least, quite as remarkable for his personal qualities as his mental.

[11] Opus Epist., epist. 253.—Ferreras, Hist. d'Espagne, tom. viii. pp. 235, 238.—Gomez, De Rebus gestis, fol. 44.

[12] Carbajal, Anales, MS., año 1503.—Gomez, De Rebus gestis, fol. 45, 46.—He was born at Alcalá de Henares. Ximenes availed himself of this circumstance to obtain from Isabella a permanent exemption from taxes for his favorite city, which his princely patronage was fast raising up to contest the palm of literary precedence with Salamanca, the ancient "Athens of Spain." The citizens of the place long preserved, and still preserve, for aught I know, the

mind of the unfortunate mother, who from this time was wholly occupied with the project of returning to Flanders. An invitation to that effect, which she received from her husband in the month of November, determined her to undertake the journey, at all hazards, notwithstanding the affectionate remonstrances of the queen, who represented the impracticability of traversing France, agitated as it then was with all the bustle of warlike preparation, or of venturing by sea at this inclement and stormy season.

One evening, while her mother was absent at Segovia, Joanna, whose residence was at Medina del Campo, left her apartment in the castle, and sallied out, though in dishabille, without announcing her purpose to any of her attendants. They followed, however, and used every argument and entreaty to prevail on her to return, at least for the night, but without effect; until the bishop of Burgos, who had charge of her household, finding every other means ineffectual, was compelled to close the castle gates, in order to prevent her departure.

The princess, thus thwarted in her purpose, gave way to the most violent indignation. She menaced the attendants with her utmost vengeance for their disobedience, and, taking her station on the barrier, she obstinately refused to re-enter the castle, or even to put on any additional clothing, but remained cold and shivering on the spot till the following morning. The good bishop, sorely em-

cradle of the royal infant, in token of their gratitude. Robles, Vida de Ximenez, p. 127.

barrassed by the dilemma to which he found himself reduced, of offending the queen by complying with the mad humor of the princess, or the latter still more by resisting it, despatched an express in all haste to Isabella, acquainting her with the affair, and begging instructions how to proceed.

The queen, who was staying, as has been said, at Segovia, about forty miles distant, alarmed at the intelligence, sent the king's cousin, the admiral Henriquez, together with the archbishop of Toledo, at once to Medina, and prepared to follow as fast as the feeble state of her health would permit. The efforts of these eminent persons, however, were not much more successful than those of the bishop. All they could obtain from Joanna was that she would retire to a miserable kitchen in the neighborhood, during the night; while she persisted in taking her station on the barrier as soon as it was light, and continued there, immovable as a statue, the whole day. In this deplorable state she was found by the queen on her arrival; and it was not without great difficulty that the latter, with all the deference habitually paid her by her daughter, succeeded in persuading her to return to her own apartments in the castle. These were the first unequivocal symptoms of that hereditary taint of insanity which had clouded the latter days of Isabella's mother, and which, with a few brief intervals, was to shed a deeper gloom over the long-protracted existence of her unfortunate daughter.[13]

[13] Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 268.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 56.—Gomez, De Rebus gestis, fol. 46.

The conviction of this sad infirmity of the princess gave a shock to the unhappy mother, scarcely less than that which she had formerly been called to endure in the death of her children. The sorrows, over which time had had so little power, were opened afresh by a calamity which naturally filled her with the most gloomy forebodings for the fate of her people, whose welfare was to be committed to such incompetent hands. These domestic griefs were still further swelled at this time by the death of two of her ancient friends and counsellors, Juan Chacon, adelantado of Murcia,[14] and Gutierre de Cardenas, grand commander of Leon.[15] They had attached themselves to Isabella in the early part of her life, when her fortunes were still under a cloud; and they afterwards reaped the requital of their services in such ample honors and emoluments as royal gratitude could bestow, and in the full enjoyment of her confidence, to which

[14] "Espejo de bondad," *mirror of virtue,* as Oviedo styles this cavalier. He was always much regarded by the sovereigns, and the lucrative post of *contador mayor,* which he filled for many years, enabled him to acquire an immense estate, 50,000 ducats a year, without imputation on his honesty. Quincuagenas, MS., bat. 1, quinc. 2, dial. 2.

[15] The name of this cavalier, as well as that of his cousin, Alonso de Cardenas, grand master of St. James, has become familiar to us in the Granadine war. If Don Gutierre made a less brilliant figure than the latter, he acquired, by means of his intimacy with the sovereigns, and his personal qualities, as great weight in the royal councils as any subject in the kingdom. "Nothing of any importance," says Oviedo, "was done without his advice." He was raised to the important posts of comendador de Leon, and contador mayor, which last, in the words of the same author, "made its possessor a second king over the public treasury." He left large estates, and more than five thousand vassals. His eldest son was created duke of Maqueda. Quincuagenas, MS., bat. 1, quinc. 2, dial. 1.—Col. de Céd., tom. v. no. 182.

their steady devotion to her interests well entitled them.[16]

But neither the domestic troubles which pressed so heavily on Isabella's heart, nor the rapidly declining state of her own health, had power to blunt the energies of her mind, or lessen the vigilance with which she watched over the interests of her people. A remarkable proof of this was given in the autumn of the present year, 1503, when the country was menaced with an invasion from France.

The whole French nation had shared the indignation of Louis the Twelfth at the mortifying result of his enterprise against Naples; and it answered his call for supplies so promptly and liberally that in a few months after the defeat of Cerignola he was able to resume operations on a more formidable scale than France had witnessed for centuries. Three large armies were raised; one to retrieve affairs in Italy, a second to penetrate into Spain by the way of Fontarabia, and a third to cross into Roussillon and get possession of the strong post of Salsas, the key of the mountain-passes in that quarter. Two fleets were also equipped in the ports of Genoa and Marseilles, the latter of which was to support the invasion of Roussillon by a descent on the coast of Catalonia.

[16] Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 255.—Gomez, De Rebus gestis, fol. 45.—For some further account of these individuals, see Part I., chapter 14, note 10.—Martyr thus panegyrizes the queen's fortitude under her accumulated sorrows: "Sentit, licet constantissima sit, et supra fœminam prudens, has alapas fortunæ sævientis regina, ita concussa fluctibus undique, veluti vasta rupes, maris in medio." Opus Epist., loc. cit.

These various corps were intended to act in concert, and thus, by one grand, simultaneous movement, Spain was to be assailed on three several points of her territory. The results did not correspond with the magnificence of the apparatus.[17]

The army destined to march on Fontarabia was placed under the command of Alan d'Albret, father of the king of Navarre, along the frontiers of whose dominions its route necessarily lay. Ferdinand had assured himself of the favorable dispositions of this prince, the situation of whose kingdom, more than its strength, made his friendship important; and the sire d'Albret, whether from a direct understanding with the Spanish monarch, or fearful of the consequences which might result to his son from the hostility of the latter, detained the forces intrusted to him so long among the bleak and barren fastnesses of the mountains that at length, exhausted by fatigue and want of food, the army melted away without even reaching the enemy's borders.[18]

The force directed against Roussillon was of a more formidable character. It was commanded by the maréchal de Rieux, a brave and experienced officer, though much broken by age and bodily

[17] Garnier, Hist. de France, tom. v. pp. 405, 406.—Ferreras, Hist. d'Espagne, tom. viii. pp. 235–238.—Guicciardini, Istoria. tom. i. pp. 300, 301.—Mémoires de la Trémoille, chap. 19, apud Petitot, Collection des Mémoires, tom. xiv.

[18] Aleson, Annales de Navarra, tom. v. pp. 110–112.—The king of Navarre promised to oppose the passage of the French, if attempted, through his dominions, and, in order to obviate any distrust on the part of Ferdinand, sent his daughter Margaret to reside at the court of Castile, as a pledge for his fidelity. Ferreras, Hist. d'Espagne, tom. viii. p. 235.

infirmities. It amounted to more than twenty thousand men. Its strength, however, lay chiefly in its numbers. It was, with the exception of a few thousand lansquenets under William de la Marck,[19] made up of the arrière-ban of the kingdom and the undisciplined militia from the great towns of Languedoc. With this numerous array the French marshal entered Roussillon without opposition, and sat down before Salsas on the 16th of September, 1503.

The old castle of Salsas, which had been carried without much difficulty by the French in the preceding war, had been put in a defensible condition at the commencement of the present, under the superintendence of Pedro Navarro, although the repairs were not yet wholly completed. Ferdinand, on the approach of the enemy, had thrown a thousand picked men into the place, which was well victualled and provided for a siege; while a corps of six thousand was placed under his cousin, Don Frederick de Toledo, duke of Alva, with orders to take up a position in the neighborhood, where he might watch the movements of the enemy, and annoy him as far as possible by cutting off his supplies.[20]

[19] Younger brother of Robert, third duke of Bouillon. (D'Auton, Hist. de Louys XII., part. 2, pp. 103, 186.) The reader will not confound him with his namesake, the famous "boar of Ardennes,"—more familiar to us now in the pages of romance than of history,—who perished ignominiously some twenty years before this period, in 1484, not in fight, but by the hands of the common executioner at Utrecht. Duclos, Hist. de Louis XI., tom. ii. p. 379.

[20] Gonzalo Ayora, Capitan de la Guardia Real, Cartas al Rey, Don Fernando (Madrid, 1794), carta 9.—Aleson, Annales de Navarra, tom. v. pp. 112, 113.—Garnier, Hist. de France, tom. v. p. 407.

Ferdinand, in the meanwhile, lost no time in enforcing levies throughout the kingdom, with which he might advance to the relief of the beleaguered fortress. While thus occupied, he received such accounts of the queen's indisposition as induced him to quit Aragon, where he then was, and hasten by rapid journeys to Castile. The accounts were probably exaggerated; he found no cause for immediate alarm on his arrival, and Isabella, ever ready to sacrifice her own inclinations to the public weal, persuaded him to return to the scene of operations, where his presence at this juncture was so important. Forgetting her illness, she made the most unwearied efforts for assembling troops without delay to support her husband. The grand constable of Castile was commissioned to raise levies through every part of the kingdom, and the principal nobility flocked in with their retainers from the farthest provinces, all eager to obey the call of their beloved mistress. Thus strengthened, Ferdinand, whose headquarters were established at Gerona, saw himself in less than a month in possession of a force which, including the supplies of Aragon, amounted to ten or twelve thousand horse and three or four times that number of foot. He no longer delayed his march, and about the middle of October put his army in motion, proposing to effect a junction with the duke of Alva, then lying before Perpignan, at a few leagues' distance from Salsas.[21]

—Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 51.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 13, sec. 11.

[21] Gonzalo Ayora, Cartas, cap. 9.—Zurita, Anales, ubi supra.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 197, 198.—Carbajal, Anales, MS.,

Isabella, who was at Segovia, was made acquainted by regular expresses with every movement of the army. She no sooner learned its departure from Gerona than she was filled with disquietude at the prospect of a speedy encounter with the enemy, whose defeat, whatever glory it might reflect on her own arms, could be purchased only at the expense of Christian blood. She wrote in earnest terms to her husband, requesting him not to drive his enemies to despair by closing up their retreat to their own land, but to leave vengeance to Him to whom alone it belonged. She passed her days, together with her whole household, in fasting and continual prayer, and, in the fervor of her pious zeal, personally visited the several religious houses of the city, distributing alms among their holy inmates, and imploring them humbly to supplicate the Almighty to avert the impending calamity.[22]

The prayers of the devout queen and her court

año 1503.—Sandoval, Hist. del Emp. Carlos V., tom. i. p. 8.—Col. de Cédulas, tom. i. no. 97.—The most authentic account of the siege of Salsas is to be found in the correspondence of Gonzalo Ayora, dated in the Spanish camp. This individual, equally eminent in letters and arms, filled the dissimilar posts of captain of the royal guard and historiographer of the crown. He served in the army at this time, and was present at all its operations. Pref. ad Cartas de Ayora; and Nic. Antonio, Bibliotheca Nova, tom. i. p. 551.

[22] Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 263.—The loyal captain, Ayora, shows little of this Christian vein. He concludes one of his letters with praying, no doubt most sincerely, "that the Almighty would be pleased to infuse less benevolence into the hearts of the sovereigns, and incite them to chastise and humble the proud French, and strip them of their ill-gotten possessions, which, however repugnant to their own godly inclinations, would tend greatly to replenish their coffers, as well as those of their faithful and loving subjects." See this graceless petition in his Cartas, carta 9, p. 66.

found favor with Heaven.[23] King Ferdinand reached Perpignan on the 19th of October; and on that same night the French marshal, finding himself unequal to the rencontre with the combined forces of Spain, broke up his camp, and, setting fire to his tents, began his retreat towards the frontier, having consumed nearly six weeks since first opening trenches. Ferdinand pressed close on his flying enemy, whose rear sustained some annoyance from the Spanish *ginetes* in its passage through the defiles of the sierras. The retreat, however, was conducted in too good order to allow any material loss to be inflicted on the French, who succeeded at length in sheltering themselves under the cannon of Narbonne, up to which place they were pursued by their victorious foe. Several places on the frontier, as Leocate, Palme, Sigean, Roquefort, and others, were abandoned to the Spaniards, who pillaged them of whatever was worth carrying off; without any violence, however, to the persons of the inhabitants, whom, as a Christian population, if we are to believe Martyr, Ferdinand refused even to make prisoners.[24]

[23] "Exaudivit igitur sanctæ reginæ religiosorumque ac virginum preces summus Altitonans." (Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 263.) The learned Theban borrows an epithet more familiar to Greek and Roman than to Christian ears.

[24] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 54.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 13, sec. 11.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 264.—Carbajal, Anales, MS., año 1503.—Bernaldez Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 198.—Garnier, Hist. de France, tom. v. pp. 408, 409.—Gonzalo Ayora, Cartas, carta 11.—Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS., dial de Deza.—Peter Martyr seems to have shared none of Isabella's scruples in regard to bringing the enemy to battle. On the contrary, he indulges in a most querulous strain of sarcasm against the Catholic king for his remissness in this particular: "Quare elucescente die moniti nostri de Gallorum discessu ad eos,

The Spanish monarch made no attempt to retain these acquisitions, but, having dismantled some of the towns which offered most resistance, returned loaded with the spoils of victory to his own dominions. "Had he been as good a general as he was a statesman," says a Spanish historian, "he might have penetrated to the centre of France."[25] Ferdinand, however, was too prudent to attempt conquests which could only be maintained, if maintained at all, at an infinite expense of blood and treasure. He had sufficiently vindicated his honor by meeting his foe so promptly and driving him triumphantly over the border; and he preferred, like a cautious prince, not to risk all he had gained by attempting more, but to employ his present successes as a vantage-ground for entering on negotiation, in which at all times he placed more reliance than on the sword.

In this, his good star still further favored him. The armada equipped at so much cost by the French king at Marseilles had no sooner put to sea

at sero, concurrerunt. Rex Perpiniani agebat, ad millia passuum sex non brevia, uti nosti. Propterea sero id actum, venit concitato cursu, at sero. Ad hostes itur, at sero. Cernunt hostium acies, at sero, at a longe. Distabant jam milliaria circiter duo. Ergo sero Phryges sapuerunt. Cujus hæc culpa, tu scrutator aliunde; mea est, si nescis. Maximam dedit ea dies, quæ est, si nescis, calendarum Novembrium sexta, Hispanis ignominiam, et aliquando jacturam illis pariet collachrymandam." Letter to the cardinal of Santa Cruz, epist. 262.

[25] Aleson Annales de Navarra, tom. v. p. 113.—Oviedo, who was present in this campaign, seems to have been of the same opinion. At least he says, "If the king had pursued vigorously, not a Frenchman would have lived to carry back the tidings of defeat to his own land." If we are to believe him, Ferdinand desisted from the pursuit at the earnest entreaty of Bishop Deza, his confessor. Quincuagenas, MS.

than it was assailed by furious tempests, and so far crippled that it was obliged to return to port without even effecting a descent on the Spanish coast.

These accumulated disasters so disheartened Louis the Twelfth that he consented to enter into negotiations for a suspension of hostilities; and an armistice was finally arranged, through the mediation of his pensioner Frederick, ex-king of Naples, between the hostile monarchs. It extended only to their hereditary dominions; Italy and the circumjacent seas being still left open as a common arena, on which the rival parties might meet and settle their respective titles by the sword. This truce, first concluded for five months, was subsequently prolonged to three years. It gave Ferdinand, what he most needed, leisure, and means to provide for the security of his Italian possessions, on which the dark storm of war was soon to burst with tenfold fury.[26]

The unfortunate Frederick, who had been drawn from his obscurity to take part in these negotiations, died in the following year. It is singular that the last act of his political life should have been to mediate a peace between the domin-

[26] Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 55.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 13, sec. 11.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 264.—Lanuza, Historias, tom. i. cap. 17.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 16.—Machiavelli, Legazione prima a Roma, let. 27.—Mons. Varillas notices as the weak side of Louis XII. "une démangeaison de faire la paix à contre-temps, dont il fut travaillé durant toute sa vie." (Politique de Ferdinand, liv. 1, p. 148.) A statesman shrewder than Varillas, De Retz, furnishes, perhaps, the best key to this policy, in the remark, "Les gens foibles ne plient jamais quand ils le doivent."

ions of two monarchs who had united to strip him of his own.

The results of this campaign were as honorable to Spain as they were disastrous and humiliating to Louis the Twelfth, who had seen his arms baffled at every point, and all his mighty apparatus of fleets and armies dissolve, as if by enchantment, in less time than had been occupied in preparing it. The immediate success of Spain may no doubt be ascribed, in a considerable degree, to the improved organization and thorough discipline introduced by the sovereigns into the national militia at the close of the Moorish war, without which it would have been scarcely possible to concentrate so promptly on a distant point such large masses of men, all well equipped and trained for active service. So soon was the nation called to feel the effect of these wise provisions.

But the results of the campaign are, after all, less worthy of notice as indicating the resources of the country than as evidence of a pervading patriotic feeling, which could alone make these resources available. Instead of the narrow local jealousies which had so long estranged the people of the separate provinces, and more especially those of the rival states of Aragon and Castile, from one another, there had been gradually raised up a common national sentiment, like that knitting together the constituent parts of one great commonwealth. At the first alarm of invasion on the frontier of Aragon, the whole extent of the sister kingdom, from the green valleys of the Guadalquivir up to the rocky fastnesses of the Asturias,

responded to the call, as to that of a common country, sending forth, as we have seen, its swarms of warriors, to repel the foe and roll back the tide of war upon his own land. What a contrast did all this present to the cold and parsimonious hand with which the nation, thirty years before, dealt out its supplies to King John the Second, Ferdinand's father, when he was left to cope single-handed with the whole power of France, in this very quarter of Roussillon! Such was the consequence of the glorious *union*, which brought together the petty and hitherto discordant tribes of the Peninsula under the same rule, and, by creating common interests and an harmonious principle of action, was silently preparing them for constituting one great nation,—one and indivisible, as intended by nature.

Those who have not themselves had occasion to pursue historical inquiries will scarcely imagine on what loose grounds the greater part of the narrative is to be built. With the exception of a few leading outlines, there is such a mass of inconsistency and contradiction in the details, even of contemporaries, that it seems almost as hopeless to seize the true aspect of any particular age as it would be to transfer to the canvas a faithful likeness of an individual from a description simply of his prominent features.

Much of the difficulty might seem to be removed, now that we are on the luminous and beaten track of Italian history; but, in fact, the vision is rather dazzled than assisted by the numerous cross-lights thrown over the path, and the infinitely various points of view from which every object is contemplated. Besides the local and party prejudices which we had to encounter in the contemporary Spanish historians, we have now a host of national prejudices, not less unfavorable to truth; while the remoteness of the scene of action necessarily begets a thousand additional inaccuracies in the gossiping and credulous chroniclers of France and Spain.

The mode in which public negotiations were conducted at this period interposes still further embarrassments in our search after truth. They were regarded as the personal concerns of the sovereign, in which the nation at large had no right to interfere. They

were settled, like the rest of his private affairs, under his own eye, without the participation of any other branch of the government. They were shrouded, therefore, in an impenetrable secrecy, which permitted such results only to emerge into light as suited the monarch. Even these results cannot be relied on as furnishing the true key to the intentions of the parties. The science of the cabinet, as then practised, authorized such a system of artifice and shameless duplicity as greatly impairs the credit of those official documents which we are accustomed to regard as the surest foundations of history.

The only records which we can receive with full confidence are the private correspondence of contemporaries, which, from its very nature, is exempt from most of the restraints and affectations incident more or less to every work destined for the public eye. Such communications, indeed, come like the voice of departed years; and when, as in Martyr's case, they proceed from one whose acuteness is combined with singular opportunities for observation, they are of inestimable value. Instead of exposing to us only the results, they lay open the interior workings of the machinery, and we enter into all the shifting doubts, passions, and purposes which agitate the minds of the actors. Unfortunately, the chain of correspondence here, as in similar cases, when not originally designed for historical uses, necessarily suffers from occasional breaks and interruptions. The scattered gleams which are thrown over the most prominent points, however, shed so strong a light as materially to aid us in groping our way through the darker and more perplexed passages of the story.

The obscurity which hangs over the period has not been dispelled by those modern writers who, like Varillas, in his well-known work, *Politique de Ferdinand le Catholique,* affect to treat the subject philosophically, paying less attention to facts than to their causes and consequences. These ingenious persons, seldom willing to take things as they find them, seem to think that truth is only to be reached by delving deep below the surface. In this search after more profound causes of action, they reject whatever is natural and obvious. They are inexhaustible in conjectures and fine-spun conclusions, inferring quite as much from what is not said or done as from what is. In short, they put the reader as completely in possession of their hero's thoughts on all occasions as any professed romance-writer would venture to do. All this may be very agreeable, and to persons of easy faith very satisfactory; but it is not history, and may well remind us of the astonishment somewhere expressed by Cardinal de Retz at the assurance of those who, at a distance from the scene of action, pretended to lay open all the secret springs of policy, of which he himself, though a principal party, was ignorant.

No prince, on the whole, has suffered more from these unwar-

ranted liberties than Ferdinand the Catholic. His reputation for shrewd policy suggests a ready key to whatever is mysterious and otherwise inexplicable in his government; while it puts writers like Gaillard and Varillas constantly on the scent after the most secret and subtile sources of action, as if there were always something more to be detected than readily meets the eye. Instead of judging him by the general rules of human conduct, everything is referred to deep-laid stratagem; no allowance is made for the ordinary disturbing forces, the passions and casualties of life; every action proceeds with the same wary calculation that regulates the moves upon a chessboard; and thus a character of consummate artifice is built up, not only unsupported by historical evidence, but in manifest contradiction to the principles of our nature. The part of our subject embraced in the present chapter has long been debatable ground between the French and Spanish historians; and the obscurity which hangs over it has furnished an ample range for speculation to the class of writers above alluded to, which they have not failed to improve.

CHAPTER XIV

ITALIAN WARS — CONDITION OF ITALY — FRENCH AND SPANISH ARMIES ON THE GARIGLIANO

1503

Melancholy State of Italy—Great Preparations of Louis—Gonsalvo repulsed before Gaeta—Armies on the Garigliano—Bloody Passage of the Bridge—Anxious Expectation of Italy—Critical Situation of the Spaniards — Gonsalvo's Resolution — Heroism of Paredes and Bayard

WE must now turn our eyes towards Italy, where the sounds of war, which had lately died away, were again heard in wilder dissonance than ever. Our attention, hitherto, has been too exclusively directed to mere military manœuvres to allow us to dwell much on the condition of this unhappy land. The dreary progress of our story, over fields of blood and battle, might naturally dispose the imagination to lay the scene of action in some rude and savage age; an age, at best, of feudal heroism, when the energies of the soul could be roused only by the fierce din of war.

Far otherwise, however: the tents of the hostile armies were now pitched in the bosom of the most lovely and cultivated regions of the globe; inhabited by a people who had carried the various arts of policy and social life to a degree of excellence elsewhere unknown; whose natural resources had been augmented by all the appliances of ingenuity and industry; whose cities were crowded with

magnificent and costly works of public utility; into whose ports every wind that blew wafted the rich freights of distant climes; whose thousand hills were covered to their very tops with the golden labors of the husbandman; and whose intellectual development showed itself not only in a liberal scholarship far outstripping that of their contemporaries, but in works of imagination, and of elegant art more particularly, which rivalled the best days of antiquity. The period before us, indeed, the commencement of the sixteenth century, was that of their meridian splendor, when Italian genius, breaking through the cloud which had temporarily obscured its early dawn, shone out in full effulgence; for we are now touching on the age of Machiavelli, Ariosto, and Michael Angelo, —the golden age of Leo the Tenth.

It is impossible, even at this distance of time, to contemplate without feelings of sadness the fate of such a country, thus suddenly converted into an arena for the bloody exhibitions of the gladiators of Europe; to behold her trodden under foot by the very nations on whom she had freely poured the light of civilization; to see the fierce soldiery of Europe, from the Danube to the Tagus, sweeping like an army of locusts over her fields, defiling her pleasant places, and raising the shout of battle or of brutal triumph under the shadow of those monuments of genius which have been the delight and despair of succeeding ages. It was the old story of the Goths and Vandals acted over again. Those more refined arts of the cabinet on which the Italians were accustomed to rely, much more

than on the sword, in their disputes with one another, were of no avail against these rude invaders, whose strong arm easily broke through the subtile webs of policy which entangled the movements of less formidable adversaries. It was the triumph of brute force over civilization,—one of the most humiliating lessons by which Providence has seen fit to rebuke the pride of human intellect.[1]

The fate of Italy inculcates a most important lesson. With all this outward show of prosperity, her political institutions had gradually lost the vital principle which could alone give them stability or real value. The forms of freedom, indeed, in most instances, had sunk under the usurpation of some aspiring chief. Everywhere patriotism was lost in the most intense selfishness. Moral principle was at as low an ebb in private as in public life. The hands which shed their liberal patronage over genius and learning were too often red with blood; the courtly precincts which seemed the favorite haunt of the Muses were too often the

[1] "O pria sì cara al ciel del mondo parte,
Che l'acqua cigne, e 'l sasso orrido serra;
O lieta sopra ogn' altra e dolce terra,
Che 'l superbo Appennin segna e diparte;
Che val omai, se 'l buon popol di Marte
Ti lasciò del mar donna e de la terra?
Le genti a te già serve, or ti fan guerra,
E pongon man ne le tue treccie sparte.
Lasso! nè manca de' tuoi figli ancora,
Chi le più strane a te chiamando insieme
La spada sua nel tuo del corpo adopre.
Or son queste simili a l' antich' opre?
O pur così pietate e Dio s' onora?
Ahi secol duro, ahi tralignato seme."
Bembo, Rime, Son. 108.

This exquisite little lyric, inferior to no other which had appeared on the same subject since the "Italia mia" of Petrarch, was composed by Bembo at the period of which we are treating.

Epicurean sty of brutish sensuality; while the head of the church itself, whose station, exalted over that of every worldly potentate, should have raised him at least above their grosser vices, was sunk in the foulest corruptions that debase poor human nature. Was it surprising, then, that the tree, thus cankered at heart, with all the goodly show of blossoms on its branches, should have fallen before the blast which now descended in such pitiless fury from the mountains?

Had there been an invigorating national feeling, any common principle of coalition, among the Italian states,—had they, in short, been true to themselves,—they possessed abundant resources in their wealth, talent, and superior science, to have shielded their soil from violation. Unfortunately, while the other European states had been augmenting their strength incalculably by the consolidation of their scattered fragments into one whole, those of Italy, in the absence of some great central point round which to rally, had grown more and more confirmed in their original disunion. Thus, without concert in action, and destitute of the vivifying impulse of patriotic sentiment, they were delivered up to be the spoil and mockery of nations whom in their proud language they still despised as barbarians; an impressive example of the impotence of human genius, and of the instability of human institutions, however excellent in themselves, when unsustained by public and private virtue.[2]

[2] The philosophic Machiavelli discerned the true causes of the calamities, in the corruptions of his country; which he has exposed

The great powers who had now entered the lists created entirely new interests in Italy, which broke up the old political combinations. The conquest of Milan enabled France to assume a decided control over the affairs of the country. Her recent reverses in Naples, however, had greatly loosened this authority; although Florence and other neighboring states, which lay under her colossal shadow, still remained true to her. Venice, with her usual crafty policy, kept aloof, maintaining a position of neutrality between the belligerents, each of whom made the most pressing efforts to secure so powerful an ally. She had, however, long since entertained a deep distrust of her French neighbor; and, although she would enter into no public engagements, she gave the Spanish minister every assurance of her friendly disposition towards his government.[3] She intimated this

with more than his usual boldness and bitterness of sarcasm, in the seventh book of his "Arte della Guerra."

[3] Lorenzo Suarez de la Vega filled the post of minister to the republic during the whole of the war. His long continuance in the office at so critical a period, under so vigilant a sovereign as Ferdinand, is sufficient warrant for his ability. Peter Martyr, while he admits his talents, makes some objections to his appointment, on the ground of his want of scholarship: "Nec placet quod hunc elegeritis hac tempestate. Maluissem namque virum, qui Latinam calleret, vel saltem intelligeret, linguam; hic tantum suam patriam vernaculam novit; prudentem esse alias, atque inter ignaros literarum satis esse gnarum, Rex ipse mihi testatus est. Cupissem tamen ego, quæ dixi." (See the letter to the Catholic queen, Opus Epist., epist. 246.) The objections have weight, undoubtedly, Latin being the common medium of diplomatic intercourse at that time. Martyr, who on his return through Venice from his Egyptian mission took charge for the time of the interests of Spain, might probably have been prevailed on to assume the difficulties of a diplomatic station there himself. See also Part II., chapter 11, note 7, of this History.

still more unequivocally, by the supplies she had allowed her citizens to carry into Barleta during the late campaign, and by other indirect aid of a similar nature during the present; for all which she was one day to be called to a heavy reckoning by her enemies.

The disposition of the papal court towards the French monarch was still less favorable; and it took no pains to conceal this after his reverses in Naples. Soon after the defeat of Cerignola, it entered into correspondence with Gonsalvo de Cordova; and, although Alexander the Sixth refused to break openly with France and sign a treaty with the Spanish sovereigns, he pledged himself to do so on the reduction of Gaeta. In the meantime, he freely allowed the Great Captain to raise such levies as he could in Rome, before the very eyes of the French ambassador. So little had the immense concessions of Louis, including those of principle and honor, availed to secure the fidelity of this treacherous ally.[4]

With the emperor Maximilian, notwithstanding repeated entreaties, he was on scarcely better terms. That prince was connected with Spain by the matrimonial alliances of his family, and no less averse to France from personal feeling, which, with the majority of minds, operates more powerfully than motives of state policy. He had, moreover, always regarded the occupation of Milan by the latter as an infringement, in some measure, of

[4] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 38, 48.—Bembo, Istoria Viniziana, tom. iii. lib. 6.—Daru, Hist. de Venise, tom. iii. p. 347.—Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. lib. 6, p. 311, ed. 1645.—Buonaccorsi, Diario, pp. 77, 81.

his imperial rights. The Spanish government, availing itself of these feelings, endeavored through its minister, Don Juan Manuel, to stimulate Maximilian to the invasion of Lombardy. As the emperor, however, demanded, as usual, a liberal subsidy for carrying on the war, King Ferdinand, who was seldom incommoded by a superfluity of funds, preferred reserving them for his own enterprises, to hazarding them on the Quixotic schemes of his ally. But, although the negotiations were attended with no result, the amicable dispositions of the Austrian government were evinced by the permission given to its subjects to serve under the banners of Gonsalvo, where indeed, as we have already seen, they formed some of the best troops.[5]

But, while Louis the Twelfth drew so little assistance from abroad, the heartiness with which the whole French people * entered into his feelings at this crisis made him nearly independent of it, and, in an incredibly short space of time, placed him in a condition for resuming operations on a far more formidable scale than before. The preceding failures in Italy he attributed in a great degree to an overweening confidence in the superiority of his own troops, and his neglect to support them with the necessary reinforcements and supplies. He now provided against this by remitting large sums to Rome, and establishing ample magazines of

[5] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 55.—Coxe, History of the House of Austria (London, 1807), vol. i. chap. 23.

* [France was more truly a nation at this time, in the modern sense of that word, than was any other country in Europe.—M.]

grain and military stores there, under the direction of commissaries, for the maintenance of the army. He equipped without loss of time a large armament at Genoa, under the marquis of Saluzzo, for the relief of Gaeta, still blockaded by the Spaniards. He obtained a small supply of men from his Italian allies, and subsidized a corps of eight thousand Swiss, the strength of his infantry; while the remainder of his army, comprehending a fine body of cavalry and the most complete train of artillery, probably, in Europe, was drawn from his own dominions. Volunteers of the highest rank pressed forward to serve in an expedition to which they confidently looked for the vindication of the national honor. The command was intrusted to the maréchal de la Trémouille, esteemed the best general in France; and the whole amount of force, exclusive of that employed permanently in the fleet, is variously computed at from twenty to thirty thousand men.[6]

In the month of July the army was on its march across the broad plains of Lombardy, but, on reaching Parma, the appointed place of rendezvous for the Swiss and Italian mercenaries, was brought to a halt by tidings of an unlooked-for

[6] Buonaccorsi, Diario, p. 78.—St. Gelais, Hist. de Louys XII., pp. 173, 174.—Varillas, Hist. de Louis XII., tom. i. pp. 386, 387.—Mémoires de la Trémoille, chap. 19, apud Petitot, Collection des Mémoires, tom. xiv.—Muratori, Annali d'Italia, tom. xiv. anno 1503.—Carta de Gonzalo, MS.—Historians, as usual, differ widely in their estimates of the French numbers. Guicciardini, whose moderate computation of 20,000 men is usually followed, does not take the trouble to reconcile his sum total with the various estimates given by him in detail, which considerably exceed that amount. Istoria, pp. 308, 309, 312.

event, the death of Pope Alexander the Sixth. He expired on the 18th of August, 1503, at the age of seventy-two, the victim, there is very little doubt, of poison he had prepared for others; thus closing an infamous life by a death equally infamous.* He was a man of undoubted talent and uncommon energy of character. But his powers were perverted to the worst purposes, and his gross vices were unredeemed, if we are to credit the report of his most respectable contemporaries, by a single virtue. In him the papacy reached its lowest degradation. His pontificate, however, was not without its use; since that Providence which still educes good from evil made the scandal which it occasioned to the Christian world a principal spring of the glorious Reformation.[7]

[7] Carta de Gonzalo, Del Real, Gaeta, 8 de Agosto, 1503, MS.—Buonaccorsi, Diario, p. 81.—Bembo, Istoria Viniziana, lib. 6.—The little ceremony with which Alexander's remains were treated, while yet scarcely cold, is the best commentary on the general detestation in which he was held. "Lorsque Alexandre," says the pope's *maître des cérémonies,* "rendit le dernier soupir, il n'y avait dans sa chambre que l'évêque de Rieti, le dataire et quelques palefreniers. Cette chambre fut aussitôt pillée. La face du cadavre devint noire; la langue s'enfla au point qu'elle remplissait la bouche qui resta ouverte. La bière dans laquelle il fallait mettre le corps se trouva trop petite; on l'y enfonça à coups de poings. Les restes du pape insultés par ses domestiques furent portés dans l'église de St. Pierre, sans être accompagnés de prêtres ni de torches, et on les plaça en dedans de la grille du chœur pour les dérober aux outrages de la populace." Notice de Burchard, apud Brequigny, Notices et Ex-

* [While the infamous character and infamous life of Alexander VI. are known to all the world, men do not generally recognize the fact that, aside from his vices, he was one of the ablest pontiffs that ever filled a throne. Alzog, the distinguished German Roman Catholic historian, does not attempt to conceal or excuse his manner of life. He says, however, that it is worthy of remark that he never compromised faith or doctrine in any of the documents he put forth.—M.]

The death of this pontiff occasioned no particular disquietude at the Spanish court, where his immortal life had been viewed with undisguised reprobation, and made the subject of more than one pressing remonstrance, as we have already seen. His public course had been as little to its satisfaction; since, although a Spaniard by birth, being a native of Valencia, he had placed himself almost wholly at the disposal of Louis the Twelfth, in return for the countenance afforded by that monarch to the iniquitous schemes of his son, Cæsar Borgia.

The pope's death was attended with important consequences on the movements of the French. Louis's favorite minister, Cardinal D'Amboise, had long looked forward to this event as opening to him the succession to the tiara. He now hastened to Italy, therefore, with his master's approbation, proposing to enforce his pretensions by the presence of the French army, placed, as it would seem, with this view at his disposal.

The army, accordingly, was ordered to advance towards Rome and halt within a few miles of its gates. The conclave of cardinals, then convened to supply the vacancy in the pontificate, were filled with indignation at this attempt to overawe their election; and the citizens beheld with anxiety the encampment of this formidable force under their walls, anticipating some counteracting movement on the part of the Great Captain, which might involve their capital, already in a state of anarchy, in

traits des Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque du Roi (Paris, 1787–1818), tom. i. p. 120.

all the horrors of war. Gonsalvo, indeed, had sent forward a detachment of between two and three thousand men, under Mendoza and Fabrizio Colonna, who posted themselves in the neighborhood of the city, where they could observe the movements of the enemy.[8]

At length Cardinal D'Amboise, yielding to public feeling and the representations of pretended friends, consented to the removal of the French forces from the neighborhood, and trusted for success to his personal influence. He overestimated its weight. It is foreign to our purpose to detail the proceedings of the reverend body thus convened to supply the chair of St. Peter. They are displayed at full length by the Italian writers, and must be allowed to form a most edifying chapter in ecclesiastical history.[9] It is enough to state that, on the departure of the French, the suffrages of the conclave fell on an Italian (September 22), who assumed the name of Pius the Third, and who justified the policy of the choice by dying in less time than his best friends had anticipated,—within a month after his elevation.[10]

The new vacancy was at once supplied by the

[8] Buonaccorsi, Diario, p. 82.—Machiavelli, Legazione prima a Roma, let. 1, 3, et al.—Bembo, Istoria Viniziana, tom. iii. lib. 6.—Ammirato, Istorie Fiorentine, tom. iii. lib. 28.—Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 47.

[9] Guicciardini, in particular, has related them with a circumstantiality which could scarcely have been exceeded by one of the conclave itself. Istoria, lib. 6, pp. 316–318.

[10] Bembo, Istoria Viniziana, lib. 6.—Ammirato, Istorie Fiorentine, tom. iii. lib. 28.—The election of Pius was extremely grateful to Queen Isabella, who caused Te Deums and thanksgiving to be celebrated in the churches for the appointment of "so worthy a pastor over the Christian fold." See Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 265.

POPE JULIUS II.

all the horrors of war. Gonsalvo, indeed, had sent forward a detachment of between two and three thousand men, under Mendoza and Fabrizio Colonna, who posted themselves in the neighborhood of the city, where they could observe the movements of the enemy.[8]

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[illegible] p. [illegible] Machiavelli, Legazione prima [illegible]
[illegible] Bembo, [illegible] Amiziana, tom. iii. lib. 6 [illegible]
[illegible] lib. 28.—Zurita, Anales, tom. [illegible]

[illegible] elated them with a circumstan[illegible] exceeded by one of the con[illegible]

[illegible] lib. 6. Ammirato, Istorie Fiorentine, [illegible] of Pius was extremely grateful to [illegible] and thanksgiving to be cel[illegible] sent of "so worthy [illegible] Mayer, Clous Epist. [illegible] 265.

Goupil & Cie. Paris

election of Julius the Second (October 31), the belligerent pontiff who made his tiara a helmet, and his crosier a sword.* It is remarkable that, while his fierce, inexorable temper left him with scarcely a personal friend, he came to the throne by the united suffrages of the rival factions of France, Spain, and, above all, Venice, whose ruin in return he made the great business of his restless pontificate.[11]

No sooner had the game into which Cardinal D'Amboise had entered with such prospects of success been snatched from his grasp by the superior address of his Italian rivals, and the election of Pius the Third been publicly announced, than the French army was permitted to resume its march on Naples, after the loss—an irreparable loss—of more than a month. A still greater misfortune had befallen it, in the meantime, in the illness of Trémouille, its chief; which compelled him to resign the command into the hands of the marquis of Mantua, an Italian nobleman, who held the second station in the army. He was a man of some military experience, having fought in the Venetian service, and led the allied forces, with doubtful credit indeed, against Charles the Eighth at the battle of Fornovo. His elevation was more acceptable to his own countrymen than to the French; and, in truth, however competent to

[11] Machiavelli, Legazione prima a Roma, let. 6.—Bembo, Istoria Viniziana, lib. 7.

* [His direction to the artist who was about to paint his portrait will occur to the reader: "Paint me with a sword in my hand, for of letters I know nothing."—M.]

ordinary exigencies, he was altogether unequal to the present, in which he was compelled to measure his genius with that of the greatest captain of the age.[12]

The Spanish commander, in the meanwhile, was detained before the strong post of Gaeta, into which Ives d'Alègre had thrown himself, as already noticed, with the fugitives from the field of Cerignola, where he had been subsequently reinforced by four thousand additional troops under the marquis of Saluzzo. From these circumstances, as well as the great strength of the place, Gonsalvo experienced an opposition to which, of late, he had been wholly unaccustomed. His exposed situation in the plains, under the guns of the city, occasioned the loss of many of his best men, and, among others, that of his friend Don Hugo de Cardona, one of the late victors at Seminara, who was shot down at his side while conversing with him. At length, after a desperate but ineffectual attempt to extricate himself from his perilous position, by forcing the neighboring eminence of Mount Orlando, he was compelled to retire to a greater distance, and draw off his army to the adjacent village of Castellone, which may call up more agreeable associations in the reader's mind, as the site of the Villa Formiana of Cicero.[13] At

[12] Garnier, Hist. de France, tom. v. pp. 435–438.—Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 6, p. 316.—Buonaccorsi, Diario, p. 83.—St. Gelais, Hist. de Louys XII., p. 173.

[13] Cicero's country-seat stood midway between Gaeta and Mola, the ancient Formiæ, about two miles and a half from each. (Cluverius, Ital. Antiq., lib. 3, cap. 6.) The remains of his mansion and of his mausoleum may still be discerned, on the borders of the old Appian Way, by the classical and credulous tourist.

this place he was still occupied with the blockade of Gaeta, when he received intelligence that the French had crossed the Tiber and were in full march against him.[14]

While Gonsalvo lay before Gaeta, he had been intent on collecting such reinforcements as he could from every quarter. The Neapolitan division under Navarro had already joined him, as well as the victorious legions of Andrada from Calabria. His strength was further augmented by the arrival of between two and three thousand troops, Spanish, German, and Italian, which the Castilian minister, Francisco de Rojas, had levied in Rome; and he was in daily hopes of a more important accession from the same quarter, through the good offices of the Venetian ambassador. Lastly, he had obtained some additional recruits, and a remittance of a considerable sum of money, in a fleet of Catalan ships lately arrived from Spain. With all this, however, a heavy amount of arrears remained due to his troops. In point of numbers he was still far inferior to the enemy; no computation swelling them higher than three thousand horse, two of them light cavalry, and nine thousand foot. The strength of his army lay in his Spanish infantry, on whose thorough discipline, steady nerve, and strong attachment to his person he felt he might confidently rely. In cavalry, and still more in artillery, he was far below the French; which, together with his great numer-

[14] Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, fol. 258, 259.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, lib. 2, cap. 95.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 19.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 261.

ical inferiority, made it impossible for him to keep the open country. His only resource was to get possession of some pass or strong position which lay in their route, where he might detain them till the arrival of further reinforcements should enable him to face them on more equal terms. The deep stream of the Garigliano presented such a line of defence as he wanted.[15]

On the 6th of October, therefore, the Great Captain broke up his camp at Castellone, and, abandoning the whole region north of the Garigliano to the enemy, struck into the interior of the country, and took post at San Germano, a strong place on the other side of the river, covered by the two fortresses of Monte Casino[16] and Rocca

[15] Carta de Gonzalo, Del Real, Gaeta, 8 de Agosto, 1503, MS.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 38, 43, 44, 48, 57.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, fol. 258, 259.—Sismondi, Hist. des Français, tom. xv. p. 417.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 16.—Ferreras, Hist. d'Espagne, tom. viii. pp. 252–257.—Mariana, Hist. de España, lib. xxvi. cap. 5.—The Castilian writers do not state the sum total of the Spanish force, which is to be inferred only from the scattered estimates, careless and contradictory as usual, of the various detachments which joined it.

[16] The Spaniards carried Monte Casino by storm, and with sacrilegious violence plundered the Benedictine monastery of all its costly plate.* They were compelled, however, to respect the bones of the martyrs, and other saintly relics; a division of spoil probably not entirely satisfactory to its reverend inmates. Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvo, fol. 262.

* [The wealth of the monastery of Monte Casino was at one time enormous. Founded in 529, its power and influence steadily increased for almost a thousand years. In the time of its splendor its abbot was the first baron of the kingdom of Naples. He was also the administrator of a special diocese, of thirty-seven parishes, which had been organized in 1321. The monastery counted among its dependencies four bishoprics, two principalities, twenty counties, two hundred and fifty castles, four hundred and forty towns or villages, three hundred and thirty-six manors, twenty-three maritime

Secca. Into this last he threw a body of determined men under Villalba, and awaited calmly the approach of the enemy.

It was not long before the columns of the latter were descried in full march on Ponte Corvo, at a few miles' distance only on the opposite side of the Garigliano. After a brief halt there, they traversed the bridge before that place, and advanced confidently forward in the expectation of encountering little resistance from a foe so much their inferior. In this they were mistaken; the garrison of Rocca Secca, against which they directed their arms, handled them so roughly that, after in vain endeavoring to carry the place in two desperate assaults, the marquis of Mantua resolved to abandon the attempt altogether, and, recrossing the river, to seek a more practicable point for his purpose lower down.[17]

Keeping along the right bank, therefore, to the southeast of the mountains of Fondi, he descended nearly to the mouth of the Garigliano, the site, as

[17] Chrónica del Gran Capitan, lib. 2, cap. 102.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 21.—Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. lib. 6, pp. 326, 327.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 267.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 188.

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ports, thirty-three islands, two hundred mills, three hundred territories, one thousand six hundred and sixty-two churches. (See Hæften, comment, in Vitam S. Benedict, p. 105.) Montalembert, Monks of the West, II., 21, says that at the end of the sixteenth century its abbot's income was reckoned at 500,000 ducats. Since that time despoilments and ransoms have shorn it of almost all its possessions. Its most grievous treatment was received at the hands of the French, in the days of Napoleon. It was rebuilt, as it now stands, in 1727. The value of its plate when it was plundered by the soldiers of the Great Captain must have been immense.—M.]

commonly supposed, of the ancient Minturnæ.[18] The place was covered by a fortress called the Tower of the Garigliano, occupied by a small Spanish garrison, who made some resistance, but surrendered on being permitted to march out with the honors of war. On rejoining their countrymen under Gonsalvo, the latter were so much incensed that the garrison should have yielded on any terms, instead of dying on their posts, that, falling on them with their pikes, they massacred them all to a man. Gonsalvo did not think proper to punish this outrage, which, however shocking to his own feelings, indicated a desperate tone of resolution, which he felt he should have occasion to tax to the utmost in the present exigency.[19]

The ground now occupied by the armies was low and swampy, a character which it possessed in ancient times; the marshes on the southern side being supposed to be the same in which Marius concealed himself from his enemies during his proscription.[20]

[18] The remains of this city, which stood about four miles above the mouth of the Liris, are still to be seen, on the right of the road. In ancient days it was of sufficient magnitude to cover both sides of the river. See Strabo, Geographia, lib. 5, p. 233 (Paris, 1629), with Casaubon's notes, p. 110.

[19] Chrónica del Gran Capitan, lib. 2, cap. 107.—Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, fol. 263.

[20] The marshes of Minturnæ lay between the city and the mouth of the Liris. (Cluverius, Ital. Antiq., lib. 3, cap. 10, sec. 9.) The Spanish army encamped, says Guicciardini, "in a place called by Livy, from its vicinity to Sessa, *aquæ Sinuessanæ*, being perhaps the marshes in which Marius hid himself." (Istoria, lib. 6.) The historian makes two blunders in a breath. 1st. *Aquæ Sinuessanæ* was a name derived not from Sessa, the ancient Suessa Aurunca, but from the adjacent Sinuessa, a town about ten miles southeast of Minturnæ. (Comp. Livy, lib. 22, cap. 14, and Strabo, lib. 5, p. 233.) 2d. The name did not indicate marshes, but natural hot springs, particularly noted for their salubrity. "Salubritate harum aquarum,"

Its natural humidity was greatly increased, at this time, by the excessive rains, which began earlier and with much more violence than usual. The French position was neither so low nor so wet as that of the Spaniards. It had the advantage, moreover, of being supported by a well-peopled and friendly country in the rear, where lay the large towns of Fondi, Itri, and Gaeta; while their fleet, under the admiral Préjan, which rode at anchor in the mouth of the Garigliano, might be of essential service in the passage of the river.

In order to effect this, the marquis of Mantua prepared to throw a bridge across, at a point not far from Trajetto. He succeeded in it, notwithstanding the swollen and troubled condition of the waters,[21] in a few days, under cover of the artillery, which he had planted on the bank of the river, and which from its greater elevation entirely commanded the opposite shore.

The bridge was constructed of boats belonging to the fleet, strongly secured together and covered with planks. The work being completed, on the

says Tacitus in allusion to them (Annales, lib. 12), and Pliny notices their medicinal properties more explicitly. Hist. Naturalis, lib. 31, cap. 2.

[21] This does not accord with Horace's character of the Garigliano, the ancient Liris, as the "taciturnus amnis" (Carm., lib. i. 30), and still less with that of Silius Italicus,

> "Liris . . . . qui fonte quieto
> Dissimulat cursum, et *nullo mutabilis imbre*
> Perstringit tacitas gemmanti gurgite ripas."
> Punica. lib. 4.

Indeed, the stream exhibits at the present day the same soft and tranquil aspect celebrated by the Roman poets. Its natural character, however, was entirely changed at the period before us, in consequence of the unexampled heaviness and duration of the autumnal rains.

6th of November the army advanced upon the bridge, supported by such a lively cannonade from the batteries along the shore as made all resistance on the part of the Spaniards ineffectual. The impetuosity with which the French rushed forward was such as to drive back the advanced guard of their enemy, which, giving way in disorder, retreated on the main body. Before the confusion could extend farther, Gonsalvo, mounted *á la gineta,* in the manner of the light cavalry, rode through the broken ranks, and, rallying the fugitives, quickly brought them to order. Navarro and Andrada, at the same time, led up the Spanish infantry, and the whole column charging furiously against the French, compelled them to falter, and at length to fall back on the bridge.

The struggle now became desperate, officers and soldiers, horse and foot, mingling together, and fighting hand to hand, with all the ferocity kindled by close personal combat. Some were trodden under the feet of the cavalry, many more were forced from the bridge, and the waters of the Garigliano were covered with men and horses, borne down by the current and struggling in vain to gain the shore. It was a contest of mere bodily strength and courage, in which skill and superior tactics were of little avail. Among those who most distinguished themselves, the name of the noble Italian, Fabrizio Colonna, is particularly mentioned. An heroic action is recorded also of a person of inferior rank, a Spanish *alferez,* or standard-bearer, named Illescas. The right hand of this man was shot away by a cannon-ball. As a

comrade was raising up the fallen colors, the gallant ensign resolutely grasped them, exclaiming that "he had one hand still left." At the same time, muffling a scarf round the bleeding stump, he took his place in the ranks as before. This brave deed did not go unrewarded, and a liberal pension was settled on him, at Gonsalvo's instance.

During the heat of the mêlée, the guns on the French shore had been entirely silent, since they could not be worked without doing as much mischief to their own men as to the Spaniards, with whom they were closely mingled. But, as the French gradually recoiled before their impetuous adversaries, fresh bodies of the latter rushing forward to support their advance necessarily exposed a considerable length of column to the range of the French guns, which opened a galling fire on the farther extremity of the bridge. The Spaniards, notwithstanding "they threw themselves into the face of the cannon," as the marquis of Mantua exclaimed, "with as much unconcern as if their bodies had been made of air instead of flesh and blood," found themselves so much distressed by this terrible fire that they were compelled to fall back; and the van, thus left without support, at length retreated in turn, abandoning the bridge to the enemy.[22]

[22] Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 188.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 14.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 16.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 269.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, fol. 262–264.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 22.—Machiavelli, Legazione prima a Roma, let. 11, Nov. 10.—let. 16, Nov. 13.—let. 17.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, lib. 2, cap. 106.—Garnier, Hist. de France, tom. v. pp. 440, 441.

This action was one of the severest which occurred in these wars. Don Hugo de Moncada, the veteran of many a fight by land and sea, told Paolo Giovio that "he had never felt himself in such imminent peril in any of his battles as in this."[23] The French, notwithstanding they remained masters of the contested bridge, had met with a resistance which greatly discouraged them; and, instead of attempting to push their success further, retired that same evening to their quarters on the other side of the river. The tempestuous weather, which continued with unabated fury, had now broken up the roads, and converted the soil into a morass, nearly impracticable for the movements of horse, and quite so for those of artillery, on which the French chiefly relied; while it interposed comparatively slight obstacles to the manœuvres of infantry, which constituted the strength of the Spaniards. From a consideration of these circumstances, the French commander resolved not to resume active operations till a change of weather, by restoring the roads, should enable him to do so with advantage. Meanwhile he constructed a redoubt on the Spanish extremity of the bridge, and threw a body of troops into it, in order to command the pass whenever he should be disposed to use it.[24]

While the hostile armies thus lay facing each other, the eyes of all Italy were turned on them, in anxious expectation of a battle which should

[23] Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, fol. 264.

[24] Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 6, pp. 327, 328.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, fol. 262.—Machiavelli, Legazione prima a Roma, let. 29.—Garnier, Hist. de France, tom. v. pp. 443–445.

finally decide the fate of Naples. Expresses were daily despatched from the French camp to Rome, whence the ministers of the different European powers transmitted the tidings to their respective governments. Machiavelli represented at that time the Florentine republic at the papal court, and his correspondence teems with as many floating rumors and speculations as a modern gazette. There were many French residents in the city, with whom the minister was personally acquainted. He frequently notices their opinions on the progress of the war, which they regarded with the most sanguine confidence, as sure to result in the triumph of their own arms, when once fairly brought into collision with the enemy. The calmer and more penetrating eye of the Florentine discerns symptoms in the condition of the two armies of quite a different tendency.[25]

It seemed now obvious that victory must declare for that party which could best endure the hardships and privations of its present situation. The local position of the Spaniards was far more unfavorable than that of the enemy. The Great Captain, soon after the affair of the bridge, had drawn off his forces to a rising ground about a mile from the river, which was crowned by the little hamlet of Cintura, and commanded the route

[25] Legazione prima a Roma, let. 9, 10, 18.—The French showed the same confidence from the beginning of hostilities. One of that nation having told Suarez, the Castilian minister at Venice, that the marshal de la Trémouille said, "He would give 20,000 ducats, if he could meet Gonsalvo de Cordova in the plains of Viterbo," the Spaniard smartly replied, "Nemours would have given twice as much not to have met him at Cerignola." Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 36.

to Naples. In front of his camp he sunk a deep trench, which, in the saturated soil, speedily filled with water; and he garnished it at each extremity with a strong redoubt. Thus securely intrenched, he resolved patiently to await the movements of the enemy.

The situation of the army, in the meantime, was indeed deplorable. Those who occupied the lower level were up to their knees in mud and water; for the excessive rains and the inundation of the Garigliano had converted the whole country into a mere quagmire, or rather standing pool. The only way in which the men could secure themselves was by covering the earth as far as possible with boughs and bundles of twigs; and it was altogether uncertain how long even this expedient would serve against the encroaching element. Those on the higher grounds were scarcely in better plight. The driving storms of sleet and rain, which had continued for several weeks without intermission, found their way into every crevice of the flimsy tents and crazy hovels, thatched only with branches of trees, which afforded a temporary shelter to the troops. In addition to these evils, the soldiers were badly fed, from the difficulty of finding resources in the waste and depopulated regions in which they were quartered,[26] and badly paid, from the negligence, or perhaps poverty, of King Ferdinand, whose inadequate remittances to

[26] This barren tract of uninhabited country must have been of very limited extent; for it lay in the Campania Felix, in the neighborhood of the cultivated plains of Sessa, the Massican mountain, and Falernian fields,—names which call up associations that must live while good poetry and good wine shall be held in honor.

his general exposed him, among many other embarrassments, to the imminent hazard of disaffection among the soldiery, especially the foreign mercenaries, which nothing, indeed, but the most delicate and judicious conduct on his part could have averted.[27]

In this difficult crisis, Gonsalvo de Cordova retained all his usual equanimity, and even the cheerfulness so indispensable in a leader who would infuse heart into his followers. He entered freely into the distresses and personal feelings of his men, and, instead of assuming any exemption from fatigue or suffering on the score of his rank, took his turn in the humblest tour of duty with the meanest of them, mounting guard himself, it is said, on more than one occasion. Above all, he displayed that inflexible constancy which enables the strong mind in the hour of darkness and peril to buoy up the sinking spirits around it. A remarkable instance of this fixedness of purpose occurred at this time.

The forlorn condition of the army, and the indefinite prospect of its continuance, raised a natural apprehension in many of the officers that, if it did not provoke some open act of mutiny, it would in all probability break down the spirits and constitution of the soldiers. Several of them, therefore, among the rest Mendoza and the two Colon-

[27] Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 28, cap. 5.—Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. lib. 6, p. 328.—Machiavelli, Legazione prima a Roma, let. 44.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 22.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 107, 108.—The Neapolitan conquests, it will be remembered, were undertaken exclusively for the crown of Aragon, the revenues of which were far more limited than those of Castile.

nas, waited on the commander-in-chief, and, after stating their fears without reserve, besought him to remove the camp to Capua, where the troops might find healthy and commodious quarters, at least until the severity of the season was mitigated; before which, they insisted, there was no reason to anticipate any movement on the part of the enemy. But Gonsalvo felt too deeply the importance of grappling with the French, before they should gain the open country, to be willing to trust to any such precarious contingency. Besides, he distrusted the effect of such a retrograde movement on the spirits of his own troops. He had decided on his course after the most mature deliberation; and, having patiently heard his officers to the end, replied in these few but memorable words: "It is indispensable to the public service to maintain our present position; and be assured, I would sooner march forward two steps, though it should bring me to my grave, than fall back one, to gain a hundred years." The decided tone of the reply relieved him from further importunity.[28]

There is no act of Gonsalvo's life which on the whole displays more strikingly the strength of his character. When thus witnessing his faithful followers drooping and dying around him, with the consciousness that a word could relieve them from all their distresses, he yet refrained from uttering it, in stern obedience to what he regarded as the call of duty; and this, too, on his own responsi-

[28] Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 188.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, lib. 2, cap. 108.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 16.—Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 6, p. 328.—Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 58.

bility, in opposition to the remonstrances of those on whose judgment he most relied.

Gonsalvo confided in the prudence, sobriety, and excellent constitution of the Spaniards, for resisting the bad effects of the climate. He relied, too, on their tried discipline,* and their devotion to himself, for carrying them through any sacrifice he should demand of them. His experience at Barleta led him to anticipate results of a very opposite character with the French troops. The events justified his conclusions in both respects.

The French, as already noticed, occupied higher and more healthy ground, on the other side of the Garigliano, than their rivals. They were fortunate enough also to find more effectual protection from the weather in the remains of a spacious amphitheatre, and some other edifices, which still covered the site of Minturnæ. With all this, however, they suffered more severely from the inclement season than their robust adversaries. Numbers daily sickened and died. They were much straitened, moreover, from want of provisions, through the knavish peculations of the commissaries who had charge of the magazines in Rome. Thus situated, the fiery spirits of the French soldiery, eager for prompt and decisive action, and impatient of delay, gradually sunk under the protracted miseries of a war where the elements were the principal enemy, and where they saw themselves melting away like slaves in a prison-ship, without even

* [Spanish discipline and Spanish endurance astounded the world then, as it did a little later in the days of Cortéz and Pizarro.—M.]

the chance of winning an honorable death on the field of battle.[29]

The discontent occasioned by these circumstances was further swelled by the imperfect success which had attended their efforts when allowed to measure weapons with the enemy.

At length the latent mass of disaffection found an object on which to vent itself, in the person of their commander-in-chief, the marquis of Mantua, never popular with the French soldiers. They now loudly taxed him with imbecility, accused him of a secret understanding with the enemy, and loaded him with the opprobrious epithets with which Transalpine insolence was accustomed to stigmatize the Italians. In all this they were secretly supported by Ives d'Alègre, Sandricourt, and other French officers, who had always regarded with dissatisfaction the elevation of the Italian general; till at length the latter, finding that he had influence with neither officers nor soldiers, and unwilling to retain command where he had lost authority, availed himself of a temporary illness, under which he was laboring, to throw up his commission, and withdrew abruptly to his own estates.

He was succeeded by the marquis of Saluzzo, an Italian, indeed, by birth, being a native of Piedmont, but one who had long served under the French banners, where he had been intrusted by Louis the Twelfth with very important com-

[29] Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, fol. 265.—Garnier, Hist. de France, tom. v. p. 445.—Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 59.—Buonaccorsi, Diario, fol. 85.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 22.—Varillas, Hist. de Louis XII., tom. i. pp. 401, 402.

mands. He was not deficient in energy of character or military science. But it required powers of a higher order than his to bring the army under subordination, and renew its confidence, under present circumstances. The Italians, disgusted with the treatment of their former chief, deserted in great numbers. The great body of the French chivalry, impatient of their present unhealthy position, dispersed among the adjacent cities of Fondi, Itri, and Gaeta, leaving the low country around the Tower of the Garigliano to the care of the Swiss and German infantry. Thus, while the whole Spanish army lay within a mile of the river, under the immediate eye of their commander, prepared for instant service, the French were scattered over a country more than ten miles in extent, where, without regard to military discipline, they sought to relieve the dreary monotony of a camp by all the relaxations which such comfortable quarters could afford.[30]

It must not be supposed that the repose of the two armies was never broken by the sounds of war. More than one rencontre, on the contrary, with various fortune, took place, and more than one display of personal prowess by the knights of the two nations, as formerly at the siege of Barleta. The Spaniards made two unsuccessful efforts to burn the enemy's bridge; but they succeeded, on the other hand, in carrying the strong fortress of Rocca Guglielma, garrisoned by the French.

[30] Garnier, Hist. de France, tom. v. pp. 440–443.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, fol. 264, 265.—Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. lib. 6, p. 329.—Machiavelli, Legazione prima a Roma, let. 44.—St. Gelais, Hist. de Louys XII., pp. 173, 174.

Among the feats of individual heroism, the Castilian writers expatiate most complacently on that of their favorite cavalier, Diego de Paredes, who descended alone on the bridge against a body of French knights, all armed in proof, with a desperate hardihood worthy of Don Quixote, and would most probably have shared the usual fate of that renowned personage on such occasions, had he not been rescued by a sally of his own countrymen. The French find a counterpart to this adventure in that of the preux chevalier Bayard, who with his single arm maintained the barriers of the bridge against two hundred Spaniards, for an hour or more.[31]

Such feats, indeed, are more easily achieved with the pen than with the sword. It would be injustice, however, to the honest chronicler of the day to suppose that he did not himself fully

"Believe the magic wonders that he sung."

Every heart confessed the influence of a romantic age,—the dying age, indeed, of chivalry, but when, with superior refinement, it had lost nothing of the enthusiasm and exaltation of its prime. A shadowy twilight of romance enveloped every object. Every day gave birth to such extravagances, not merely of sentiment, but of action, as made it difficult to discern the precise boundaries of fact and fiction. The chronicler might inno-

[31] Chrónica del Gran Capitan, lib. 2, cap. 106.—Mémoires de Bayard, chap. 25, apud Petitot, Collection des Mémoires, tom. xv.—Varillas, Hist. de Louis XII., tom. i. p. 417.—Quintana, Españoles célebres, tom. i. pp. 288–290.—Machiavelli, Legazione prima a Roma, let. 39, 44.

cently encroach sometimes on the province of the poet, and the poet occasionally draw the theme of his visions from the pages of the chronicler. Such, in fact, was the case; and the romantic Muse of Italy, then coming forth in her glory, did little more than give a brighter flush of color to the chimeras of real life. The characters of living heroes, a Bayard, a Paredes, and a La Palice, readily supplied her with the elements of those ideal combinations in which she has so gracefully embodied the perfections of chivalry.[32]

[32] Compare the prose romances of D'Auton, of the "loyal serviteur" of Bayard, and the no less loyal biographer of the Great Captain, with the poetic ones of Ariosto, Berni, and the like.

"Magnanima menzogna! or quando è il vero
Si bello, che si possa a te preporre?"

CHAPTER XV

ITALIAN WARS—ROUT OF THE GARIGLIANO—TREATY WITH FRANCE—GONSALVO'S MILITARY CONDUCT

1503–1504

Gonsalvo crosses the River—Consternation of the French—Action near Gaeta—Hotly contested—The French defeated—Gaeta surrenders—Public Enthusiasm—Treaty with France—Review of Gonsalvo's Military Conduct—Results of the Campaign

SEVEN weeks had now elapsed while the two armies had lain in sight of each other without any decided movement on either side. During this time the Great Captain had made repeated efforts to strengthen himself, through the intervention of the Spanish ambassador, Francisco de Rojas,[1] by reinforcements from Rome. His negotiations were chiefly directed to secure the alliance of the Orsini, a powerful family, long involved in a bitter feud with the Colonnas, then in the Spanish service. A reconciliation between these noble houses was at length happily effected; and Bartolommeo d'Alviano, the head of the Orsini, agreed to enlist under the Spanish commander with three thousand men. This arrangement was finally brought about through the good offices of

[1] He succeeded Garcilasso de la Vega at the court of Rome. Oviedo says, in reference to the illustrious house of Rojas, "En todas las historias de España no se hallan tantos caballeros de un linage y nombre notados por valerosos caballeros y valientes milites como deste nombre de Rojas." Quincuagenas, MS., bat. 1, quinc. 2, dial. 8.

the Venetian minister at Rome, who even advanced a considerable sum of money towards the payment of the new levies.[2]

The appearance of this corps, with one of the most able and valiant of the Italian captains at its head, revived the drooping spirits of the camp. Soon after his arrival, Alviano strongly urged Gonsalvo to abandon his original plan of operations, and avail himself of his augmented strength to attack the enemy in his own quarters. The Spanish commander had intended to confine himself wholly to the defensive, and, too unequal in force to meet the French in the open field, as before noticed, had intrenched himself in his present strong position, with the fixed purpose of awaiting the enemy there. Circumstances had now greatly changed. The original inequality was diminished by the arrival of the Italian levies, and still further compensated by the present disorderly state of the French army. He knew, moreover, that, in the most perilous enterprises, the assailing party gathers an enthusiasm and an impetus in its career which counterbalance large numerical odds; while the party taken by surprise is proportionably disconcerted, and prepared, as it were, for defeat before a blow is struck. From these considerations, the cautious general acquiesced in Alviano's project to cross the Garigliano, by establishing a bridge at a point opposite Suzio, a small place garrisoned by the French, on the right bank,

[2] Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 28, cap. 5.—Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 6, pp. 319, 320.—Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 48, 57.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 14, sec. 4, 5.—Daru, Hist. de Venise, tom. iii. pp. 364, 365.

about four miles above their headquarters. The time for the attack was fixed as soon as possible after the approaching Christmas, when the French, occupied with the festivities of the season, might be thrown off their guard.[3]

This day of general rejoicing to the Christian world at length arrived. It brought little joy to the Spaniards, buried in the depths of these dreary morasses, destitute of most of the necessaries of life, and with scarcely any other means of resisting the climate than those afforded by their iron constitutions and invincible courage. They celebrated the day, however, with all the devotional feeling and the imposing solemnities with which it is commemorated by the Roman Catholic church; * and the exercises of religion, rendered more impressive by their situation, served to exalt still higher the heroic constancy which had sustained them under such unparalleled sufferings.

In the meanwhile, the materials for the bridge were collected, and the work went forward with such despatch that on the 28th of December all was in readiness for carrying the plan of attack into execution. The task of laying the bridge across the river was intrusted to Alviano, who had charge of the van. The central and main division

[3] Giovio, Vītæ Īllust. Virorum, pp. 267, 268.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 22.—Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. lib. 6, pp. 329, 330.—Machiavelli, Legazione prima a Roma, let. 36.—Cæsar, at the battle of Pharsalia, acted on the principle mentioned in the text, in becoming the assailing party; and he severely censures Pompey for allowing the ardor of his troops to escape in inaction, as they coldly waited to receive his attack. De Bello Civili, lib. iii. cap. 92.

* [It was in *Puritan* New England that Prescott penned those words.—M.]

of the army under Gonsalvo was to cross at the same point; while Andrada at the head of the rear-guard was to force a passage at the old bridge, lower down the stream, opposite to the Tower of the Garigliano.[4]

The night was dark and stormy. Alviano performed the duty intrusted to him with such silence and celerity that the work was completed without attracting the enemy's notice. He then crossed over with the vanguard, consisting chiefly of cavalry, supported by Navarro, Paredes, and Pizarro, and, falling on the sleeping garrison of Suzio, cut to pieces all who offered resistance.

The report of the Spaniards having passed the river spread far and wide, and soon reached the headquarters of the marquis of Saluzzo, near the Tower of the Garigliano. The French commander-in-chief, who had believed that the Spaniards were lying on the other side of the river, as torpid as the snakes in their own marshes, was as much astounded by the event as if a thunderbolt had burst over his head from a cloudless sky. He lost no time, however, in rallying such of his scattered forces as he could assemble, and in the meanwhile despatched Ives d'Alègre with a body of horse to hold the enemy in check till he could make good his own retreat on Gaeta. His first step was to demolish the bridge near his own quarters, cutting the moorings of the boats and turning them adrift down the river. He abandoned his tents

[4] Chrónica del Gran Capitan, lib. 2, cap. 110.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 189.—Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, lib. 3, fol. 266.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 60.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 270.—Buonaccorsi, Diario, p. 84.

and baggage, together with nine of his heaviest cannon; leaving even the sick and wounded to the mercy of the enemy, rather than encumber himself with anything that should retard his march. The remainder of the artillery he sent forward in the van; the infantry followed next; and the rear, in which Saluzzo took his own station, was brought up by the men-at-arms, to cover the retreat.

Before Alègre could reach Suzio, the whole Spanish army had passed the Garigliano and formed on the right bank. Unable to face such superior numbers, he fell back with precipitation, and joined himself to the main body of the French, now in full retreat on Gaeta.[5]

Gonsalvo, afraid the French might escape him, sent forward Prospero Colonna, with a corps of light horse, to annoy and retard their march until he could come up. Keeping the right bank of the river with the main body, he marched rapidly through the deserted camp of the enemy, leaving little leisure for his men to glean the rich spoil which lay tempting them on every side. It was not long before he came up with the French, whose movements were greatly retarded by the difficulty of dragging their guns over the ground completely saturated with rain. The retreat was conducted, however, in excellent order; they were eminently favored by the narrowness of the road,

[5] Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 189.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 22, 23.—Guicciardini, Istoria, p. 330.—Garnier, Hist. de France, tom. v. pp. 448, 449.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, lib. 2, cap. 110.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 14, sec. 6.—Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 60.—Senarega, apud Muratori, Rerum Ital. Script., tom. xxiv. p. 579.

which, allowing but a comparatively small body of troops on either side to come into action, made success chiefly depend on the relative merits of these. The French rear, as already stated, was made up of their men-at-arms, including Bayard, Sandricourt, La Fayette, and others of their bravest chivalry, who, armed at all points, found no great difficulty in beating off the light troops which formed the advance of the Spaniards. At every bridge, stream, and narrow pass, which afforded a favorable position, the French cavalry closed their ranks and made a resolute stand to gain time for the columns in advance.

In this way, alternately halting and retreating, with perpetual skirmishes, though without much loss on either side, they reached the bridge before Mola di Gaeta. Here, some of the gun-carriages, breaking down or being overturned, occasioned considerable delay and confusion. The infantry, pressing on, became entangled with the artillery. The marquis of Saluzzo endeavored to avail himself of the strong position afforded by the bridge to restore order. A desperate struggle ensued. The French knights dashed boldly into the Spanish ranks, driving back for a time the tide of pursuit. The chevalier Bayard, who was seen as usual in the front of danger, had three horses killed under him, and at length, carried forward by his ardor into the thickest of the enemy, was retrieved with difficulty from their hands by a desperate charge of his friend Sandricourt.[6]

[6] Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 6, pp. 330, 331.—Garnier, Hist. de France, tom. v. pp. 449–451.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, ubi supra.

The Spaniards, shaken by the violence of the assault, seemed for a moment to hesitate; but Gonsalvo had now time to bring up his men-at-arms, who sustained the faltering columns, and renewed the combat on more equal terms. He himself was in the hottest of the mêlée, and at one time was exposed to imminent hazard by his horse's losing his footing on the slippery soil and coming with him to the ground. The general fortunately experienced no injury, and, quickly recovering himself, continued to animate his followers by his voice and intrepid bearing, as before.

The fight had now lasted two hours. The Spaniards, although still in excellent heart, were faint with fatigue and want of food, having travelled six leagues, without breaking their fast since the preceding evening. It was, therefore, with no little anxiety that Gonsalvo looked for the coming up of his rear-guard, left, as the reader will remember, under Andrada at the lower bridge, to decide the fortune of the day.

The welcome spectacle at length presented itself. The dark columns of the Spaniards were seen, at first faint in the distance, by degrees growing more and more distinct to the eye. Andrada had easily carried the French redoubt on his side of the Garigliano; but it was not without difficulty and delay that he recovered the scattered boats which the French had set adrift down the stream, and finally succeeded in re-establishing his

—Varillas, Hist. de Louis XII., tom. i. pp. 416–418.—Ammirato, Istorie Fiorentine, tom. iii. lib. 28, p. 273.—Summonte, Hist. di Napoli, tom. iii. p. 555.—Buonaccorsi, Diario, pp. 84, 85.—Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, fol. 268.

communications with the opposite bank. Having accomplished this, he rapidly advanced by a more direct road, to the east of that lately traversed by Gonsalvo along the sea-side, in pursuit of the French. The latter beheld with dismay the arrival of this fresh body of troops, who seemed to have dropped from the clouds on the field of battle. They scarcely waited for the shock before they broke, and gave way in all directions. The disabled carriages of the artillery, which clogged up the avenues in the rear, increased the confusion among the fugitives; and the foot were trampled down without mercy under the heels of their own cavalry, in the eagerness of the latter to extricate themselves from their perilous situation. The Spanish light horse followed up their advantage with the alacrity of vengeance long delayed, inflicting bloody retribution for all they had so long suffered in the marshes of Sessa.

At no great distance from the bridge the road takes two directions, the one towards Itri, the other to Gaeta. The bewildered fugitives here separated; by far the greater part keeping the latter route. Gonsalvo sent forward a body of horse under Navarro and Pedro de la Paz, by a short cut across the country, to intercept their flight. A large number fell into his hands in consequence of this manœuvre; but the greater part of those who escaped the sword succeeded in throwing themselves into Gaeta.[7]

[7] Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 190.—Garnier, Hist. de France, tom. v. pp. 452, 453.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 23.—Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 6, p. 331.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 16.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, ubi supra.—Buonac-

The Great Captain took up his quarters that night in the neighboring village of Castellone. His brave followers had great need of refreshment, having fasted and fought through the whole day, and that under a driving storm of rain which had not ceased for a moment. Thus terminated the battle—or rout, as it is commonly called—of the Garigliano, the most important in its results of all Gonsalvo's victories, and furnishing a suitable close to his brilliant military career.[8] The loss of the French is computed at from three to four thousand men, left dead on the field, together with all their baggage, colors, and splendid train of artillery. The Spaniards must have suffered severely during the sharp conflict on the bridge; but no estimate of their loss is to be met with, in any native or foreign writer.[9] It was observed

corsi, Diario, pp. 84, 85.—Ammirato, Istorie Fiorentine, ubi supra. —Varillas, Hist. de Louis XII., tom. i. pp. 416–418.

[8] Soon after the rout of the Garigliano, Bembo produced the following sonnet, which most critics agree was intended, although no name appears in it, for Gonsalvo de Cordova:

"Ben devria farvi onor d' eterno esempio
Napoli vostra, e 'n mezzo al suo bel monte
Scolpirvi in lieta e coronata fronte,
Gir trionfando, e dar i voti al tempio:
Poi che l' avete all' orgoglioso ed empio
Stuolo ritolta, e pareggiate l' onte;
Or ch' avea più la voglia e le man pronte
A far d' Italia tutta acerbo scempio.
Torcestel voi, Signor, dal corso ardito,
E foste tal, ch' ancora esser vorebbe
A por di qua dall' Alpe nostra il piede.
L' onda Tirrena del suo sangue crebbe,
E di tronchi resto coperto il lito,
E gli augelli ne fer secure prede."
Opere, tom. ii. p. 57.

[9] The Curate of Los Palacios sums up the loss of the French, from the time of Gonsalvo's occupation of Barleta to the surrender of Gaeta, in the following manner: 6000 prisoners, 14,000 killed in battle, a still greater number by exposure and fatigue, besides a con-

that the 29th of December, on which this battle was won, came on Friday, the same ominous day of the week which had so often proved auspicious to the Spaniards under the present reign.[10]

The disparity of the forces actually engaged was probably not great, since the extent of country over which the French were quartered prevented many of them from coming up in time for action. Several corps, who succeeded in reaching the field at the close of the fight, were seized with such a panic as to throw down their arms without attempting resistance.[11] The admirable artillery, on which the French placed their chief reliance, was not only of no service, but of infinite mischief to them, as we have seen. The brunt of the battle fell on their chivalry, which bore itself throughout the day with a spirit and gallantry worthy of its ancient renown; never flinching, till the arrival of the Spanish rear-guard fresh in the field, at so critical a juncture, turned the scale in their adversaries' favor.

Early on the following morning, Gonsalvo made preparations for storming the heights of Mount Orlando, which overlooked the city of Gaeta. Such was the despondency of its garrison, how-

siderable body cut off by the peasantry. To balance this bloody roll, he computes the Spanish loss at two hundred slain in the field! Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 191.

[10] Chrónica del Gran Capitan, lib. 2, cap. 110.—Zurita, Anales, ubi supra.—Garibay, Compendio, lib. 19, cap. 16.—Quintana, Españoles célebres, tom. i. pp. 296, 297.—Guicciardini, who has been followed in this by the French writers, fixes the date of the rout as the 28th of December. If, however, it occurred on Friday, as he, and every authority, indeed, asserts, it must have been on the 29th, as stated by the Spanish historians. Istoria, lib. 6, p. 330.

[11] Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, fol. 268.

ever, that this strong position, which bade defiance a few months before to the most desperate efforts of Spanish valor, was now surrendered without a struggle. The same feeling of despondency had communicated itself to the garrison of Gaeta; and, before Navarro could bring the batteries of Mount Orlando to bear upon the city, a flag of truce arrived from the marquis of Saluzzo with proposals for capitulation.

This was more than the Great Captain could have ventured to promise himself. The French were in great force; the fortifications of the place in excellent repair; it was well provided with artillery and ammunition, and with provisions for ten days at least; while their fleet, riding in the harbor, afforded the means of obtaining supplies from Leghorn, Genoa, and other friendly ports. But the French had lost all heart; they were sorely wasted by disease; their buoyant self-confidence was gone, and their spirits were broken by the series of reverses which had followed without interruption from the first hour of the campaign to the last disastrous affair of the Garigliano. The very elements seemed to have leagued against them. Further efforts they deemed a fruitless struggle against destiny; and they now looked with melancholy longing to their native land, eager only to quit these ill-omened shores forever.

The Great Captain made no difficulty in granting such terms as, while they had a show of liberality, secured him the most important fruits of victory. This suited his cautious temper far better than pressing a desperate foe to extremity. He

was, moreover, with all his successes, in no condition to do so; he was without funds, and, as usual, deeply in arrears to his army; while there was scarcely a ration of bread, says an Italian historian, in the whole camp.[12]

It was agreed by the terms of capitulation, January 1, 1504, that the French should evacuate Gaeta at once, and deliver it up to the Spaniards, with its artillery, munitions, and military stores of every description. The prisoners on both sides, including those taken in the preceding campaign, —an arrangement greatly to the advantage of the enemy,—were to be restored; and the army in Gaeta was to be allowed a free passage by land or sea, as they should prefer, to their own country.[13]

[12] Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, fol. 268, 269.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, lib. 2, cap. 111.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 270.—Guicciardini, Istoria,. lib. 6, p. 331.—Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 61.—Garnier, Hist. de France, tom. v. pp. 454, 455.—Sismondi, Hist. des Français, tom. xv. cap. 29.

[13] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 61.—Garnier, Hist. de France, tom. v. pp. 454, 455.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 190.—Giannone, Istoria di Napoli, lib. 29, cap. 4.—No particular mention was made of the Italian allies in the capitulation. It so happened that several of the great Angevin lords, who had been taken in the preceding campaigns of Calabria, were found in arms in the place. (Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, fol. 252, 253, 269.) Gonsalvo, in consequence of this manifest breach of faith, refusing to regard them as comprehended in the treaty, sent them all prisoners of state to the dungeons of Castel Nuovo in Naples. This action has brought on him much unmerited obloquy with the French writers. Indeed, before the treaty was signed, if we are to credit the Italian historians, Gonsalvo peremptorily refused to include the Neapolitan lords within it. Thus much is certain, that, after having been taken and released, they were now found under the French banners a second time. It seems not improbable, therefore, that the French, however naturally desirous they may have been of protection for their allies, finding themselves unable to enforce it, acquiesced in such an equivocal silence with respect to them as, without apparently compromising their own honor, left the

From the moment hostilities were brought to a close, Gonsalvo displayed such generous sympathy for his late enemies, and such humanity in relieving them, as to reflect more honor on his character than all his victories. He scrupulously enforced the faithful performance of the treaty, and severely punished any violence offered to the French by his own men. His benign and courteous demeanor towards the vanquished, so remote from the images of terror with which he had been hitherto associated in their minds, excited unqualified admiration; and they testified their sense of his amiable qualities by speaking of him as the "gentil capitaine et gentil cavalier." [14]

The news of the rout of the Garigliano and the surrender of Gaeta diffused general gloom and consternation over France. There was scarcely a family of rank, says a writer of that country, that had not some one of its members involved in these sad disasters.[15] The court went into mourning.

whole affair to the discretion of the Great Captain. With regard to the sweeping charge made by certain modern French historians against the Spanish general, of a similar severity to the other Italians indiscriminately, found in the place, there is not the slightest foundation for it in any contemporary authority. See Gaillard, Rivalité, tom. iv. p. 254.—Garnier, Hist. de France, tom. v. p. 456. —Varillas, Hist. de Louis XII., tom. i. pp. 419, 420.

[14] Fleurange, Mémoires, chap. 5, apud Petitot, Collection des Mémoires, tom. xvi.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 190.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, fol. 269, 270.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 111.

[15] Brantôme, who visited the banks of the Garigliano some fifty years after this, beheld them in imagination thronged with the shades of the illustrious dead whose bones lay buried in its dreary and pestilent marshes. There is a sombre coloring in the vision of the old chronicler, not unpoetical. Vies des Hommes illustres, disc. 6.

The king, mortified at the discomfiture of all his lofty schemes by the foe whom he despised, shut himself up in his palace, refusing access to every one, until the agitation of his spirits threw him into an illness which had wellnigh proved fatal.

Meanwhile his exasperated feelings found an object on which to vent themselves in the unfortunate garrison of Gaeta, who so pusillanimously abandoned their post to return to their own country. He commanded them to winter in Italy, and not to recross the Alps without further orders. He sentenced Sandricourt and Alègre to banishment for insubordination to their commander-in-chief,—the latter for his conduct, more particularly, before the battle of Cerignola; and he hanged the commissaries of the army, whose infamous peculations had been a principal cause of its ruin.[16]

But the impotent wrath of their monarch was not needed to fill the bitter cup which the French soldiers were now draining to the dregs. A large number of those who embarked for Genoa died of the maladies contracted during their long bivouac in the marshes of Minturnæ. The rest recrossed the Alps into France, too desperate to heed their master's prohibition. Those who took their way by land suffered still more severely from the Italian peasantry, who retaliated in full measure the barbarities they had so long endured from the French. They were seen wandering like spectres along the high-roads and principal cities on the

[16] Garnier, Hist. de France, tom. v. pp. 456–458.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, fol. 269–270.—Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. lib. 6, pp. 332, 337.—St. Gelais, Hist. de Louys XII., p. 173.

route, pining with cold and famine; and all the hospitals in Rome, as well as the stables, sheds, and every other place, however mean, affording shelter, were filled with the wretched vagabonds, eager only to find some obscure retreat to die in.

The chiefs of the expedition fared little better. Among others, the marquis of Saluzzo, soon after reaching Genoa, was carried off by a fever caused by his distress of mind. Sandricourt, too haughty to endure disgrace, laid violent hands on himself. Alègre, more culpable, but more courageous, survived to be reconciled with his sovereign, and to die a soldier's death on the field of battle.[17]

Such are the dismal colors in which the French historians depict the last struggle made by their monarch for the recovery of Naples. Few military expeditions have commenced under more brilliant and imposing auspices; few have been conducted in so ill-advised a manner through their whole progress; and none attended in their close with more indiscriminate and overwhelming ruin.

On the 3d of January, 1504, Gonsalvo made his entry into Gaeta; and the thunders of his ordnance, now for the first time heard from its battlements, announced that this strong key to the dominions of Naples had passed into the hands of Aragon. After a short delay for the refreshment of his troops, he set out for the capital. But, amidst the general jubilee which greeted his return, he was seized with a fever, brought on by the

[17] Buonaccorsi, Diario, p. 86.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 23.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 190.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, ubi supra.—Gaillard, Rivalité, tom. iv. pp. 254–256.

incessant fatigue and high mental excitement in which he had been kept for the last four months. The attack was severe, and the event for some time doubtful. During this state of suspense the public mind was in the deepest agitation. The popular manners of Gonsalvo had won the hearts of the giddy people of Naples, who transferred their affections, indeed, as readily as their allegiance; and prayers and vows for his restoration were offered up in all the churches and monasteries of the city. His excellent constitution at length got the better of his disease. As soon as this favorable result was ascertained, the whole population, rushing to the other extreme, abandoned itself to a delirium of joy; and, when he was sufficiently recovered to give them audience, men of all ranks thronged to Castel Nuovo to tender their congratulations, and obtain a sight of the hero who now returned to their capital, for the third time, with the laurel of victory on his brow. Every tongue, says his enthusiastic biographer, was eloquent in his praise: some dwelling on his noble port and the beauty of his countenance; others on the elegance and amenity of his manners; and all dazzled by a spirit of munificence which would have become royalty itself.[18]

The tide of panegyric was swelled by more than one bard, who sought, though with indifferent success, to catch inspiration from so glorious a theme; trusting doubtless that his liberal hand would not

[18] Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, fol. 270–271.—Quintana, Españoles célebres, tom. i. p. 298.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, lib. 3, cap. 1.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. fol. 359.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 190, 191.

stint the recompense to the precise measure of desert. Amid this general burst of adulation, the Muse of Sannazaro, worth all his tribe, was alone silent; for the trophies of the conqueror were raised on the ruins of that royal house under which the bard had been so long sheltered; and this silence, so rare in his tuneful brethren, must be admitted to reflect more credit on his name than the best he ever sung.[19]

The first business of Gonsalvo was to call together the different orders of the state and receive their oaths of allegiance to King Ferdinand. He next occupied himself with the necessary arrangements for the reorganization of the government, and for reforming various abuses which had crept into the administration of justice, more particularly. In these attempts to introduce order he was not a little thwarted, however, by the insubordination of his own soldiery. They loudly clamored for the discharge of the arrears, still shamefully protracted, till, their discontent swelling to open mutiny, they forcibly seized on two of the principal places in the kingdom as security for the payment. Gonsalvo chastised their insolence by disbanding several of the most refractory companies and sending them home for punishment. He endeavored to relieve them in part by raising contributions from the Neapolitans. But the soldiers took the matter into their own hands, oppressing the unfortunate people on whom they were quartered in a manner which rendered their condition scarcely more tolerable than when exposed to the

[19] Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, fol. 271.

horrors of actual war.[20] This was the introduction, according to Guicciardini, of those systematic military exactions in time of peace which became so common afterwards in Italy, adding an inconceivable amount to the long catalogue of woes which afflicted that unhappy land.[21]

Amidst his manifold duties, Gonsalvo did not forget the gallant officers who had borne with him the burdens of the war; and he requited their services in a princely style, better suited to his feelings than his interests, as subsequently appeared. Among them was Navarro, Mendoza, Andrada, Benavides, Leyva, the Italians Alviano and the two Colonnas, most of whom lived to display the lessons of tactics which they learned under this great commander, on a still wider theatre of glory, in the reign of Charles the Fifth. He made them grants of cities, fortresses, and extensive lands, according to their various claims, to be held as fiefs of the crown. All this was done with the previous sanction of his royal master, Ferdinand the Catholic. They did some violence, however, to his more economical spirit, and he was heard somewhat peevishly to exclaim, "It boots little for Gonsalvo de Cordova to have won a kingdom for me, if he

20 "Per servir sempre, vincitrice o vinta."

The Italians began at this early period to feel the pressure of those woes, which a century and a half later wrung from Filicaja the beautiful lament, which has lost something of its touching graces even under the hand of Lord Byron.

21 Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 64.—Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 6, pp. 340, 341.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, ubi supra.—See also Gonsalvo's letter to the sovereigns, in which he states that all Italy this year was wasted by a terrible famine, brought on by the neglect of husbandry, as well as by the unprecedented rains. Carta de Napoles, 25 de Agosto, 1503, MS.

lavishes it all away before it comes into my hands." It began to be perceived at court that the Great Captain was too powerful for a subject.[22]

Meanwhile, Louis the Twelfth was filled with serious apprehensions for the fate of his possessions in the north of Italy. His former allies, the emperor Maximilian and the republic of Venice, the latter more especially, had shown many indications not merely of coldness to himself, but of a secret understanding with his rival, the Spanish king. The restless pope, Julius the Second, had schemes of his own, wholly independent of France. The republics of Pisa and Genoa, the latter one of her avowed dependencies, had entered into correspondence with the Great Captain and invited him to assume their protection; while several of the disaffected party in Milan had assured him of their active support in case he would march with a sufficient force to overturn the existing government. Indeed, not only France, but Europe in general, expected that the Spanish commander would avail himself of the present crisis to push his victorious arms into upper Italy, revolutionize Tuscany in his way, and, wresting Milan from the French, drive them, crippled and disheartened by their late reverses, beyond the Alps.[23]

But Gonsalvo had occupation enough on his hands in settling the disordered state of Naples. King Ferdinand, his sovereign, notwithstanding

[22] Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, fol. 270, 271.—Chrónica del Gran Capitan, lib. 3, cap. 1.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 24.

[23] Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 6, p. 338.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 64.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, rey 30, cap. 14.—Buonaccorsi, Diario, pp. 85, 86.

the ambition of universal conquest absurdly imputed to him by the French writers, had no design to extend his acquisitions beyond what he could permanently maintain. His treasury, never overflowing, was too deeply drained by the late heavy demands on it for him so soon to embark on another perilous enterprise, that must rouse anew the swarms of enemies who seemed willing to rest in quiet after their long and exhausting struggle; nor is there any reason to suppose he sincerely contemplated such a movement for a moment.[24]

The apprehension of it, however, answered Ferdinand's purpose, by preparing the French monarch to arrange his differences with his rival, as the latter now earnestly desired, by negotiation. Indeed, two Spanish ministers had resided during the greater part of the war at the French court, with the view of improving the first opening that should occur for accomplishing this object; and by their agency a treaty was concluded, to continue for three years, which guaranteed to Aragon the undisturbed possession of her conquests during that period. The chief articles provided for the immediate cessation of hostilities between the belligerents, and the complete re-establishment of their commercial relations and intercourse, with the exception of Naples, from which the French were to be excluded. The Spanish crown was to

[24] Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 66.—The campaign against Louis XII. had cost the Spanish crown 331 *cuentos* or millions of maravedis, equivalent to 9,268,000 dollars of the present time. A moderate charge enough for the conquest of a kingdom; and made still lighter to the Spaniards by one-fifth of the whole being drawn from Naples itself. See Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. fol. 359.

have full power to reduce all refractory places in that kingdom; and the contracting parties solemnly pledged themselves, each to render no assistance, secretly or openly, to the enemies of the other. The treaty, which was to run from the 25th of February, 1504, was signed by the French king and the Spanish plenipotentiaries at Lyons, on the 11th of that month, and ratified by Ferdinand and Isabella, at the convent of Santa Maria de la Mejorada, the 31st of March following.[25]

There was still a small spot in the heart of Naples, comprehending Venosa and several adjoining towns, where Louis d'Ars and his brave associates yet held out against the Spanish arms. Although cut off by the operation of this treaty from the hope of further support from home, the French knight disdained to surrender, but sallied out at the head of his little troop of gallant veterans, and thus, armed at all points, says Brantôme, with lance in rest, took his way through Naples and the centre of Italy. He marched in battle-array, levying contributions for his support on the places through which he passed. In this manner he entered France, and presented himself before the court at Blois. The king and queen, delighted with his prowess, came forward to welcome him, and made good cheer, says the old chronicler, for himself and his companions, whom they recompensed with liberal largesses, proffering at the same time any boon to the brave knight

[25] The treaty is to be found in Dumont, Corps diplomatique, tom. iv. no. 26, pp. 51–53.—Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 64.—Machiavelli, Legazione seconda a Francia, let. 9, Feb. 11.

which he should demand for himself. The latter in return simply requested that his old comrade Ives d'Alègre should be recalled from exile. This trait of magnanimity, when contrasted with the general ferocity of the times, has something in it inexpressibly pleasing. It shows, like others recorded of the French gentlemen of that period, that the age of chivalry—the chivalry of romance, indeed—had not wholly passed away.[26]

The pacification of Lyons sealed the fate of Naples, and, while it terminated the wars in that kingdom, closed the military career of Gonsalvo de Cordova. It is impossible to contemplate the magnitude of the results achieved with such slender resources, and in the face of such overwhelming odds, without deep admiration for the genius of the man by whom they were accomplished.

His success, it is true, is imputable in part to the signal errors of his adversaries. The magnificent expedition of Charles the Eighth failed to produce any permanent impression, chiefly in consequence of the precipitation with which it had been entered into, without sufficient concert with the Italian states, who became a formidable enemy when united in his rear. He did not even avail himself of his temporary acquisition of Naples to gather support from the attachment of his new subjects. Far from incorporating with them, he

[26] Brantôme, Œuvres, tom. ii. disc. 11.—Fleurange, Mémoires, chap. 5, apud Petitot, Collection des Mémoires, tom. xvi.—Buonaccorsi, Diario, p. 85.—Gaillard, Rivalité, tom. iv. pp. 255–260.—See also Mémoires de Bayard, chap. 25; the good knight "sans peur et sans reproche" made one of this intrepid little band, having joined Louis d'Ars after the capitulation of Gaeta.

was regarded as a foreigner and an enemy, and, as such, expelled by the joint action of all Italy from its bosom, as soon as it had recovered sufficient strength to rally.

Louis the Twelfth profited by the errors of his predecessor. His acquisitions in the Milanese formed a basis for future operations; and by negotiation and otherwise he secured the alliance and the interests of the various Italian governments on his side. These preliminary arrangements were followed by preparations every way commensurate with his object. He failed in the first campaign, however, by intrusting the command to incompetent hands, consulting birth rather than talent or experience.

In the succeeding campaigns, his failure, though partly chargeable on himself, was less so than on circumstances beyond his control. The first of these was the long detention of the army before Rome by Cardinal D'Amboise, and its consequent exposure to the unexampled severity of the ensuing winter; a second was the fraudulent conduct of the commissaries, implying, no doubt, some degree of negligence in the person who appointed them; and lastly, the want of a suitable commander-in-chief of the army. La Trémouille being ill, and D'Aubigny a prisoner in the hands of the enemy, there appeared no one among the French qualified to cope with the Spanish general. The marquis of Mantua, independently of the disadvantage of being a foreigner, was too timid in council and dilatory in conduct to be any way competent to this difficult task.

If his enemies, however, committed great errors, it is altogether owing to Gonsalvo that he was in a situation to take advantage of them. Nothing could be more unpromising than his position on first entering Calabria. Military operations had been conducted in Spain on principles totally different from those which prevailed in the rest of Europe. This was the case especially in the late Moorish wars, where the old tactics and the character of the ground brought light cavalry chiefly into use. This, indeed, constituted his principal strength at this period; for his infantry, though accustomed to irregular service, was indifferently armed and disciplined. An important revolution, however, had occurred in the other parts of Europe. The infantry had there regained the superiority which it maintained in the days of the Greeks and Romans. The experiment had been made on more than one bloody field; and it was found that the solid columns of Swiss and German pikes not only bore down all opposition in their onward march, but presented an impregnable barrier, not to be shaken by the most desperate charges of the best heavy-armed cavalry. It was against these dreaded battalions that Gonsalvo was now called to measure for the first time the bold but rudely-armed and comparatively raw recruits from Galicia and Asturias.

He lost his first battle, into which, it should be remembered, he was precipitated against his will. He proceeded afterwards with the greatest caution, gradually familiarizing his men with the

aspect and usages of the enemy whom they held in such awe, before bringing them again to a direct encounter. He put himself to school during this whole campaign, carefully acquainting himself with the tactics, discipline, and novel arms of his adversaries, and borrowing just so much as he could incorporate into the ancient system of the Spaniards without discarding the latter altogether. Thus, while he retained the short sword and buckler of his countrymen, he fortified his battalions with a large number of spearmen, after the German fashion. The arrangement is highly commended by the sagacious Machiavelli, who considers it as combining the advantages of both systems; since, while the long spear served all the purposes of resistance, or even of attack on level ground, the short swords and targets enabled their wearers, as already noticed, to cut in under the dense array of hostile pikes and bring the enemy to close quarters, where his formidable weapon was of no avail.[27]

While Gonsalvo made this innovation in the arms and tactics, he paid equal attention to the formation of a suitable character to his soldiery. The circumstances in which he was placed at

[27] Machiavelli, Arte della Guerra, lib. 2.—Machiavelli considers the victory over D'Aubigny at Seminara as imputable in a great degree to the peculiar arms of the Spaniards, who, with their short swords and shields, gliding in among the deep ranks of the Swiss spearmen, brought them to close combat, where the former had the whole advantage. Another instance of the kind occurred at the memorable battle of Ravenna some years later. Ubi supra.*

* [Until the invention of gunpowder it was the nation that surpassed its opponents in hand-to-hand contests which conquered in the long run.—M.]

Barleta, and on the Garigliano, imperatively demanded this. Without food, clothes, or pay, without the chance even of retrieving his desperate condition by venturing a blow at the enemy, the Spanish soldier was required to remain passive. To do this demanded patience, abstinence, strict subordination, and a degree of resolution far higher than that required to combat obstacles, however formidable in themselves, where active exertion, which tasks the utmost energies of the soldier, renews his spirits and raises them to a contempt of danger. It was calling on him, in short, to begin with achieving that most difficult of all victories, the victory over himself.

All this the Spanish commander effected. He infused into his men a portion of his own invincible energy. He inspired a love of his person, which led them to emulate his example, and a confidence in his genius and resources, which supported them under all their privations by a firm reliance on a fortunate issue. His manners were distinguished by a graceful courtesy, less encumbered with etiquette than was usual with persons of his high rank in Castile. He knew well the proud and independent feelings of the Spanish soldier, and, far from annoying him by unnecessary restraints, showed the most liberal indulgence at all times. But his kindness was tempered with severity, which displayed itself, on such occasions as required interposition, in a manner that rarely failed to repress everything like insubordination. The reader will readily recall an example of this in the mutiny before Tarento; and it was doubtless

by the assertion of similar power that he was so long able to keep in check his German mercenaries, distinguished above the troops of every other nation by their habitual license and contempt of authority.

While Gonsalvo relied so freely on the hardy constitution and patient habits of the Spaniards, he trusted no less to the deficiency of these qualities in the French, who, possessing little of the artificial character formed under the stern training of later times, resembled their Gaulish ancestors in the facility with which they were discouraged by unexpected obstacles, and the difficulty with which they could be brought to rally.[28] In this he did not miscalculate. The French infantry, drawn from the militia of the country, hastily collected and soon to be disbanded, and the independent nobility and gentry who composed the cavalry service, were alike difficult to be brought within the strict curb of military rule. The severe trials, which steeled the souls and gave sinewy strength to the constitutions of the Spanish soldiers, impaired those of their enemies, introduced divisions into their councils, and relaxed the whole tone of discipline. Gonsalvo watched the operation of all this, and, coolly awaiting the moment when his weary and disheartened adversary should be thrown off his guard, collected all his strength for a decisive blow, by which to terminate the action. Such was the history of those memorable cam-

[28] "Prima," says Livy pithily, speaking of the Gauls in the time of the Republic, "eorum prœlia plus quam virorum, postrema minus quam fœminarum." Lib. 10, cap. 28.

paigns which closed with the brilliant victories of Cerignola and the Garigliano.

In a review of his military conduct, we must not overlook his politic deportment towards the Italians, altogether the reverse of the careless and insolent bearing of the French. He availed himself liberally of their superior science, showing great deference and confiding the most important trusts to their officers.[29] Far from the reserve usually shown to foreigners, he appeared insensible to national distinctions, and ardently embraced them as companions-in-arms, embarked in a common cause with himself. In their tourney with the French before Barleta, to which the whole nation attached such importance as a vindication of national honor, they were entirely supported by Gonsalvo, who furnished them with arms, secured a fair field of fight, and shared the triumph of the victors as that of his own countrymen,—paying those delicate attentions which cost far less, indeed, but to an honorable mind are of greater value, than more substantial benefits. He conciliated the good will of the Italian states by various important services: of the Venetians, by his gallant defence of their possessions in the Levant; of the people of Rome, by delivering them from the pirates of Ostia; while he succeeded, notwithstanding the excesses of his soldiery, in captivating the giddy Neapolitans to such a degree, by his

[29] Two of the most distinguished of these were the Colonnas, Prospero and Fabrizio, of whom frequent mention has been made in our narrative. The best commentary on the military reputation of the latter is the fact that he is selected by Machiavelli as the principal interlocutor in his Dialogues on the Art of War.

affable manners and splendid style of life, as seemed to efface from their minds every recollection of the last and most popular of their monarchs, the unfortunate Frederick.

The distance of Gonsalvo's theatre of operations from his own country, apparently most discouraging, proved extremely favorable to his purposes. The troops, cut off from retreat by a wide sea and an impassable mountain barrier, had no alternative but to conquer or to die. Their long continuance in the field without disbanding gave them all the stern, inflexible qualities of a standing army; and, as they served through so many successive campaigns under the banner of the same leader, they were drilled in a system of tactics far steadier and more uniform than could be acquired under a variety of commanders, however able. Under these circumstances, which so well fitted them for receiving impressions, the Spanish army was gradually moulded into the form determined by the will of its great chief.

When we look at the amount of forces at the disposal of Gonsalvo, it appears so paltry, especially compared with the gigantic apparatus of later wars, that it may well suggest disparaging ideas of the whole contest. To judge correctly, we must direct our eyes to the result. With this insignificant force, we shall then see the kingdom of Naples conquered, and the best generals and armies of France annihilated; an important innovation effected in military science; the art of mining, if not invented, carried to unprecedented perfection; a thorough reform introduced in the

arms and discipline of the Spanish soldier; and the organization completed of that valiant infantry which is honestly eulogized by a French writer as irresistible in attack and impossible to rout,[30] and which carried the banners of Spain victorious, for more than a century, over the most distant parts of Europe.

The brilliant qualities and achievements of Gonzalo de Cordova have naturally made him a popular theme both for history and romance. Various biographies of him have appeared in different European languages, though none, I believe, hitherto in English. The authority of principal reference in these pages is the Life which Paolo Giovio has incorporated in his great work, "Vitæ Illustrium Virorum," which I have elsewhere noticed. This life of Gonsalvo is not exempt from the prejudices, nor from the minor inaccuracies, which may be charged on most of the author's productions; but these are abundantly compensated by the stores of novel and interesting details which Giovio's familiarity with the principal actors of the time enabled him to throw into his work, and by the skilful arrangement of his narrative, so disposed as, without studied effort, to bring into light the prominent qualities of his hero. Every page bears the marks of that "golden pen" which the politic Italian reserved for his favorites; and, while this obvious partiality may put the reader somewhat on his guard, it gives an interest to the work, inferior to none other of his agreeable compositions.

The most imposing of the Spanish memoirs of Gonsalvo, in bulk at least, is the "Chrónica del Gran Capitan," Alcalá de Henares, 1584. Nic. Antonio doubts whether the author were the Pulgar who wrote the "History of the Catholic Kings," of such frequent reference in the Granadine wars, or another Pulgar, de Salar, as he is called, who received the honors of knighthood from King Ferdinand for his valorous exploits against the Moors. (See Bibliotheca Nova, tom. i. p. 387.) With regard to the first Pulgar, there is no reason to suppose that he lived into the sixteenth century; and as to the second, the work composed by him, so far from being the one in question, was a compendium, bearing the title of "Sumario de los Hechos del Gran Capitan," printed as early as 1527, at Seville. (See the editor's prologue to Pulgar's "Chrónica de los Reyes

[30] See Dubos, Ligue de Cambray, dissert. prélim., p. 60.—This French writer has shown himself superior to national distinctions, in the liberal testimony which he bears to the character of these brave troops. See a similar strain of panegyric from the chivalrous pen of old Brantôme, Œuvres, tom. i. disc. 27.

Católicos," ed. Valencia, 1780.) Its author, therefore, remains in obscurity. He sustains no great damage on the score of reputation, however, from this circumstance; as his work is but an indifferent specimen of the rich old Spanish chronicle, exhibiting most of its characteristic blemishes, with a very small admixture of its beauties. The long and prosy narrative is overloaded with the most frivolous details, trumpeted forth in a strain of glorification, which sometimes disfigures more meritorious compositions in the Castilian. Nothing like discrimination of character, of course, is to be looked for in the unvarying swell of panegyric, which claims for its subject all the extravagant flights of a hero of romance. With these deductions, however, and a liberal allowance, consequently, for the nationality of the work, it has considerable value as a record of events too recent in their occurrence to be seriously defaced by those deeper stains of error which are so apt to settle on the weather-beaten monuments of antiquity. It has accordingly formed a principal source of the "Vida del Gran Capitan," introduced by Quintana in the first volume of his "Españoles célebres," printed at Madrid in 1807. This memoir, in which the incidents are selected with discernment, displays the usual freedom and vivacity of its poetic author. It does not bring the general politics of the period under review, but will not be found deficient in particulars having immediate connection with the personal history of its subject; and, on the whole, exhibits in an agreeable and compendious form whatever is of most interest or importance for the general reader.

The French have also an "Histoire de Gonsalve de Cordoue," composed by Father Duponcet, a Jesuit, in two vols. 12mo, Paris, 1714. Though an ambitious, it is a bungling performance, most unskilfully put together, and contains quite as much of what its hero did not do as of what he did. The prolixity of the narrative is not even relieved by that piquancy of style which forms something like a substitute for thought in many of the lower order of French historians. It is less to history, however, than to romance that the French public is indebted for its conceptions of the character of Gonsalvo de Cordova, as depicted by the gaudy pencil of Florian, in that highly poetic coloring which is more attractive to the majority of readers than the cold and sober delineations of truth.

The contemporary French accounts of the Neapolitan wars of Louis XII. are extremely meagre, and few in number. The most striking, on the whole, is D'Auton's chronicle, composed in the true chivalrous vein of old Froissart, but, unfortunately, terminating before the close of the first campaign. St. Gelais and Claude Seyssel touch very lightly on this part of their subject. History becomes in their hands, moreover, little better than fulsome panegyric, carried to such a height, indeed, by the latter writer, as brought on him the most severe strictures from his contemporaries; so that he was compelled to take up the pen more than once in his own vindication.

The memoirs of Bayard, Fleurange, and La Trémouille, so diffuse in most military details, are nearly silent in regard to those of the Neapolitan war. The truth is, the subject was too ungrateful in itself, and presented too unbroken a series of calamities and defeats, to invite the attention of the French historians, who willingly turned to the brilliant passages in this reign more soothing to national vanity.

The blank has been filled up, or rather attempted to be so, by the assiduity of their later writers. Among those occasionally consulted by me are Varillas, whose "Historie de Louis XII., loose as it is, rests on a somewhat more solid basis than his metaphysical reveries, assuming the title of "Politique de Ferdinand," already repeatedly noticed; Garnier, whose perspicuous narrative, if inferior to that of Gaillard in acuteness and epigrammatic point, makes a much nearer approach to truth; and, lastly, Sismondi, who, if he may be charged, in his "Histoire des Français," with some of the defects incident to indiscreet rapidity of composition, succeeds by a few brief and animated touches in opening deeper views into character and conduct than can be got from volumes of ordinary writers.

The want of authentic materials for a perfect acquaintance with the reign of Louis XII. is a subject of complaint with French writers themselves. The memoirs of the period, occupied with the more dazzling military transactions, make no attempt to instruct us in the interior organization or policy of the government. One might imagine that their authors lived a century before Philippe de Comines, instead of coming after him, so inferior are they, in all the great properties of historic composition, to this eminent statesman. The French *savans* have made slender contributions to the stock of original documents collected more than two centuries ago by Godefroy for the illustration of this reign. It can scarcely be supposed, however, that the labors of this early antiquary exhausted the department in which the French are rich beyond all others, and that those who work the same mine hereafter should not find valuable materials for a broader foundation of this interesting portion of their history.

It is fortunate that the reserve of the French in regard to their relations with Italy at this time has been abundantly compensated by the labors of the most eminent contemporary writers of the latter country, as Bembo, Machiavelli, Giovio, and the philosophic Guicciardini; whose situation as Italians enabled them to maintain the balance of historic truth undisturbed, at least by undue partiality for either of the two great rival powers; whose high public stations introduced them to the principal characters of the day, and to springs of action hidden from vulgar eyes; and whose superior science, as well as genius, qualified them for rising above the humble level of garrulous chronicle and memoir to the classic dignity

of history. It is with regret that we must now strike into a track unillumined by the labors of those great masters of their art in modern times.

Since the publication of this History, the Spanish Minister at Washington, Don Angel Calderon de la Barca, did me the favor to send me a copy of the biography above noticed as the "Summario de los Hechos del Gran Capitan." It is a recent reprint from the edition of 1527, of which the industrious editor, Don F. Martinez de la Rosa, was able to find but one copy in Spain. In its new form it covers about a hundred duodecimo pages. It has positive value, as a contemporary document, and as such I gladly avail myself of it. But the greater part is devoted to the early history of Gonsalvo, over which my limits have compelled me to pass lightly; and, for the rest, I am happy to find, on the perusal of it, nothing of moment which conflicts with the statements drawn from other sources. The able editor has also combined an interesting notice of its author, Pulgar, *El de las Hazañas,* one of those heroes whose doughty feats shed the illusions of knight-errantry over the war of Granada.

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